

THE ENVIRONMENT OF INSURGENCY

9 November 1962

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NOTICE

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Publication No. L63-69

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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MR. PALMER: General Stoughton, Students: Today we start our first lecture on the subject of insurgency. You will recall that in September Dr. Sanders gave us a talk entitled "The Introduction to Counterinsurgency."

We are fortunate to have as our speaker today a person who is eminently qualified to discuss this subject, both as a scholar and as a person who has lived for some years in southeast Asia, which is one of the areas in which we are most concerned in the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Also, our speaker is now the head of a section, a course, which is being conducted on this subject at the Foreign Service Institute.

It is my pleasure to introduce to the class Dr. Kenneth P. Landon.

Dr. Landon.

DR. LANDON: Gentlemen: The topic today is "The Environment of Insurgency." Personally, I am in favor of insurgency. I have always been an insurgent. I was an insurgent at the age of 4, when I ran away from home. I think that insurgency and revolution are American. We are a revolutionary people.

The scope that we have before us calls for an analysis of the economic, social, and political conditions which are favorable to revolution. Such conditions are widespread in our world today, as most of you probably know from experience.

Most of you have served abroad. Many of you have lived in various parts of the underdeveloped world. I did. I went to southeast Asia when I was 24 as a Presbyterian missionary. I have knocked around all parts of Asia. I lived for 10 years in old Siam. I have lived in the villages of the traditional societies of Siam, Burma, and Malaya.

When my wife and I went to Siam in 1927, it was like turning the clock back two centuries. We had no running water, electricity, or ice, no uncooked fresh vegetables we dared eat. There was no refrigeration. There was no rapid transit faster than the elephant, ox-cart, bicycle, and the old Model A Ford which I took with me.

It may interest you to know that in 1942, during World War II while I was with the Board of Economic Warfare, I was briefly consulted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on elephants and their use in the logistics problems of the Stilwell campaign--"Elephants versus tanks" was debated. I provided such important and exotic information as how many miles an elephant can walk in a day, how much he can carry on his back, how much he can drag, how steep a hill he can go up, how steep a hill he can go down, how many hours a day he has to eat, why he always has gas on his stomach, and things of this sort which the Joint Chiefs felt they needed to know. As I recall it, they decided on tanks except for a small herd of elephants which operated under an expert known as Elephant Bill.

Today we see about us the cultured catastrophes that are occurring throughout the world--in Africa, Latin America, and southeast Asia. These cultural catastrophes are similar to the catastrophes that a large part of Western Europe went through in the early days of capitalism when industrialization was new in the world. The British and French went through it. The British enclosed agricultural lands, putting up fences, denying the people access to the land, forcing them into a kind of slave labor under captains of the new industries, creating the tragic conditions of human misery that Charles Dickens wrote about. If you want to understand cultural catastrophes which are occurring today, look back at Western Europe during the early days of industrialism.

Our preoccupation with the evils of colonial exploitation has hidden from our view the greater issue of cultural degeneration which is a result of the rapid and violent disruption of the basic institutions of the victims. Basic cultural institutions are disrupted in the underdeveloped world by the very fact that a market economy is foisted on a differently organized community which is unprepared for it. The nonindustrial community goes through convulsions with heavy loss of life while adjusting to industrialism.

If you read the history of the development of a market economy in Western Europe and the human tragedies that occurred in the development of mining, the steel and weaving industries, you will see there

a pattern which is being repeated in many of the new nations where cultural catastrophes are occurring, where an environment favoring insurgency is created. The insurgency in such environments becomes dangerous only when it is organized in a fashion that is inimical to the welfare of the people or the peace of the world.

We are interested in it when it is inimical to U. S. national interests. We are not against insurgency as such. I think we are for it. But there is a certain kind of insurgency which is organized and which further enslaves the people while mobilizing them on military lines for military exploits of a new and novel nature which the Communists call "Wars of Liberation" but which we view as a technique for liberating the people to greater enslavement to the economic discriminator.

If you want a short formula for the liquidation of every cultural institution in a traditional, organic society, I can give it to you. It is very simple. When labor, land, and money are made into commodities you have a short formula for the liquidation of every cultural institution in a traditional society. Let's just pause and think about these three things. When you make labor a commodity, something you buy and sell, in an area where people have never bought and sold labor but have bartered it or donated it in return for favors, you begin to destroy a cultural institution. Where things have been on a barter basis, where labor has been in support of a feudal overlord, or for conscription in a king's war, you begin to destroy the institution by putting a price on labor. This was what kings were for: to conscript the people to fight their wars, to require corvée labor on an annual quota, and to requisition taxes in kind, not cash.

But now you buy and sell labor in an industrial, capitalist society and you begin to destroy the home, the village, and traditional security. The people are no longer sure that they are going to eat. They are no longer sure that they are going to have things to wear. They learn the cost of money in human tragedy. Now, they say, money is the root of all evil.

Personally I have always liked people with money. This was what led me to learn Chinese when I was a missionary in Siam and I found that the Chinese had the money. It was the Chinese who put the squeeze on the peasants, making the peasants realize that if they were going to have the good things of life that they saw in the Chinese shops they, too, would have to get money. How do they get it if they are peasants? Perhaps they are producing a commodity that isn't wanted. They must then abandon traditional crops or trades

and produce something that is wanted in the market economy. They may be exploited, as the Indonesians were, for instance, by the Dutch, who turned the Netherlands East Indies into one gigantic farm.

How does a young man get money when he has nothing but an elementary education and a strong back? He has a pretty girl he would like to marry, who won't marry him unless he has money to buy her some pretty things. He hears that he can go to the city, to Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, or Jakarta. And what does he do when he gets there? He may peddle a three-wheel bicycle taxi. He may labor in odd jobs requiring no experience. He probably will lead a horrible life if he has no friends. At night he has no place to sleep, or he may sleep in barracks with hundreds of other young men, fellows like himself who have village girls back home who have been after them to go and make some money. Such young men travel in packs.

Here you have a breeding group for insurgency. Young men who are dispossessed of their traditional security. They are freed from village authority and away from their fathers and mothers. Labor has become a commodity. You can buy, sell, or rent him for so much a month. His traditional basis for dignity and status has been demolished. A new social order is required.

The old relationship to the land is also lost in a market economy. No longer is there free land to be had for the settling. Land becomes a commercial product. The tin miner comes in and explores the land and finds that on peasants lands there is tin. He buys up the farms. The farmers have to leave; they are dispossessed. They are not used to money and spend it quickly. Then what do they do? They must go and work for somebody else at a value set by someone else. And if the dispossessed peasants flood the market they are hired at bargain prices.

Even money becomes a commodity. Peasants have to pay interest on money to buy tools or seed grains or rental. In the old days they borrowed from a friend and later returned the courtesy without paying anything extra. Now they pay interest, and in the Far East interest runs at great percentages, not a mere 6 percent. They are lucky if they don't pay 50 to 100 percent.

So here is the short formula for catastrophe for the exotic peoples who are encountering in these times the same predicaments that the Western World previously went through: make land, labor, and money into commodities.

This is the process of modernization that you can read about in books by Milliken, Rostow, Staley, and others, books about economic, political, and societal development. We imagine we are in the process of helping these peoples and nations to move into the modern technological world, our world. But we also are modernizing and moving away from them faster than they can ever hope to catch up. Their industrial legs are short and ours are long. We are moving faster than they are or ever can hope to move. But let's see some of the new experiences they are having.

They encounter, for instance, new technical devices. What do you think the public health syringe does to a peasant's thinking? He has always practiced public health in terms of spirit worship and has used the talents of the local wizard or witch. Some of my best friends in the 1920's and 1930's were witches and wizards. I saw native medicine at work. I have sat by the sick for hours and days in villages and have seen their healers at work. I have heard them talk unselfconsciously. I've heard them talk, as though I wasn't there, about the injection the doctor used to abate a fever. It's a new magic, a new wizardry. They want it. They can't get it without money. It does something to their ego, to their psyche to see a white man with an injection do things for them that they can't do with their traditional magic.

Think what the railroad does to them. When the railroad went through, it not only made them more mobile but it took them out of it. The farmer had somehow to find a money market for his produce. Barter was no longer good enough. Then the farmer, with his wife and kids, loads up a picnic lunch and they all go down to the railroad station to ride the train up the line 20 miles or so to visit Auntie Dang. The stationmaster says, "Oh, sorry, the train has gone." They ask, "When did it go?" He answers, "Eight a. m." They never heard of "eight a. m." The stationmaster tells them it's when the sun is up there at such and such a relationship to that coconut tree. They go back home and unpack their lunch and eat it. They make a new lunch and come down the next morning and take a reading on the tree to check on eight a. m. They missed the train.

So what do they do? They are determined to catch that train. So they camp on the tracks. This is why for several decades the trains in this part of the world ran only in the daytime. The engineer could see who was sitting on the tracks, along with stray buffaloes and elephants. At last the train arrives and the peasants get on. They have a new sense of time.

Then along comes a Swiss-watch salesman and sells them a watch for a very cheap price. They are good watches and are constantly consulted as the peasants refine their sense of time. It is a new technical gadget. They have to have money to get it. Because of it they learn new values and make new judgments in new situations.

These new situations favor the breakdown of family solidarity. The daughter finds she has to have money. She can't get it from her elders. If the boy friend stays home he can't give her the things money buys and if he goes to the city she wants to go too. She hears that girls in the city can have a good time and make money. So she goes to town. Maybe she gets a job as a servant. If she fails she may drift into the oldest profession. I have seen the tragedy of hundreds of village girls who went to the city. I have seen people selling their daughters. I have seen brothers sell their sisters into a new way of life without counting the consequences.

In the traditional societies that I have experienced, the villagers are usually against the government. But they can't do anything about it. We are often against the Government, too, and grumble about it, but we know that there is an election coming up and we can always vote. We have orderly procedures. But in their societies they have had government by assassination or coup de etat as the alternative to docile acceptance.

Revolution is encouraged when ideas are brought in that encourage the people to revolt against tyranny. Insurgency may be a good thing. But it may be very bad if it results in the repression of civil liberties. It's this kind of insurgency that particularly concerns us.

Now, you might not think of Hinayana Buddhism as an organizing agency for insurgency against an autocratic monarch. And you might not know what steps monarchs have taken to make Buddhism safe for the monarchy. Hinayana Buddhism is egalitarian in doctrine. It gave people the idea of equality between the peasant and the monarch. Everybody underwent certain equalizing facts of life: you are born, you get old, you become sick, and you die. All people, whether peasant or monarch, encounter sorrow. Buddhism provided the people with a sense of dignity and in the Order provided an organizing element for all men of equal sorrow.

The monks settled in monasteries in the villages. The monasteries becoming the organizing center for village life, all social life revolved around them. This was the beginning of potential national

organized opposition to the monarchy. But the monarchy beat the villages to the punch. The kings licked them by joining them. The Buddhist monarchs made themselves the protectors of the church. They even became monks at some period in life. They, too, shaved their heads and took the yellow robe. It was good politics. A smart monarch in Burma, Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand would also appoint his uncle or his brother to be the Prince Patriarch, administrator of the clergy. He would organize the monks in their village monasteries under a hierarchy and then would forbid the monks to engage in politics or insurgency. The Buddhist monks were then safe to be used as a political instrument to reflect the policies of the monarchy.

The peasants were instinctively insurgent against the colonial powers also. They wanted to react against the colonial powers, but they didn't have the organization to resist. This organizational element was provided by the Communists. The Communists came with a message of hope and of revolution. They appealed to all the disturbed political, social, and economic groups who had been upset by the new demands laid on them when land, labor, and money became commodities.

It seems a pity that it was the Communists who came with a message of hope, of revolution, of a better world order, promoting "Wars of Liberation." We Americans are a revolutionary people. We believe in insurgency if it is directed against oppressive authority and is aimed to preserve the dignity of the individual and the political independence of the nation.

We often hear it said that the Communists inject themselves into a situation by intimidation and assassination, and of course they do. But they also win their way by ward politics. I have a document in my hands that was sent me from Saigon, dated July 1962. It is entitled, "When the Communists Come." It's a translation from the Vietnamese of a report dated 14 October 1961, made by a delegate to a national liberation front interdistrict meeting, entitled, "The Experiences in Turning the Village of XB in Kien Phong Province into a Combatant Village." It is an account of the efforts of the Viet Cong to convert this village to the Communist equivalent of a strategic hamlet.

The document provides a summary of the operational methods of the Viet Cong in an area where they maintain a relatively stable degree of political control. It is a graphic account of the tribulations experienced by the rank and file Viet Cong in promoting their doctrine, of the Viet Cong scale of values, of their communication

methods, including their political propaganda program. This is the route to political power taken by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

The village described contains about 6,000 people. As the story goes--and I'll give it to you in capsule form--a Viet Cong agent came into this village in late 1959. He didn't come in and threaten anybody. He came in like a missionary and sat down with the peasants and listened to them talk. This is sound missionary procedure. He listened to their gripes and their complaints, and he found that they talked about money and land most of the time. Corvé labor and tax requirements also afflicted them and disturbed them. They were not able to get the money they felt they needed. They felt they were unfairly taxed. They had absentee landlords whom they had to pay. So the Viet Cong promised to help them drive out their landlords and free them from the district officers who imposed taxes and corvé labor.

I don't believe any two Viet Cong infiltrators work develops exactly the same theme. Each village, family, and person is a special case. In this particular village the preoccupation was with landlords, taxation, and corvé labor. So the Communist message in village XB was in terms of ward politics--"We will help you throw the landlords out. We will help you develop and strengthen your village so that the Diem district administrator cannot plague you. We will even free you from the threat of those American imperialists who are supporting the oppressive Diem Government." This was the message.

It appears from the document that this message fell on deaf ears for a while because the peasants were not bold. But the Communist agents posed as men of reason and peace, not urging the peasants to kill anybody, not asking them to arm themselves, but simply to become active in various village activities.

Within 16 months the Communists had developed in village XB a party strength of 26 dedicated Communist agents. They had organized a Lao Dong youth group of 30, a farmer's association of 274, a liberation youth group of 150, and a women's liberation group of 119. Two thousand people or one-third of the villagers in the village of XB were taking part in party-led activities. This was accomplished in 16 months of indoctrination. They preached and practiced ward politics with a positive message of revolution. They provided an organized effort that involved the total life of the village.

There is no aspect of life that is exempt in this kind of warfare. This is political warfare with the emphasis on the political and not on the military. But the military was also injected because, by the end of 1961 in the village of XB they had people manufacturing little boards with nails through them for planting in the fields to pierce the feet of the Diem soldiery. They trained peasants to put up roadblocks with grenades hidden in them. Slowly this became a combattant village, organized to support the Viet Cong in their so-called "War of Liberation."

The United States Government is helping the Diem Government and the Vietnamese Army to develop an effective military machine to counter the Viet Cong. Enough military muscle has been put on the Vietnamese Army so that it can march through the village of XB or any combination of such villages. But suppose the army passes through the village frequently. Has anything been changed unless the peasants have a change of heart, unless these people have grounds to hope for a better way of life that is not Communist?

This is an enormous problem because it involves the total way of life of a people. I would like to turn to an address made by the Under Secretary of State, George McGhee, at the Senior Seminar Graduation in June 1962. If you want some of the most significant language for the kind of diplomacy that is aimed at such restless societies as the Vietnamese, I recommend this to you. On page 6 Mr. McGhee outlines a country plan or system of priorities for the use of U.S. resources in these situations. It's a four-point plan which does not include a fifth element, U.S. policy, because he takes that as given, something that is handed down by the President. This is a country plan which an embassy country team is supposed to evolve for submission to Washington for revision and approval.

The first point is: "A unified and realistic concept of the forces at work within that country and the ways in which these forces can be influenced or motivated over any period of time."

If you stop and think of how you are going to arrive at a unified and realistic concept of the forces at work in any given country, this is dynamite. What are the forces at work in a country? I'm not sure that we are fully aware of the forces at work in our own country.

You take the State of California and the recent election there. Why do you think Nixon was on TV every night for weeks to answer questions put to him by the voters? He was less interested in his

own answers than he was in the questions. There were forces at work in the political and societal situation in California that he, as a politician, needed to know. California is a State in flux. This was one device that Nixon used to try to find out what was stirring in California.

Think of the forces at work in the State of Mississippi. Imagine USIA, AID, and other agencies being given the job of influencing or motivating those forces. What could be done about Mississippi? It doesn't matter which side you are on, the forces are there. Maybe you want to influence them one way, and maybe you want to influence them another. How would you do it? Send them a bookmobile? Show them some movies? Insert some items in the press developed by experts on human motivation? Send the troops in? Strengthen the police? Build them a new bridge? Improve their irrigation system? Improve their roads? These are some of the things we do in other countries. Are they effective in motivating people?

It's difficult enough, gentlemen, in our own country to try to motivate the forces at work in our own society. When we contemplate motivating the forces at work in Vietnam, Burma, or Indonesia with the little we know about them we are even less sure of how to do it. How are you going to motivate and influence the people of the northeastern plateau area of Thailand so that they will oppose Communist subversives infiltrating from Laos? This is a current problem. We know a lot about the things we think they might use. Do we know what they feel and hope?

We are told that they feel like political orphans even though Marshall Sarit is an old northeast Thailander. He has paid scant attention to them politically. Now, belatedly, he realizes that something has to be done to motivate these people to help keep Thailand free from Communist infiltration. How is he going to do it? How are we able to help him?

I have great confidence in us when we really face up to a problem no matter how difficult. I think we are beginning to face up to these problems today. I have never seen so many village studies. Anthropologists, sociologists, social psychologists, economists, political scientists are hard at work on diverse aspects of the problem. I learned just the other day that such study can become a way of life. I was introducing a lecturer in the State Department when I discovered that for six years he had lived without working. He had been on study grants from foundations. I am sure that every U. S. Government agency is also analyzing the forces that are at work in these societies where insurgency is a threat.

I am sure that we have the ingenuity to cope with these troublesome problems.

DR. SANDERS: Gentlemen, Dr. Landon is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: It seems that this Communist agent that comes into the village is a very key man. Is there any individual representing the United States who can play a somewhat similar role?

DR. LANDON: It could not be an American. It should be a person of the same nationality. For instance, we read in our papers about the Viet Cong coming down from the north, that is, from the northern part of Vietnam. Actually, most of them are southerners who have been trained in the north and returned south. They are in their own environment. You could not send Americans into this kind of situation. We have to attract people who can do it in their own country. We would be too conspicuous. No matter how long you live in an area you are still a foreigner. I lived in one Siamese town many years. I played tennis every day and one year I played tennis well enough to be runner-up for the championship of the local tennis club. I was the only American in the area. All of these people were my friends. I ate in their homes, they ate in mine. We went hunting together. I suddenly realized during the final match that if I won that championship, which I felt I could, I would do myself no good in that community. They wanted one of their own boys to win. I think we are in this kind of situation in the big contest. I think we have to find people of those communities who can do the job. It's their contest, not ours. Our problem is to devise ways to help the people in the country have the ideas and develop the methods to do it themselves.

QUESTION: Could you comment on the current and perhaps potential role that our churches in their missionary effort might get into in relation to this?

DR. LANDON: The churches I think have moved in the right direction. They began 20 years ago at least, turning over responsibility in these countries to the local congregations, ministry, and medical men.

I think in most mission fields the missionaries have phased out of the lead positions and work in a supporting role. They act as advisers. In fact, in many mission groups a missionary is voted on by the local clergy to determine whether he should return. I think

this is right. In the mission field the missionaries were aware long ago that it is the people of the country who have to take the lead.

QUESTION: Sir, previous speakers say that the Soviets are taking large numbers of people out of underdeveloped or developing countries and are taking them to the Soviet Union and training them. Are we taking large numbers of people out of southeast Asia and bringing them back to the United States for training and then sending them back?

DR. LANDON: Probably not enough. I have long been an advocate of more training in the United States for the key people of a country. The Soviets began such training as early as 1920. You may recall that an Indian, M. N. Roy, established a school at Tashkent for the training of Asian Communists. This was abolished in 1922 under British pressure. The Soviets immediately constituted three other schools to do the training in Moscow. One of them was Sun Yat-sen University. It was at a school like that that Chou En-lai and people like him received the kind of training that the Communists felt their key men needed. They brought people from all parts of the world--from Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia; a man like Tan Malacca out of Indonesia went to Moscow in 1922 and received this kind of training. Before I knew very much about communism I was already aware of the fact that many southeast Asians were being recruited in Paris for training in Moscow. Ho Chi-minh far from being recruited in Paris, however, was one of the original Bolsheviks who helped found the Communist Party in France. Then he recruited other Vietnamese and with them went to Moscow for training.

Certainly the more training that we can give key leaders in our own country and in our own schools, the better.

QUESTION: Dr. Landon, having lived in southeast Asia a good part of your life, could you give us your thoughts as to why the Chinese Communists have made southeast Asia a target? What are the charms in southeast Asia that cause them to come down there?

DR. LANDON: Right after the war, you may recall, the Chinese made a deal with the French to have access to the Port of Haiphong. This gave them control over the railroad that went out of Haiphong into Yunan Province and opened the way for an extension of Chinese economic and political influence in southeast Asia. There are about 12 million overseas Chinese living in southeast Asia who might form a bridge for further extension of China's power. The stakes there are very large. China needs such products as rice,

rubber, tin, coconuts, phosphates, and oil. Also then there is a lot of room in southeast Asia which might accommodate China's expanding population.

Interest in southeast Asia is not a new thing with the Chinese. You may recall that in the 15th century the Chinese went all the way down to Java with a fleet to extend their political influence. The present conflict that we see developing between China and India I think is another expression of Chinese determination to move their sphere of influence south of the Himalayas. They don't have a fleet. I think if China had a fleet you would not see them bothering about a border contest with India. They could lock up the Straits of Malacca and Sunda with a fleet and block off the whole eastern end of the Indian Ocean. If the Soviets could block off the other end they would have India dropping into their hands like a bunch of ripe grapes.

I would say the stakes are enormous in southeast Asia for China. I am sure that Sihanouk has been convinced for 10 or more years that the future destiny of Cambodia lies with China. He has measured China and India. He has been back and forth. The pendulum between his fears and his hopes does not lie between the United States and the U. S. S. R. It lies between China and India.

QUESTION: Doctor, what do you think our prospects are for economic unity between the countries of southeast Asia?

DR. LANDON: Economic unity?

STUDENT: Yes, where they work together.

DR. LANDON: Well, I would say, very little. They are natural competitors. From the time they began moving into the modern world under colonial guidance and leadership they have competed. I think the values of colonialism have not been fully taken into account, in that the colonial powers did enable these peoples to stop their wars with one another and to have about 100 years of peace while they were exposed to the modern ideas and concepts of the Western World. You might say that colonialism was a kind of cultural and economic pressure cooker. During the colonial period, all of these economies were focused on the particular metropolises-- either The Hague, London, Paris, or Washington.

The Philippines are not in southeast Asia emotionally, culturally, or economically. For 400 years the Philippines has faced across the Pacific toward America with its back to Asia. It is very

difficult for the Filipinos to think of themselves as an Asian people. To understand them you have to understand Latin America more than Asia.

So, when you begin thinking of southeast Asia as a region, and we talk a lot about a regional approach to southeast Asian problems, let us remember that it isn't a region. How these economies could be coordinated or made noncompetitive with one another I don't know. I think that nationalist fragmentation will go on. I don't see economic regionalism coming in southeast Asia.

QUESTION: You mentioned, Dr. Landon, the contribution of USIA in the southeast Asian area. How about the contribution of the Military Assistance Program in that area?

DR. LANDON: The Military Assistance Programs have had, I think, an enormous political and societal impact on southeast Asia. The rise of the military in Burma is changing the societal and the political pattern of Burma, by way of illustration.

The Burmese have never been willing to be subject to discipline. They are an undisciplined people. The time to begin to worry about your relations with the Burmese is when you are on good terms with them and try to get them to do things your way. When our Military Assistance Program was going especially well in Burma, that was the time that I thought it was in its most dangerous period. The Burmese periodically throw out advisers. They threw out the Russians and they threw out the Robert Nathan advisers.

The Military Assistance Program has developed in the Burmese Armed Forces a nucleus of people who see the value of discipline, of organization. I think the Burmese must have been a great disappointment to the Communists, because at the beginning, you may recall, the Burmese nationalist movement was led by men who were Marxists and thought of themselves as Communists. But they were not subject to Communist discipline. They were opportunists.

You remember how Aung San turned against the British and went along with the Japanese. Then he turned against the Japanese and went with the British, while working with the Communists. He then turned on the Communists.

However, it was the military who finally became so exasperated with economic and social conditions that they took political control. There were Burmese squatters in slums built along Rangoon streets,

refugees from the civil war of 1950. The city was also full of piles of garbage. There were pariah dogs all over the place. The streets were cluttered with farmer boys sitting in three-wheel taxis ready to shanghai you. So General Ne Win took over, you may recall, for a year. He cleaned the garbage out of town, poisoned the pariah dogs, forbade the three-wheel taxicabs to lurk in the center of town, cleaned and resettled the squatters. He even made the Rangoon University clean up the campus--an astounding development. It had never occurred since the British left.

The military began to plan a very strong political role which was made possible in part by United States assistance. I think that we are recognizing that our military aid programs have more than military significance in community development, public health, and better administration.

QUESTION: In this connection, what effect does the Peace Corps have on the politics of these emerging nations?

DR. LANDON: The Peace Corps, I think, has a great potential. I do not believe the Peace Corps can generally work in a disturbed area. Their kind of work is generally under the supervision of the host government in areas when the government actually exercises control. They take their orders, you might say, from the ministers of the various departments, whether they be of education, public health, or interior.

What the Peace Corps offers is not money or things, but skills, techniques, and talent. I think this is a wonderful thing. I think they can make a great contribution to any nation that uses them wisely.

QUESTION: Dr. Landon, to use your historical approach, there is some evidence that a period of dissolution very often sets in after the initial success of a Communist movement. For instance, in Western Europe there was the training that went on in Paris and the large Communist Party they once had there. They are definitely losing their influence there. Is there some trend of this kind noticeable that you are familiar with?

DR. LANDON: Yes, the Communists certainly do not have it all their own way, and they are not going on a one-way street straight ahead. They go a rather tortuous path, often proceeding two steps forward and one back.

Let's turn to Cuba for just a minute. We think of the Communists as being defeated or having suffered a serious setback. They may have won a victory politically by taking a step back militarily. I am not a Cuban expert. I was impressed with the alacrity with which the Soviets pulled out those weapons. At least the ones that can be seen. They may at the same time be consolidating a Communist regime of our shores. They have taken their step backward militarily. The question to ask is in what other direction they are moving forward.

We saw the Communists defeated in Malaya, the Philippines, and Greece. We know they can be defeated. We know that people can be motivated so that they do not want to have Communist control.

Our problem is to try to identify the crucial forces at work in each particular society which might be targets of opportunity. These targets are constantly changing. It has taken the Communists about 43 years to move to their present positions. It may take us in the non-Communist world a comparable period of time to dissolve that development.

Yes, I think they can be pushed back. They do not have it all their own way. They are human, just like us. They do not have a master plan. They can be fragmented. They can be defeated.

We have failed to make the necessary case studies of places where they have been defeated to know why they were defeated. Simply a recitation of what happened in Greece does not tell you. I think we have to do a really thorough job of analyzing and appraising the impact of U.S. instruments in these programs to see what effect we really had. We don't know.

These are things we need to know a great deal more about. This is one of the things I hope we can develop in our files--case studies of situations where the Communists have been defeated or where they pulled back. Why did they draw back? Why were they defeated? How was it done? Maybe certain programs are effective one place and not effective another. Take the strategic hamlets in South Vietnam. The strategic-hamlet concept was used successfully in Malaya against the Communists. Consequently we have the strategic hamlets program in South Vietnam. But these are two totally different kinds of situations. In Malaya they had only a few thousand squatters who did not own their land, who lived on the edge of the jungle, and who were exploited by the Communist guerrillas in the jungle. The strategic hamlets in Malaya took squatters and moved them away from the

jungle and settled them on land and let them become landowners. They were given new incentives. These were people who didn't have a settled way of life before.

But in South Vietnam we are proposing to use the strategic-hamlet concept in a population of over 10 million people. That is a lot of people. We are proposing to take people who have never lived in closely knit villages and whose village way of life is strung out, house by house, along the rivers and canals, and to bring them together in some kind of situation where we can protect them at night and they can go out in the day and go to work.

But the Vietnamese have never lived in this kind of village. It is contrary to their way of life. That does not mean that they cannot be made to like it or that they cannot learn to like it. Lots of people can learn to adjust to all sorts of things. But this is what I mean when I say that we have to learn a great deal more about the processes that were used successfully in one country. Will they work in another? Let us analyze them. Maybe they will, maybe they will not.

QUESTION: Doctor, you recommend that we follow a policy of insurgency of our own rather than stability. In your opinion, what would this mean with respect to getting the support or the nonsupport of the government?

DR. LANDON: I think it means planning with the government for good social and economic revolution. I think it means developing agents who are Vietnamese, who can go out and sell new ideas to the people. I think it means convincing the top officials that their own future lies in revolutionary change. It means trying to cope with the so-called mandarin mind of Diem. It is not only he who has it. His other officials have the same mandarin mind. And I think you will find that Ho Chi-minh has had to cope with the mandarin mind in the north, also. Many of the leaders working with Ho Chi-minh also have the mandarin mind. They have been convinced by certain pressures, temperatures, opportunities, and disappointments to work in the Communist pattern.

Our problem is to develop something comparable but with different techniques, different values, emphasizing the value of the individual, maternity care, education, public health, and security.

I think that we have to recognize that just maintaining the status quo is not good enough, because the status quo does not last. It is

always changing. What we need to recognize is that this is a world in revolution, in insurgency. Our problem is to see to it that it is the right kind of revolution, the right kind of insurgency, not a kind that is inimical to the welfare of mankind but the kind that will free, that will enable people to make the most of their talents rather than the least of them.

It is not easy to do. It is easy to say.

(21 Feb 1963--7, 600)O/gh:en