



WELCOMING ADDRESS

Vice Admiral Rufus E. Rose, USN

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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16 August 1963

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

WELCOMING ADDRESS

16 August 1963

ADMIRAL ROSE: Good morning! Gentlemen--I am speaking primarily to the 180 of you whom I met yesterday for the first time. First, let me congratulate you on your assignment to the Industrial College, and welcome you aboard. We are going to see a lot of one another during the next 10 months, and I intend to do all I can to make our relationship mutually pleasant and profitable. Mrs. Rose and I want to get acquainted with all of you and your wives just as soon as possible. After you have unpacked, and located the kids in school, and worked out car pools, and otherwise shaken down--not shaken up, I hope--we will start asking you to drop in and see us in small groups, so that we may have a chance to meet you informally and individually. Meanwhile, we look forward to seeing you at the reception at the Club on the 23d.

I don't intend to talk to you very long this morning, gentlemen. Perhaps I should warn you, in the words of the old French king, "After me, the deluge." First, you will be addressed by Admiral McDonald, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, all the information and instruction you will need to get started, about our course, our educational methods, how the school is organized, what we will expect of you in terms of assignments and performance, and all the rest. But before we get into that, I would like to talk to you for a little while in a somewhat serious vein about this College, its mission, and the security of our Nation.

In coming to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, you have reached the highest level of our military educational system. This College is recognized by its charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "the capstone of our military schools in the management of logistic resources for national security." In other words, the Industrial College is pre-eminent in the economic and managerial aspects of national security, just as the National War College, our neighbor across the street, is the recognized leader in the political and military field. The College is a very important part of our Nation's total response to the problems of our times. Small though it is, it

wields great power--the power to mould the attitudes and thinking of men--and this includes you, gentlemen--who during the next decade may help to guide the destinies of our Nation. Not all of you will rise to the top. It may be that this audience does not contain a future President, Secretary of Defense, or Chief of Naval Operations. But it is a statistical certainty that some of you, at some future date, will have to make decisions, or advise the men who make them, which directly or indirectly will affect the lives of millions of people. It is important, for us and the rest of the world, that the intellectual influences we expose you to here should be such as to enhance your ability to face up to whatever challenges the future may bring--with wisdom, humility, and courage.

Most of you are professional military officers representing four distinct services. The rest of you are professional civilian career officials of the various Government departments. Yet we all have one very important thing in common--we are, or claim to be, professionals. To use academic terminology--which is appropriate, I think--each of us professes a special competence in a certain broad field of activity and thought, a competence consisting of special skills, special understanding and perception, special habits of thought, acquired through rigorous and dedicated study, training, and experience. As pros, we all aspire to excellence in our respective fields of endeavor. We all try to live according to a code of conduct and ideals that is part of the heritage of the profession in which we have been reared. The professional soldier, airman, naval officer, Marine, or civil servant each has his own special heritage and traditions. Each of you is proud of this heritage, and perhaps--in his secret thoughts--believes it stands for a special kind of excellence that no one else, not reared in the same profession, can fully understand or aspire to.

But there is one basic idea that we will try to impress upon you during your stay at the Industrial College. It is that national security is an undertaking in which civilians and the military of all services must work together as a team. If I may take liberties with Clemenceau's famous remark, national security is too big and important to entrust to either the civilians or the military alone--much less to any one service. It must be a joint enterprise. Most of what we do in the national security business today carries a "joint" or "defense" label--that is, it requires the combined efforts of a carefully integrated team composed of a variety of skilled and dedicated professionals, each trained to do a particular part of the job--whether as officers in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the

Marines, or as civilian public servants. We have joint commands, and joint staffs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with their own Joint Staff, and a vast web of joint task forces, joint boards, and joint committees.

In my own career, I have had service with officers of other services, including those of our allies abroad, and with civilian officials. I have learned that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines--and civilians, too--all share, or lack, in pretty equal measure the virtues we sometimes think of as peculiarly military--devotion to duty, willingness to accept responsibility, capacity to make decisions, fighting spirit, love of country. On the other side of the coin, you civilian students will now have an opportunity to study at close range that fabled monster, that jabberwock of the Pentagon, the "military mind." I think you will find it not so very different from the civilian mind as you may have been led to believe.

So much for the military, and the civilian, mind--if indeed such things exist. Whichever kind you may happen to have, I promise you it will get plenty of exercise during the next 10 months. Later today our Director of Instruction, Dr. Reichley, will explain precisely how we plan to exercise and feed it. But now, I would like to touch on another matter.

What do we mean by "management of resources?" It is a key phrase in our educational mission as I mentioned a moment ago. Some time back, a group of eminent educators reviewed our educational program. To my surprise, some of these eminent individuals raised their eyebrows at the phrase "management of the national economy" which appeared somewhere in our course material. Was the Industrial College, they demanded, teaching our future generals and admirals how to take over and manage the national economy? I assured them--and I assure you--we are doing no such thing. Nor are we, incidentally, "teaching Communism" or "teaching how to be President"--although we have plenty to say about Communism and about the Presidency.

Is this a significant distinction? I think it is. Management of the national economy under emergency conditions is one of the many contingent problems of the nuclear age that we must be prepared to face up to when the time comes. It is a problem that very much concerns one of the President's chief planning agencies, the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). I don't believe, incidentally, the OEP

has in mind turning over the job of managing the economy to the generals and the admirals. But, as future generals and admirals, it is very much your business to acquaint yourself with--to learn about--this area of planning, since it is a part of the larger problem of national security. And national security, gentlemen, is your business and my business.

But that doesn't mean that we are training you to take over the national economy. In fact, we do not try to train you to do anything, for ours is not a training mission. It is not our job to try to teach you how to manage, or to do, anything in particular. Some of you have studied management at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, or the Wharton School of Finance, or the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, or the other management schools of your respective services. At those schools you were taught how to manage a business firm, or an installation, or an office. If the Industrial College, as the "capstone" of the system, had a training mission, I suppose it would be to teach you how to be program managers in the Department of Defense--that is, if it were possible to teach anyone how to be a program manager.

Anyway, we will not attempt to teach you how to take over Mr. Hitch's or General McNamara's job in the Defense Department. But you will learn a lot at the College about the management of military and national resources--not as a body of theoretical principles, but in terms of the practical problems encountered by managers at the upper levels of the Defense Department and other parts of the national security structure. I hope that by the time you leave us you will have acquired something of the perspective of a top-level program or command manager--the habit of seeing a particular problem of management in its relation to the whole problem of national security.

The whole problem of national security--that, gentlemen, is what we must try to keep in view. Here at the College you will, I hope, find the task less difficult than it was at the desk you left a few weeks ago, where jangling telephones and an overflowing in-basket kept your mind riveted to a tiny, though no doubt important segment of the problem. Here we give you no in-baskets and not many telephones, and your other distractions are kept to a minimum.

What threatens our country's security? The central facts are, I am sure, familiar to you. Since World War II the march of Communist imperialism has brought the total populations of countries

lying within its orbit, including the Soviet Union itself, to almost 1 billion--about one-third of the world's peoples. The power dominating this enormous mass of real estate and humanity, ordering and exploiting its material resources and channeling its human energies, is, of course, a hostile power--hostile to our influence and interests wherever they are found, hostile to our way of life, hostile to our prosperity and our very existence as a free people. This is the central truth which no talk of peaceful coexistence, of thaw in the cold war, of polycentrist dissension in the enemy's camp, should be allowed to obscure. This is the essence and the purpose of communism. The fact that we have signed a treaty limiting nuclear testing to underground operations will give us increased need to be sure we know where future steps will take us.

But to say this is not to answer the really important questions, nor, still less, to provide a guide for action. With what kinds of weapons and tactics does communism threaten us, and what is our best defense against them? The singular, and significant, fact is that on both sides the ultimate weapons, though ready as always for instant unleashing, are not in the forefront of our thinking, as they were a few years ago. Communism, which reduces everything to doctrine, has in recent years revised its whole doctrine of war. Its high priests now appear to rely heavily, as we do, on mutual deterrence to avert the catastrophe of a general nuclear war. Nor do they minimize, even in public, the destruction that nuclear war would bring to both contestants. They appear to be mindful, too, of the risks of escalation in a local, limited war. In fact, only one form of armed conflict now seems to appeal to the Communist doctrinaires--at least the Soviet ones--as a promising instrument of policy, the--quote--"national liberation war," which you will recall Mr. K. proclaimed almost three years ago as deserving of Communist support in its struggle against the imperialist warmongers of the West. This is the kind of conflict in which--again, using Communist terminology--an oppressed people seeks to throw off the yoke of Western colonialism or its corrupt native lackeys, and naturally welcomes the assistance of their freedom-loving Communist brethren across the border.

There is little doubt, gentlemen, that this is the most menacing technique of Communist expansion with which we have to deal. Internal subversion, insurgency, and revolutionary war constitute an integrated, well-tested pattern of action. It was used with most spectacular success in imposing communism on the swarming millions of China, and since then has given the Communists their cheapest

gains in the great peninsula of southeast Asia. Even where it has thus far been successfully countered--in the Philippines, in Malaya, in South Vietnam--the costs of doing so, in effort, money, and human suffering are immensely disproportionate to what it costs the Communists to mount and sustain an insurgent offensive. Apart from the insurrection actually in progress in South Vietnam, Communist insurgency is, of course, an ever-present threat elsewhere in southeast Asia as well as in many parts of Latin America and Africa today. Mr. K even managed to find space to reaffirm it as a major instrument of Communist policy a few weeks ago in his 35,000 word rebuttal to the 30,000 word Chinese ideological blast against his peaceful co-existence doctrine. I need hardly tell you that you will devote some time to this problem in the course of your studies at the College.

And yet, I must return to my original theme--let's keep in view the whole problem of national security. The conflict with communism ranges over a wide spectrum, and most of that spectrum is what we call the cold war. The areas where Communist insurgency poses the greatest threat--the gray world of weak, unstable nations, small and large, old and new, the world of underdeveloped or worn-out economies, of strident nationalisms, of impoverished and teeming populations--this is the main arena of the cold war today. It makes up the bulk of the membership of the United Nations, and is still growing. Its prevailing attitude toward us and our contest with communism is--let's face it--"a plague on both your houses." And yet this gray world needs, and seeks, all the outside help it can get, wherever it can get it, and its abundant manpower, untapped natural resources, command of space, and location in a shrinking world make every part of it, however small, a prize in the struggle. This is the principal area where communism seeks to extend, and we to repel, its dominion. Throughout most of this vast arena, comprising most of the world's southern hemisphere as well as fringes to the north, the contest is being fought, not with lethal, but with cold war weapons--trade and aid, loans and grants, technical assistance, political pressure and infiltration, the processes of diplomacy and protocol, propaganda and education and cultural exchange programs, missile rattling and disarmament conferences, May Day parades and world peace conventions--and all the other devices of suasion and dissuasion by which modern nations seek to improve their competitive positions.

All of which points up a significant contrast--and this is my closing thought. In the areas I have just described our basic problem

is to cope with weakness, which makes the countries of the gray world vulnerable to Communist influence and domination, and therefore a potential threat to our own security. What a vivid contrast with the problems we face on our own side of the fence! Here our major headaches are caused, at bottom, by the growing strength of our major allies, and by the assertiveness and the cantankerousness and sense of confidence and independence that spring from strength. Let me concede at the outset the dangers and divisiveness of overconfidence, of irresponsible independence, of selfish particularism and nationalism, which seem so conspicuous in some Western European countries today. These are real dangers and we must find ways to deal with them. But in my own mind they count for little besides the confidence inspired by the healthy economies, stable currencies, flourishing trade, booming industries, expanding communications, and intense competition that I see in Western Europe and Japan today. If a few headaches come with blessings like these, I think we can put up with them.

Remember, too, that our present difficulties with our Western European allies stem in part from awareness of the serious weaknesses and dissension that are becoming evident on the other side of the Curtain. There is no longer any reason to doubt the reality and the depth of the fissures that split the Communist world. The dramatic head-on clash between the Soviet Union and China at the recent conference in Moscow on the issue of peaceful coexistence brings out into the open a source of bitter conflict that has long festered beneath the outward unity of Communist parties the world over. Polycentrism in the Communist world is a reality which makes a mockery of Communist pretensions to unity and stems from deep-seated internal weaknesses and processes of change. Polycentrism in the West--and I state this dogmatically, if only to give you something to argue about--has always been inherent in the pluralism of Western civilization and, in its present manifestations, is a reflection of fundamental and growing strength, not weakness.

Well, gentlemen, I leave you with that thought. Let me also add this one. A few moments ago I mentioned that during your stay at the College you would be blessedly free of the omnipresent telephones, the in-baskets, the duty rosters, the "green hornets," the red "expedite" tabs, and all the other symbols of the strenuous life you were leading up to a few weeks ago. Rejoice and be grateful that these particular features of your recent years won't be here to harass you. But this is not intended, by your government, as just a year of rest. I think you will find plenty to do. You will take work

home with you, you will meet a few deadlines, you will at times be a trial to your wives and children. But I think you will enjoy it all, nonetheless. Without any doubt you will get out of the course what you put into it--the opportunities are legion.

Thank you all--and once again, most cordially, welcome aboard.