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THE UNITED KINGDOM IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD AFFAIRS

Mr. Denis A. Greenhill

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF on 6 March 1964.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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The United Kingdom
in
Contemporary World Affairs

3 March 1964

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Reviewed by: Col R. W. Bergamyer, USAF **Date:** 6 March 1964

Reporter: Albert C. Helder

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3 March 1964

GENERAL STOUGHTON: As you've noted in the biography of our speaker this morning, Mr. Denis A. Greenhill, the Minister at the British Embassy, he has had a distinguished career of service to his country in both the military and the diplomatic fields. Indicative of the high regard in which he is held at the Industrial College, this is his fifth appearance at the college. We're fortunate to have him again this year to talk to us on "The United Kingdom in Contemporary World Affairs."

Mr. Denis A. Greenhill, the Minister at the British Embassy.

MR. GREENHILL: Admiral Rose; Gentlemen:

I welcome this opportunity to talk once again at this magnificent auditorium, to you, about the United Kingdom. One often forgets that one's own country's policy needs explanation; it seems so self-evidently sensible. However, the need for such an explanation was very briskly recalled to me recently by a postcard which was received at the Embassy, which conveyed a simple, direct two-word message - "You bastards."

Whilst I'm not implying that any of you sent it, it does suggest that our policies are in need of constant explanation. Whilst I intend to speak for the most part about Britain's contribution to world affairs, I will try, if you're agreeable, to say a few words about our domestic affairs. We are, as you know, in measurable distance of a general election. This election is not mandatory before October of this year, but it could come next month - more likely in May or June. And its paralyz-

ing shadow falls across the desk of every member of the government.

As somebody so wisely said, "It's always difficult to forecast events, especially those in the future." I will not, therefore, try and tell you whether the Labor Party will win, or whether the Conservative Party will return, or whether the Liberal Party will stage the comeback which is so steadily predicted for the last 40 years. I don't think that anybody really knows the mood of the country, which at this time - and I think for this election - is particularly enigmatic.

As a matter of interest, I have within the last month spoken both to the Prime Minister, and within the last day or two, to the leader of the opposition. And their own views, for what they're worth, are that they're both going to win. But I think, interestingly, both think that they're going to win by a pretty narrow margin. In fact, Mr. Wilson was speaking in terms of 20 or 30 seats. But whether or not they're right - and I suppose they ought to know; I mean, I think they do detect that this will be quite a tough election and whoever wins will win by a comparatively narrow margin.

But I would say that whoever wins, we're on the edge of one of those periods of fairly profound change. The World War I generation is going out of business and the new generation is taking over. And, I think, whether the leader is Conservative Labor, or Liberal, things in the future will be done very differently. You hear a great deal in the press and elsewhere about England having lost its way; being without a national purpose; and the impression is sometimes given that it's a nation of tired old people lying awake at night beweailing the passing of an empire. And those who are not so tired are passing too many of their nights in other

more reprehensible activities. I think this is all nonsense and there is ample evidence, I think, to prove it.

British doctors and scientists still get more than their fair share of Nobel Prizes. British athletes still break world records; and British cars still win most of the big races. And British actors and playwrights still dominate broadway. So, I think one can claim that the quality is still there and responsible people are not bewildered by our new status in the world, and are fully equal to the challenge of earning our living in an increasingly competitive world.

From 1949 onward the story of the United Kingdom has been a story of a rising standard of living amongst the mass of the people; full employment, high wages, and a general consensus on the main issues of domestic politics. And there is indeed a very wide area of agreement between the center groups of the political parties. Each has raided the election platform of the other for its most saleable items, and much depends on the personalities of the leaders. However, whatever the outcome of the next election, I would expect some fairly substantial changes in the machinery of government.

The Ministry of Defense, for example, has already been drastically reorganized, and I would expect the same sort of thing to take place in other Ministries, including my own parent department at the Foreign Office. And I would expect a greater emphasis than hitherto on the management of the economy, and greater attention to the proper organization of labor relations.

But in the foreign field there is a considerable degree of unanimity on the great issues of the day. Both parties basically agree on the role

of the United Nations,on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the use of the deterrent, and on the policy of decolonization. When you come to think of it this is indeed not surprising, as the choice of policy open to any British Government of whatever party, is limited - and fairly strictly limited. This limitation is imposed by certain constant or nearly constant facts. And these facts include the geographical position of the country, its natural resources in human and material terms, the pattern of its trade, and the tradition of its people.

Perhaps we can examine for a moment some of these factors as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, and see how they determine our foreign policy. First of all, the United Kingdom is an island, and a very small island; Europe's off-shore islands, as somebody said. It has few natural resources. Prime Minister MacMillan said, "A bit of coal and ourselves." And somebody else said, "Coal surrounded by fish;" to which Mr. Churchill said, "Only a labor government could achieve a shortage of both." I don't put that forward in any partisan way.

We in the United Kingdom live by importing raw materials, processing them and selling them abroad. In a very literal sense, what Britain makes makes Britain. In other words, we live by our wits. The diversification of both imports and exports is extraordinarily wide. We import from almost everywhere and export to every country in the world. Our problem is to earn enough from exports to cover five essential requirements; to pay for half our food and almost all our raw materials. Second; to build up gold and foreign exchange reserves needed in a world of multilateral trading and convertible currencies. Thirdly; to meet our very considerable debt obligations brought about by two world wars. Fourth; to pay for our over-

seas military expenditure now running at about $700 million per annum. And lastly, to meet our obligations in respect of economic development overseas, also running at about $700 million per annum.

Ours is thus, necessarily, a precarious existence. But by ingenuity, brains and mercantile skill, an economy has been built up which is supporting over 50 million people at a standard of living which is second only to this country. If you're statistically minded the United Kingdom, with only 2% of the world's population, is responsible for 10% of all international trade, and half the world's trade is conducted in the pound sterling. These 50 million people are crowded into an area very little larger than the State of Alabama. They're brought up in the tradition of freedom and social justice, which may have been equaled, but which certainly has not been surpassed.

And lastly, by a largely accidental process over the last 200 years, the United Kingdom built up an extensive empire which has evolved and is now evolving with increasing pace, into a Commonwealth of independent nations. The picture is therefore a densely populated island with negligible natural resources, living in freedom, at a high standard, by means of worldwide trade, and the center, also, of an extensive multi-racial commonwealth of nations.

Given all these facts; the dependence on trade; the dispersion of an evolving empire; and the limited natural resources, what must be the objective of British foreign policy? First and foremost, peace with the preservation of our own freedom. No nation in the world has a greater vested interest in maintaining peace than we have. War kills trade, and it's only by worldwide trading that we can live. Peace is for us doubly neces-

sary in the nuclear age.

Once upon a time, before the invention of aircraft, we enjoyed a certain immunity sheltering behind a powerful fleet. Spain, France and Germany were all defeated over the centuries, mainly because we were an island. And World War II was the last time we enjoyed this immunity; and as far as I remember, there was not much enjoyment. Nowadays the situation has entirely changed, as indeed it has for you. Although we have our own nuclear striking force we have no protection against enemy missiles. And the crowded United Kingdom is about as good a nuclear target as anybody could wish for. Indeed, the current estimate is six bombs are sufficient to put us out for keeps.

So, the first priority must be so to conduct our foreign policy that war doesn't break out. But this doesn't mean, let me assure you, peace at any price. What it does mean is that we can't take many risks; we have to look at every situation with the utmost care, to insure that if there is a risk of war, that risk is worth taking. And no British statesman can expect to be able to lead his country into a war in this day and age unless and until he has satisfied public opinion that there is no honorable alternative.

All this explains the constant search by the United Kingdom, for a basis of negotiation in those matters where the risk of war is greatest; in Berlin, in Southeast Asia and in the search for a test-ban treaty and a workable system of disarmament. These are matters that every British statesman must give high priority to, and situations which he cannot accept without attempting from time to time some initiative or some step to attempt to break the deadlock.

We can't expect to keep the peace on our own, nor, indeed, can anybody else. The potential peace-breakers are too powerful and too numerous. To meet these threats the countries of the Free World need allies; they need to band together for mutual defense, to pool their resources, to coordinate their strategies, in order to keep the peace. The United Kingdom is indeed no exception, and has always been a great believer in coalitions to defeat powerful enemies, as the history of the country clearly demonstrates.

And whilst we give our full support to the United Nations and to its development and evolution, we naturally seek and find our closest allies in our kith and kin in the Commonwealth, in the United States, and in our European neighbors. We are the only country which has simultaneous membership of NATO, SEATO and CENTO. And these alliances are the keystone of our foreign policy.

We, of course, attach the utmost importance to the closest links with you. And many of you who have worked in the diplomatic,defense and intelligence fields, know how close these links are. We like to think of the Anglo-American Alliance not just as an alliance dictated by the necessities of a hard world, but that it is the natural outcome of ideals shared in common. At the same time, it's our policy to draw closer to Europe. And it is here that one of the greatest changes in the climate of English opinion has taken place. English opinion in relation to Europe has undergone a quiet revolution, the significance of which is bound to be profound.

Until recently the average Englishman drew a sharp distinction between himself and his European neighbors. That wasn't always so. In the Middle Ages, for example, and even at later times, the English had a sense of

oneness with Europe. But in the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries England and Europe drew apart and wasted much of their wealth in mutual antagonism. For us, the enemy was always on the Continent of Europe; first Spain, then France, and then Germany. There is the story of the headline in the English newspaper which read, "Fog in the English Channel; the Continent Isolated." Well, if you think for a moment about that you realize what an arrogant frame of mind it concealed. But it does show how the average Englishman looked in recent times at his European neighbors.

This was because we had found our destiny in other continents of the world and built up our power and prosperity by trade, emigration and conquest in Asia, Africa and America. All this had created a way of life and a pull of allegiances which led away from Europe. There is hardly a family in Great Britain which has not direct family connections in the Commonwealth. I think my own family is a typical one in that I have first cousins in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, America and South Africa. And this is something which effects all the outlook of all thinking and unthinking English people. And with the annihilation of distance by modern communications, these family relationships, far from diminishing with the passage of time, are kept alive and real.

But the final catastrophe of World War II brought a new outlook; it brought, first of all, a realization to the Western Continental European countries that some drawing together was essential for survival. The common experience of defeat and occupation produced the idea of the unity of Western Europe; described recently as the one great creative political idea which has emerged since the Second World War.

But we in the United Kingdom were slow to appreciate and to under-

stand this coming together on Continental Europe. I think we were smart in our share of the victory and preoccupied with our own efforts of post-war recovery. But the lesson was finally learned as our historic decision to try to enter the Common Market clearly showed. Of course, this attempt to enter the Common Market was check-mated by the fateful French decision of January 1963, the decision taken for political reasons - and selfish political reasons - which, no doubt, the members of the French Embassy who speak here will deny.

But, this was a serious setback to the conception of the Atlantic Alliance which we share with you. And for a time it seemed that public opinion in England, shocked by the rebuff, would turn inward. But it hasn't happened that way, and I think it is only a temporary check to the drawing together of Britain and Europe. At the same time, we are determined that we shall not be made to choose between Europe and the Commonwealth, and between Europe and America. We don't believe that this choice is necessary, and if it has to be made it will be made to the detriment of all.

I said earlier that the alliances of NATO, SEATO and CENTO are the keystone of our foreign policy. And what can the United Kingdom contribute to these alliances? First of all, there is the contribution to the productive capacity of the Free World, of a gross national product worth about $70 billion a year. This may not seem very much when compared with your own gross national product, but when you're engaged in a production race between the Free World and the Communist World, every little $70 billion counts.

Moreover, Great Britain has allocated to the defense of the Free World since the war, a larger proportion of her gross national product

than any other country except your own. A second contribution that we have to make is that of one of the most highly-skilled labor forces in the world, working with advanced industrial resources, plant and equipment. Also, I see no reason why one should not include in this context some highly-skilled bankers, investors and merchants, and even diplomats who contribute their experience to the smoothing of relations between the nations of the Free World.

The third contribution we make is our scientists, technicians, etc., who have made discoveries throughout the whole range of scientific invention. Whilst I won't claim, Russian-style, that we invented everything, I think if you cast your mind back over the major inventions and advances in the defense field in the last quarter of a century, you must agree that our contribution has been significant.

The fourth contribution we make is Britain's own nuclear capacity both in contributing to the Western deterrent, and in pioneering the production of electrical power from nuclear energy.

These are all important items. But we've never relied upon a preponderance of material power to secure our own position in the world. Britain's power and influence have never been a matter of her immediately available material strength, population and resources; and it's not so today. Our power and influence have always depended on our capacity to adapt ourselves to changing circumstances, and above all, on the position which we have from time to time come to occupy in relation to various combinations of military, economic and political forces.

For example, in the 16th and 17th Centuries when we successfully mobilized coalitions to contain what in modern terms would be called

the "aggressive expansionism of Philip II and Louis XIV," the populations of Spain and France were each of them three times our own, and their resources were immeasurably greater. And later on, when Napoleon was at the height of his power our population had risen to 16 million, and the great Napleonic Empire approached 100 million, with a comparable disparity of resources. Nevertheless, a British-led coalition destroyed Napoleon's power. Thus, today Britain's influence in world affairs depends on, firstly, militarily playing a prominent although not the leading role, in a worldwide series of coalitions which we did much to initiate. It depends economically upon the central position which Britain occupies as a banker, manufacturer and trader for the Free World. And, politically, as the focal point of a great multi-racial Commonwealth.

Nevertheless, I don't want to under-value the physical contribution that we can make militarily to these alliances. This contribution comprises first, real estate for military bases. The United Kingdom itself is an essential base for your own Air Force and nuclear submarine fleet. It is no secret that some of the first moves in any realiatory action against the Soviet Union will be launched from bases in the United Kingdom. And, as many of you know, there are other installations in the United Kingdom which need not be specified, which are essential links in the defense chain of North America and the Free World.

In addition to the United Kingdom itself we can offer a worldwide pattern of bases stemming the greater part of the globe; Gibraltar, Malta, Libya, Cyprus, Aden, the Persian Gulf, the Maldese, Singapore, and certain Pacific islands. The future of some of these bases is uncertain, but it's

safe to say that the essential fabric of them will remain beyond the next decade. And indeed, recent weeks have shown us invited back into some of those places which we had voluntarily left only a few months before.

The second contribution that we can make is that of our owned Armed Forces. They consist, first, of the deterrent force of nuclear-armed V-Bombers. This does not compare at all in size to your deterrent, but it's sufficiently formidable independently to inflict unacceptable damage on any potential aggressor. And as you know, these bombers will be followed in due course by five of our own Polaris Submarines, which were made possible by the famous Nassau Agreement concluded between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan in December 1962.

In addition to this deterrent force there are our own land and naval forces which are undergoing extensive modernization and reorganization, and are capable of taking rapid and varied action in all areas where our interests are threatened. And I think the effectiveness of the new arrangements was demonstrated by the operations in Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, which were conducted with losses, I think, of less than five or six people.

Mobility has been, and is being, especially developed, and the naval forces are getting an increased amphibious capacity. And, of course, we have taken the decision to build the first of the new generation of aircraft carriers.

But having prepared ourselves by the organization of our own forces, and by our participation in a widespread system of alliances, we in the United Kingdom feel it necessary to go a bit further than that; we feel it desirable in the interests of all, to seek actively and constantly an

understanding with the Soviet Bloc. Soviet society is constantly evolving and we feel we must not miss any chance of enabling it to evolve in the direction which may make possible a more lasting understanding between the East and West. If peace with justice is our first objective, we have another - and for us, equally important one - namely, the aim of creating favorable trading conditions; conditions which will permit access to raw materials on reasonable terms, freedom for our ships to come and go, security for our overseas enterprises, and a place in all markets - including Sino-Soviet markets - for our manufactured goods.

We want to see the overall expansion of world trade. The bigger the cake the larger we hope will be our share. And we want to see the underdeveloped countries more fully developed. Equally, we want to see the advanced countries advance still further. As I said, we are ourselves investing $700 million a year to this end. And we want to see the purchasing power of the Indian peasants increased, just as much as we want to see more money in your pockets, since we believe that amongst the purchases of both the Indian peasant and the American professional man will be the product of our own factories.

But this outlook also means that we must oppose any ism which seeks to exclude us by unreasonable means from a fair share of available commerce; any ism which seems to exact an unreasonable charge for raw materials essential to our industry; and any ism which threatens our ability to move our purchases and products freely across the sea and air lanes of the world. As you can see, these isms may range from American protectionism right across the spectrum to Russian Communism.

To sum up, the United Kingdom is not, as I sometimes see implied in

the press here, the threadbare, down-at-heel state deploring departed glories. I hope that you see it as it is, a modern country with a powerful industrial base, ready to accept international obligations in the interests of world peace, and ready to contribute with the special risks which that entails, its considerable resources to the defense of freedom.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned a political crystal ball. Painfully remembering such things as Tom Dewey's political triumph in our 1948 election, would you comment on the use of public opinion polls in the U.K.?

MR. GREENHILL: Yes. That's something I'm an expert on - public opinion polls - but nobody can fail to notice that public opinion polls reflect the policy of the papers in which they appear. And this has just recently been the case, of showing a great - in, I think, a month - a drop - I can't remember quite, how many percent, in Mr. Wilson's popularity. This poll appeared in the Daily Telegraph the other day. And he said, I thought, very reasonably, that he couldn't think of anything that has happened in the last month which would have caused 3/4 of a million English voters to have changed their minds about him. I think that was a very fair comment.

I mean, I don't think opinion, in the absence of very striking events, changes as rapidly as that. But I don't know anything about the sort of scientific accuracy of public opinion polls. However, as I say, one can't fail to notice this connection.

QUESTION: One of the Common Market objectives, as seen from the U.S. point of view, is providing a mechanism which would keep the recurrence of German nationalism in check. Do you feel that the increase in membership in the Common Market might dilute the effectiveness of this check?

MR. GREENHILL: I think it would. In fact, I think the basis for the small nations' wish for the United Kingdom to be a part of Europe is essentially that; in order to dilute the German influence in Europe. And I think that it must inevitably be so; that if there is a Europe consisting of three fairly powerful elements - France, Germany and the United Kingdom - that they will act as checks, one against the other. But as I say, I think many Europeans, the whole basis of their wish for us to participate in Europe is just that.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned that the people in Britain are getting a feeling of closer ties with present Europe. I wonder if you would comment on what political or economic moves Britain will have to take in order to make a closer bond with Europe?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, I think we shall have to get an answer to the economic problems, which will be a matter of hard negotiation. But I don't think they're insoluble in the next few years. As far as political initiatives, I don't think there is anything particular that we have got to do. I think that after a great deal of suspicion, the people in Europe are beginning to appreciate that we are loyal members of Europe, and they're beginning to understand the restraints that have kept us from coming forward faster than we have to date.

I don't think there is any single political move that we could make

which would accelerate our going into Europe.

QUESTION: Sir, I read a recent magazine article - I think it was in the "U.S. News & World Report" - which said that there is a serious military manpower shortage in Britain. The gist of it was that Britain can no longer meet its military manpower requirements around the world. Is this article true? And if it is, do you see any danger in this trend?

MR. GREENHILL: No. I think there is half-truth in that. There is no doubt that we are short of skilled manpower. I mean, our unemployment rate is under 2% and there is a very distinct shortage of manpower. We've had an influx of a large number of people from the Commonwealth, into England, to increase our manpower. As for the shortage of the Armed Forces and the question of whether one ought to have conscription in order to bring the numbers up, we've gone into this very carefully;and leaving aside the political aspects of it - which, of course, you can't entirely do - the plain fact is that we think that we can get by normal, voluntary recruitment, the numbers of people whom we require. If, of course, the demands became very much greater we would have to go out for reserves and things.

But normal peacetime requirements we think can be met by voluntary recruitment. It's tight. But immediately, for example, if we had conscription - bearing in mind our general shortage of numbers - if we had conscription a large percentage of our professional forces would have to be employed in instructing the conscripts. And we have found this in our numbers an extremely wasteful system and it simply doesn't make sense; if you have an Army of a certain size, to have a large proportion of its professional element teaching conscripts who come in for two years and

then go out again.

We have calculated this very carefully and we think that we can manage better with a professional Army fully occupied in its professional duties rather than a mixed conscript professional Army where so many of the best people are employed in teaching a lot of people who don't want to learn, and who are going to go out in two years in any case. I have no doubt that this U. S. World, or whatever it is called, was thinking in terms of Cyprus - that problem. And our problem in Cyprus has not been a shortage of troops; our views being that the only way to secure a political settlement in Cyprus is to divert the peace-keeping force. We felt that British troops only in Cyprus were an impediment to a political solution. It wasn't a question of a shortage of people; we have reinforced the place; we could reinforce it a great deal more.

We feel it doesn't help the situation there to have only British troops keeping the Greek and Turkish communities apart. And there was a lot of nonsense put in the papers here about conscription and shortage of troops, and why should America send troops to Cyprus because we couldn't be bothered to have conscription in England, to provide sufficient people to meet our responsibilities. This simply wasn't the case.

QUESTION: Mr. Greenhill, what importance do your people attach to the recent test-ban treaty? And, do you have a policy, as we do, of being prepared to resume in case the treaty is broken?

MR. GREENHILL: Yes. I think that we understood very well the limitations of the present treaty. What we felt about the present treaty was that it was a valuable first political step, and it has been our objective

since the treaty was signed, to try to go forward from that point. I think from the weapons point of view and all that sort of thing, we realize that it's not a very significant thing. But we think, from a political point of view that it was a very important first step which should be followed up. And our diplomacy since the test-ban treaty has been to do just that; to proceed from this limited agreement with the Soviet Union, to larger and more fundamental agreements. And, of course, we always have in mind, a full test-ban arrangement. But as I say, I don't think we delude ourselves that this is a completely new system that has been created by that particular treaty. But we do attach political importance to it.

And we have plans to go on testing if the political situation demands it.

QUESTION: In a recent article a few weeks ago, I noticed that the Americans are counseling your government that in order to stabilize international monetary funds and interest rates, that the U.K. should raise taxes and lower its expenditures. Inasmuch as this advice seems to be pretty much of an export item of ours, I would like your attitude toward this type of advice.

MR. GREENHILL: Well, I think both of us engage in this extremely attractive policy of telling each other how to run their own economies. We've had a recent - wâl, let me put it this way; the British economy has been going forward at a tremendous pace the last few months. And we have got to, at this coming budget - which comes in April - the Chancellor has got to make up his mind what to do about taxation and expenditures. There is still a good deal of argument going on as to what he is going to do; whether he's going to increase taxes or lower government expenditure; probably, I

should think, a bit of both.

But as I say, we're used to receiving unacceptable advice from the United States, and I'm sure that the economists over here are the same. And we do have this very difficult sort of balance, in that sometimes what is good for us has immediately bad effects for you and vice versa. For example, the raising of the bank rate recently was a matter of discussion between the two governments. And the raising of our interest rates at home could have harmful effects here. I think that what is new and what is beneficial is that these matters now are subjects for mutual consultation. In the old days it was very much the "I'm all right Jack," business. And if it was good for us, to hell with you.

And I think one of the, as I say, big advances that have been made in recent times is this cooperation on the economic front and between the central banks. And the International Monetary Fund has sort of helped all this. These are big and important improvements which have got to be maintained.

QUESTION: Does the British policy in its trade toward the communist nations make any distinction among the various nations, in the bloc specifically; do the same policies that apply to trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc apply to Cuba and China?

MR. GREENHILL: Yes. First of all, we have the agreed strategic list of items which should not be traded in, and this applies to the whole bloc, including Cuba. Commodities apart from those on the strategic list we trade with the bloc on a strictly commercial basis; which means that there may be different policies toward different bloc countries. For example, if we judge that the Soviet economy is strong and they can pay their debts

and what-not, we will obviously trade with them more than one of the smaller countries, or maybe Cuba where we think that the commercial basis is not so good. So, outside of the strategic list we trade on a strictly commercial basis related to the capacity of the customer to pay.

QUESTION: Mr. Greenhill, it seems like with every change in periodicals we see articles expressing alarm over the migration of scientific and other professional manpower from Britain to the United States. And usually the articles blame United States dowries. Do you consider the dowries here as the main reason, or do you consider this symbolic?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, we were talking about this in the faculty room before the lecture. Inevitably, I think, institutions in this country can pay better in most cases than the comparable institutions in the United Kingdom and Europe. And the pure pay will inevitably attract people. This has been going on for a long time and will obviously go on. But I think that very often there are sort of fringe benefits quite apart from climatic improvements. If you've worked all your life in Manchester, sometimes it's rather nice to go to California, Florida or something like that.

But as I was saying to Admiral Rose this morning, I talked to an Englishman here who works at Johns Hopkins. I asked him why he came and he said, "I suppose you think it's the money." And I said, "Well, the thought had crossed my mind." He said that it was not; it was the fact that he got secretarial support at Johns Hopkins University, which he didn't get at Cambridge. And that, if he wrote an article it was typed rapidly by some smart-looking girl, millions of copies were run off, etc., etc. Whereas, in Cambridge he had to take his article down into the town

to be typed by some typing agency. It was all sorts of little things like that which make all the difference in the world. They increase the man's output and increase his earning capacity.

I think those are the things that will have to be adjusted at home rather than the basic salaries of the people concerned. I mean, in the old universities, and in some of the new universities, we're obviously very much out of date in the logistics support that the wretched scientist, historian or person gets.

QUESTION: Mr. Greenhill, it's a rather shocking realization that Britain can be done in completely by six bombs. What's the nature of the British civil defense plan?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, the shock is as great to me as it is to you. We have a civil defense corps which I think, surprisingly still seems to attract a good number of recruits. But I don't think anybody is deceived as to what they can do; and they're a sort of tidying-up corps. The idea would be that this corps, the territorial army and the Army, would have to be the pickers-up of the mess afterward. I think people thoroughly realize that air-raid precautions and what-not are not going to be like they were in 1940.

The government has, of course, its plans - its sort of shelters, governmental hideouts and what-not, very much as you do here. It has plans for the running of the country after the nuclear attack, a sort of decentralization of authority etc. And I think we have got, as far as you can have it in our peculiar circumstances, a fairly realistic civil defense policy. But we're not building public shelters.

QUESTION: Sir, it has been difficult for us to distinguish between

our political parties at times, and I think it more, possibly, to see what the differences might be in your parties. Could you tell us what, if anything, you could forecast so far as foreign policy is concerned if Mr. Wilson and his party should come to power?

MR. GREENHILL: Very little, I would say. And I think that Mr. Wilson would be ready to admit that in private, and to say that during the election campaign, of course, there will be various differences sort of sharpened. But, in fact, as I said in my talk, we've got very little choice and I think that we should go through one of those irritating periods if the Labor Party came in at all, that people have to do with new administrations, waiting whilst the new incumbents found out for themselves what you already know. And we should strike off in various directions on so-called new policies and end up exactly where we left off.

QUESTION: The United Kingdom has had a representation as being king now, for several years. Would you comment on two points? One; what does the United Kingdom consider to have been the actual advantages achieved in her foreign representation? And two; do the advantages live up to the initial expectations?

MR. GREENHILL: The answer to that is that we got very little advantages and they didn't come up to the initial expectations. But that doesn't mean, I think, that we feel that it was a mistake to do what we did. And in the circumstances of that particular time I think we did the right thing. We have, in fact, gotten certain benefits; not many. We always hope we might get more. But we still think what we did was right. It was done by the Labor Government and I think it would equally

have been done by a Conservative Government at that time.

QUESTION: You mentioned earlier that you expected emphasis on labor relations and management of the economy. Would you expand on what you mean by "expansion of the economy" and what form you expect it?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, we've been struggling toward a sort of coherent incomes policy. And one of the legacies of the old trade union movement in England is that it's very stick-in-the-mud, really. And the present government has been working hard with the unions and with the employers, to try and get a realization from them both of their responsibility toward the proper development of the economy at home. And this will go on, I think, with either government. That's what I particularly had in mind, consultation between the government, the employers and the employees, to evolve wages and income policy which make sense in the particular conditions of the country.

A much greater cooperation between these three groups, I think, is to be hoped for. And this is one of those basic problems, I think, that has got to be tackled at home and a certain amount of time has had to pass to allow the people to change their conceptions. And a whole new generation of trades union leaders of a totally different type are now coming into existence.

The old trade union leader was a sort of dominating type over the union until recent times; he's been a sort of flat-cap, workshop floor-type of leader. Well, now, this generation is brought up in a tradition of passionate argument with the management; long strike histories; memories going back to general strikes and all that sort of thing; that generation is going away now; it's dying off, and you've got a new sort of

college-educated trades unionist, etc. It's the welding together in a sort of mutual responsibility that I think any government, of whatever color, has got to achieve in the next few years.

COLONEL SMITH: Well, once again, sir, we thank you for a delightful and highly informative morning.