

**FRANCE IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD AFFAIRS**

Mr. Bruno de Leusse

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 12 March 1964/

**INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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6 March 1964

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
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Reviewed by: Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF Date: 12 March 1964
Reporter--Grace R. O'Boyle



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GENERAL STOUGHTON: Gentlemen: In spite of the current differences between our Nation and the Republic of France, as we all know, through many difficult times in world history our two countries have been the staunchest of allies. In this time of complex problems and rapidly changing situations, it is more important than ever that we all appreciate and understand the many views on the complicated subjects in the world today.

To explain to us and discuss with us today his country's views, we are fortunate to have the Minister Counselor of the French Embassy, Mr. Bruno de Leuss.

It is a great pleasure to welcome to ICAF and to present to this audience Mr. Bruno de Leuss.

MR. DE LEUSS: General Stoughton, Gentlemen: First I would like to thank the Industrial College of the Armed Forces for the opportunity they have given me to speak this morning about France in Contemporary World Affairs.

When I read the newspapers, and even if I look only at the first page, I notice on one hand the importance of the place reserved to news from France and on the other hand the contradictions often apparent in comments concerning it. That is why I will attempt in a brief talk to give you a resumé of French policy in its three chief domains of foreign affairs--Europe and the Atlantic World, the Communist World,

and the Third World. At the conclusion I shall try to determine what impact France's position in these areas may have on her relations with the United States.

As a first preliminary remark may I stress that I have no authority at all to give an official interpretation of French policy. I will speak simply of my own mind, and that will apply equally to the answers I may give to your questions.

In the second place I would like to remind you that if from time to time divergent view separate France and her allies, and in particular the United States, these differences should not be interpreted in any way as a sign that we want to damage the alliance which unites us all and which is, as General De Gaulle recalled on July 29, an elementary necessity.

Whether indeed at the national or at the international level democracy does not stress itself through a chorus with only one voice, on the contrary it helps us to develop free and varied opinions whose very expression bears witness to its own vigor.

One should not see occasional disagreements as a sign on the French part of a lack of gratefulness or a diminished sympathy or friendship for your country. Nothing could be worse for the maintenance of such relations than to confuse conformism with solidarity.

It is therefore with a free mind that we shall take up the first subject of our study--France, Europe, and the Atlantic world. In this first domain the chief reproach addressed to France was its refusal

on August 30, 1954, to approve the creation of a European Army, to have since then constantly opposed with determination European integration, and to have stood up for the concept of the Europe of the states and consequently ruin all hopes for an organization of the Atlantic world.

What must we think of this series of criticisms which are often voiced with a bitter tone? The European integration attempt of 1954 was failure. No doubt France was mainly responsible for it, but in thus acting, was she not the spokesman for the wisdom of nations? In refusing at the last moment to abandon her sovereignty in military affairs she joined those who reproached her for not having done what they were asking and for having done the same as they did.

After the torment of the two World Wars, when Europe was the main battleground, and on the eve of great transformations brought about by decolonization from which she mainly suffered, it was necessary to move slowly, not to hurt any feelings, and not to begin the union of Europeans by forcing them to abandon their attributes of sovereignty in the most sensitive domain of national fusion.

Did that mean that France would oppose all attempts at organizing Europe? Not at all. As a matter of fact, France took her place with honor alongside those countries who in 1950 founded the Coal and Steel Community and in 1957 the Common Market. And ever since she has tirelessly worked for an acceleration of the process of economic unification and for the strengthening of the six powers concerned. In 1961, for

instance, she proposed a plan for a loose political union of Europe which was turned down by the Belgians the following year. But, you will ask me, why not step immediately from an economic integration to a political integration of Europe? The answer is simple. It was necessary to act quickly in the field of interest of the six countries to make them conscious of their common destiny, but one must not renew the error of 1954 and risk dividing the same six countries under the pretext of joining them together more completely.

I will give you an example to explain this idea. Let us suppose that a European parliament, from which a European government would be formed as so many of our well wishers want, was to take up the question of a solution posed on both sides of the dividing line of Germany, taking into account the attitudes of the socialistic position in Germany of Belgium and Italy. Would not the Bonn authorities feel forced by the sheer game of parliamentary majority and against the best advice to accept at the European level the formula that they would oppose at the national level in a field where Germany is the most directly concerned?

Don't you believe that such an experience repeated several times and create a would shake off the solidity of the Six/great peril even for the Common Market? It is in order to avoid such risk that France feels that it is necessary to act more carefully and to submit herself to entering on the road to European unity through the gate of a confederation, of which the Franco-German Treaty was the first stage, in January 1963. The

fusion of European communities could be the second, next year or the year after. In this way will be facilitated the needed transitions which will allow those countries so burdened with memories to walk together slowly but surely on the way which one day will lead them, in common with the four other nations of continental Europe, to the creation of a political entity.

But you will tell me, "Our doubts about French policy would never have been so strong if France had not unitarily and in an almost dictatorial way kept England out of the Common Market and out of Europe. Acting in this way she has inspired suspicious and fears." Answering this question I will first of all remark that there are some inconsistencies in those blames. The Europe of the Six, which was welcome in 1954, is the object of all criticism a little less than 10 years later. Is it because of the changing attitude of the London government or is it because of existing fears that the success of this enterprise will be regretted?

In any case, if France last year did not accept the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market, it was not at all a sign of her **hostility** to her neighbor, to whom she is linked by so many memories, but was in order not to lose the chance of success of this first European community endeavor, the Common Market.

One can talk forever about the possibilities of a happy conclusion to the conversations held by the Seven for 18 months which ended in December 1962. As far as I am concerned, I believe that Great Britain had not made a decisive choice between the appeal of Europe and the

appeal of the rest of the world. Mr. Wilson's statements made last week in Ottawa and three days ago in Washington carry with them the proof that laborite England ~~any~~ more than Lord Beaverbrook's England is for the time being/^{not}ready to look exclusively toward Europe.

However, we are sure that, after an evolution of smaller or greater duration, Great Britain will decide to join Europe and to belong to it. On that day, which we are all awaiting with impatience, it will be possible to see that, contrary to those who advocate integration while at the same time pleading without fear of contradicting themselves for the immediate entry of Great Britain into Europe, the formula of a confederation will prove to be the most efficient method of facilitating the passage from Europe of the Six to the Europe of the Seven.

What about its membership? This Europe, it is asserted--and this is a new reproach--is becoming under French impulse an independent Europe, inward looking and even neutral, at least in its attitude toward the East and the West, confronting each other above its head. This presentation of French policy does not correspond to reality, and I am sure you are well conscious of that. What France would not greatly appreciate is an Atlantic community in which many states would be thrown topsy-turvy together, without any order, and in which simply, through its specific mass, the United States would take the leadership. We believe as a matter of fact that such an organization would not be one at all, that such an Atlantic community would be only a window show

with nothing behind it. Its discussions would be purely a facade, and the membership, especially with the vast differences between the specific weights of its partners, would make possible only academic exchanges without any real participation in the decisions that would affect the whole community.

To this nebulous concept we prefer a more limited framework and a more difficult construction, therefore, for an Atlantic world, in which a Europe in weight would balance the weight of the United States. This Europe, thanks to the Common Market, would have a common economic policy and the means of a military policy through a French atomic deterrent and, let us hope, also an English deterrent.

It was with this objective in view that France--and she was the only one among the six nations of the continent capable of it--entered alone the hard and difficult road that leads to atomic force. This decision brought upon her a torrent of reproaches. What France was trying to do was considered a crime, after all help had been given to Great Britain to achieve the same thing.

General De Gaulle has said on several occasions that, as soon as the French efforts lead to a real deterrent force, he will be ready to establish cooperation with the United States, whatever immense differences exist between the two forces. Moreover, his Ministers have let it be known that he will be ready on the date there is a united political power in Europe to study the conditions under which it may be possible to place the French nuclear means at the disposal of the new political

entity. This is really what this is all about. The example comes from the ten amendments. The problem is to allow Europe, thanks to her possession of the ultimate weapon, to participate in political discussions that will take place within the Western world and eventually between this world and the oriental world.

How would it be possible to imagine that this political entity, which has so many godfathers, could really be conscious of itself if, from the minute it is created, it finds itself deprived of the essential attributes of its sovereignty, the possession of adequate means for its defense?

Mr. Jean Monnet, who often finds himself opposed to General De Gaulle, last week approved in Bonn the creation of such a European deterrent. I think this is a fact it is well to be reminded of. This general view of Europe, of a Europe speaking on equal terms with the United States, is not at all opposed to the ideas of your country. Indeed, it corresponds with its long-term goal, which was the object of the appeal launched with eloquence by President Kennedy at Philadelphia on July 4, 1962. I quote: "We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on the basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations."

At the same time France was blamed for her attitude toward the future of Europe she was equally reproached for her position toward the

Communist world, the second point of our study. On the one hand the Paris Government has been reproached for not joining Washington and London forces to initiate a deterrent toward the Eastern bloc. On the other hand she is criticized also for appearing too benevolent toward China, at the risk of encouraging its expansionistic aims.

For several years now the United States and England have initiated conversations with Russia about Berlin and Germany and about disarmament and nuclear test ban. France kept aside from all these discussions. She did not in particular participate in any of the meetings with Mr. Gromyko and his aides which ended in signing last summer the Treaty of Moscow and the cessation of nuclear testing. On this very precise point I would like to tell you the reasons for our abstention.

Having started out later than the other powers our military exercises in the atomic field, we cannot today renounce those experiments which the United States, Russia, and England have for years conducted by the hundreds. Contrary to the 100 and a few more nations which have approved the treaty, our addition would not have represented solely a symbolic significance but for us it would have meant the renouncing of all our work program.

Caught between those who had everything and those who wanted nothing, we found ourselves in the position of having to keep away from disagreement. This by no means implies that we oppose as a basic policy disarmament. When the time comes, as we hope it will, to undertake the progressive destruction of atomic arms, it will be with enthusiasm that

we will join the other nuclear powers.

On a marginal level our abstention from the New York and Geneva conversations does not mean at all that we are against the detant. Far from it, we want to bring about a real detant which will serve the interests of the whole world and in particular those of the Western world, and not only the interests of Soviet Russia. The word, "detant," does not hold any magic power to us, therefore.

In 1959 and 1960, faced with the arbitrary demands of Mr. Khrushchev, this very word, "detant," did not prove sufficient to prevent the summit conference of May 1960 from being a fiasco. Since then, each time there appears to be a ray of hope, Moscow deals it a level blow. It was after the negotiation in the spring of 1961 that there was the building of the Berlin Wall. After the talks in Berlin in the summer of 1962, there was the Cuban affair. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow in July 1963, there was the incidence of the autobahn. Each time proof is given to the fact that Russia takes on the responsibility of the renewal of the cold war. She alone, therefore, must put an end to it. Let her show her desire for relaxation of tension through deeds that will bind her, and then we will be willing to talk. But there again, if we are willing to talk, it will have to be about our concerns and not only about Soviet concerns.

In fact, what did happen last summer in the course of conversations? Do you remember? Of all the topics considered, each one of them with the exception of the nondissemination of atomic weapons was proposed by

the Soviets, be it the nonaggression pact, the control proposed, the reduction of foreign forces in Germany, the demilitarization of Central Europe. All these questions had in fact Germany, its status, and its future as their objective, on the pretense of disarmament. Each one tends to either maintain the present situation, that is to say, the recognition of the East German Communist state, or neutralization of Germany, that is to say its separation from the West.

Thus it is that the Russians are endeavoring to obtain from the West the ratification of the present status quo of Europe which is favorable to her designs, with the exception of one, but one of importance, Berlin, where the West has been seeking in vain to obtain from the Soviets the acknowledgment of the rights which are theirs owing to the victory of 1945.

But then you might say, "What is there to do? Is it wise to withdraw to a negative attitude, to deny the virtues of a cause, to doubt one's right to the extent of fearing to protect it?" But does not the wisdom which is well understood lead to the displaying of infinite patience linked with a firm desire to resist all encroachments of the adversary?

Events have ~~proved~~ that time has been wearing down the ramparts of the adversary. It gave rise to divisions within its camp, divisions whose scope we should not exaggerate / ^{but} which we might exploit some day to our advantage.

As far as France is concerned she feels that this time has come,

and she has decided to capitalize on the quarrel that has separated Peking and Moscow for years, and to recognize Communist China. The Communist bloc is no longer a monolith. The two capitals are now competing for its leadership. It is therefore normal to establish with the second one the same relations we have had for such a long time with the first. By our recognition of China we tend in no way to express our approval of the political regime that exists today in Peking. We simply desire to recognize the world as it is and take into account the important political fact that the empire of the middle stands forth by its mass, its history, and its present interests. Maybe one day this line of communication between a country of the Western world and China will prove useful, in particular in the search for a solution to the problem that exists on the periphery of this limitless Far East where no settlement, either by peaceful means or through war, is conceivable without Peking's participation.

This being said--and this is not presented as an excuse for our decision--we have only followed the example given ^{by} four nations belonging to NATO and by one of CENTO which 15 years ago recognized Communist China and never broke relations with her during either the Korean or the Indo China War.

In Southeast Asia, but even more so in Africa and in Latin America, there exists a third world formed by countries on the road to development and for whom France shows a special interest for two reasons. First, in remembering her maritime vocation and her colonial past, France feels an

obligation to continue her aid and to increase her assistance, especially to countries traditionally depending on her. Naturally, it is in Africa where for geographical as well as historical reasons she is making the greatest effort. In the three countries of North Africa and in the 14 countries of the UAN she is sending thousands of teachers, engineers, architects, doctors, and military instructors, all of whom are helping to facilitate the tasks of the various leaders, who are faced with the need to build and to strengthen the framework of their states. Moreover, she provides them the financial aid indispensable to their new independence and to their economic development.

To a smaller extent this work goes on in Asia, chiefly in Laos and Cambodia but also in Viet Nam, especially in the control field.

Quite recently France has decided to expand her activities to Latin America, a continent with which she is bound by so many affinities of culture and civilization. She is now encouraging her Common Market partners to join her in this aid campaign. At a recent meeting in Paris General De Gaulle and Chancellor Erhardt settled on the formation of a study group which will define the main lines on joint programs to Latin America.

This effort is obviously limited by France's means, but it is important all the same. To developing countries in 1963 we gave a public aid amounting to \$1 billion, to which can be added the private aid for an amount of \$400 million. The total came to 2 percent of our gross national income and to 10 percent of the investments we earmark

for our own country. I believe that these figures constitute an adequate reply to criticism heard here and there about the so-called selfishness of the European nations. It shows moreover that France, in order to pursue this task, is not stopped by a consideration of prestige or by sentiment. May I draw your attention to the effort we make especially in favor of Algeria, to whom we give nearly \$400 million a year, and we maintain this aid in spite of certain measures taken by the government in Algiers, notably the nationalization of properties belonging to French nationals.

Our policy certainly has on one hand for its objectives the safeguard of France's presence in various parts of the globe, the establishment of links with emerging countries, and the facilitating of new or developing commercial relations with them, but this policy aims at the same time at easing the march of these new nations toward democracy and at securing their political independence. Nothing in these goals in question differs from American policy. But, if I wanted to recall some details to your attention, I would underline the fact that in these vast fields of aid and assistance we are marching side by side with you toward our common objectives.

It is upon this note of harmony between the U. S. and France which goes far beyond passing divergencies that I would like to conclude. Very often, as I said in the beginning, newspapers draw out the opposition and the antagonism, and that may be the reason for the inference and for their being, but we must not let ourselves be deceived by the

search for sensation. We must see the world as it is really.

First of all we must not be deceived by what we read every day. Do not believe that France is trying to stay her distance from your country. Public opinion in France remains as always faithful to the friendship which has united us with you for such a long time. All your compatriots who, during the fateful days of last November were in France, were unanimous to recognize that, upon the announcement of the drama, whose victims we are, all of us, you and us, all Frenchmen felt the same deep emotion, which is still perceptible today.

Whenever in the last two years, whether about Cuba or about the autobahn to Berlin, you found yourselves threatened, we supported you without hesitation or delay.

Don't believe that France/^{is}so puffed up with self-satisfaction or vanity that she wants to expand her hegemony, especially upon Europe, whose total population is three times her own. Do not imagine that Europe, bound by the links of the Common Market, can, under France's influence, attempt to oppose your country and close her doors to your products.

Just now in Washington some important conversations are taking place between your highest representatives and the leaders of the European Economic Community in order to prepare the Geneva negotiations from which we are all hoping to gain an increase and an exchange. On this occasion the Secretary of Commerce himself asserted that the United States has mostly benefited from the Common Market when extending

by over 50 percent the exports toward Europe's for the last five years, thus getting a positive trade balance of more than \$2.5 billion a year.

At the same time, let us not be confused by words. We cannot believe that launching an appearance for unity and a battery of lighting for some verbal demonstration of solidarity suffices to solve the numerous problems created for the free world by the resurrection of Europe and the persistency of the Communist danger.

A country as powerful and as great as yours has no need for supine allies but it needs strong and exacting friends whose freedom of thought is the surest guarantee of their fidelity. In a word, while every day are born new and various perils, it would be wise for the members of the Atlantic Alliance to contract the habit of free deliberation and assert by this way the solidity of the Western camp.

Then, passing the positions that may be apparent in the conception we may have, you and us, about the future of Europe, the means to contain the ambitions of the totalitarian communism, or about the way to prevent the third world from withdrawal since its recent accession to independence or from succumbing to the attractions of an easy demagoguery, the United States and France, bound by so many memories of the past, will never be far distant from one another but will continue to be joined together in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Thank you.

COLONEL SMILEY: Gentlemen, Mr. De Leuss is now ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss the minority position on France, the position that France took relative to the position taken by the Superior Council on Cyprus?

MR. DE LEUSS: I think that the French position in this affair was motivated by the fact that we think that there is a problem that could be solved under the sponsorship of the United Nations, but directly on the spot by the only possible participation of the countries involved in this problem, especially Great Britain. We think that it is not a question of increasing the number of troops in Cyprus but to urge the three countries involved in this problem to come together and to try to solve the problem.

QUESTION: Sir, do you believe that Germany should have an independent atomic capability?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I never said that, and my answer is definitely no. I know that it is a problem, and a question which is raised very often. I would like to answer your question by another question. Have you ever met a German who publicly or privately has asked for a national, independent, German atomic force capability? Personally, I was many years in Germany and I have many German friends, but I have never met such a German. Why? It is very obvious. I think it is impossible for Germany to get a national, independent, atomic force without provoking at the same time such reaction on the part of the Russians that it would

certainly kill in the bud any move in this direction. What I have said is that it was necessary for Europe to dispose one day of an atomic deterrent in order not to use this deterrent against anybody, but to participate in the discussions about common strategy in the West and eventually about disarmament questions with the East. I think that there is a very precise and limited idea which was defended with great authority by Mr. Thornecroft at the Commons some weeks ago when he proposed a White Book on the defense of Great Britain.

QUESTION: Sir, does France favor the reunification of Germany, or would it prefer to have Germany divided, with one half approximately the same size as France?

MR. DE LEUSSE: Our policy is exactly yours, that we are in favor of the reunification of Germany for moral reasons and for historical reasons, but certainly we would prefer 100 times that Germany would be truly united in a common Europe, because certainly the dimension of a united Germany, if she is not linked very tightly to a united Europe, could one day again be viewed as dangerous for this very Europe. But we think that it is the goal of our efforts to build up little by little this Europe and to prepare this Europe to accept and even to favor the reunification of Germany.

QUESTION: Sir, would you give us the French position on sharing nuclear information with the United States back and forth in the same way as we share with England? If there was this open sharing with France, would France cease the development of nuclear energy?

MR. DE LEUSSE: But you know you never proposed to share with France your atomic secrets. It is very understandable for historical and technical reasons. We think this question is not concrete, because you will probably never share your secrets with us. For that reason we tried to go alone on our way. We think that as soon as we dispose of even a very small and minimum atomic capability we will cooperate with you about the use of this capability. But, as far as sharing the secrets is concerned, I think that nobody has proposed that and nobody has asked that.

QUESTION: In your prepared remarks it seems to me that you indicated that France thought that Peking's participation may be necessary in solving some of the problems in Asia which we have not been able to solve through wars or peaceful methods. What specific goal does France envision that Peking could play in accomplishing the objective that we have not been able to accomplish?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I don't know if you are able to solve the problems in Southeast Asia, but what I do know is that we failed ourselves to solve the problems in Indo China, and that subsequent solutions brought to these problems were not possible without the participation of China. It was true in 1954 and it was true in 1961 about Laos. If a peaceful solution must be brought to the Vietnamese problem I think this would be impossible without the participation of China, which is waging war against you by the proxy of North Viet Nam. So there are three solutions.

One is to win the war and build up a political force in South

Viet Nam capable of resisting sabotage and subversion from the North. The Second solution is discussion with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. The third solution is to go on as you do at the present time for moths and months and years and years.

You know we don't propose anything precise. The proposal of neutralization of Viet Nam made by General De Gaulle last August was not a precise and definitive plan for nowadays. It was only an idea, a suggestion for the future. You could take this suggestion or you could reject the suggestion. It is not our job. I think that we shall not intervene any longer in this question.

QUESTION: Some 5 or 10 years ago France was filled with Communists. To what extent have the recent decisions since General De Gaulle has become President in the international arena really attempted to restore the French national character as opposed to the belief that the position is correct in the long term for the benefit of the world? These are the decisions France has taken with respect to Britain's entry into the Common Market, the recognition of Peking and others of similar nature.

MR. DE LEUSSE: I don't think that the refusal of entry to Great Britain or the recognition of China could be termed as a proof of the nationalistic tendency of France. What France tries to do, as a country in the Common Market and a country of Western Europe, is really to build up a Europe, a real Europe, not as a certain kind of loose group of nations but really a new international entity. We tried to begin by not putting on the roof before having laid down the foundations of

the house, but, little by little, step by step, story by story, to build this new house. And so, if we refused the entry of Britain into the Common Market, it was because we felt at the time that the British had not made a decision between Europe and the rest of the world-- between Europe and the United States, and between Europe and the Common Market.

The same thing applies for China. It is a manifestation of an independence, certainly, toward you, but it is a manifestation of the will of Europe to have an autonomous foreign policy. But we would be very happy if this decision could be shared by other countries of Europe and by Europe itself. For the present we propose that all the six Foreign Ministers would meet periodically and methodically together.

We are astonished by the fact that we are reproached with not having consulted our five other partners, when at the same time the five other partners refused this plan when we proposed it to them in 1961 and refused nowadays still today this beginning of a loose but anyhow an existing confederation.

So I can't understand why you could interpret the French moves as signs of nationalism. I think that you could interpret these moves as proof that France is trying to give Europe a consciousness of its own identity and of its own solidarity with all the attributes of international capacity.

QUESTION: During your prepared remarks I think you said something to the effect that it is doubtful that England is ready to look exclusively

toward Europe. I assume that the implication is that, unless England is ready to look exclusively toward Europe and give up its Commonwealth association, France isn't going to let them come into the Common Market. My question is this: How do you justify this position when we think of the fact that France has already extended associate membership in the Common Market to some 15 or 18 independent African states?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I think that your remark is very good. In a way we don't accept the entry of the British into the Common Market because they don't decide at one time to really join Europe and to cut off consequently their tie with the Commonwealth. To explain that is very easy. Let's take the problem of agricultural products. It would be possible for Great Britain to benefit from all the big markets for industrial products in continental Europe, and at the same time except the agricultural products of Australia, for instance, or of Canada, which would have an exclusive market in Great Britain. I think this fact is indefensible on the part of the British. We understand very well that for historical and sentimental reasons it is very difficult for them to make the decision, but, if you look at the problem itself without all these other considerations, I think our reasons for refusing this half choice of Great Britain are obvious.

You raised the problem of the ties between the French and the 14 or 15 other countries of the former French empire. I would say that there is no comparison in size between the 14 or 15 countries of Black Africa and the countries of the Commonwealth. I think that in all these

former French countries the population is not as big as 20 million inhabitants, and the economic force of these 14 countries certainly is not one-tenth of the force of the Commonwealth countries. Besides, we are trying to help these countries to begin the career of independent states, and nobody in the Common Market objects to that. The Belgians do the same with the Congo, and nobody opposes the fact that France pours money into these countries and tries to help these countries to go through a stage or period for adapting themselves to the rules and laws of the world market.

I recall to you that a decision was taken in Brussels in order to oblige all the countries that were part of the former Belgian and French empires to renounce any preference rights in the Common Market for a period of five years. This period of five years I think will end in 2 or 2-1/2 years.

So, to sum up my thoughts, I think there is no comparison possible between the Commonwealth and the very important and large countries of the Commonwealth with great political and economic weight on one side, and these very poor just beginning states of the former French and Belgian empires.

QUESTION: Will you discuss the size and influence of the Communist Party within France today and also give us your views as to the advantage that might accrue to the Communist Party in France and the power vacuum which will result when General De Gaulle leaves the scene?

MR. DE LEUSSE: First, I have no crystal ball to know exactly what

will happen when General De Gaulle will leave the scene, so my remarks will be marked by some doubt and my own thoughts. The strength of the Communist Party in France is now 23 or 24 percent of the illiterates. I think there is no increase and no decrease of the strength of the Communist Party. It is probable that the recognition of China had an effect that could be judged bad as it certainly has increased divisions within the French Communist Party.

What the French Communist Party will do when General De Gaulle leaves the scene is very difficult to say. Certainly the Communist Party is trying now to build up a new fronte popular. They are making advances to the Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party is inclined to respond less abruptly than the President to the approach of the Communist Party. But M. de Feu, who is the leader of the Socialist opposition, has said that he probably would accept the vote of the Communists but that he would never accept the participation of the Communists in the government he intends to build.

That is all I can say about the thing, because, if General De Gaulle, for instance, does not run next year, which is a possibility, I suppose at times there would be some quarrels and the Communist Party probably will try to push not one of its members but one of its proteges to display its own force and prove that it is the first political party opposed to the Gaullist Party.

QUESTION: Sir, in the face of concern over the world population explosion, I wonder about General De Gaulle's desire to double the

population of France. Is there some ulterior motive here, sir, or does it merely reflect the old French philosophy of Vive la France?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I think the remark of General De Gaulle about the growth of the population of France is not so different from the remark of the Washingtonian authorities about the United States in the year 2,000.

QUESTION: Sir, in General De Gaulle's quest for European leadership, he seems to do some strange things, such as literally ostracizing England and stirring up a hornets' nest by recognizing Red China.

Erhardt seems to be more in disagreement with him than was the case with Adenauer. It's hard to understand who he intends to lead. Would you tell us what the long-range implications are or what his long-range plans are?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I think that we come back always to the same question: Why did we refuse the entry to the Common Market of Great Britain? I think there is only one answer. I don't feel so sure that General De Gaulle and France are now seeking the leadership of Europe. As I told you, I think it would be nearly impossible for France, which has only 45 million inhabitants, to try to lead such countries as Germany or Italy, whose populations together is more than double that of our own.

You said that we are trying to lead this Europe, or probably you mean to dictate to this Europe. I am not so sure. We try to discuss with Europe and we try to give Europe this consciousness of its own existence. You can't build an international entity with two disparate

elements. You can't build Europe with a country which has not yet chosen between Europe and the rest of the world. That is the only reason why we refused the entry of Great Britain. I couldn't advise you better than to suggest that you read very carefully the declarations of Mr. Wilson in Ottawa and in Washington three days ago. They are very obvious. Mr. Wilson does not intend at all to enter the Common Market like it is. He said, "We shall never give up our national independence." So I think he speaks at least in a way which proves that the decision of France 18 months ago or 15 months ago was a proper one.

But you ask, "Whom will General De Gaulle lead, because Germany is now opposed more than before, and as a rule Mr. Adenauer opposed the French views?" I'm not so sure of that. I think the meetings between Chancellor ERhardt and General De Gaulle, the first one and the second one, were very good. I think really that we don't intend to lead the Germans, and the Germans know very well that they will never accept any leadership of the French. But I can assure you that a joint meeting of the German Cabinet and the French Cabinet three weeks ago or so in Paris was a very good one.

It is the beginning of a new cooperation among the Europeans, and this is exactly the aim of our policy. The treaty that we signed with Mr. Adenauer on the 22 January 1963 is an open treaty, and we would be very happy if the Italians and the Dutch and the Belgians would join this treaty. We are really decided to accept the rule of the majority. We are really ready to discuss any problem, even recognition of China,

under the conditions that all the partners of France in the Common Market would accept this kind of solution of permanent and methodical consultation. But I think there is some contradiction in the view of some people who are saying the French are awful because they refuse to build up Europe and at the same time commending the Dutch and the Belgians for refusing the proposal of the French, accepted by the Germans, on the beginning of the first step toward a loose confederation among European nations.

QUESTION: Sir, will you comment on the possible extreme West German concern on the possible French recognition of East Germany, using the same basis as for the recognition of Red China, namely, recognizing the world as it is?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I think that is a very interesting question. I think you are right that the Germans have been at times concerned by the possible consequence of the French recognition of China. But we told them very precisely that our stand against East Germany on any question on Berlin or on the autobahn to Berlin was so clear that there was no danger at all that we could recognize a thing which in our eyes does not exist--I mean the reality of an East German state. We are certain that the East German state exists only thanks to the presence of the Russian troops.

This is not at all the case, more and more, in China. So we can't draw a parallel between the Panco case and the China case. So I think this explanation has appeased the German fears, and there has been no

trouble at all in the talks between General De Gaulle and Chancellor Erhardt three weeks ago in Paris about this subject.

QUESTION: Sir, one of the reasons given for the fall of the Fourth Republic was the collapse of morale and esprit in the French Army. Since the arrive of General De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic, have any specific actions been taken to restore this morale?

MR. DE LEUSSE: I am not quite sure that your explanation of the fall of the Fourth Republic is perfectly true. On the contrary, I think the Army, at the end of the Fourth Republic, had a very high morale, so high that they tended to impose some political solutions in Paris at the time. It is true that the morale of the Army in the following months and years decreased very much and to a very low and dangerous level.

I think that something which must be put to the credit of the Fifth Republic is the fact that the French Government didn't hesitate even at the cost of the morale of the Army to solve the colonial problem. Certainly in Algeria the Army was put to a terrible trial, divided between dedication to its country and the position toward the Communist world, and taken between this dedication and the faith to their government and to the state.

Certainly there is no reason to hide that. For some months the morale was very low, and the beginning of the Army riots in April 1961 was a proof of this very low morale. But since then I think that the Army has accepted and understood very well the political reasons which

pushed the French Government to take these decisions in the colonial field. Now the Army is again a real part of the nation and there is no problem any longer, and no discussion, really, in the Army itself of the decision taken by the French Government. Now the Army is devoting itself to the reconstruction of its own forces and to transferring its main forces from the Guerrier methods and units to the modern warfare.

QUESTION: Sir, I am interested in what you think France's attitude toward Spain is at the present time and what part Spain will play in the European community in the future.

MR. DE LEUSSE: I think that is a very interesting question. You know that our relations with Spain were very poor just after the war, for reasons I don't need to recall here. But little by little these relations have improved, and now our national relations are very good. We are recommending the association of Spain to the Common Market. I think that discussions have begun today in Brussels about that. We hope that very soon Spain will become an associate member of the Common Market.

As you know, opposition has followed, especially from the Dutch, for political and religious reasons. So there are some difficulties. But we hope to surmount the difficulties in the present year. But there is another problem, too, now, the proposal for Spain to become a member of NATO. As you know very well, this would be far more difficult because of the opposition of the Northern members, Norway and Denmark, who think it is not possible to accept a not completely democratic country

into the Western allies. But so far as France is concerned, we think that the laws of geography are very important, and they dispose us as a solution to accept Spain into the community of the European nations.

COLONEL SMILEY: Mr. de Leusse, on behalf of all of us in the Industrial College, may I say how great a pleasure it has been to have you with us. I must also say that you have stood up very well in the face of very withering fire this morning. We have benefited greatly from your frank and open answers to our many questions. Thank you very much.