



ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL APPRAISAL OF INDIA

Mr. Avtar Krishna Dar

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Berganyer, USAF on 20 April 1964.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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30 March 1964

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MR. FREERS: Gentlemen: India, as you all know, is in the throes of an experiment in which the United States has a great stake and a deep interest. From the standpoint of the number of people involved, it is the greatest effort undertaken to date to achieve security and prosperity with democratic institutions.

The speaker who will tell us about India this morning and about India's problems in pursuing this experiment is one of her distinguished diplomats. As you have noted from the biography, he has enjoyed wide experience at home and at a number of important posts throughout the world.

It is my pleasure to introduce to the Class of 1964 for his first lecture here at the Industrial College Mr. Avtar Krishna Dar, Minister at the Indian Embassy.

Mr. Dar.

MR. DAR: Gentlemen: I am grateful for this opportunity which has been given to me by the Industrial College, because we in India have known the United States for a longer period than the United States has known India. As diplomats and soldiers--I mean soldiers in the broader sense--it is our constant concern to strive for insuring peace, stability, and order. At the same time, as Mr. Freers said, India is a country which is in the process of an experiment to which the United States has been committed for the past 10 years in an ever-increasing measure.

Yet, over this period, there have been strains and stresses, and I feel that it would be appropriate if I were to talk frankly, reviewing our past connections, and see where we go on from here.

To start with, the Founding Fathers of this country were a great inspiration to those who were struggling for freedom in India. The names Jefferson, Payne, Madison, and Lincoln are household words. The educated Indian regarded them as his heroes, not as national heroes of the United States.

It was therefore with great emotion that we first set up a mission in the United States. We were both broadly English-speaking countries which had derived from the British tradition and had both thrown out the British. So we had things in common at that time. It so happened, however, that there were also differences which at least we had not fully taken into account and I do not know at present if you had. The way we have grown, our geographical position, and, more so, our economic situation are totally different.

In 1947 the United States had perfected a means of power which the United States was unwilling, or, I should say, almost unable to apply before the Russians had perfected their system. That was one of the difficulties that faced us for quite some time--whether that amount of power was rationally exercisable or not. We in India felt that it was not feasible. Of course, after the Cuban episode, it is generally conceded more readily that the amount of power that has been developed

by the two large groups is such that it has almost made warfare difficult to contemplate. I would not say it is unthinkable, because soldiers and diplomats have to hover almost on the ^{brink of the}unthinkable also to prevent it, but I should say that it is almost unthinkable.

This was a problem that we were facing previously also, in that the days of classical warfare, which, as a part-time soldier, I indulged in in the Middle East, were over. There were no desert wars and no tank warfare. Even the Burmese episode seemed to be comparatively simple in comparison to what I saw later on in Malaya. I do not mention this country, Malaya, because of the so-called Communists there. The problem in Malaya was the same as the one in my country, that we had inherited the tradition of democracy, or representative government, and after political freedom had been achieved the people, naturally, wanted to know, having read what other parts of the world were doing, what ~~the~~ their government was going to do to meet their needs.

That is where the differences in our approach to that of the United States crept in. I am happy to say that they were resolved, but those difficulties still, honestly, plague us. I'll leave out the partition, which is a peculiar problem, for the time being, the partition of India. There were almost 400 people, and I will recall an incident in 1944, just about the time of the German surrender, when I happened to be at Army Staff Headquarters, whilst India was supplying ammunition, including 25 pounds of ammunition, to all the armies of the Middle East and to large parts of Lord Mountbatten's forces in

Burma. We were placing orders for steel helmets, and since the lines of supply were not secure then, the British were placing orders for steel helmets in the UK, in South Africa, in Australia, and in Canada.

At the end of 1944 we had quantities of steel helmets which we didn't know what to do with. Somehow it became my task to sort out what should be done with those steel helmets.

So I mention this as an instance of the state of affairs obtaining in India. The Indian cotton was transplanted in Egypt. It flourished. It was made into material in the mills of the UK and was sent back to us as saris for our women. This was absurd. We were supposedly unable to even make barbed wire.

I do not say that the British should be held responsible. Obviously they were there as a colonizing power and not essentially for the benefit of the Indians. They did a number of very good things and we are certainly grateful for them. That is one of the reasons why we continue in an association with them.

Nevertheless, political freedom in India--unlike the case as it was in England or America or France, where representative government came in the wake of economic development--and in other parts of Afro-Asia and representative government came ahead of economic independence.

That posed an immediate problem, because we had heard of a system being followed in Russia at that time--China was not very much on the horizon--whereby human beings could be driven to produce more, save more, and spend less, during the period they were alive; that is to say to

build for the future.

We had a system of government which we wished to keep because it was also very clear that, given a certain modicum of economic freedom, people everywhere do prefer a representative form of government and systems of freedom. If we were to preserve that system, how were we going to go ahead? That was a major problem which faced us in 1947.

The difficulty was compounded because we depended on agriculture. There are over 500,000 villages in India, and 80 percent of the population lives in villages. We had been, from about 1943, when we last estimated it, 10 percent deficient in food. It was the hope that, as irrigation expanded and as we got more techniques for improving agriculture, this food deficiency would be met. After all, 10 percent was not very much when there were almost 200 million acres under agriculture.

Somehow we omitted to take into account that the Indian, who had been starving for so long, would want to eat better, also that there would be an increase in population, not merely by natural birth rates but by health-giving measures. This may sound cruel, but, why do we have these health-giving measures which prolong the life of people? That is how it is. From a calorie diet of about 1800 in 1946 and 1947, individuals in India today are on a 2600-calorie diet. In the United States it is over 3,000. The World Health Organization says it should be 2,800.

Therefore, even with an increase in agriculture--and we have

irrigated our lands better by 20 percent and we have an increasing supply of foodstuffs--the deficiency remains. It is not 10 percent, it is 4 percent. Nevertheless it does remain. Life expectancy has gone up, as against an average of 28 in 1945, to about 47. Also, while life expectancy has gone up, nevertheless the age is still 47. The result is a remarkable phenomena in India, which has 50 percent of its people who are about age 20 or below. This creates its own problems of finding employment and jobs for these people.

Having concentrated on agriculture, we discovered that it would not be possible for agriculture to supply livelihood for the majority of the people of India. Therefore we had to concentrate also on industrial development. Now, it was not merely because of the nonavailability of steel helmets-----but it seemed ridiculous that, having been using locomotives for about 75 years, by 1947 we were not producing a single locomotive. We had the steel, we had the technique, we had the skill. Our boys came to the Pacific Baldwin Locomotive Works, they went to England, and they came back, but we were denied because of the lack of equipment.

That presented us with another great problem. Industrial equipment is a catalyst which enables further production. But in turn it requires saved capital resources or saved energies, which we did not have. When we gave the pretty passes to our 300-odd rulers, the then President of the World Bank was somewhat horrified. He felt that, if we had not distributed this vast amount of money to our Princes, who were really

idle, at least most of them, and not doing very much, we would have lesser dependence on foreign aid. There, in a nutshell, was the problem that was posed by the World Bank: Why do you want to feed these drones? All they will do is to go to Europe or to their estates and waste their money.

In a system which honors contracts and obligations, we had just no escape. Therefore, this amount of money which the Princes received was over a million dollars, tax free, all expenses free, and all the way down the scale. These problems were inherited by us. If we were to have respect for law and order and for contracts, we had to, as it were, incur a fair amount of infructuous expenditure. It was not merely on account of the pension that it gave to the Princes. The entire set of thinking was and had to be geared to providing the goods of life for the people of the country who were electing the government and were therefore in control of the government.

Unlimited enterprise in a free society undoubtedly has great advantages, and yet it has been built up and made possible only when there were no trade unions, when people were obliged to sacrifice, as they are sacrificing in China or the Soviet Union.

That was a state of affairs which also we could not afford, because here was a government elected by the people--and there were 180 million people at the last election who voted, most of whom were poor--and they would not be content to wait ad infinitum for their greatgrandchildren to be better off. They also wanted to see some improvement in their

daily living. This presented us and is still presenting us with the problem of taxation and distribution. We had the slogan of the welfare state and a socialist society, which caused no end of confusion. I use that slogan advisedly, because that is what it is. In the United States the gross national product is about 75 percent private enterprise. In India it is 85 percent. So percentagewise the United States is officially perhaps a little more socialistic than we are.

But in our terms all the major heavy industries had to be undertaken by government, because the very state of underdevelopment did not attract private ventures to go in. The very fact that government went into heavy industry made it more socialistic. I am trying to explain this because it does cause some confusion as to where India is heading and aiming at. What has she done? Certainly you can get the statistical handbook of India and see that in terms of percentages we are making 200 percent more steel, and I suppose we are making--I don't know how many hundred percent-more electrical power. But we have to consider this in absolute terms.

As I mentioned, India still is on a 2600-calorie diet, and it should be 2800 to be normal. We certainly, as the Prime Minister put it, have left the bullock-cart age and come to the bicycle age. The bicycle age is not satisfactory enough, when the world is moving into Mach III. It is still far behind.

So we have to keep in perspective that, with a representative form of government, the people demand that there should be improvement

in their life and living standards and they are wedded to individual liberty and freedom. What are the procedures open to government to continue the system which they have inherited of democracy and a parliamentary form of government and at the same time to give sufficient encouragement and hope to the people so that they will continue to sacrifice a little for the future? That is the task that has been facing us ever since, I should say, 1947 or 1948. That task will face us, I am sure, for quite another few years.

There is the additional problem of not only internal but international conflicts. So far as the partition of India and Pakistan is concerned, that was a peculiar problem. We do not bother about it very much. It is a specialized branch which I will deal with separately.

Our difficulties arose because, although the outside world might regard India as socialistic and inclined to be Communistic, we felt that was the only means we had to keep the people satisfied and for them to persevere in working, by promising them that the government is responsible for the welfare of those who elect the government. I am not suggesting that you are going that way. Anyhow, there was no other possibility for us.

I might mention that, in the last general election two years ago, in my own state of Upi, the so-called illiterate electors threw out the presidents of the Congress Party, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party. So the illiterate elector is not quite so illiterate when his

interests are involved. After a period of 10 years, he was able to see and to know that he had the power to upset governments and to throw out those who fought to represent him.

It was therefore obligatory on India to try to satisfy its people, at least by means of promising them that it was trying for the welfare and economic uplift of the masses rather than merely generating capital for heavy industry. You know we have been associated with the World Bank and with the United States over a long period of time to get foreign equipment through foreign exchange for setting up industry in India. Apart from the steel mills, we are now producing motor cars and in fact we are now about to export steam locomotives--which may seem strange considering that in 1947 we weren't even making any locomotives.

There is, however, still a great leeway. And, as I was saying, there came the international aspect. Our differences are these: We like a free society, we would like to preserve our individual values, our sense of what is reasonable. It is not feasible to apply the amount of power which has been developed by the United States to achieve the objective normally in view. The whole concept of warfare, the whole objective of warfare, is changing. It did take almost until the Cuban episode for persons to feel that perhaps it had changed irrevocably. Colonialism was disappearing. We were concerned with what were the after effects of colonialism. One was economic development and one was to keep at the same time a form of government that we liked.

Some other persons felt that that it was not the power of a foreign

state but the ideology which was causing the trouble. Well, we thought that ideology could not be defeated by physical means. Certainly physical means are important to control an onslaught whilst you are able to argue. But eventually it will be in the market place of ideas that it will have to rub shoulders and prove its worth. We find now that after the fiasco, I should say, of the Great Leap Forward in China regimentation has not produced the answer and that therefore something is wrong with the basic thinking, no doubt.

We do need physical strength to stem an advancing side in order to be able to stand up and argue back. But our feeling was that, situated as we were, with the after effects of colonialism, with our economy and the development of our social and economic structures of primary importance, the idea of fighting ideology with physical means was not going to be very successful and was not likely to be of immediate importance.

Well, as we know now, what was known as classical war, of the type I mentioned in the Middle East and Burma, has become very simple compared to what we have to face now. I would not cite Viet Nam or Malaya, but take our case with China. Here were two countries, both ancient and in a sense new, embarked on different procedures and different parts, but with the same objective, i.e., to secure economic betterment for their people. Broadly one can say they were reasonably satisfied countries. You can fling Goa at me and we can fling Tibet at China. But broadly they were satisfied countries.

We started with the assumption that it would take a good 20 or 25 years for either of these countries to make an impact on the thinking of their neighbors and that that would give us that much of a period of peace. For various reasons, however, it became difficult for China, particularly after her so-called liberation of Tibet, not to attempt to completely stop any influx of ideas or people or traders into Tibet. Hence there were the incursions.

There was, you may recall, a great hue and cry that perhaps the Chinese were now going to launch a massive assault on India. Our soldiers did not have that fear, because that would not be very feasible. And if that happened it would escalate into a different pattern of warfare.

What we felt has now come to pass, that it was to be a strain on our entire economy, which is what the Chinese wanted to achieve, in order to prove, or disprove, that their system was the one that would yield results. Now, I cite this as a classic instance of the international conflict that prevails today and with which we have to be concerned. At some unthinkable time there might be a general holocaust, but, short of that, the pattern of conflict, at least in Afro-Asia and in parts of India, has changed immeasurably. The task of soldiers has become much more complicated than it used to be previously, certainly during World War II.

These are wars of liberation. To fight the wars of liberation one has to be geared on all fronts and be trained on all fronts. It is

much more a combined battle of the civilians and the soldiers, a battle of one way of thinking against another, rather than the classical concept of warfare that one was used to before.

We had these arguments, you might say, with persons in the United States, and happily they have been resolved to a large extent, because to some extent we have moved. We had some confidence that we were not altogether wrong and that in the final analysis there would be economic development in India. And also the social-political pattern was important, rather than stemming anything in Malaya or elsewhere.

That brings me to the third phase which, I believe, is to be covered in the lecture, and that is the political situation in India. This is a very interesting subject. Most generally we specialize in pronouncing "After Nehru who and after Nehru what." The Communist Party is fairly stable. Our state assemblies delight in democratic rowdiness occasionally. I was reading in the papers that they walk out in a huff and they attempt to throw newspapers about, in order to prove that they have the right to run the government and to discipline the ministers.

The political difficulties in India are not wholly from the lack of hold of the Communist Party or after Nehru, who, but that a different ideology could take hold if there is not a sufficiency of performance on the economic front. That is the basic problem. I mentioned that in my own state the Congress, the Socialist, and the Communist leaders were thrown out of the assembly by the electorate. Therefore the electorate

is quite literate enough so far as its basic objectives are concerned. It knows them.

There is certainly going to be a slight problem when the Founding Fathers pass away. The second generation always finds it a little more difficult. There is the task of achieving independence, there is a great upsurge, and history moves, like a coiled spring, forward. Then comes the day-to-day, humdrum activity of making things work. That is always more trying and it requires more patience.

We have no fear that things will continue to function. Maybe there will not be the same amount of impact of one leader, as we are used to from Mr. Nehru, but they will function as a team, you can say, or as a group, which is how most democracies do function, by methods of a consensus, rather than outright control by one person, which was true enough in the case of an outstanding personality like Mr. Churchill or that of Mr. Roosevelt or that of Mr. Nehru. This may happen. But broadly it is by consensus that democracies do work.

That consensus, as we have found in the past few months, when the Prime Minister has not been so very well, has been functioning. Maybe it is not as efficient and active. Nevertheless, democracy is not the ideal form of government so far as, perhaps, efficiency is concerned. But it does function and it is most stable.

The difficulty that I mentioned does arise from the fact that, if there should not be a sufficient degree of economic performance-- and there has been so far despite some crop failures in India, and

you have the book of statistics which will indicate what has been achieved--the problem still is: How long will people wait? Is the leadership going to be able to make them wait? For that purpose we have a Finance Minister who almost belongs to what we in India would call, amongst the Congress Parties, the Republican wing. He is a businessman and a private enterpriser himself, and he has imposed a very rigid budget. It is very difficult for the private-enterprise people to cavil at him, because he is one of them. But he saw the necessity.

On top of this came the defense problem. Our defense budget was infinitesimal compared to your approximately \$1 billion a week. But, nevertheless, it did get doubled and more than doubled, amounting to \$1.8 billion a year. It may seem absurd in your parlance, and it is not very much of our gross national product, but it has thrown a burden on India. Certainly we are being helped by the Commonwealth and by the U.S.A., but we have also to think that in case of any active hostilities with China--as I say I am leaving out Pakistan for the time being, as it is a special situation--we should be able, at least, to have sufficient productive capacity to maintain for a few months--not for ad infinitum but at least for a few months--at war-wasted risk, something which we had not contemplated, because we had allowed about 20 to 25 years before India and China would be in a position to try an assertion. We had no particular desire to assert ourselves, and I am not willing to concede that the Chinese particularly want to assert themselves in terms of

military power, but they do want to assert in terms of their ideology being superior. That is an undoubted fact. They were, for various reasons of their own, driven into a situation which they cannot get out of, and, having been driven into that situation, we are quite confident that they will stay there, because it is advantageous to them. Their system is such that either there will be a great cataclysm in the country or it will be 30 or 40 years before the changes occur.

They have thrown an additional economic burden on us, and that is a challenge which we have to meet. If I may be pardoned for saying so, the rest of the world along with India has to meet this burden, because, although the power potential of India and the capacity to create international conflict at the moment may not be very great, yet India is 430 million people. I could say that is, perhaps, 100 million too many, but, anyhow, that's how many there are. Although we have no desire to take any leadership in any part of the world, what one country does does affect the others.

The fact that we have been able to function to some extent does give heart and encouragement to Pakistan, where they keep on having an agitation about democratic, representative government, not because they are having an absolute dictatorship at the moment, but because they feel that one-man government, and the transition of power, are very unsafe and very insecure. I suppose their desire is to have a more representative government. They have this agitation.

In turn, what happens in Ceylon and Burma affects us. I do not

suggest that India is the key, but by her very size and by her very presence she is a factor which does influence, not only the surrounding neighbors but parts of East Africa also, which for historical reasons were connected with the British. They have a lot of exchange with India and they take heart and encouragement from India. Of course, we take heart and encouragement from the Europeans and from the United States. But they are far away. They have reached the stage where they are not easily translatable in comprehensible terms to the Burman or the average Indian or the average East African. To that extent what happens in India is of importance, not only for 430 million people but for large parts around us.

I would not like to go into any details of our production or statistics, but I say these statistics are available. I will say that the difficulty has been caused by some misunderstanding as to the direction in which India is going. There was talk of a socialistic society and there was talk of public sector and private sector. There were differences in not realizing where the threat lay, to which maybe other parts of the world were subjected, but, so far as we in our part of the world were concerned, we felt that the threat lay from poverty and the lack of economic development, rather than from pure ideology, because ideology also much be effected through some instruments. Those instruments we now have discovered were the internal situation inside each country. In Kerala, for instance, which was the most literate state, with 80 percent literacy, and which, as a religious group, is the largest

Christian community, there was the only Communist government which we have in India. It seemed astounding. Nevertheless it was an object lesson to us. On the one hand we cannot and we should not prevent the spread of literacy. On the other hand we should do our best to provide a certain measure of economic development. And yet the combination, we discovered, can be very dangerous. Persons are willing to wait for a fair amount of time, but they would not like to see a great deal of distinction between a handful of the rich and the general mass.

It's always a balancing feat. Sometimes we are perhaps miscarried and go to the other extreme of freeing all enterprise. Occasionally perhaps we do impose rigidities on economic development. But that is the basic objective and the main drive has been to improve the social-economic structure of India in order that she may be able to become a stable factor, not only in India but in her neighboring areas as well.

The only other problem that remains for me to deal with is Pakistan. I might as well submit to it. It is frequently believed, and it was written by the press all over the world, that the British withdrew leaving India divided into two portions. That is quite incorrect, absolutely incorrect. The British withdrew leaving India divided into three and two-quarter bits. This may seem silly. The three bits were :

What was then known as British India, which was divided into two: West Pakistan, North Baluchistan, the northwestern frontier province, and half of Punjab, and Sind. The other part was East Bengal, which was primarily Moslem by religion. The minority religion was Hindu.

These were the two bits. Pakistan is now what was British India. The other bit took the 365 Princes each of whom was given the right to do exactly what he wanted to do. Some of them did cause a fair amount of trouble. Then there was Baluchistan and Afghanistan. The idea was that the British would withdraw their paramountcy, and what would happen in Baluchistan one wouldn't know, because it had been more or less occupied by conquest, and the frontier people thought that they should have the right to decide whether they would join India, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, or join nobody.

Well, as it happened, the founders of Pakistan said that, if the frontier and Baluchistan were to be given any choice, there would be no Pakistan. This meant that if there was to be no Pakistan the Indian leaders felt there would be no India, and this meant that there would be no independence at all.

So those two quarter bits were compromised by the Indian leadership, who said, "All right. They can go to Pakistan if that is what the British decide. We don't decide it." That still left us with three bits, India, Pakistan, and the Indian Princes. I might mention that, surprisingly enough, most of the Indian Princes did show a remarkable degree of patriotism and loyalty by joining up with one side or the other well before the departure day for the British team. Some of them did not. The Maharajah of Jodhpur was one. The Maharajah of Travanglo was another, Bhopal hesitated. Kashmir hesitated. Hyderabad hesitated. Eventually most of them did join. The poor Maharajah's government in Hyderabad was taken over by outsiders and he was made by-parlous. He

did not know what was being done.

At the same time it was a remarkable phenomenon. I do not say that the British Cabinet was responsible for it, although I had some explanation from Lord Atley himself, as to how things went wrong.

The Government of India since 1922 had been more or less an independent entity. I might mention that up until 1928 Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya were more or less governed from India. Malaya was governed from the Calcutta presidency. Iraq, on the other hand, and other states were governed from Bombay. When the League of Nations was formed in 1928 India became one of the independent members. It gave them an independent vote. Nevertheless, the British Government of India, I should say, was functioning as an independent entity.

The British civil servants in India and the soldiers and sailors had acquired their own ideas of how India should be run and governed. Never mind what the British government did or did not, because they really did not know. Curiously enough, as you know, I was for 6 or 7 years a soldier, and my brigadiers and commanding officers belonged to the Indian Army--the Sing Horse or the Skinner's Horse, which were Indian units. Their fathers and grandfathers had been in Skinner's or in Sing Horse. They spoke Hindustani better than I did. They did not wish to go. But the Indian authorities, not the Cabinet, but the British-Indian government in India decided that no British officer, civilian, or army would be permitted to stay in India.

There were heartrending and tragic scenes when these officers were

obliged to go. Yet they could all go and stay in Pakistan. It was fantastic. Here a field marshal could go in the Second Punjab Regiment and stay in Pakistan. Rabusha and the others could stay in Pakistan. But not a single one could stay in India. Only two did, and they had to resign before they could stay in India.

My impression is that the British-Indian civil servant and soldier felt that this business would collapse, that it would not last. The Congress was rather stupid when they said: "Give us independence." After all, Mr. Churchill had referred to Mr. Nehru as a man of straw. He said, "You give the government to Nehru and it is handing it to men of straw. It will be inflamed the day after tomorrow." Mr. Churchill is a very wise man.

So I am not saying that the British civil servant in India was malicious or wicked, but he felt, somehow or other, that it would not work. They left India to her devices and withdrew into Pakistan and waited there.

Now only that--the British business sold out en masse in Calcutta. The jute mills, the tea plantations, and the rubber estates were being sold out by the British. I remember distinctly that Lord Miller, who used to be in India, was here at that time advising American businessmen to go and buy at rockbottom prices. But everyone expected that India would collapse, so nobody was buying. The Indian traders purchased all these properties at very low prices, to the regret of British and American people who had to come back after five years and buy at much

higher prices.

There seemed to be^a sense created that this would not last, that this could not function.

I mention this because it caused a great amount of difficulty and misunderstanding. India was to be divided and so far as the British government was concerned, they were leaving. What the British civil servant had thought of, nobody really knows... It had not been accepted publicly. Sir Walter Mountain was advising the government at Hyderabad. There was another gentleman advising Chavancor Cochin, and another advising Jodhpur. They were advising them not to join us after all, that India would not last, and that the feudal barons would form a new form of government, a new form of federation, according to the 1935 Act, which was that the Princes would form one unit, British India would form another unit, and parts of British India, which are now Pakistan, would form the third unit. All three would get together and form a new style of government. So they thought that perhaps it would be possible.

However, it did give us in India a feeling of real frustration at the time, that we were being done down by those who had earned their livelihood in India and who had lived in India and raised their families in India. They were leaving us and going over and just sitting idly in Pakistan.

At the same time it did encourage the government of Pakistan to feel that perhaps the three-cornered constitution might develop. I cite

this because it is regarded that Kashmir is the sole bone of contention between India and Pakistan, and that if Kashmir were handed over everything would be all right. Well, at the moment, if we had to handle the Kashmir situation, why should we go and fight the Chinese? We could handle the Kashmir situation and save our money. It's perfectly simple.

I mention this background because it was not Kashmir. Kashmir came later in the day. There was supposed to be a stand-still agreement with Kashmir. India was hesitating to enter into a stand-still agreement with Kashmir. Kashmir had an agreement with the old government. It was for customs and duty to be free so that everything would be allowed to go in. We were hesitating about an agreement and Pakistan made an agreement with them. Therefore, they should have honored the agreement even more. As it turned out, somehow or other, they hesitated in honoring the agreement, whilst we were still thinking about whether we should have an agreement with Kashmir or not. I mention this merely as a background.

It was not religion. It was not Kashmir. It was merely the feeling that India as it is somehow is a trick and was not intended to be. I am not saying this was the feeling of the Cabinet Mission but this was the general feeling of vast masses in India also who were in touch with the British authorities that India was somehow a trick and it was not meant to be like that and it wouldn't be like that.

This psychology caused a great amount of difficulty. ~~Manadna~~ Sakakun Bashad was the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. He was Hindu as was everybody else. He was the Prime Minister for a long while. My own father served

in that government. He was Hindu. There was no problem. Grampulis had the same thing. To say that religion constitutes a difference is wrong. It is true that religion arouses passions, and wicked politicians who play on passions can utilize religion. But that is not so. There are 48 million Mussulmans in India. There are 20 million Christians. There are about 9 million non-Mussulmans in Pakistan even today.

The world would be quite an impossible place if religion were to constitute the sole basis of nation states., particularly in mixed societies, especially in India, which is developing as a diversified, pluralistic society, where the winds from all corners of the world are free to come in and combine to enrich the culture.

So it was not religion. Religion was a factor, indeed. It was not Kashmir. It was somehow a feeling that India was not meant to be what it had become.

Well I do give credit to the Indian Princes who were patriotic enough, credit to our civil services, who stood up under the strain, and credit to the Congress leaders, who made it possible. But this is the frustration which is really the backbone of the present generation of leadership in either country which causes the problem with Pakistan. It is technically an international problem, but it is a very mixed situation. How long it will take for these frustrations to die down I would not like to prophecy. That they must die down is quite clear.

The present Ambassador of Pakistan in Batabal was with me in the

Ardilili. The present High Commissioner of Pakistan in Canada was with me at Army Headquarters . He was a stock captain. I telephone him, and we are good friends. Our present Ambassador to Teheran has a brother who was the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan.

This sort of thing just cannot go on. There are families divided. Yet we are independent countries and we have the right to have our differences and to perhaps have our quarrels. It is a peculiar problem which was born more of frustration than of religious differences or of Kashmir. And I suspect that it will take some time to die down. It is still contingent on economic development.

If there is an economic nexus, the trouble that we had in Rokala, where the Hindus thought, "Now there are 50 Mussulmans who are working in the steel mill. If we kill those 50 we can get better jobs, because there are no other skilled personnel available." would lessen.

It is to a large extent an economic problem. If the economics were much better this friction would tend to abate if not altogether disappear.

I suppose there will be further questions on this. I will not talk about it any more.

COLONEL AUSTIN: Gentlemen, Mr. Dar will welcome your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, is there any trade, commerce, or any other relationship between India and Pakistan?

MR. DAR: Oh, yes, there is a lot of trade that goes on--textiles. After all, Pakistan still exports jute to India for manufacture there.

Coal is being exported from India to Pakistan. Trade gets arrested from time to time because of political friction, but it continues. The migration of people continues. It seems to me a peculiar situation. It should be regulated completely in accordance with normal, international standards and procedures, but it somehow manages to circumvent that. It is treated, as it were, as a part of a family affair in addition to normal trade in commerce, which comes by the ports.

QUESTION: You have indicated that the Chinese action toward India, having created an economic burden for you, was a premeditated thing. From the newspaper stories that I have read I have been under the distinct impression that the greatest part of India's military strength is directed toward Pakistan. Is this correct?

MR. DAR: Today it is incorrect. Take the Army, which I am familiar with completely. We were supposed to have an authorized establishment of half a million. We had run it down to 402,000. For our own internal defense we had it scattered so that there were about 120,000, including training reserves, et cetera, in the West. That was the situation at the time.

Today, of course, Pakistan can say that everything in Kashmir is aimed at Pakistan. Well, I mean, you can say so, but it is not aimed at Pakistan as such. We had a very small establishment, compared even to the last phase of World War II, when we put an army in the field of a million and one-half.

So it is quite right that, until 1959, I would say, the bulk of Indian thinking was that any possibility of a large-scale encroachment from Pakistan, in terms of war, we had never contemplated. That is very silly, I know. Sometimes things do happen by accident. Nobody contemplated that.

It was something like the Kashmir affair. So-called tribal raiders who do not wear insignia or badges of rank in the Pakistan Army but really belong to the Army, are let loose as persons of Kashmir to go and attack, or want to liberate. That is the sort of thing we are concerned with. At that time it would have been quite true to say that perhaps the bulk was thinking in terms of Pakistan.

Consider also the long frontier with Pakistan both on the East and on the West. There was nothing. So far as the Himalayas are concerned, broadly, north of the Himalayas is not India. Broadly, south of the Himalayas is not China. There was no reason to imagine that the Chinese would go to the lengths they did go. Therefore we had not thought of raising the Army.

In fact, our former Defense Minister, has been criticized for many things, Mr. Krishna Menon, including now the idea that he had not been telling the truth to the people in the Parliament in that he scaled down the Army establishment. But he did. He did not think that there would be any major warfare with Pakistan. There is cattle thievery and robbery. The whole of the Jodhpur western desert is open. People come across, ostensibly chasing cattle. They go in, attack a few houses, and

go back, merely to create trouble.

We did expect the possibility of larger-scale trouble as had happened in 1947 and 1948 in Kashmir. We kept our troops for that purpose.

But that is not the situation today, unless, as I said, one regards that all our troops in the northeastern frontier agency and in Kashmir are aimed at Pakistan. Well, politically, they could say so. We have not seen what they do at night. In the daytime we know that all the guns and the hardware are pointing north. Maybe at night they turn them south. That's all I can say. I can't prove it.

QUESTION: Sir, how do you view the Sino-Soviet situation now as to authenticity and depth? Is there a real rift? What are your views on that situation?

MR. DAR: I don't know that I am an expert on that. It is commonly believed, I would say as a Foreign Service Officer, ^{that} there are in Afro-Asia, or, shall I say, in the nonaligned world, distinctly three views. One is broadly held by the Yugoslavs, which is that there is a rift as to methods and ^{in saying} not of objectives. I am not being facetious/that they are both interested in burying the rest of the world, no. They feel that merely the Chinese method is more direct, because they have the facilities and the means and the need, but that there is no fundamental rift, so far as ideology and overall objectives are concerned. This is broadly the Yugoslav view. Perhaps it is conditioned by the fact that the Yugoslavs themselves, officially at least, came to be Communists, so that

they would not like to say that there can be differences amongst the Communists. I do not know that.

The other view is held by the African countries, broadly. They feel that there is no rift at all. In fact, some of them go to the length of saying that Mr. Mao is misbehaving within the limits of tolerance set by Mr. Khrushchev. That is their view.

Most of Asia does not accept that at all. In fact, most of Asia is inclined to believe that the rift is not only of methods but also of ultimate ideology and objectives. Leave out the fact that they want to bury somebody else. What they want to achieve also is something different.

We in India broadly think that the difficulty is not only nationalism but is also a clash of personalities, that Mr. Mao, after all, was rejected by Stalin, who sent his Ambassador to Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Mao, perhaps, does feel that he represents the truer version of the struggle for liberation of the world than that which is represented by the Russians at the moment.

Broadly in Asia the feeling is that it is a combination of factors. One is nationalism. There are borders and the natural, normal, Chinese pride, added to the fact that the phase through China is passing today necessitates more rigid control and authoritarianism than is required in Russia where, for scientific development, they have to free their people. They have to prove that communism has achieved something.

So it is a much more fundamental thing. How long it will last

depends on world factors. It is quite conceivable that, if we were to land armies on both ends of the northern Communist empire, they might get together. But it is also conceivable that, since nobody is interested in doing that, it might tend to grow.

So these are the three views held broadly in the nonaligned world. You ask your experts what they feel.

QUESTION: Sir, during my 4½ years of graduate school in an engineering capacity I studied with six of your countrymen who were very fine engineers. Four of those six remained in the United States for the past 5 years because they didn't have an opportunity to practice in India. Would you discuss that situation?

MR. DAR: Yes. For instance, Formosa and Iran--at least two I know--and Turkey have a rigid system that anyone who goes abroad must come back to the country from which he went--i.e., Formosa, Iran, or Turkey. They go abroad for technical training. I submit, there again there is a fundamental difference in the way we have set about our government. We say, "We hope you will come back." If they do not, we say that whatever was the civil and financial obligation should be returned. Our students who come on government scholarships return the money and they are free to seek their livelihood abroad.

It might seem a waste of talent. On the other hand, we are not an exclusive society. I mean, our feeling has all along been that we are able to contribute something to the betterment of the human world if our scientists are useful. My own cousin is doing atomic work at Harvard.

It's not that he wants money. He is fairly well to do. It is not simply association with the government. We felt that, if he can be more usefully employed for the betterment of humanity in a highly specialized institution, at Harwell, well, good luck to him. Perhaps he could come back and contribute something to India, also.

We do not have such a dearth of talent as to obligate everybody's coming back.

Secondly, it has its own advantages in that people are more willing to go abroad and are more willing to get back. We have today approximately 8,000 Indian students in North America, including Canada, of whom about 6,000 are in technical fields--engineering, agriculture, chemistry, physics--and we have an education counselor who tabulates how many go back. Approximately 99 percent do go back. So should we, for the sake of that one-tenth, regiment our society and our whole way of thinking? We don't think it is really worth while. What may be our loss, possibly, is a gain to the rest of humanity.

Occasionally it's pure finances. Some people feel, not that they will do a better job but that they can get a better job abroad.

Well, that is how we function.

QUESTION: Sir, it is my understanding that the birth-control problem in India is probably one of your greatest economic challenges. Can you give us some idea of your prospects in that situation?

MR. DAR:I wish I could. We understand now that the United States Government has officially blessed family planning. We are very happy

about that. For long years we have tried. I would be quite clear on this. I wouldn't like to mislead. When the British were still in India we knew that we had resources. We did not know what resources we had. We knew also that they were not being utilized and developed. So, to a large extent, in 1947, the feeling was allowed to grow--or perhaps it grew by not being checked--that India had tremendous resources, and that it would not be a problem of poverty but of merely developing those resources.

We discovered, of course, after seeing the birth rate, et cetera, in the very first five years, that it was not so. Known resources were limited. In fact the present head of our Statistical Organization made it quite clear that we are, roughly, two-thirds of the land size of the United States, with roughly one-fourth of the resources, if they are exploited. Therefore, if we have the same population, the maximum we can achieve is approximately one-sixth the living standard of the United States--if the population is the same. But, with our population, it would be terrible.

We accepted that. The difficulty arose in that we were blessed with a Health Minister who had been in the Congress Party for a long time. She belonged to a princely family who had sacrificed a great deal for the Congress. It was a she. It is very difficult to argue with a Roman Catholic Health Minister. She brought to bear all the Cardinals of the Church on us.

Also, during the days when Mahatma Gandhi was leading the struggle,

he was for self-discipline as being the best means of conducting one's self. He wasn't thinking of birth control as such but of self-discipline of the human being altogether. Therefore, his emphasis had been on self-discipline.

These two combined and it was quite some time before the government could officially bring itself to say that this was a problem. When we did find it was a problem, we didn't know what to do about it. There are various systems that we have tried, and we still haven't found or been told about a fool-proof method.

Certainly, we have almost gone to the verge of illegality in India. But we have 8,000 mobile clinics, and that is still not enough. We just do not have enough manpower to be able to cope with the situation through normal means of physical operation.

The elusive pill is still elusive. So the problem is there. I mean, we multiply at the rate of, roughly, 10 million a year, which is colossal. With the best of will, it is going to be a problem. It is not that the villager--the village woman or the village man--or the industrial worker is not interested. It is surprising. I have seen in Bombay and Cawnpore industrial areas that the women and the men go to be sterilized after they have had three children. But, as an average, they go after they have had seven children and not three. Well, that's too late.

If we were a dictatorship, I calculated with my Ambassador, sitting down, all we would have to do would be to say, "For five years no children.

No children in India for five years." It seems to simple. But, do you think it would be possible for us to get a single vote if I advocated that program?

QUESTION: Mr. Dar, there has been some discussion of the development of water resources, not on the northwestern frontier but on the frontier between Pakistan and India. Can you tell us something about what is contemplated there? Does it mean a sharing of the water?

MR. DAR: That has all been regulated already by the Indus Water Treaty. That was another myth that was created, that five of the rivers into Pakistan traverse Kashmir, and, therefore, to be sure of getting the water, Kashmire must go to Pakistan. Of course, the largest two rivers, the Jhelum and the Indus, don't rise in Kashmir at all. They rise in Tibet. So, by that theory, Pakistan should go and control Tibet.

What will happen to Europe? The various rivers pass through various states. No. That was regulated with the help of the World Bank and the Indus Water Treaty, which has not been challenged and which has not caused any difficulty. The problem really was, they wanted to be assured of getting a certain amount of water that they were using, and allowing also for a modicum of growth, which they have got through the Baramula Dam project. They can have their own water resources.

We do not envisage any problem arising on that account, nor can Pakistan say today that they have encountered any problem in the past five years, since the Indus Water Treaty regulated the conduct of the

rivers. The World Bank is there to determine if the treaty is incomplete, if we have stopped or directed any water supply which was essential for their development. Rather than haveing any argument advanced, it has been regulated. I mean, they have decided how much water Pakistan needs and they have taken into count also the need of it for further growth.

If everything goes well, after two years from now, Pakistan will no longer be dependent on the waters that flow through India and the southern half of Kashmir for their water resources. They will be completely independent.

QUESTION: Sir, would you review for us the negotiation between your government and ours involving the position of the United States Fleet in the Indian Ocean, specifically the political and the military aspects, and more particularly the reaction of the government vis-a-vis the people of India?

MR. SAR: The answer is very simple. There has been no negotiation. But it is not quite finished there. As our Prime Minister said, although the Indian Ocean is called the Indian Ocean, it doesn't mean that India owns it. The Indonesians call it the Indonesian Ocean. So, what can you do? If, for instance the Russian submarines or the Russian Fleet go 12 miles away from our shores, or 6 miles away from our shores-- we claim now a 6-mile territorial limit--on the 7th mile, there is nothing we can do. We may not like it. We'll perhaps be very concerned about it, but there is not much one can do legally.

Of course the United States would not wish to in any way cause

any difficulty for us. The problem was posed because Japan had protested, in view of their experience with nuclear weapons, that the Seventh Fleet would be carrying nuclear weapons and that they didn't like any nuclear ships to go into Japanese harbors. The Ceylon government took up the cry and said, "How is India not concerned by these nuclear ships? We would like to make it quite clear that we should know first which ships are equipped with nuclear devices before we let them in."

Well, that is somewhat childish, in practical terms, to expect the United States Government to declare in advance which vessels are equipped with nuclear devices. I mean, that obviously wouldn't be done.

The press thereupon took it up, and of course the press delights in exaggerating, or at least trying to pin down the government to certain lines. But there was no line. The contingency has not arisen, because we quite understand that the U. S. Navy wants to familiarize itself with the waters of the Indian Ocean. In fact, occasionally, the U. S. Navy has been visiting India and Ceylon, just as the British have been visiting. In fact, we hold joint exercises with the Commonwealth forces.

Our people are worried that we will then be importing nuclear warfare into India, and therefore the impact of India on China to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons will be lessened. I do not know that this would have a great impact. But, anyhow, the situation has not arisen. I do not see how it could arise. The fact that the U. S. Navy

would like to familiarize itself with the waters of the entire world is quite understandable. That the U. S. Navy is not intending to make a show of force is also known, because, what force needs to be shown? India is not at war with the United States or anything.

It was just somehow or other played up because it started with Japan and went down to Ceylon. You see how it happens. On the way to Australia they go almost near Ceylon, and the Ceylonese got very agitated. Naturally, the brunt fell on India, India, with 450 million, and Nehru normally independent. So why was Nehru keeping quiet? What could he do? He said, "Well, the Indian Ocean doesn't belong to us. They are free to familiarize themselves with oceans to avoid attacks." That doesn't mean that he has become a stooge of the Americans. He said, "I do not say that they are coming here. They have not said they are coming here. What for should they come here?"

There have been no negotiations. No negotiation is required for the U. S. Navy to go into the high seas. We would not expect, of course, that the U. S. Navy would make a show of force with a landing as it did in Beirut some time ago. There is no occasion for it.

Somalia was concerned because of her quarrels with Ethiopia. Zanzibar was concerned, because they were cooking up their own troubles. The neighboring countries were more concerned than we were concerned.

QUESTION: Sir, you played down the religious differences part in your prepared remarks. Over the weekend the papers were full of articles discussing the mass exodus of Hindus out of East Pakistan into the problem

in getting them back into India. I wish you would discuss a little more the religious problems, particularly in East Pakistan? Will there eventually be a complete exchange of Hindus and Moslems?

MR. DAR: I would answer the second part of your question first. Will there ever be an exchange? I could not predict. But, if there ever is, then it would be a great strain on India and on Pakistan. The theory would then be that the millions of Christians would form a state of their own. The approximately 48 million Moslems in India would form a state of their own. Pakistan could then say, if all 48 million went, "We should receive more land, because, really, there will be no space in Pakistan to receive these 48 million. Therefore we should get more land." This would be at the expense, naturally, of India. Where else could they get more land? They can't go to China. They are not on friendly terms with them.

That is an unthinkable situation, or an almost unthinkable situation, which would cause the reformation, practically, of India and Pakistan. Before that reformation comes about, what all the Congress Government stands for would have to be undone. That government surely will resist. As Mr. Freers said, we have been experimenting with a diverse, pluralistic society for the past 15 years, and our leaders, at least, have been preaching that for the past 50 years. All that would have to be undone.

I do not envisage that happening, although I do not predict anything. I do envisage the possibility that religion and these movements can be utilized for political purposes. To an extent, I regret to say, they have

been. I don't say this is true only in Pakistan. It's perhaps more so on the other side. But they have done this. One of our parties, the Jungsun, merely says that we will have a Hindu state. The fact is that it has never formed a government and will not form a government. It has only one member in the House, in Congress. It makes no difference. They are capable of exploiting it.

These migrations that you talk about become the business of the newspapers. They present things which attract human attention. The fact that India produces 10 million people every year is obviously a much greater burden than 300 or 500 or 5,000 coming across. It is the politics involved with it which causes trouble. The politics arises also from economics.

At the time of partition, in Punjab the carpenters were all Sikhs. Some of you might have met some of them, They wear turbans, and they wear beards. The stonemasons were all Moslems. In Lahore, which I did go to see when I went back from here in 1952, it was strange. No houses were being built because there were no woodcraftsmen left. All the Sikhs had gone away. This is the sort of thing that happens.

In Rotela it so happens that 50, or 60 Mussulmans had acquired higher skills, working at the steel mill. When the commotion started, the Hindus and the non-Hindus said, "If these 60 would disappear, we would get their jobs." They took steps to make them disappear. The same thing happened in East Pakistan. By and large the Hindus have built up certain shops and certain properties. Suddenly it was felt

that if these persons left they would inherit going concerns. If the spark was lighted, there were enough unemployed, and, as the saying goes, the Devil finds mischief for idle hands to do. That is the state of affairs. Persons are idle. There is unemployment, more so in East Bengal and West Bengal, for that matter, because the pressure of population is very great. They are, therefore, discontented. When they see the possibility that they can toss out, say, a dozen or two dozen shopkeepers and take over their goods and stores, they think, "Why not?" and it is done.

This in turn creates a climate on the other side, and persons on our side say, "Let's do unto them what they have done unto us." It has changed the resources of government and it is utilized as a political matter.

I am not suggesting that religion plays no part in nationalism or the building of states, no. It has played a part, as Dr. Umbetkal used to say, that religion is like a roadblock on a road. It does not completely block the road. It has no business to be there. It obliges you to divert the traffic. It is illogical but it is there. That is the situation.

The more illiterate and the poorer economically are the societies the more religious they are. You can look around the world. The more developed economically and industrially countries are the less religious they are. A man has nothing else but his pride to hang on to. What is that pride? It is religion. I'm not suggesting that religion is the

opiate of the people, no. But that is the state of affairs. You can look around in Europe, or around in your neighboring countries, also. That is true in India. In Bombay, Calcutta, and Cawnpore, the big cities, nobody bothers about religion. Hindus and Moslems marry. Our consul in New York is married to a Mussulman lady. Nobody thinks twice about it.

It is amongst the poorer sections where they have nothing else to do that this occurs. Either they increase the population or they talk about religion.

COLONEL AUSTIN: We must cut off the questions now. Minister Dar, in a couple weeks nine of us will be touring your country and when we describe our school to them we can tell them that the student body has learned a lot about India this year and that a man named Dar was the reason. Thank you very much.