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A TYPICAL METROPOLITAN AREA--SUPPORT AREA
CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, USA (Ret.)

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 24 January 1961

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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Reviewed By: Col Tom W. Sell, USA Date 24 Jan 1961

Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Mundy, Gentlemen:

So far in our Civil Defense Study Program we have covered Federal and State activities.

Now we will consider the grass roots, the local government level, namely, the metropolitan area and its supply or reception area.

We are fortunate again this year in having a particularly well equipped speaker on this subject, a well qualified one, who since 1954 has been the Civil Defense Director of the City of Milwaukee.

Since the inception of the nation-wide civil defense program, Milwaukee has been one of the better cities so far as defense readiness is concerned. This is due in no small part to the comprehensive program developed and administered by our speaker this morning, Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, United States Army (Ret.).

In mid-November General Carleton reviewed civil defense in Milwaukee with members of our Blue Team and was present at the Milwaukee National Security Seminar when we talked on civil defense and oriented our talk to the city, as we generally do. We appreciated his help there.

General Carleton, it is a pleasure to welcome you to our new

building and to introduce you to the Class of 1961 for this, your second talk before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Gentlemen, General Carleton.

GENERAL CARLETON: Thank you, Admiral. Gentlemen:
invited
I am honored indeed and flattered at being/back to talk to you and your class on local civil defense problems, despite the fact that civil defense is not a very happy subject.

I have been in this business for six years now, and I know no one who has succeeded in making civil defense a glamorous popular program. We have many staunch supporters, it is true, but I am sure that most if not all of them are working because they feel the great need for this program if our Nation is to survive in the uncertain years ahead, rather than through any love for the work.

There is nothing glamorous or even exciting about the prospect of sweating out a fallout period in a tiny shelter and wondering what the world will be like if and when you are able to come out. Nor is the prospect of uprooting your family and taking them to the countryside to spend a similar period in some farmer's basement, not the least bit enticing.

Consequently, regardless of how we approach the problem, the average man will continue to know more about and be far more interested in the problems that will confront the astronaut in the future space ship

than he is in the problems that will confront him following a nuclear attack on this country.

Although we have been severely criticized for doing so, we have had to literally scare people into the civil defense program. However, people don't actually mind being frightened a little bit. More often than not we have to be frightened before we will do anything. How many insurance policies would be sold except for the background of fear motivation? Just look at the things we are doing today in the field of education and research and development because Sputnik I scared us into action. Civil defense cannot be sold to Mr. John Citizen without the fear background.

Of course, one can't overdo it, for he will be scared into immobility. We promote civil defense very much like the old Kentucky mountaineer who came down out of the hills with his jug and his rifle and approached a stranger on the road. He said, "Stranger, have a drink." The stranger said, "I don't care for any. I don't drink." The mountaineer set the jug down and leveled his rifle, and he said, "Stranger, I said, have a drink." The stranger, thinking valor was the better part of caution, took a drink. He spit, and tears came to his eyes, and he quickly set the jug down. The mountaineer said, "Now, ain't that the most godawful stuff you ever tasted in your life?" He said, "It sure was." So the mountaineer handed him the gun and said, "Here, now, you take the gun, and I'll have a drink."

There is, however, ample evidence that public attitude toward civil defense has undergone a considerable change for the better in the past several months. Not it almost looks as if civil defense is on the verge of becoming popular. Of course, Mr. Khrushchev's attitude since the ill-fated Paris conference has had a considerable amount to do with that, as has his little friend, Fidel Castro.

However, other things have also occurred to help increase public confidence and to develop the belief that perhaps something worth while can be done.

As most of you well know, civil defense had a pretty tough time for many years. Until two years ago there was no Federal plan, and such State and local plans as did exist were without the backing of State laws. The military establishment had oversold massive retaliation as a deterrent to war, so that very few people believed that anything else was necessary.

Today 38 out of the 50 States have survival plans adequately backed by State law. In the most critical target areas community plans have now been completed. Today the military establishment has withdrawn from the massive-retaliation-only concept and has insisted on the need to be able to meet any type of aggression anywhere on its own ground, with something more selective than nuclear weapons.

Civil defense was given its greatest encouragement when it was

recognized by the Department of Defense as a partner of the military forces and as a deterrent to war. The Department of Defense Directive No. 3020.27 of July 28, 1960, states in its introduction:

"The vulnerability of the civil population of the Nation in a nuclear attack may impair the ultimate utility, if not the actual combat capability, of our military forces. A well protected civil population is a strong additional deterrent to the possible enemy aggressor. Such protection would not only contribute to the defense of the Nation but would enhance the effectiveness of our offensive military capabilities, and would be evidence" (and this is the part we don't talk about in public) "of the willingness of the U. S. population to accept and adopt the probable consequences of nuclear warfare."

I say again that that is something the public is very unwilling to accept. It's going to take a lot of training and a lot of doing before that phase of our policy can be implemented.

In paragraph two the DOD strongly supports the national shelter policy. The order states:

"The Department of Defense has a vital interest in the entire Civil Defense Program for three major reasons. The Nation is not defended in fact by all the readily available means of defense if civil defense measures are inadequate or neglected.

"The vulnerability of our civil defense structure impairs the capabilities of existing military forces to serve their intended purpose. Under prevailing plans and arrangements, if general war occurred, military capabilities for execution of primary military missions could be substantially lessened by diversion of civil relief tasks."

Preceding the DOD Order by almost two months, U. S. CONARC Basic Plan, dated 1 June 1960, under the Concept of Operation, states:

"Civil defense is recognized as an essential element of the general war deterrent. Accordingly, Army civil defense emergency support planning and preparedness has the overall objective of contributing to the deterrent and survival capabilities of the Nation by insuring a capability for rapid and effective response to civil defense emergency situations."

As most of you know, the CONARC Basic Plan then directs Army commands to prepare all necessary plans to supplement and support civil defense emergency operations to the maximum extent possible without interference with the Army's primary mission.

Inasmuch as the last time I spoke from this platform I made the statement that the Army wanted no part of civil defense, I am now most happy to recognize that times have changed, and we can work together toward an integrated national defense that will, we pray, be a more effective deterrent to war.

The most recent shot in the arm for local civil defense was the appropriation of funds by the Congress to implement Public Law 85606. Over two years have passed since Congress, as of August 1958, declared it to be the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility for civil defense be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions. Beginning with January 1, 1961, the Federal Government will now match local civil defense costs on a 50-50 basis.

Although Federal Law 85606 defines civil defense as the joint responsibility between Federal, State and local governments, it actually is basically a local problem. Federal and civil defense authorities can advise and coordinate only. The real operation must be carried out at the local level. Without a strong local civil defense, we'd be like an army with all staff and no soldiers.

Our mission is simply stated—to save as many lives as possible in time of war or of natural disaster. However, in preparation for the accomplishment of this mission, things become much more complicated. We decided that, during the normal readiness period, we must develop the following capabilities. They are listed, not in the order of their importance but in the order of their possible accomplishment.

First, to be able to disperse people from areas of concentrated population prior to attack if time is available.

Second, to disperse and safeguard essential equipment, personnel, and communications, to facilitate post-attack mobilization.

Third, to provide minimum shelter from radioactive fallout for a maximum number of people everywhere in our area of responsibility.

Fourth, to provide minimum shelter from blast and thermal radiation within the target areas.

Fifth, and the most difficult, the permanent dispersal of industry and of urban population.

Slide I

Our first step was to define our area of responsibility. This is metropolitan Milwaukee and its surrounding counties. The population of this area is about 1,500,000 people, with 720,000 of them in the city itself. We developed a number of possible attack patterns, each of which we considered against the following three assumed conditions.

1. Little or no civil defense preparations.
2. Dispersal of 40 percent of the population, with fallout shelter for all.
3. Dispersal of 75 percent of the population, with fallout shelter and 10 PSI blast and thermal protection in the target area.

Naturally, there could be a countless number of attack patterns and an equal number of possible conditions under which such attack might take place. But, for the purpose of this discussion, I have chosen three of each.

Slide II

This first one--the little red spots you see there are Mitchell Field and the General Motors Company. This is an air strike over Mitchell Field Air Base and the surrounding industry. We feel that this is the logical assumption, because on Mitchell Field we have an interceptor group and a troop carrier command. But perhaps of more importance is the great A. C. Spark Plug Electronics Division that is currently producing the inertial guidance equipment for our ICBM's. What damage would such a strike actually do to this area?

Slide III

This would be the area of total destruction in a rough circle 4.6 miles in diameter.

Slide IV

Out to this area the damage would be severe, buildings demolished, and only those with sturdy structure could survive.

Slide V

Out to this area the damage would begin to lessen, but most windows would be broken, light frame buildings demolished, and many fires started. People would survive in shelters and in basements-- however, not in the open.

Slide VI

In this area and beyond, damage would be slight. Some windows

would be broken, and there would be severe thermal effects on persons in the open. However, a high level of radiation from the immediate fallout could be expected shortly after the blast.

Slide VII

With this attack pattern, under Condition A, with little or no civil defense preparation, it is estimated that on the basis of the population of the area affected 199,790 people would perish from blast and thermal effects; 215,350 would be injured; and radiation effects would kill at least half of these within 90 days.

Under Condition B, with dispersal of 40 percent of the population, and with Rad. F. shelter, 110,330 people would perish, and 118,000 would be injured.

Under Condition C, with dispersal of 75 percent of the population, and with blast and thermal Rad. F. shelter, 57,800 people would die. This later figure includes those destroyed by blast and thermal effects as well as those who died later on from radioactive effects.

Slide VIII

Our second attack pattern visualizes an ICBM attack on this general area. We are informed by highly classified civil defense information service, the New York Times, that the Soviets have set aside five 5-megaton missiles to be fired from bases in the vicinity of Archangel. Taking into account the probable error inherent in such a weapon system, the strike, perhaps, could look like this.

Using the same basis of computation as in Attack Pattern No. 1, we find that under Condition A, no civil defense, we would suffer some 770,000 deaths and 560,000 injured.

With Condition B, dispersal of 40 percent of the population, and fallout shelter, the casualties in the area would be about 423,000 dead and 400,000 injured.

Under Condition C, with dispersal of 75 percent of the population, with fallout shelter, and with 10 PSI blast and thermal protection, our losses would be down to 144,550 dead and 120,000 injured.

Slide IX

Our third attack pattern visualizes a series of strikes on the City of Milwaukee, and on Racine and Kenosha, in connection with a very accurate attack against the whole Milwaukee-Chicago complex. The pattern could look something like this.

Slide X

Under Condition A our total losses would be about 1,144,000. Under B, as you see, we would cut that practically in half, down to 627,500, and under Condition C, our total losses would be reduced to about 214,000.

Gentlemen, these figures have not been pulled out of a hat. They have been carefully calculated by able people who based their calculations on the effects of atomic weapons as published by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Slide XI

Superimposing these attack patterns one over the other, we find that our metropolitan target area would look like this. We conclude that this 7-county area is our area of responsibility and must be organized and coordinated under one plan. We called it the Milwaukee Metropolitan Target Area Plan.

We then set up a planning commission to prepare a metropolitan target area plan. A copy of this plan is on file in your library. It is a plan to organize the facilities of local government throughout the 7-county area in Eastern Wisconsin to meet emergencies.

It is planned to establish a communications system that could be expected to function under any emergency situation, to establish the means whereby the governments of the municipalities of the area may continue to function during and following disaster situations; to facilitate the dispersal of people from congested areas to dispersed reception areas where shelter can be provided; to provide for the mobilization and direction of the resources of the 7-county area following an attack; and to provide for the special and unusual requirements for meeting war and natural emergencies, such as radiological defense, radiation control, economic controls of finance and production, and so forth.

what

This plan had to visualize/would be done under a variety of assumptions. The first one was a strategic situation, a condition that would exist when the seriousness of the possibility of war appeared so great that the

President would warn the Nation to undertake preliminary protection measures. The mobilization of the civilian components of the Armed Forces would be a good example of a warning of this nature.

Next is the tactical alert, the situation which would exist when we received word from NAWAS, the National Air Warning System, that an enemy attack was actually under way; an attack against any part of the United States or its allies, sufficient to trigger our retaliatory force would also constitute a tactical alert.

Our third assumption is the take-cover situation. It stems from NAWAS warning that an attack is imminent and there is sufficient time only to take the best cover available.

Fourth is the post-attack mobilization and rehabilitation.

These were the objectives and assumptions on which the plan was based. However, it was no simple task to organize the police and the sheriff departments, the fire department, the public works and county road commissions, as well as the medical and welfare organizations, and others into vertical organizations on a 7-county area and to obtain agreements on how things would be done and who would be the boss. The jealousies and suspicions that exist between cities and counties and between rural counties and urban counties could not be easily overcome. Local politicians, like some military officers, often wear their rank and prerogatives around their waists like rubber balloons. And you should see how they twist and dodge to keep one from being

punctured. Let one be touched and it goes off with a hell of a bang, and it's very difficult to repair.

However, by having county and urban representation on the planning commission, they soon came to realize that this was an areawide problem and that each of their municipalities would want help and would be expected to give help in times of emergency.

Slide XII
which

So the emergency services, consist of police, fire rescue, medical, engineering, welfare, and communications, agreed to a vertical organization, each service to be under an MMTA Director. This is the setup. We have an order to set up two different headquarters for the entire area, one out about 30 miles from the city, and one practically at the edge of the city, in a fallout shelter, a fairly safe place from even blast effects, which can continue and intends to continue operations as long as it has communications.

Each of the counties in here has a similar setup to that, and then there is an overall setup for the entire metropolitan target area.

Slide XIII

This is a picture of our control center in operation during^a test exercise.

Slide XIV

Our communications network was established based on a combination

of interlocking wire, radio, teletype, and radio teletype, which we believe has an excellent chance of surviving any pattern of destruction. In the alternate headquarters communications are installed in two 6x6 semi-trailers. We have two of the big yellow type jobs, and they are kept stored at widely separated places 20 to 30 miles from the city.

We have two of the smaller ones which can be used to supplement the larger ones and are used in natural disasters and at traffic control centers.

In short, we think our MMTA Plan will work. So far tests have indicated that it will work. However, it is under continuous study and revision.

Slide XV

As part of our MMTA Plan it was necessary to develop the Dispersal and Reception Area Plan. If there was time to disperse, people had to know where to go and how to get there. This is the reception area surrounding the MMTA. You will note that we could not go south because of Chicago, and our movement west was somewhat limited by the City of Madison, the State Capital, and the location of Truex Field, which is the Control Center for the Air Defense Command for this 5-State region. It is also, naturally, a target.

So our main movement for dispersal had to be north and west.

Slide XVI

This is our Site to Site Dispersal Plan, part of our MMTA Plan. Basically in this plan each school district in the city or in the suburbs outside the city has been assigned as a reception area. Studies have indicated that the designated reception areas can afford refuge to all or any part of the population assigned to them.

The routes from the sectors in the city have been marked with large blue reflecting signs so that people should know how to get there. The plan was published in detail in color by the Milwaukee Journal, with over half a million circulation.

We also developed a plan to capture and direct the fluid transportation always moving in our city.

SLIDE XVII

This is our transportation map, showing the location of all transportation dispatch points and the radio routes out of the city. When the alert signal is sounded, all transport will check into the nearest dispatch point, where they will be sent where needed according to the plan. In these dispatch points we have a little booklet which will indicate where transportation would be most needed--schools, hospitals, and that sort of thing.

We have plans whereby we can take brewery vans, for example, and moving vans, and strap stretchers which we call stacking litters

one on top of the other to the sides of the van, and these vans can take care of 30 or so patients with one attendant.

In order to implement the MMTA Plan it was necessary for every city, county, and township to have a plan, and for all government employees from the top to the bottom to be thoroughly briefed in its operation.

We have such a plan in the City of Milwaukee, and you have a copy in your library. The mission of the plan is to provide for the full utilization and control of all the resources of city government in an emergency. Specifically, it provides for the following: Lines of succession of authority in all departments of government; preservation of essential records by microfilming and duplication, and deposit in safe storage; phased dispersal of essential personnel and equipment to the alternate seat of government and to assembly areas; the emergency assignment of all city employees as a condition of employment, and provision for each employee to take the necessary training to carry out that assignment. That is not a simple thing to do with local common councils or county boards--to have an administration such as civil defense be able to call people out during workdays to take additional training. The plan also provides for the augmentation of the regular city services by the employment of trained volunteers.

This plan was approved by the City Council and now has the force

of a regular city ordinance. Preparing the plan, however, and having it carried out are two different problems, as you all know too darn well. The State and municipal laws had to be adjusted to make implementation possible. This, of course, varies with the State and municipality. However, it is ⁱⁿ an attempt to launch the program and to actually do something that one discovers the forces that are out of sympathy with any change.

For example, for the last two years we have striven mightily to develop a fallout shelter program in our area, especially for schools, hospitals, and homes. Logically, such shelter areas must have a dual purpose to justify the expenditure of funds and to make them effective as shelters. The dual purpose must also be compatible with the use of the area shelter in an emergency.

We found that it is contrary to State and local building codes in our area to conduct classroom instruction, study hall, or library, and things of that nature, in rooms in which the floor is over two feet below grade. As for homes, it is contrary to the same codes to construct a basement below a garage, or a room in a house below the grade that is intended as living quarters of any kind. These laws have been on the books for many years, and they are very difficult to change.

Nevertheless, eight new companies have been organized in Milwaukee since the first of the year for the purpose of building home fallout shelters. I am informed that they are not doing a rushing business; nevertheless

it is a profitable enough venture that they are staying in the business. A public shelter for 2,500 people is being included in our new museum. I might say that was under the prototype shelter program of the Federal Government, which is contributing some \$200,000. The cost of the building runs around \$5,200,000, and the Federal Government is adding \$200,000 for the construction of this shelter. It will be a really safe shelter, 34 feet below grade, with a four-story concrete building, reenforced, above it.

The program moves, and, given enough time, we can gradually become better prepared. The problem of monitoring fallout would not be too difficult if instruments were available in sufficient quantity and at a reasonable price. It is my rather uneducated opinion that our specifications for Rad. F. instruments have always been too sophisticated so that the price was too high and the instrument too delicate.

New instruments are now coming on the market. They are much better, but the price is still high, considering the numbers required. For instance, I have here a radiation monitoring instrument which can be carried in the pocket, and when set it will let out a very strong beep that can alert you to the danger of any excessive radiation in the area where you are operating. However, this is one of about three such instruments that have been marketed so far, and I am unable to even give you a price on it.

Here is an instrument that has not yet been put on the market but has been developed with the hope that there would be a market--a transistor radio with a radiation monitoring instrument included in the setup. It is an ideal sort of thing for people to have in the home, whether they have a shelter or not.

Our solution to the local problem is to equip all police cars, fire rigs, rescue vehicles, and repair trucks from the telephone, gas, and electric companies with monitoring instruments for their own protection, and they are also radio controlled so that they will report at the same time regularly to the control center all Rad. F. information.

In addition to the above, all civil defense services are responsible for their own radiological defense.

In our opinion, the most difficult problem to lick will be the post-attack maintenance of law and order and the imposition and management of economic controls. Experience indicates that, although people will probably not panic during or immediately following an attack, in a post-attack situation, as the fear of radiation poisoning sets in, an almost total irrational behavior pattern must be expected. There may be an argument on that, but I noticed just the other day, for example, that when the people in New York had a bomb explosion in a subway car-- I remember that article--the people in the car where the explosion occurred did not panic. They immediately got busy and tore up skirts to make bandages, and people who were competent there gave first-aid,

and so forth. But on the platform outside, where they didn't know what happened, a real panic developed. Unfortunately, the symptoms of fear and radiation poisoning are very much alike. So the situation will be doubly confounded.

Widespread looting and black-market operations must be expected as soon as people are able to move about. So, unless we are able to obtain help from the military, the national guard, and the reserve, it will be quite likely that the government forces will be quite unequal to the situation.

Of course we should have volunteer security forces in being, in training, now. However, except to a very limited extent, it seems quite impossible to develop an adequate program at this time. The reason is largely political. The metropolitan police forces are unwilling to recruit and train the necessary auxiliary reserve forces because they claim that such forces would soon exert strong political influence and would in time dominate the regular force. They can point to plenty of examples where this has occurred.

Although it would seem most natural and desirable for the State to organize such security forces, we have been unable to do so because in our area it is believed that violent political opposition would immediately develop. Opposition would be encouraged by the labor organizations, the county sheriff associations, and so forth.

So last May, during our OPAL exercise, we asked the 84th Reserve Division to join us in demonstrating to the public what could be expected. The exercise was a great success. The troops were alerted by the CONELRAD radio broadcast and immediately reported to their armories from which places they were dispatched to stations throughout the city.

Contrary to a widespread opinion, people are not apathetic. They just don't know what to do. They are difficult to reach because they largely read only that which is superficial and interesting or pleasant and listen to only that which is profitable or funny. When I say "people" I include legislators as well. I am undergoing a great task at the present moment of reeducating a new political group in our City of Milwaukee. Although we had a good, strong civil defense program for the last 12 years during one political regime, a new one has come in, and the education must start all over again. There is even the point that there is quite a sizable group in that new political regime that would like to do away with civil defense in Milwaukee entirely.

Of course we use the mediums of radio, television, news stories, and our monthly Civil Defense News to spread the word. But our most effective medium is through our home defense corps. This is a volunteer organization, made up largely of women, recruited through PTA's, women's clubs, and veterans' auxiliary organizations. Its members

take an 8-hour basic course in civil defense, and its mission is to bring civil defense into the home and to promote training in first-aid, home nursing, and emergency welfare activities.

Another means of reaching people is through the kids in school. If teacher tells Johnny to take a questionnaire home and have mother and father fill it out and bring it back, it will be filled out and brought back. A survey conducted through the mail with a stamped, return addressed envelope enclosed, will bring about a 10 percent return, while a similar survey brought home by the kids will bring a 98 percent return.

Most of you, I think, have received a copy of what some 200,000 kids will be taking home tomorrow, Civil Defense Day. I am confident that we will get almost 100 percent return on this questionnaire. Of course we can use this medium only occasionally.

If you will look at the questionnaire you will see where we are trying to accomplish two things: One, to add a little bit more to the education of the people who make it out, to dispel some of the ideas that have been current, such as the fact that civil defense is either evacuation or shelter and can't be both, and civil defense doesn't know what it's talking about, because one minute it's shelter and the next minute it's evacuation. We try in this to point up the fact that both means of defense must be available for utilization if necessary. We also want to find out some way or other how many shelters actually exist in Milwaukee. People

don't want to tell you, you know, when they have a shelter. They are very reluctant, for two reasons: One, they are afraid they might be laughed at; and, two, they feel that if a shelter is necessary they want it for their family and not for a lot of neighbors to come tumbling in on top of them, so they'd just as soon the neighbor didn't know that they even had one.

We hope that we can get some idea of how many exist in our area from this questionnaire. Maybe they won't tell us on this. I don't know.

Gentlemen, I am confident that if our national policy of deterring war by threat of retaliation is to be believed by the Kremlin--and it can't succeed unless it is believed--it must be accompanied by a strong civil defense. Picture, if you will, the Soviet G-2 preparing his estimate of the situation. "The Americans," he says, "now possess a strong offensive capability built around the use of nuclear warheads and a considerable variety of delivery systems. They have surrounded the Soviet Union with rocket and bomber bases and will soon be able to reach any target in our country by rockets fired from submarines from beneath the sea. However, their cities are open and vulnerable to destruction. They have built no shelters for their people, and very few of them have any idea or understanding of a personal defense in a nuclear attack. If they intended to launch a surprise preventive attack this situation would be somewhat more logical. However, we

know that they do not intend to launch such an attack, and, under the decadent system of government and their dependence on joint action with their allies, it would be impossible for them to do so without being forewarned. Therefore, this lack of any defensive capability for their people is a fatal weakness the Americans seem unable to understand. As you know, comrades, Russia now possesses the capability of striking a large number of American targets from hard rocket bases near Archangel, and the number grows day by day. In addition, America no longer possesses a monopoly on nuclear submarines capable of firing missiles from beneath the surface. We have solved the technical problems involved and most of our submarine fleet will soon have this capability. Inasmuch as 45 of the largest cities in America are within easy reach of missiles launched from the sea, this weapon alone could have a decisive effect. Therefore, comrades, we can now move our troops in Berlin, West Germany, or other areas without fear of nuclear reaction, because no American President would dare issue the order that would mean the almost immediate death of 30 or 40 million U. S. citizens."

I am confident that the only reason that up to this time we have had only slight indication of this appreciation of the situation, such as the break-up of the Paris Conference, and the vile, insulting language of the Russian Premier in the United Nations, is because the Soviet is not ready. They do not yet possess the capability of decisive retaliation

against our cities. But they soon will have this capability, and when they do we will know it, because the Soviet inspired and controlled incidence of violence and terror will erupt in Germany, in the Middle East, and in Africa.

We are all in this business together. It is our national defense. It is our Nation and our survival that are at stake. Further, national defense, both military and civil, must be legitimately and inherently concerned with the development of the ideological strength of our people and with relating this clearly to the national defense effort.

This is admittedly an elusive and somewhat intangible responsibility to grasp. It is basic, however, to both the strength of our own motivation for self-defense and our capacity for long-range survival as a nation.

We must be able to accept the challenge to not only survive but win. The great national effort that will be required must be dedicated to something of real value, to the existence of something of far greater worth than that represented by communism.

Every aspect of our national defense effort must be insistently and informatively tied to this national justification for being. There is much evidence in our American life today that we do not clearly understand and often do not adequately support what we are fighting for. We are too content with life as it is. We resist change.

In our basic ideological struggle with communism, our ultimate strength as a people is the support of our democratic ideals. This is

the real power and purpose behind our military might, our civilian defense, our warning systems, our bomb shelters, and our dispersal plans. If together we strive in all our contacts with people to carry the purpose of these principles and to identify them inseparably with the daily lives of our citizens, it will make national defense, both military and civil, a force of conviction and vigilance for the preservation of our own liberties, and the enduring principles of world peace.

Thank you.

MR. PULVER: Now we will take some questions.

QUESTION: I live 13 miles from here, and this morning it took me 60 minutes to come to work. I realize that Washington is probably a peculiar place, but in the face of an experience of this kind, it is hard for me as an individual, as distinguished from someone who is trying to organize civil defense, to see the realism or the logic of evacuation. Do your studies in Milwaukee review this notion?

GENERAL CARLETON: I must confess that we don't have the traffic problem in Milwaukee that you have in Washington. However, I did note in coming in here yesterday by airplane an awful lot of new highways under construction leading out of Washington. However, I do say this: In the first place, we do not talk about evacuation any more. We talk about dispersal if time is available. If you have a dispersal plan whereby you can stop and turn off all incoming traffic

and use even the lanes that you have now for only outgoing traffic, you could disperse an awful lot of people in a comparatively short time. This is contingent, again, on the judgment of the Civil Defense Director as to whether or not time is available.

Let's say, for example, that our SAC bases were attacked, and nothing else. We would expect a second wave of attack the next day or hours and hours later and that we would get another one, perhaps, on the cities. At that time it might be ^{thought} expedient, and we might make a mistake, but certainly it wouldn't destroy any more people to ask them to disperse and get out into the country, or get into shelters away from the concentrated, populous city, than it would if they stayed there in the city.

QUESTION: With dispersal prior to attack, or after the attack evacuation, money has vanished. The banks are back in the city, and the checks and other paper money have been used. What is the means by which the populace is clothed, fed, or assisted?

GENERAL CARLETON: That's a rough one. But most banks today have made provision, not necessarily for all of their money to be dispersed, but their records of the existence of the money and the value of the bank are now microfilmed and duplicated in dispersed locations. So that the actual loss of the paper money would not represent any real monetary loss to the bank. In many cases industry, for example, is making provision where people can be cared for, can receive their pay

from assembly areas located out in the countryside, away from target areas. As to clothing and things of that nature, we have that taken care of by our welfare people. I admit that immediately following an attack on great centers of population there would be a great scarcity. However, with proper distribution through welfare services, we think that the people that would be left would be at least taken care of in a minimum manner.

It is going to be rough. It certainly will be terribly rough. I hope to the good Lord that it never happens. We all look on this thing as a deterrent rather than having to carry it through, but, unless we are prepared to carry it through, there certainly will be chaos when it happens, if it happens.

QUESTION: I would like to ask a question about Milwaukee. Could you point to me the reason for the interest in Milwaukee, whether it might be an enlightened city council or perhaps individuals? You mentioned that you had 12 years of civil defense education under one administration. Would you try to locate the hope of interest, using Milwaukee as a case history?

GENERAL CARLETON: I think it stems from a great variety of reasons. As a matter of fact, until I get that questionnaire back I am not going to be too sure whether the interest in the last four years has gone up or not. As I said a while ago, we teach civil defense in the schools. The teachers have all taken what we call in-service training of

forces. It has been integrated into their very subjects. The subjects of science, mathematics, city government, and that sort of thing, all have integrated civil defense into them. So kids are pretty well versed in it.

As far as the older people are concerned, some of them are interested and some are disinterested, and some of them are really anti. They think it's crazy. We had a shelter exhibit at the Fair and there was a lot of interest shown. We handed out a couple pamphlets, and so forth. Just outside the exhibit people were passing out pamphlets against fallout shelter. This particular group happened to be a socialist group, but there are other groups that are equally biased—Quakers, for example, and the Friends Society. There are several of them. In their meetings they are telling people all the time how wrong I am. To say nothing, of course, about the Communists, or the Fellow Travelers, who are violently opposed.

As I said a while ago, we use the radio and everything else we can to reach the older people. They have closed their minds and have closed their ears, and I don't think we will get very far with the whole business until the present generation of school kids grows up and takes over.

MR. PULVER: General Carleton can't very well say this himself, but, when I was in Milwaukee in November and contacted General Carleton and looked over the Milwaukee defense, the impression I obtained was that the reason Milwaukee had such a fine program was

that they had a Director there who picked up the ball and ran with it, and the dynamic program which he is responsible for is the reason why they have such a good program.

QUESTION: My question is closely related to that, General. It seems to me that the key is getting competent people. How can we use the retired military people?

GENERAL CARLETON: As I look over the U. S. Civil Defense Council, I note that it is made up in about two-thirds of military people. But I want to tell you that when you get out into civil life, sometimes this business of having had a rank in the military forces is as much a handicap in some areas as it might be a help in certain other areas. I run into people who really see red when my rank is mentioned. I don't know. I think they think that all retired people ought to crawl in a hole somewhere and not get mixed up with the civil population.

However in the State and local governments I think most Civil Defense Directors are retired military people. As a matter of fact, they are about the only people available to the local governments that have the experience and the background to go into this type of planning.

I find that our police force and our fire department and our public works and our welfare people are used to doing normal things, routine things. They can adequately handle them. But when it comes to looking ahead at a disaster of the type that I mentioned here on the charts a

while ago, they are completely lost. It is only a person who has had considerable planning experience, who had to plan an operation or to participate in planning large operations, that can get hold of that thing and carry it along.

I don't think you will have any trouble. You don't look like you are going to retire very soon. By the time you do I am sure there will probably be some good civil defense job waiting for you to go after.

QUESTION: Sir, I notice that the alert warnings are primarily audio. In the particular suburban area that I live in they have numerous gongs, and the fire department seems to be testing its sirens periodically. When people are out in the open driving their cars they don't necessarily have the CONELRAD station turned on. Have you ever considered the use of multi-colored rockets that would be appropriate, signal rockets, for alert warnings, particularly in metropolitan areas, like yellow, red, or green, to take cover, and so forth?

GENERAL CARLETON: I have heard such a problem discussed, including the large aerial bombs, and that sort of thing. It might be quite effective. However, there are many different types of warning systems available and soon to become available. There is the NEAR system, for example, a simple little gadget which can be plugged into any electric light outlet and will sound an alarm in the home when the proper cycle is put on the power system. I know OCDM expects that

to sweep the country in a very short time, as soon as it becomes available. It will cost something in the neighborhood of five dollars.

You will note in that questionnaire that I asked the question: If that system can be made available, how many people would be willing to spend five dollars for that warning system?

We also have a siren system in the cities. For the countryside (they don't all have it now) there is a siren with a third signal which is becoming very popular, where you have volunteer fire departments. Only that third signal is used, except for the civil defense warning. That third signal is easily distinguishable. It has a kwak, kwak, kwak sound and it does not have any relation to the siren signal, and is used to call the volunteer fire department.

We have in Milwaukee a rather unique system which has been very successful. It's called the Voice of Warning and is tied in also with the music, the Musak System and other music systems. That's a closed wire circuit that goes into the control center, and there are outlets to the schools, the industries, hospitals, and key civil defense personnel. So that the operator on Thule can broadcast over the wires to that Voice Warning System in a matter of two seconds. We want to be able to get kids home if time is available, as quickly as possible.

We've used it lots of time. You might say at 1:00 o'clock we might get a snow warning for 3:30 that afternoon, so we will broadcast that over the Voice of Warning, and they let the kids off to get home. It

helps to test the equipment, and it works very well. The kids like it.

So there are a lot of systems being developed. Perhaps some day what you talked about may be necessary in certain areas.

QUESTION: Is there any advantage in your geographical position on the water? If you could have the people use boats, could you take advantage of the water?

GENERAL CARLETON: I always get that question from a Navy man. Actually there is not. We have studied the matter carefully. Ships coming into Milwaukee have to dock in the river. For the most part they are shut off by bridges and the bridges have to open to let them in and out. Their time schedules are so variable that we can hardly ever depend on being able to put people aboard a ship to get them out. Even if we did, I am not so sure it would be too advantageous, because they can't go very far in Lake Michigan.

So we have figured entirely on dispersing people by land and keeping the bridges available for traffic to move out, to have train and automobile traffic to disperse people if time is available.

The harbor civil defense plan is to get every ship out as soon as possible after the alert comes, to get them away from the target area. How many people we might get aboard is something we would almost have to play by ear even though it happened right in that vicinity and we knew about it, because we can never depend on any ship being

available to us.

QUESTION: General, in your questionnaire referring to that you have on the home ownership and shelter program questions there. My question has to do with those friends of mine who are living in rented homes for a period of time. What type of reading do you get on that type from your questionnaires?

GENERAL CARLETON: In my questionnaire I won't get it from people in rented homes. We happen to live in rather a unique situation in Milwaukee, however, because the vast number of people in Milwaukee own their own homes. We don't have a transient population that you have here in Washington. Young people, particularly the veterans, can get a home for nothing down and \$30 a month. It's almost less than what you have to pay in rent. Of course they are little band boxes, it's true, but an awful lot of them own their own homes. I would say that 60 percent of the families in Milwaukee live in their own homes.

As to those who rent, I don't know. Nothing will happen on that until such time as we make it compulsory for all new construction, regardless, to have a shelter in the basement.

QUESTION: General, you are forecasting some pretty grim figures on injured people. Can you give us some idea how you are going to handle those from a medical standpoint of doctors and nurses and facilities and supplies?

GENERAL CARLETON: We are going to do our best, but I assure you that the figures are such that nothing we are able to do if it should come to pass and we are getting the worst of the situation would be sufficient or adequate. However, we have some 38, I think it is now, packaged hospitals distributed around the outside, away from the target area itself, in storage today in basements, and that sort of thing.

We also have plans whereby the 27 hospitals within the city would immediately phase out into predesignated locations that they have already surveyed, and they understand how they could move into those areas the packaged hospitals and open them up and get them into operation. The equipment is similar to that in a field hospital. Although they are called 250-bed hospitals, there is equipment there to handle over 1,000 beds if needed.

We have also prepositioned the necessary equipment for the blood bank affair, outside the area. There is no effort to store blood, of course, but the equipment is there, so that blood could be drawn from the healthy populace to give to those who need it. There are many hundreds of thousand of containers now in storage in outside areas.

From the standpoint of the nursing care, and so forth, we have discovered all we could of those people who have had nursing training, so that they are lined up and given an assignment away from the city area, and we have also developed a pretty good program in what we call

home nursing. That is going on constantly. It is taken care of by the Red Cross. So that we have increased the number of people.

We have also stepped up the Red Cross first-aid training. That took quite a bit of doing, to get it agreed on. They have stepped up the first-aid training to the point beyond where it used to be. It used to be first-aid until the doctor came. Now they understand what to do if the doctor never gets there.

MR. PULVER: General Carleton, in behalf of the Commandant and all of us here, thank you for a very realistic and hard-hitting description of your program in Milwaukee.