



NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Honorable George V. Allen

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Reviewed by: Colonel J. H. M. Smith 7 November 1962

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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National Security Objectives

26 September 1962

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
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MR. PALMER: Today's lecture is the first in Unit II, on the Management of National Security Programs. In the present world situation it's entirely fitting that we have as our guest lecturer today someone who is thoroughly experienced in the field of foreign affairs. As you will have noticed from our speaker's biography which was distributed, he has held four important Ambassadorial posts. In addition he has been the Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East and South Asian Affairs, and lastly, he has been Director of the United States Information Program.

It is my pleasure to introduce to you today, the Honorable George V. Allen.
Mr. Allen.

MR. ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Palmer. Gentlemen of the Industrial College:
I've had the privilege of speaking to this school on several occasions in the past, but this is my first occasion in this splendid new auditorium. When I look at the comfort of those seats; the splendid arrangement that you have here, it reminds me of a story I heard just yesterday, of a church in New England, where the preacher was preaching away on a very hot summer day. The temperature was about 95 in the church. The women were all fanning and dabbing at themselves, and the men had taken their coats off. Finally, one fellow right down the aisle near the front went to sleep and in the midst of the sermon he fell out of his chair and into the aisle. Of course, it created a great deal of commotion, but the paster went on speaking, bravely, but he was wondering in his mind all the time how that fellow was going to

explain this one now.

After the sermon and they were shaking hands with the pastor as they were leaving the church, this fellow came up and the pastor again wondered what he was going to say about this, but the fellow was equal to the occasion. He said, "Pastor, what this church needs is seat belts."

I don't think you'll have that complaint about this great, splendid auditorium; however, it's very comfortable there and I shall try to say enough things of interest to have you follow the discussion.

I just read again the tracing in the program, of what I'm going to speak about - an analysis of the present national security objectives, and an appraisal of the degree to which these objectives coincide with, or contribute to the realization of the national goals and ideals of the American people. I was commenting before we came in that that is broad enough to cover anything that I might have to say. You may think, when I've finished, that any similarity between what I say and the descriptive material, is purely coincidental.

However, I think this is a very appropriate subject to consider; the relationship between national security and the goals of America. You know that some two years ago a great campaign was carried on in the United States to describe the national goals of America, what are we striving for. And it finally ended in quite a book, describing our national goals, that you have probably had addressed to your attention.

One might say in the simplest terms that the security goal of the United States in the present world situation can be described in very simple terms; it is, to sur-

vive. You recall the well-known incident of the French Nobleman who managed to live through the French Revolution. After it was over somebody asked him what he did during the revolution, and his answer was, "I survived." But you can ask yourself the question very pertinently - in the present situation I think we Americans should - "Is survival enough?" That is, if you have as your objective purely and simply survival at all costs, then that could lead - if we've come to the conclusion as perhaps most aristocrats did during the French Revolution, that the stemming of the tide of the revolution is impossible, consequently the only thing for a man to do is to search for any hole he can find and hide out in it, and manage to survive through either hiding or a compromise with the revolution, or joining it if you can't do anything else, that line of thinking would lead you to start exercising your brain to discover, what is the best thing I can do just to survive. Maybe the Communist Revolution is so overpowering that if you can't beat it, join it; if your goal is purely one of survival.

We Americans have a different tradition, set forth as well as anybody else's remarks, in Patrick Henry's, "Give me liberty or give me death." In other words, survival isn't good enough. I don't want to survive if there aren't certain standards and attributes of life that go along with survival that I can live with; I'd rather not survive. There are certain situations and positions in which a decent person will say, "The price is too high." Now, I'm not suggesting that we are up against quite such an international crisis that we have to say that this is it; that we have only one choice that must be met from a crisis point of view as Patrick Henry was talking about; the time has come to fight right now because we're up against the problem

of liberty or death. But I think this is a basic underlying principle of America that ought to be repeated to our children and our children's children; that there are values in American life that we are willing to give our lives for, and that life isn't worth living unless we can have those principles of human liberty and decency that we stand for.

Now, there is one rather somewhat philosophical speculation that has concerned me and interested me a good deal in connection with my own experiences in international affairs, that I want to throw out this morning, and suggest some thought be given to it. When I was in India I was rather surprised to find that pictures of the high standard of living in the United States, the level of the common man in the United States, insofar as shoes and clothes and housing, and the things we have that our system has produced - of which we are very proud and which we cite in the Voice of America and other means, as an evidence that the free enterprise system of the United States is obviously a successful system because look what it has produced for the common man, not just a few rich in the United States.

We had the same problem when we put on an exhibit in Moscow about three years ago; you remember - when Mr. Nixon went and had his famous kitchen debate with Khrushchev. He was there to open an American exhibit at Sokolnicky Park in Moscow. And those of us who were concerned with that were faced with a problem; "What shall we show to the Russian people? This is one opportunity to come into direct contact with the people of the Soviet Union and show them about life in America. Shall we show them our high standard of living?" We finally, after having argued the matter backward and forward, decided that we should.

One of the chief exhibits, as you may recall, was a model American house that the average American worker could own. It was a house built - not by Levitt who built Levittown; we talked or negotiated with Levitt for awhile, I can tell you, but it didn't quite come off because of certain disputes which arose - but another builder of the same general type, put up a house in Moscow for us just exactly the same as he had recently put up a sub-division in New Jersey, of 500 houses of this kind, sold for \$13,500 or \$14,000. We had Macy's put \$5,000 worth of equipment in it - furniture, washing machines, curtains, vacuum cleaners, and things of that kind; a hot and cold water system, etc.

Well, now, we were honest in figuring that that was an average house that the average American could live in. It was so much further above anything that the Russians could ever expect to achieve during their lifetime that it really, as it turned out, really had very little practical impact, I think, on most of the Russians who saw it. They just shrugged it off sort of as propaganda. They had some interesting ways they attacked it. The Soviet Ambassador here in Washington, Menshikov, at that time, had it all figured out what a hoax this was, by saying, "You say that this house costs \$14,000, but what actually happens is, you pay \$2,000 down and you sign a mortgage for 40 years. And you keep paying on that for 40 years and by the time you add up the principal and the interest that you've paid, the house actually comes to \$40,000. So, you ought to advertise this as a \$40,000 house instead of a \$14,000 house." Etc.

Well, my main point is this; that in many countries, not only the Soviet Union, but other emerging countries, India, for example, our talking about the high stand-

ard of living in the United States, and the American way of life and what it has produced in the material sense, surprisingly falls flat, for this rather strange reason. It was a great curiosity for me to find out for a long time; I kept inquiring about it. It seems to me it adds up to something like this; new countries pride themselves in calling themselves "revolutionary countries." And revolutionary is a good slogan that you carry on for a long time. You know, Mexico still calls its government "The government of the revolution;" the revolution took place in 1912. And, as a matter of fact, we Americans on the 4th of July, particularly, continue to call ourselves a revolutionary country. But newly emerging countries that have just gotten their independence are particularly conscious of thinking of the fact that this is a new era.

India, Pakistan, Burma, or the Congo, or any other areas, have gotten their independence, and not only their political independence, but it's going to be an industrial, economic and social revolution also. So, they get up to thinking of what their country is going to be like, not what it's like now - they've got all sorts of excuses and reasons of why it's poor at the present time; it was the exploitation of the imperialists, or one thing or another. So, their whole psychological impact is building for the future. And it has become very popular to have 5-year plans and 7-year plans and 10-year plans, and all their talk is about what the country is going to be like.

Well, now, a very advanced country like the United States has gone through all that. We've finished all our so-called 5-year plans and 10-year plans, etc. We have arrived. And we are enjoying the fruits of what these emerging countries are

dreaming about. But in their mind - you put yourself into their mentality - when they see a country that is living off the fat of the land; that has two automobiles in every garage; that has more food surpluses than it can possibly eat; and that has all these things that they are striving for so hard, their inclination is to think that we are profligate; that we are wastrels; that we are an inferior type because we are sort of gluttons who are eating up all this; how much more noble it is for a person to sacrifice himself, they say, for the future generations, our children or the future greatness of the country. So, the real admirable nation, in their mind, oftentimes, is the nation that is depriving itself; that is tightening its belt; that is foregoing consumer goods at the present time for the sake of some future goal that they are striving for. And the picture of the opulent United States with all of its wealth which it's eating up and living up, is, in their mind, a rather even disgusting picture, if you wish.

You run across this point of view, this mentality, from time to time, which I throw out as one of the problems so far as goals are concerned, if you put your emphasis on physical goals. Some time or other, even India, or Panama, or the Congo, or whatever country it is, has got to arrive. Then what do you do? You just sit back and enjoy it? Have you reached the goal?

Now, philosophers have pointed out for a long time that the real drive and pleasure in life is striving to achieve something; not enjoying what you have achieved or what your father's and grandfather's have achieved; but what you yourself are working for in the future. And once you get there there's a great let-down if you don't have other goals that you are striving to achieve. And the picture of the

United States in a large part of the world is a country which has arrived, which is just living it up and degeneracy has set in. Juvenile delinquency and this and that are resulting from the opulence of our American society. That is not a true picture of the United States, but I think we Americans must be tough-minded enough to look this in the face to be certain that it is not and does not become a true picture; that we are not a self-satisfied nation that considers that it has reached its goals, its ends, but that we still have a vision and drive, and something to accomplish.

Now, it's a great paradox; if you paint one picture of the United States as a great self-satisfied country that has arrived and is enjoying the fruits of its endeavors, etc., on the one hand; on the other hand you can paint as dire a picture of the United States and all the people in the world today, when they are sitting in a posture of uncertainty as to what the morrow will bring. If you open up a newspaper, any of us who open a newspaper or listen to a radio broadcast, find that everyone is wondering what is the latest that happened in Berlin, or in Cuba, or in Vietnam, or some other place where there is the conflict between the great powers, which might come to touch in the possibility of an explosion.

So, instead of a satisfied world, the world at the present moment is probably as uncertain a world, as dissatisfied, as uneasy, as it has been in history, because of the constant threat of international conflict. Now, how are we going to try to achieve the goal of living in a world that, in the first place, may blow itself to pieces, or at least not live under the immediate and constant threat of international hostilities at any moment? What policies should the United States follow in order

to try to achieve security in a world situation of this kind?

Let me take just a minute to remind you that you will have many speakers on the question of foreign policy. I see that Alexis Johnson, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, will be speaking to you within a few days or weeks, and many other people who are actually engaged in foreign affairs. But, as a little running background let me pause just a minute to ask you to address your attention to the difference between foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations. I think this is of some importance because it's often confused in peoples' minds. Let me illustrate.

If you were asked to describe the foreign policy of the United States today, as many young State Department people are, when they go before committees of Congress. Because, every young fellow on the desk at the State Department has got a job sheet that is written up to make it look as though he conducts the foreign policy of the United States. That's a Civil Service mechanism, as most of you know, that results in upping the classification. But the fellow is only the assistant on the Venezuela desk; he coordinates the foreign policy of the United States in its economic, political and military aspects insofar as Venezuela is concerned. And the Members of Congress always start off by saying, "Mr. so and so, will you please describe the foreign policy of the United States which you coordinate?"

Well, it's a standard sort of procedure, but it isn't too difficult a question to answer them in a broad field. Let's think for a minute, if you were asked this question on an examination paper - "Describe several of the foreign policies of the United States." At the present moment you could put down very easily, one is

collective security. Now, that's one important change in United States foreign policy because for 150 years we carried out the exact opposite foreign policy; we carried out the foreign policy of withdrawal from collective security arrangements, alliances, involvement, etc., in the affairs of other countries, since our first Administration of George Washington. We didn't want to get mixed up in the quarrels of Europe and get tied up in alliances. We were very particular about not being members of alliances.

Suddenly - since the last war - the United States has switched around 180 degrees. We are signing pacts here and there and everywhere, starting with NATO, and then SEATO, and then affiliation with MEATO and the Pan-American Alliance, etc. The French have a favorite expression they use on that. They say that we Americans are suffering from the disease of pactomania. We have come to the conclusion - and this is not a party matter at all; it's a national policy followed by every Administration since the war; that perhaps we were wrong - either that, or that the United States is now in a much different position from what it was previously. I think that is the main reason for this change; that we tried to stay out in 1914; we tried to stay out in 1939, but we found we were inevitably drawn into wars which became broad in their character; they were not limited to small localities, and consequently, perhaps if, in 1914, the German Government had realized that if they invaded Belgium they were going to find not only Britain, France and Russia, but the United States on their neck immediately, they wouldn't have invaded.

And again in 1939, Hitler had carried out a process of gradual aggrandizement, first with the occupation of the Rhineland and then the Anschluss taking over Austria,

then taking over the Sudetenland, and then taking over all of Czechoslovakia. And finally, he said he had just one more goal, that little corridor toward Danzig in Poland. The British and French Ambassadors in Berlin wanted instructions from their government to go to him and tell him - and they did tell him - "Look we've stood by and seen you do this, and this, and this, and this; that's all we can take; we can't take any more. If you attack Poland it means war." Hitler had Von Ribbentrop whispering in his ear, "Don't pay any attention to that; the British won't fight. If they wouldn't fight for the Rhineland and the things in Central Europe, Czechoslovakia, which had a fine little army, they're not going to fight for a little strip of corridor to Danzig in Poland." Hitler took the chance and brought on World War II.

Now, the concept of collective security is that if there are definite enough pacts and people believe in them and believe they will be carried out - there are national obligations; not just a statement of this Administration that we will fight if such and such happens, but solemn treaty agreements undertaken and ratified by the Senate - that the United States will fight if the NATO area is attacked anywhere in the NATO area, then would-be aggressors will respect that more and we may by that means be able to prevent an aggressor's attack which would bring on war. That's the theory under which we have changed, as I say, 180 degrees to collective security.

So, if you wanted to put down one dominant foreign policy of the United States, I, if I were answering the question, would say it's collective security.

Another strong foreign policy of the United States is to support the United Nations. That, as you know, is quite a change since the time when we turned down membership in the League of Nations in 1921. So, again, I'm suggesting foreign

policies - some of them are new, and there are other policies that are not such a sharp change. It's a foreign policy of the United States, for example, to assist through technical assistance and economic aid, underdeveloped countries. Now, that isn't a contrary policy to the ones we've had before, but it's a newly emerged policy, and every Administration has followed it since the war. Every time it comes up before Congress there is great talk that it is not going to be passed this year or it's going to be cut in half, and it has finally emerged with between \$3 and \$4 billion dollars appropriated every year; it doesn't make any difference which Administration is in office.

Now, those are United States' foreign policies. I could suggest a good many more. The conduct of foreign relations is, on the other hand, the machinery by which you carry out or seek to achieve these policies. How do you persuade people to join us in collective security pacts; the governments and peoples of other nations? How do you implement our desire to assist underdeveloped nations? These are the means of carrying out foreign policy. That too has changed very remarkably during the last 15 years - since the world war. It used to be traditionally foreign relations were conducted in a very strictly protocol manner by which one government selected a relatively small group of people, sent them to live in the capital of a foreign country where they dealt with a relatively small group of people in the foreign office of the other country, and that was the link; that was the way that nation spoke to nation.

Today and under the old system, if a diplomat went out of channels and went over the head of the local government to which he was accredited, and started

dealing directly with the people behind their backs, under the table, or any other way, he was considered very much at fault and was wrapped over the knuckles severely. And if it was a serious case he was declared persona non grata and sent home. Here again there has been a sharp change in the conduct of foreign relations by all governments, not just the United States. All governments are busy trying to make direct contact with the people in foreign countries in any way they possibly can. The most conspicuous part of that is the radio programs that fill the air over short-wave every day. The United States broadcasts to foreign people in some 40 or more foreign languages every day, when we select the news that we think a foreign country ought to have. It's translated into their language, put on powerful transmitters, on short-wave and with the antennas directed toward country X, Y or Z. We are obviously trying to penetrate right into the heart of that country; into the living room, or bed room, or cellar, wherever they may have a radio receiver.

When we put these U. S. Information Libraries around the world we put them on the main street of town and we ask any Tom, Dick or Harry to step in off the sidewalk in Athens, Calcutta or Rome, or wherever we have them, and see what information we have to impart direct to the citizens of foreign countries. As I say, every other country is doing the same thing. This is a new means of conducting your relations with foreign people. There is a question as to whether it's an improvement or not; it doesn't mean it has supplanted the traditional way of conducting your foreign relations; you still write diplomatic notes; you still have formal negotiations. Dean Rusk still goes to New York and talks to Mr. Gromyko, as he

is right now, in the traditional manner in which nations deal with each other.

These are extra dimensions which have been added. As I say, I'll stay on this subject just long enough to admit that having been involved in it for the last three years under the past Administration, I'm not certain that I can make out a great case that it's an improvement. Because, if you throw the impact of the conduct of your foreign relations into this public arena you are likely to have not an improvement in relations, but an exacerbation of them. If you throw all of your quarrels on the public forum of the United Nations - take the last case that I was interested in, which was the Cyprus case when I was in Greece. Every year that case was on the agenda, or the Kashmir question, or the Arab-Israeli question, and other disputes of this sort.

Whenever the item comes on the agenda some fellow - the Foreign Minister of Greece - gets up and makes an impassioned speech because he knows that the Press of the world, and particularly the Press of Greece, are watching and writing down everything, and are going to make big headlines in the paper the next morning. Then the Turkish Minister has to get up and reply and he wants the people back home, to show them that he didn't take his lying down, and he comes back with a lashing attack. Then the British have to get up and say their piece. And, instead of calming the situation and finding solutions to these international problems, this new way of conducting your foreign relations through propaganda and wave-lengths, and headlines of newspapers, may often-times tear open wounds and make them worse.

The most extreme example of conducting this kind of foreign relations was

carried out by Khrushchev himself, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, when he came to the United States on his first visit. He went all through the country, to California and back. From the moment he came here he didn't come to negotiate any settlement of the outstanding problems between the United States and the Soviet Union, he came to stay in the spotlight, to make as much world news as he could, to be talked about and have the center of attention directed on him. You remember when he came to head the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations he made his flamboyant 3 1/2-hour speech. People let him speak. They listened to him. And then when he sat down another started speaking, the British Prime Minister, he was pounding the table all the time, trying to get attention directed at him, trying to prevent the British Prime Minister from speaking, and finally, when he couldn't make enough noise with his hand he took off his shoe and pounded the table.

Now, that is the way foreign relations can be conducted, but I don't submit that it's a very improved way of doing it. On the other hand, maybe something can be said for the fact that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "Let your ideas file their currency in the competition of the market place." In other words, if you've got an idea, stand up in the market place and state your concepts, your thoughts and your ideas; and let the other man stand up and state his. And through that means of the competition of the market place of ideas, good ideas will survive and the bad ones will fall by the wayside. I think you, perhaps, must have a sort of innate faith in the common sense of the common man, the sort of Jeffersonian belief that if you give people enough information and give them freedom to decide, that they will generally come out on the right or sound side in deciding questions. Some

people have that faith in humanity; others don't. Maybe you can divide the world between optimists and pessimists; I don't know, but anyway there is a case that can be made for the fact that in the long run in spite of these exacerbations by public debates; that if there is enough of a kernel of truth in this principle that this new method of conducting foreign relations has something to be said on its side.

I spoke of the Cyprus question. I think it's quite true - and the Algerian question also. While the Algerian question was on the agenda of the United Nations year after year - seven or eight years - and often-times France was right on the verge; and often-times she did walk out; she wouldn't have anything to do with it. But if you go back and read the history of the Algerian question, every year just before the United Nations met France took another little step in solving the Algerian question either through promising elections or saying that negotiations are just about to start, or something or other, to sort of shelter the blows that France knew she was going to get on the platform of the United Nations when it came. In one breath she would say that the United Nations has no right to say one word about this we will not pay one bit of attention to what the United Nations says, but in actual fact she had very much in mind these debates before the United Nations.

It's also true, I think, that the solution to the Cyprus question was helped on the whole, by the realization of Greece and Turkey and Great Britain, that every year that was going to be spotlighted in the speeches in the United Nations, and let's do something that might soften it, and they finally came to a solution that every one of them said they would not agree to - independence for Cyprus. Again, whether that was the best solution or not I'm not certain, but it did remove that one problem.

While we're speaking of new means of conducting foreign relations let me refer briefly to certain others. Of course, one of the big new additions that we have made to the conduct of our foreign relations, not only as propaganda or the open forum or efforts to reach directly to foreign people, but this whole complex of foreign aid and technical assistance. That's a dimension in the conduct of foreign relations. Military assistance - all of your MAAG missions - that's something new. But it's an important aspect of the way you conduct your relations with foreign peoples. And in this very field of collective security I think that the problem of the MAAG missions, whether they are done well or bad, will determine more largely than any other single element in our foreign policy, whether our collective security policy will be carried out effectively and will achieve its goal.

We have now the newest addition to the conduct of foreign relations, if you wish, which some will probably deny that it's an arm of the conduct of foreign relations, but I refer to the Peace Corps. Now, I admit that I was quite skeptical about the Peace Corps when it was first approached. I had a picture - I was a little bit influenced, perhaps, by letters to the New York Times, again not only Indians, but Burmese, Ceylonese, Pakistanis and others saying that we don't want a lot of brash young Americans fresh out of college coming out here and trying to tell us what's wrong with our country and how to run it. We're glad to have your economic assistance and your surplus food and that sort of thing, but let us run our country; don't have all these young American do-gooders who think they know how to run our country better than we do coming out spreading all through our countries with this so-called peace mission.

And, there were dangers in it. After it has been in operation for a year and a half, now, I admit in all candor and frankness - and I'm very happy to - that it has succeeded far beyond my expectations, and I think it's one of the best things we are doing in the foreign field. Let me give you just another reason for that. There have been a lot of accusations - and sometimes with some justification - that the United States is forcing its aid down people's throats. And sometimes it's government officials who are guilty of giving that impression; sometimes it's the newspapers. You know that when, say, Nasser of Egypt, gets a shipment of food from us, or MIGs from Russia, or the new government in Algiers - there is a situation that may come up tomorrow; I'm not very happy about it - but, if, for example the new government in Algiers which was just formed yesterday suddenly announced that the United States was going to give them \$10 million worth of wheat, I'll bet you that the headlines in the Washington Post and the New York Times both will say, "Ferhar Abbas" - if he signs it - or "Ben Bella," or whoever it is, "Algeria agrees to accept American aid. In other words, it's been a great victory for us that we got him to take the \$10 million worth of food from us.

"Nasser agrees to accept this and that." The impression all too often, is that both we and the Soviet Union are in there negotiating and begging to have foreign countries be kind enough to accept our assistance.

The Peace Corps is operating - the last I heard - in 11 countries, I believe; I'm not certain how up-to-date my figures are. There were 14 or 15 countries standing in line begging for Peace Corps groups, and each of the 11 countries in which it was operating, and had been operating up to periods of a year or more,

were begging for more. This is certainly not a type of technical assistance that we are cramming down anybody's throats; they are begging for it. So, I have to say that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Up to the present time - and I hope genuinely that it will continue - the Peace Corps has earned its plaudits and is accomplishing a magnificent job. It is, however, I don't know what Sargent Shriver would say about this, but I submit that it's an arm of the conduct of foreign relations of the United States.

These different means that we are using, have as their purpose, the carrying out of the policies that I suggested. Now, let's take one of those policies and look at it a little bit more closely; and I think it's one that this group would be particularly interested in; it is collective security. It may be true that we are guilty of pactomania. Many intelligent writers - Walter Lippman, for example, is one who has been rather bearish on our continuing to extend our assurances to far-off countries like Iran, that we will guarantee their frontiers; that maybe we are spreading ourselves too thin; that maybe we are going to be involved in a life and death struggle in which the United States will put all of its chips on the table in this poker game of international affairs today, risking not only a nation of 180 million people, but all of our industry and our high standard of living, in a game in which the stakes are actually a few miles of frontier in Northern Azerbaidzhan.

Some people have raised the question, "Is this proportionate? Should we risk all of our chips and have the danger of an all-out war over every little strip of territory here or there?" There is an opposite view; there is a view that we ought to draw a line in Laos and Berlin and Azerbaidzhan and everywhere else, and say

to Moscow, "You step over that line and you've had it." That is a matter which you can debate in your seminars, and I wouldn't be surprised if you didn't have supporters of either point of view. I'm merely pointing out that there is a question as to how - granted that collective security is a good thing - how we ought to carry it out in order to achieve the national security of the United States.

I find that we are going toward the end of time for this, and I'll be glad to carry on through answering questions. But I want to make a concluding view which is based on my own 30 years of experience in the field of the conduct of foreign relations, and give a purely personal opinion as to what the future is like and what we should try to do about it.

In the modern era man can be very proud to call himself homo sapiens, an intelligent being. If he looks at what he has achieved in the scientific and technologic fields; that is, man has certainly got a brain, when he has discovered the secrets of the atom, and now a trip to outer space, and the amazing accumulation of scientific knowledge and discovery, which is going in a very rapidly ascending scale. I mean, man proved that he was an intelligent animal way long before this era; the ancient Greeks - / ^{and those who} built the pyramids. But things have a way of accelerating very fast. I read a statement the other day that 95% of all the scientists who ever lived are living at the present time. Whether that's statistically correct or not, I suppose it comes somewhat close to the mark.

There is a tremendous acceleration in scientific knowledge. Similarly in the technological field; in the clever dexterity with which man has been able through his fingers and through machinery, to learn how to mass-produce things, whether

it is food, clothing and housing, or military equipment, or what have you. Certainly, nobody could dispute the fact that man is an intelligent animal when you look at the accomplishments in those fields. I submit to you that in the international political field man is almost in the primitive state of just barely emerging from the jungle. That is, when you look at the world today, if you were the mythical man from Mars who came here and saw on the one hand the evidences of how intelligent, smart and brainy he is, and on the other hand with the masses of population all over the world opening their newspapers every morning rather frantically, to find out whether the world was going to come to an end tomorrow through atomic warfare, you can't come to the conclusion from that picture, that man is very intelligent.

That is, we have not yet organized the way in which homo sapiens can live on the surface of this globe without being in the constant fear - and now with the increasing power of atomic weapons - of the most devastating warfare that we've ever had. Now, why has man been so clever in the scientific and technical fields, and so, I claim, stupid - and I'm talking about a field that's very dear to my heart because I've spent 30 years in it - in how nations can get along? Why haven't they been able to evolve some kind of a more sensible arrangement?

Now, an ordinary person would think, from reading the newspapers and listening to the radio and television with their political speeches, that the great problem in the world today is the ideological conflict between freedom on the one hand and totalitarianism or the communist philosophy on the other. And I perfectly readily admit and agree that that is the most acute problem which causes this sword of Damocles to hang over our heads. But I also urge you to ponder the fact that if

communism were to sink into the ground tomorrow - and I heartily wish it would - we would still be in a very parlous international state. Where there are great forces, great power groups, individual nations or blocs face to face with each other, the world has always found this suspicion and jealousy, each of the other, a concern that one may extend its hegemony to the point where one can point the finger at the other and say, "Now you do my bidding."

My friend, "Krishna Menon," in the United Nations, is fond of saying that all the troubles of the world are caused by this great power rivalry, and directly he points the finger, saying it's Washington and Moscow, and he doesn't point the finger nearly as insistently as he does at Washington, but anyway, he says it's the great power rivalry that causes all the trouble in the world. All underdeveloped peoples, he gives the impression, are peace-loving and innocent, and would live in harmony and fellowship with their human beings if it weren't for the evil, wicked great powers that, like elephants, are tramping around the world and stepping on the small-fry. Well, I can assure you that that is a very overdrawn picture. I've lived in India long enough to know that the rivalries between India and Pakistan over Kashmir are just as intense as any great power rivalries. I've seen the birth of the Cyprus situation when Greece and Turkey were just about to go to blows for several years over that question. You all know the Arab-Israeli dispute. These rivalries exist all up and down the line from great powers to the smallest.

It's in the nature of the international system that we have when we have strictly sovereign entities. Now, this rivalry has gone on for a long time, of course. So far as Soviet Russia is concerned, a hundred years ago, long before the Revolution

in 1917 Rudyard Kipling, in India, was pointing the finger toward the Kyber Pass north through Afghanistan and Central Asia, and pointing toward Russia which was extending its hegemony down in that direction, and calling the Russians "the bear that walks like a man." These rivalries will continue to exist, I submit, as long as the international structure is as it is. I think it's perfectly clear - certainly in my mind - that if we are going to organize the world in a sensible fashion, that we have to set up some kind of international institutions that are built up - they're not going to be built up tomorrow - but they've got to be built, in which they are gradually strong enough in the economic, the political and the military fields, to keep the world in control.

The most immediate possibilities of that, it seems to me, is a greatly strengthened NATO, a North Atlantic Organization. We are in the midst - I spoke of a rapidly accelerating speed of developments in the scientific field. I think it may be that we're on the verge of it in the political field also - in the international political field. We see that the Common Market has been built and strong strides toward a political federation in Europe which has all come about in 14 years. It stems - I think you can almost put a finger on this movement - when Secretary of State Marshall - General Marshall - made his speech at Harvard University in 1948, in which he said that we Americans recognize that we are free from the destruction of the past war; that our factories are still going; and that Europe suffered a great dislocation and destruction. And if the peoples of the nations - our allies and friends in Europe would get together and suggest to us the means by which we could assist in the rehabilitation of their economies, we should be glad to consider what we could

do.

It was that suggestion that the nations of Europe combine - get together and let us know; and we also made it very clear from that moment and onward, that we were not going to put our resources and technical assistance into a Europe that was going to be continually building up France against Germany and Germany against France - the old rivalries. It had to be a new Europe, a new arrangement by which they would cooperate to build up their economies.

Now, why this happened in 1948 I'm not certain, but I think it might have something to do with what Victor Hugo said, "There is nothing so powerful as an idea which meets its time." Now, the idea of international federation is an old one. The philosophers talked about it; and Alfred Lord Tennyson wrote a hundred years ago that he dipped into the future as far as the human eye could see and he saw the parliament of man, the federation of the world. But that was before its time.

When General Marshall spoke and launched the "Marshall Plan," I think it was timed so that the momentum could gather. First after setting up the OEEC, the six powers of Europe started this idea of the Common Market. The British didn't think much of it; they didn't think it was going to succeed. They just took the time to laugh at it. How can France and Germany, traditionally the greatest rivals in Europe, become parts even of an economic community? And for several years the British scoffed at it. And then when it got a little more serious they started to try to block it; they built up an Outer Seven. Then, in spite of that, they found out they couldn't block it; that it was going to succeed; its economy was developing much faster than their own, and furthermore, it was basically a sound idea. It was the

same idea that has developed the economy of the United States, while we have a Common Market of 50 states, and it was an obvious thing that it would succeed in Europe. So, the British finally decided a year and a half ago that like it or not it was going to succeed, and if they didn't join it they'd be left outside. So, most of them, still today holding their nose, hating every minute of it, are taking the step 22 miles across the English Channel and joining Europe.

My own guess is that within this decade, and maybe with this accelerating pace, even much sooner, the United States and Canada must make that same decision. I think that we, in order to put our brains to organizing the world in some kind of a sensible way, have got to take it step by step; we can't just go, as Wendell Wilkie said, into One World all at once. It won't work. There are too many levels of social and economic and political development. But there is a level reasonably enough together in the North Atlantic area where the military people have made very fine strides in bringing about a community of thinking, of interests, of creating the Atlantic Community.

Economic people will be next, I think, and then the political people. And it seems to me that the most practical step within the next few years insofar as the security of the United States is concerned is to work for an economic, military and political Atlantic Community.

I've gone over my time. We will have a break now and then have some questions.

QUESTION: Some people say that the recognition of Red China would be a great

step in improving international relations. Would you comment on that, please?

MR. ALLEN: I'm going to surprise you on this one. This is not a question that I would have volunteered to speak out on, but now that you've asked me, I will. I will tell you my view; it's going to shock some of you. But while I think that it actually would be impractical to recognize Peking, I can't see what machinery would be effectuated by which we would do it. Furthermore, I certainly do not envy the American diplomat who had to go to Peking to live if we did recognize it. He would deserve a medal of the first type. It would be the most unpleasant experience that any American group was ever subjected to, I think; he would be spat upon and treated like dust from beginning to end. And you can well ask the question, "Why should we subject Americans to any such situation?"

In my own opinion, the other side of the question is this; this is certainly personal and subjective; but I served in China for three years. I think that the great problem of getting nations to come together is one that the Greeks had a word for - Xenophobia - a hatred of that which is strange, which is foreign, a phobia against the foreigner. Now, all of us have it a little bit; some of us more than others. I think that Americans on the whole have, perhaps, less xenophobia than any other nation because we are a nation of foreigners. We are accustomed to accommodating ourselves to people of different races, and different religions, and different backgrounds, and different cultures, and different linguistic backgrounds, etc.

The tighter a nation is, the more homogeneous a nation is, the more likely it is to distrust anybody who is not like them. And we are a mixture. So, consequently, we are a little more inclined on the whole to be a little more tolerant of differences

than most people. Of the peoples of the world - and I say this with a very warm feeling toward the Chinese - I lived there for three years and I think the Chinese, not only the old cultured Mandarin types, but the coolie, is as admirable, hard-working, cheerful and friendly a fellow as I know anywhere in the world. But the Chinese are the most xenophobic people. If you scratch under the surface, even the most sophisticated - and there are a lot of sophisticated ones; many of them have been educated abroad - some of them have gotten over the xenophobia - but the great masses of the 600 million Chinese, particularly on the mainland, are the most xenophobic people in the world.

Now, I spoke about the human element that's inhabiting this globe. The most difficult globule to digest are these 600 million Chinese. They built a great wall around themselves physically, and also psychologically, to keep out the foreigner, the barbarian. And as late as 1900, you know the Empress Dowager was requiring all foreigners - we had a little war over it - to perform the kow-tow; to bump their head on the ground three times when they presented their credentials. The foreigner was not to be trusted; he was to be distrusted. Any foreign influence that came into China was, ipso facto, an evil, a bad influence to be kept out like Yellow Fever, mosquitoes, or anything else.

China is tied up in this xenophobic knot, including 600 million people. Now, that's going to be a problem for the people who live in the world, for a long time to come. China isn't the only problem; I don't want to picture the world as one in which that is the only globule. But anything we can do to make people, it seems to me, realize that they do live in a world - they may be 600 million, but there are

also two billion other people around on this globe; that it's got to be a world of live and let live. I don't like to encourage this further withdrawal of the Chinese from the world. Consequently, I would be happy if some mechanism could be found to overcome that.

That leads me to seeing certain desirabilities of our having an embassy in Peking, unpleasant as it might be.

QUESTION: Would you care to give us an equally candid opinion about what we can do in Cuba?

MR. ALLEN: Cuba is certainly one of the toughest ones, and this latest news of the Soviets building a fishing port in Havana is further evidence, as the New York Times said this morning, of the shadow of the communist conspiracy over the Western Hemisphere. I think we Americans must also be tough-minded, though - and maybe I'm a little more conscious of this than others, since I've been so closely personally involved in it.

I doubt that there is very much that the Soviet Union has done in Cuba up to the present time that they can't make out a very good case that we did 15 years ago in Iran and Turkey, or in Taiwan. Now, I think also that a lot of people forget that there are two parts to the Monroe Doctrine.

James Monroe, when he announced the doctrine, said that there shall be no extension of foreign systems to this hemisphere. But he also in the next paragraph which is not very often quoted, said that the United States has no intention of interfering or concerning itself with the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere. Now, that picture has been changed just about as radically in the last 15 or 18 years as the

other side of the coin. So, we do have to be tough-minded. The Russians are obviously trying to show us that two can play at this game. You also have to put yourself in the mentality of the Russians, who, since Peter the Great, - and this isn't just communism - ever since Peter the Great they have wanted the Dardenelles. It has been the United States, now, since the Potsdam Conference of 1945 we took on our shoulders the burden that Britain carried for 100 years - Britain and France, but mainly Britain - of keeping the Russians out of the Dardenelles. That's what the Conference of Berlin was about; that was what the Eastern Question - the British called it the "Eastern Question" - all during the 19th Century, was about; the Russian drive to get control of the Dardenelles.

I was at the Potsdam Conference and heard Stalin make his great plea for it. He said that when Hitler first suddenly attacked us we had our ships on the four seas spread around the world. With an unfriendly Turkey on the Dardenelles we are bottled up and we have no place for our ships to repair to - merchant ships or naval ships. We must be certain that the Government of Turkey or whatever power controls the Dardenelles, even though friendly, is strong enough to be sure that the national security of the Soviet Union can be guaranteed by a joint control of the passage in and out of the Dardenelles, to let in our friendly ships and to keep out unfriendly ones.

The British have said for 100 years, "No, you can't do it." We said it as clearly at Potsdam as anybody else - we said that the Turks are a sovereign nation, we are friendly with the Turks; the only way you can gain bases on the Dardenelles is to declare war on Turkey; we will not stand by and see Turkey submitted

to aggression in order to obtain Soviet bases on the Dardenelles. Now, I repeat that this isn't merely a Soviet question, this is a Russian question.

So, when we have taken that position, if you were in Moscow - I'm not extenuating what the Russians are doing in Cuba - but I think in a seminar of this kind we have got to be tough-minded and look at the picture not from an emotional stance, but a realistic point of view. Wouldn't you, if you couldn't do anything about Turkey, about the Dardenelles, about the Persian Gulf - the warm waters of the Persian Gulf - wouldn't you search for some opportunity in which you could play the same game at least, and bring back sharply to the attention of the American people that two can play at this game?

Now, that doesn't mean that we've got to submit to it. But I think we must also recognize that if we're going to say you can't have it both ways; that if we're going to be absolutely adamant and declare war tomorrow if Russia gives military and economic aid to Cuba and starts building bases, and not recognize at the same time that we're doing a lot of that same sort of stuff in a lot of areas around the Soviet Union.

That doesn't go to the heart of your question, yet, of what we must do about it. I think we must work as carefully as we can with the other members of the Pan-American Union - the Organization of American States - to try to get them to come along. Just recently, you see, Panama has suggested - I believe it's Panama - of an alliance in the Caribbean - among themselves, to guard against the spread of Castroism among the other states. That's a very good development if we can encourage that sort of thing. Those governments of Honduras, Haiti, Panama,

etc., are the ones that are really under the gun. And if we can let them come to realize it instead of our shouldering the burden of saying we're going to protect them from Castro - we have played it along so that Castroism has become quite a threat to some of those countries - let them realize their peril and we could be behind them, then I think that we could eventually choke off brother Castro.

QUESTION: Sir, based on the number of speakers that have been here and our discussions and seminars, a number of us feel that our foreign policy is fundamentally passive in nature; that we are not taking the advantage of aggressive opportunities - I don't mean war, but offensive opportunities that were characterized by Mr. Sarnoff at one time as a political counter-strategy - a massive political counter-strategy. What are your views on this subject?

MR. ALLEN: You have expressed a point of view that is fairly prevalent; that the United States has merely reacted to Soviet moves and hasn't had any initiative ourselves. I'll point out that there is quite a counter point of view though on the part of people in the United States and abroad. I refer to the view of the French that we are not passive; that we are mad, going around the world signing alliances and pacts and all that sort of thing.

I remember calling on Rajago Polichari, the only Indian Governor General of India during the transition period before the British left; he's an old gentleman living down in Madras now, but he's still very active in politics. When I went down to call on him - just a courtesy call - he was the Prime Minister of Madras State at the time - he looked at me and said, with a twinkle in his eye; he was pleasant, but he was quite direct - he said, "Mr. Allen, you Americans are an amazing

people. You never do anything moderately or half-way. For 150 years you were isolationists. You have suddenly become interventionists and you are intervening everywhere; in Korea, in Taiwan, in Vietnam, in Laos, and Greece, and Turkey, and Pakistan, etc. He mentioned Pakistan last because that's what he had first in his mind because we had just agreed to give ^{military} aid to Pakistan. So, I'm saying it depends on your point of view and where you are sitting.

But in many of these cases the United States is viewed not as a pacifist country that is taking no initiative, but the most active country in establishing not only alliances, but military operations, and bases, and putting - well, take Laos right now. We've had 800 American troops in Laos; the last one is to come out next week. As far as I know, there hasn't been a Russian soldier in Laos. There have been a lot of Chinese, North Vietnamese - one thing and another - but in the great over-all look as between the United States and Russia, the United States has been the activist there, and Russia has either managed to do it under the table with their friends, or maybe in conflict with Peking; I don't know. It may have been Peking that was principally doing it.

To sum up, I merely say that there are two views on this point. And while I am a little inclined to the point of view which you have expressed; that the United States has too much reacted to waiting for Moscow to act and react, I think that can possibly be explained by the fact that the United States is really - and here again we must be tough-minded - we are the satisfied power more or less. We're ready to let the world stay as it is. We're in pretty good shape. That is, we've got the highest standard of living. We've got a very fine country; and if people would just be

quiet we'd be happy. The revolutionary crowd are the ones that don't like it. The 90% of the have-nots in Cuba, for example; the reason they look to Moscow as their friend instead of Washington, is that they are the have-nots. They think of us as the haves; that we are automatically sort of satisfied with the situation as it exists and we talk about evolution and land reform and the Alliance for Progress, and those sort of things, but we emphasize that we want it to be orderly and evolutionary. They want to tear the whole thing upside down today. And they think that Moscow is their friend, not Washington.

The activist policies for the United States, while I hope that they will be taken more often, must be taken with our feet solidly on the ground.

QUESTION: Recently there has been some criticism of our foreign aid to India. From your experience in India, sir, would you care to comment on the value of this foreign aid and the hostile results that we may obtain from it?

MR. ALLEN: I'll be glad to. I support our aid to India and I'll undertake to say why. I speak again here with as much personal feeling, I think, as the next one because I have suffered under some of the difficulties of that while I was serving in India that caused me many times to want to - I'd have to bite my lip; I wanted to say "To hell with you; that's all we're going to do." Basically, I think the justification for our aid to India and to other underdeveloped countries is this. First and foremost, and purely self-interest terms, the United States cannot live on a high plateau of our standard of living, with great masses of the world in much less standards of living, down at the foot of the hill.

As long as that great difference exists the world isn't going to be a very pleasant

place for us. Now, we can say, "Go out and make a million dollars yourself," the way Wall Street used to say to people who complained about millionaires. We could say that. We could point out perfectly well that we didn't get up on this high plateau just by manna falling from heaven; we had to dig the coal out of the ground, and the iron. We had to plow the fields to plant and grow our crops. We had to build factories and work hard to get our position. Nevertheless, the fact still remains that we are on a much higher position than 3/4 of the population of the world; as long as that difference exists there is going to be jealousy, bitterness and animosity, and it just isn't a very pleasant place to live in.

If you have a big house in a community and all the other houses around are very poor and don't have running water or sewers, it wouldn't be a very pleasant place. So, in our own - for our own selfish interests I think we ought to do what we can in reason, to try to resist underdeveloped parts of the world, to improve their situation. Even if it weren't for the fact that there is a communist conspiracy around that takes advantage of the great mass of have-nots in the world that goes more directly toward the national military security of the United States if the communists are going to take advantage of that unrest, as they did in Cuba.

A third reason, I think, is that a person, no matter how hard he may have worked, and how trifling the other fellow may have been - and the other fellow might, if he had worked as hard as we did, have achieved the same advantages; nevertheless, if, partly through hard work and partly through good luck you have achieved a high position, I don't think a decent man can sleep very well with his conscience at night by saying "Let them work and achieve what we did." We've got

to sort of lean down and give a hand and do what we can, in reason, to help them to try to achieve a higher standard. The larger underdeveloped part of the world in the Free World is India. And it would be rather conspicuous if we didn't lend that hand to India as well as to the rest of them.

Now, I know all the difficulties. My good friend, Admiral Radford, takes the position very strongly, with the slang expression, "To hell with the Indians; let's put all of our money on Pakistan. Pakistan is bold enough and strong enough to stand up and face the communists and say 'we'll fight you to the end;' Pakistan will sign on the dotted line in the SEATO Pact, and it's the Pakistanis whom we ought to put our money on and support them in every way we can." I don't subscribe to that. That's an all or nothing point of view.

I don't want to, now, seem to be taking the Indian side on this question, but I do think that there is a certain justification for saying - and I'm going to speak very frankly here; I know that this is a well-classified audience - that the Pakistanis, while assuming the posture that Admiral Radford and others like to support them in, and even over-draw the picture, of shaking their fist at Soviet Russia, saying, "We're going to fight the communists," Pakistan is getting our military aid more to be able to take a strong position in Kashmir, in my opinion. No one has recognized this. As far as military aid is concerned, yes, I think it's perfectly justified to give aid to Pakistan.

As far as economic aid, however, there is the broader question of the underdeveloped parts of the world, of which India is the greatest. And from that business of its being in our own self-interest plus the conscience of a decent human

being, I think we ought to try to help the Indians in such reasonable ways as we can,
as well as the Pakistanis.

MR. PALMER: It looks like our time has run out, Mr. Allen. We all want to
thank you for a most interesting lecture.