



ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Dr. Paul Y. Hammond

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Reviewed by Colonel J. H. M. Smith, 5 December 1962

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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Organization of the United States Government for National Security

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
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY

COLONEL MORGAN: Good morning gentlemen. Our subject this morning deals with the "Organization of the United States Government for National Security." Naturally, the vitality, the nature and the efficiency of such organization are vital factors in the management of our national interest.

Dr. Paul Y. Hammond of Yale University will discuss this subject with us this morning. He is currently in Washington, working on a Rockefeller Foundation grant, in the international field.

Dr. Hammond, it is a pleasure to welcome you back to the college.

DR. HAMMOND: Thank you, Colonel Morgan. The War College circuit, as some of you may know, is regarded as a formidable one, no doubt because of the caliber of people to whom one speaks. There are also other aspects of this formidability which some of you may not be aware of. I have a colleague who, at an early juncture, warned me with the following story: He had lectured at one War College - I won't identify any of the ones involved. The following year he was asked to lecture on the same subject at another. He had planned to write an entirely new lecture, though the subject was supposed to have been the same, but being as disorganized as most university people are, he arrived with only the notes he used at the other college the previous year.

The last thing that was said in introducing him was, "By the way, most of you will have read Professor Fox's speech given at the Naval War College last year;

Professor Fox.

I am to talk to you today on the same subject I spoke on last year. I don't really know, though I'm quite certain that what I said last year was not worth distributing to you this year. You may regard this as a rather skillful plan on my part so that I could use what I said last year, again. I would, however, feel compelled to talk in somewhat different terms because of both the changes that have occurred in the structure, and I think more in the way we have conceived of the over-all organization for national security, but perhaps more because I'm acutely aware of how wrong I was last year and hope that I can say things a little more correctly this year. I expect that this demeanor will go on for many years to come. I will be alarmed when I cease to behave in this manner.

Surely, the organization of the United States Government for national security is the organization of the government as a whole. The principal institutions of our national security within the government are easily identified. I don't want to dwell upon them in terms of identifying them at any length. The two major departments are obviously State and Defense. The United States Information Agency, the Administration for International Developments; I believe it is still called that, the U. S. Disarmament Administration; these are three somewhat independent agencies associated with State.

I could go on to identify a number of important large agencies of the federal government involved in national security - the Atomic Energy Commission; in the Executive Office of the President the Office of Defense Mobilization - I believe that is now the present title; or is it the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization - how many times

has that term been changed, in any case, in the last ten years? Obviously, it does not include Civil Defense now. The CIA, as you know, has a peculiar relationship to the National Security Council. Technically, it is administered by the NSE; not by any line agency of the federal government. On the other hand, it is not regarded as a line agency itself.

Surely, any list of ours, before we even started considering it very widely, would include the Space Agency, NASA. Behind these immediate agencies one would have to turn to agencies which have functions across-the-board, as it were, of the Executive Branch of the government, and which have particular significance as well for foreign affairs; the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors in one area; it would be difficult not to name the principal ^{Executive} departments represented in the cabinet, in their entirety as we cast our net wider. Then, we would have to turn to the Congress - the principal committees there - and the list would grow rapidly.

Obviously, the two foreign committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The two Armed Services committees; the House Science and Astronautics Committee, and the Senate Aeronautical and Space Committee. The two government operations committees; the Joint Economic Committee; the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Above all, the Appropriations Committees.

So, immediately, our problem, I should think, is not identifying the range of interest, the range of involvement; the problem is how to cope with these. Some of you will recall with me that in the early post World War II period it was

fashionable to range across the government in this way, and to go into greater detail; to talk about how the Department of Commerce was involved in foreign relations; to emphasize, thereby, the foreign connections of American government activities. Those of us who did this thought we were making scores against the isolationists. And I suppose, in a way we were. We also thought we were posing the problem of coordinating all of these agencies. But one of the things I want to suggest to you in the half hour or so remaining, is some of the reasons why posing the problem of coordination on this level has very little to do with solving the problem.

I want to assume from here on that we know what the State Department is about. I suspect that most of you know more about it than I do. I would want to say the same of many of these other agencies. What I want to try to do today is to talk about what it would mean to put these agencies of the government together to establish, to develop, to carry on, a foreign policy, a national security policy. I would want to begin by suggesting that it would probably be very difficult for any of us to over-estimate the difficulties of putting together the elements of policy. Surely, it is an old saw - and has been for a long time now - that the elements of foreign policy ought to be coordinated. Surely, that the people involved centrally in the making of foreign policy, ought to be coordinated. Yet, among the several dozen interpretations of what went wrong with Cuba, surely one of the more prominent ones is that there was a failure of communication at certain vital points in the Executive Branch of the government.

One interpretation - and I don't offer it to you authoritatively - but I offer it to you as one of the many which deserves consideration, is that as important a person

as the Secretary of State was not really making his own doubts known to the President. The explanation in very concrete terms would be simple enough if we wished to accept this, among several versions, of what went wrong. It would simply be that Secretary Rusk felt that the President had committed himself on Cuba; that it was not his job as Secretary of State to question a decision already made by the Chief Executive, and that therefore he failed to make known his grave misgivings about the matter until it was so late in the game that what he had to say was not treated very seriously.

But, as I say, I'm not seriously concerned about the authenticity of this story; we could discuss it at some point; I don't think this is the place to do it. In a way, I think it's something that is open to serious question as a matter of interpretation. I don't think this is a situation in which we should all be historians. I use this only to indicate that even in this - supposedly one of the closest relationships in government - between, in this particular case, surely, two men who potentially - actually I think we could say at this point - have a very close relationship; who surely are not at logger-heads, the way Chief Executives sometimes get to be with cabinet members. Secretary Rusk was hardly a man who was appointed to placate the Western vote or to avoid conflicts with the Southern vote, or to solve some problem of Congressional relations. He was picked, quite obviously, as the President's man. Yet, there could be some grounds for feeling that at that crucial point there were some difficulties in communication.

One could go on. Instead of using a kind of inside interpretation of a problem, to look at another problem where we could illustrate the same difficulties wholly

from the outside. Consider the fact that at the right time, in the period 1955 to 1957, when we were pressing with probably as many hopeful signs as we ever had, for an Arms Control Arrangement with the Russians, primarily in negotiations in London, proposals which would reduce, first, our nuclear capabilities, and which, most of the time, did not deal in any way with conventional forces, we were shifting the emphasis of our own military posture to a heavier and heavier reliance upon nuclear capabilities. It was, indeed, in the Fall of 1953, as some of you well know, that the American Administration for the first time committed itself to the military that they would be able to and should plan on the basis that they would be able to use nuclear weapons. This was, in effect, a commitment which released the military planners - released the Joint Chiefs of Staff from having to assume that they must always be ready in any situation to operate with conventional forces in case the Chief Executive decided that they were not to use nuclear weapons.

I use this to suggest a kind of landmark in the move of the American Administration which, of course, has been changed in some measure since the new Administration came in, moving us in precisely the opposite direction from what our disarmament plans would have been. Indeed, one could speculate about the consternation which would have resulted if the Soviet Union had accepted our proposal; if we had gone ahead with nuclear disarmament and found ourselves with a weakening conventional force exposed to a very strong Soviet force. Well, here we are very much out of kilter; two important elements of American policy. Why? Isn't it obvious? Where is the coordination here? Now, it's easy for us, I think, to do

two things in this. One is to see things more clearly from hindsight. And this is surely one of the problems.

Another is to assume that it was as easy as it is for us to express this problem, to have coordinated it at the time. I'm only trying to suggest for the moment that it is terribly difficult to bring together all the elements of foreign policy on the level of the Executive Branch. Now, it isn't very fruitful simply to say that things are tough and that, surely, shouldn't be my purpose here. What we should be talking about is why and what can be done about it. It has been fashionable for people in my field, in political science for the last 20 years, to tell themselves that we should be spending more of our time on why and less of our time on what should be done about it, because we have too often been loud-mouthed solutionists. Before I'm through, though, I'm going to be a loud-mouthed solutionist with you.

There are several ways that have been conceived of for coordinating on the highest level of the American Government. I want to look at some of these very briefly and come down to a consideration, then, of some of the problems of this coordination. First of all, let me emphasize to you that the word coordination, as most of us use it, is a trap. We probably ought to excoriate the word from our language, as students of government. What do we mean by it? We say, "Well policies ought to be coordinated." What does that mean? Well, probably most of us have in mind the vague notion that a couple of guys get together and they talk it out. But which way do they talk it out? Who wins? Who loses? Do they accommodate themselves to the issues? Do they compromise? None of this is there. Coordination is a kind of vague and happy phrase which I would suggest to you we

often resort to in the absence of having anything in mind. It is, in a sense, an admission of failure to have a policy in mind.

Well, now, one of the most important proponents of coordination is a tradition, if you will, of administrative management which in our age has been exemplified as at any time, by the Hoover Commissions. It combines a series of interests; one is economy in government; another is more business administration in government. It usually emphasizes clear lines of authority and responsibility. The notion is that people who are superior in rank to other people ought to have some identifiable relationship with each other. These are things that most of us aren't going to quarrel particularly with. We'd like to save money in government. We'd like to be more efficient. Most of us, therefore, have been happy to have people look at government and tell us how to reorganize it. I would submit to you that this is, in some measure, a coordination problem; the notion that somehow you get an improvement in policies by juggling the wiring diagrams about.

Those of us who are sometimes cynical about these matters would also point out that this tradition in American Government is neutral or hostile to government, and it's far more concerned with reducing costs in government than in improving the policies in government. And one can find this stated explicitly on occasion. It's something to be understood more than it is to be condemned. I think we ought to be more concerned about the first. People who don't take government function, seriously, you see, will see as the primary objective let's save some money. You can't get rid of this; we've found this out, but you can at least save some money. The notion is that it's important to improve; to make things better is very often

thrust aside.

The second kind of approach, and quite a different one, is one which emphasizes content. It comes from, if you will permit me, the intellectuals. And fortunately for my purposes there are a few identifiable ones here and they are quite different kinds of people, so we don't have to tie our stereotype of intellectuals to one particular type. The two men I have in mind are a foreign-born university professor very much American at this point, but a foreign-born university professor, Hans Morgenthau, whom many of you have read; and the other, a professional diplomat and scholar, I suppose by any of our standards, one of our leading intellectuals, George Kennan.

Morgenthau and Kennan, as you know, were primary proponents of what we might call the new realism or the realistic approach to foreign policy. Again in the post World War II period they had both stated their positions by the early 1950s, and these are the positions I'm mostly concerned with. We could argue as to whether they've changed them substantially, but I'm not so concerned with that as with what they represent and the uses of the limits with what they have to say. Suffice it for my purposes here to point this out; what they were after was coordination of all the efforts of foreign policy, or of those efforts that they were interested in, by focusing on a single idea which was the national interest; by deriving from that, some kind of analytical process, all of the elements that foreign policy should consist of.

Now, this is, in a way, unfair to them, but I think it is not wholly unjustifiable to characterize what they were after as this. In any case, one of the ways you could

conceive of getting coordinate foreign policy is to have a single central notion of what it is all about and then deriving the various positions on particular issues, programs for particular instruments of policy would come from that. I understand that some of you are disappointed that you didn't get such a program laid out yesterday. You wanted, as we all would, and I would suspect, as planners, must desperately want some clear answers as to what it's all about. Well, in a sense this is what Kennan and Morgenthau seem to be offering us; a way to get some few very simple, very clear objectives in foreign policy from which everything can be derived. The trouble is that none of us can agree on what the national interest is.

A third approach is that which, in desperation, military planners take. General Wedemyer has related that on several occasions as Army planner after World War II it was his job to lay out the over-all objectives of Army operation. Nobody told him what they were and he ended up trying to derive them from the Preamble of the Constitution. I've heard him say this, my first reaction being, having the anonymity of being in a rather large group, was to laugh too. It's a laughing matter, but it's also pathetic too, isn't it? You see this vast, efficient, expensive operation of the U. S. Army, and it gets down to the moment of the truth and you read the Preamble to the Constitution.

General Bradley stated that the Joint Chiefs went through the same experience, in testimony before the House Armed Service Committee in the Fall of 1949, in what came to be called "The Unification and Strategy Hearings." Nobody gave the Joint Chiefs any national objectives, and so they worked out four, and the four he listed were highly innocuous.

Well, another approach could be to listen to economists who have a keen appreciation for free enterprise, or to students of politics who have a keen appreciation, say, for the British Government. They talk about muddling through. And this is not to be ignored. It is probably one of the more serious intellectual efforts to cope with the problem, that on this level there aren't any clear objectives; you just poke along; you take the next step; the vital point of concern is the margin. And you make marginal decisions, see how they work out, and then take the next one.

But this is hardly very useful when you have to decide whether you're going into Minuteman or stick with liquid fuel, or whether Polaris is the thing to take on or some vast system. Surely, concern with weapons systems leads one in quite a different direction from going the next step and seeing. I would suggest to you that if research and development for military purposes - or for any other, really - were carried on in terms of marginal decisions, you'd never get a weapons system in time. You'd be dickering along with several and they'd all be too late. There is a point at which you have to take long-term plunges.

Another solution has been this kind of more sophisticated version of the sort of thing that I caricature as the Hoover Commission approach, the attempt to assert the primacy of the Secretary of State in foreign affairs. This, put on a more practical level, is putting it in terms of something concrete. No doubt there is some value in the idea. You will recall that toward the end of his Administration President Eisenhower seemed to be favoring this notion. As Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles - it's clear from some of the memoirs of the period - was particularly sensitive to maintaining his primary position with the President, so that, in

effect, in practice, he was the Chief Cabinet Member in a very important way. What Eisenhower was talking about at the end of his Administration was apparently something even more formalized than he had with Secretary Dulles, probably involving more than the personal relationship that Secretary Dulles had with the President.

You may recall also that Governor Rockefeller supported this view in December 1960. The discussion of these proposals may be one of the things that you have read here. But like the Hoover proposals, this is by itself a proposal without content; we're still not down to what do you coordinate. If you do have a First Secretary of the Government whose function it is to put together foreign policy, what is it that you put together? How do you go about putting it together? Moreover, there are some substantial problems in establishing a First Secretary in coping with the status of the President of the United States.

The Presidential system, some people would argue, is one in which you can't have a single important official subordinate to the President, whose interests range across the government. Either the President will support him so uniformly that he, in fact, becomes the President, or the President doesn't support him uniformly, in which case he will be thrust down among his equals in a cabinet.

You will all be quite strongly aware that another solution proposed - a traditional one in some ways, though it appeared in a rather new guise at one point - is with us; it's the National Security Council. This is indeed a form of Executive reorganization. It's significant to note that Hans Morgenthau who has thought of coordination in terms of knowing the truth, a kind of epistemological approach, you just know what foreign policy is all about because you know what the national interest is and then

you derive everything from there. Morgenthau has argued against policy-making by committee. He has rather strongly attacked the National Security Council. This suggests, in a way, how different these two approaches are; the notion that you can do this by intellectualizing, if you wish; the notion that you can do this by reorganizing.

Well, now, what I would like to suggest to you is that we ought to at least look with a little more care at the content of the problem we are dealing with. Surely, it involves relating means to ends, and one of the difficulties with what General Wedemeyer and General Bradley had to do was that they were talking about ends independent of the means with which we would seek those ends. The National Security Council has, on occasion, done this too. And in the attempt to bring the NSE down to earth, one of the first changes made there in the Eisenhower Administration was to introduce as a regular procedure the appending of cost figures; of a financial section to NSE papers, to see what the price would be for the objectives sought in an NSE paper.

This, I would suggest to you, is a form of intellectual discipline forced upon policy-makers, though apparently it has not worked out very well. The reasons it has not worked out very well, I would submit to you, would be well known by operations or systems analysts. They would want to argue that to be confronted with a piece of paper which says, "We ought to do X with Brazil and it will cost Y," these are not meaningful relationships. It's well to know that Y is over a billion or under a billion, or it's well to know what the range there is, but the real choices are, "Do you spend Y on Brazil or do you spend it somewhere else? What are the trade-offs?"

If you have Y dollars, where is the best place to spend it?" You want to know the marginal costs too. What if you spend a little more than Y or a little less than Y on Brazil? Well, these are elementary, standard, classical notions in economic analysis which have been drawn over into other uses, into the rationalizing of decision-making. What I want to suggest to you, then, this is the solutionism, if you wish, is that one can turn to the disciplines involved in systems analysis or the larger and perhaps more mundane field of operations analysis, to find the least and primarily suggestively, to find ways of solving the subsidy problem of coordination within the Executive Branch of the government.

Now, what I want to pose for you here is this; that in the face of supreme pressures, not to bring things together; the Executive Department heads faced with the necessity to represent the interests of their departments, required by the burdens of their work, the demands of loyalty from their subordinates, to represent their departments to the President; this is one of the obstacles to coordination and it's a real one. It's an unavoidable one. Behind it lies an informational problem, which, from the point of view of the President, then, can be serious and an acute one. Obviously President Kennedy has thought about this one. Some of the early things he did in breaking out of the White House mold of the Eisenhower Administration was an attempt to cope with this problem.

There was a conscious turn-back to an idealized version of the way Franklin Roosevelt ran the White House. If Executive Department heads have real interests to defend, to promote, to support, they're not likely to be as candid as their boss would like them to be. What do you do about this? For one thing, you leave them

in an uneasy position. And we could draw a long list of people whom Roosevelt was closer to who were on the Under-Secretary or Assistant Secretary level than he was with the Cabinet Officer himself. If you want to be critical about it, you'd have a lot of dividing and conquering, one of the more pleasant terms that were used, of Roosevelt's style of administration. You can put it in other terms, the balance between the line executives, the heads of the major ~~executive~~ executive branches of the government, and the President's men, the White House staff, although it need not always be just the White House staff.

Here the White House staff becomes the people who ask the embarrassing questions. You ferret out answers which have not been provided by the Executive Department heads. There are two problems in this. One of them is power. The other is the basic information problem. It is the information problem, in a sense, that I am suggesting that we can cope with by borrowing from some of the techniques of systems analysis. As for the power problem it might be illustrated best by referring you to an incident which one of President Eisenhower's principal aids has related. He indicated that on two occasions, in Cabinet meetings, sitting there as an aid to the President, he had gone to the mat with a powerful Executive Department head. And after relating the details of these two occasions where he stood up to and pressed his case all the way, he said, "I figure that I can do this once more and then I have lost my value to the President."

Well, this is the problem with the White House Staff, in effect, or the President's men, as I like to call them, a term which is drawn from "The Kings Men." We are talking now, if you wish, about Humpty Dumpty. How often can one of these

President's men stand up to a powerful Executive Branch with all the resources which it has at hand, without becoming useless to the President? This is the power problem one suspects.

The information problem is that these people have every disadvantage when they do stand up to the Executive Department people. How can they know answers which come largely from the Executive Agency? How can they know what questions to ask when the expertise is in that agency? And above all this is unavoidably an important part of it. When the chips are down is there any question as to who should be supported? The man who is responsible for carrying out a policy, or someone irresponsible, unconnected with the agency involved, who is bound to be in the end only a kibitzer? This is the problem of the President's men. Now, what I am suggesting to you is, faced with information problems of a substantial character, as Chief Executives are bound to be, it would be useful to improve their capability of asking embarrassing questions in a way which I would submit to you, whatever else is happening in the Pentagon, this thing is happening there.

The Secretary of Defense has shown a remarkable ability to find people who can ask embarrassing questions, or ask penetrating questions. Perhaps there is no need for embarrassment in many cases. What do you need to know? What kinds of questions ought to be asked about what kind of problems?

Well, now, this information problem is surely a tricky one itself. To begin with, the instruments by which one obtains information, and the instruments by which policy is carried out, which give meaning to an administrative agency, are bound to change rapidly. Let me suggest what I mean by both of these things. I think one could

write a history of national security policy in terms of the way information has been obtained about important matters. If you wanted to start with 1940 you'd find that in '40, '41 and '42 some very elementary statistical innovations developed in the Armed Services. We would regard them today as highly crude, but they involved a great deal of effort. It took much energy to develop them at the time. They include, as many of you know, simply the status figures on production, on training, on mobilization, on distribution, allocation, etc; things that are just elementary parts of management today. They were not taken for granted then, but we surely have to take them for granted now.

An organization gets meaning in a variety of ways. One of them is to conceive of it as a combination of instruments for achieving policy. We haven't yet decided what that policy is, and we're not going to, in a way. We are now, then, thinking of how you conceive of an organization? It's there. We begin with the fact that it's there. At any point in time we begin with the fact that it's there. How do you conceive of its function? Largely in terms of certain instruments to perform some kind of work - some function. We conceive of foreign policy, for instance, as a series of instruments - military, economic, propaganda, diplomatic, espionage and what-have-you. You can subdivide these down. These are the instruments of foreign policy.

Now, how do you relate these to the ends which they will serve? Surely, the function of operations analysis, of systems analysis, is not to decide what the end purpose of an organization is, but to posit ends and to analyze the choices of means, their costs, their efficiency factors, in order to pose for those who are

responsible for deciding what the ends of the organization are, relationships which will give substantial meaning to the analysis of the policy-maker. Which will, that is to say, confront him with meaningful choices about policy which he then can make. Operations systems analysis ought to provide better understanding of input-output relationships for various foreign policy operations. What would X number of dollars in foreign economic aid do in country Y? What would be the consequences of a symmetrical arms reduction plan - say "Plan R" - for the two sides? Now, these are surely not questions the answers to which spring readily to mind. They are questions, nevertheless, which administrators need some kinds of answers for, and ought to have.

They ought to have some understanding of what marginal relationships are, what marginal increases and decreases in existing programs would mean. They need to know what trade-offs are available in the instruments of foreign policy.

Now, I come to this proposal of something which looks like hard research or hard calculating of some kind, with a strong feeling about the lack of hardness; about the ephemeral, the undefinable character of many of our goals and aspirations in foreign policy. I surely don't identify an encouragement of this kind of approach with a belief that there are pat answers to the question "What are the goals of American foreign policy?" Indeed, what I am trying to suggest is that one can cope more readily with the vagaries of national objectives if he has done more homework on ends-means relationships with respect to the instruments of foreign policy.

When one joins the ranks of loud-mouthed solutionists, I should think one of the first things that ought to be asked is, why haven't people thought of this before?

And surely they have. Then the second question is, aren't they really doing this now in some other form? I would only, in conclusion, to answer these two questions, suggest two things. One is that the evidence remains that there are substantial problems of coordination at the top of the Executive Branch of the government where immense political pressures are brought to focus; that most of us probably under-estimate how controlling these forces are until we attempt to interpret events like Cuba. That is, interpreting them short of concluding that people were just stupid. Until we attempt to deal with such obvious inconsistencies as national forces and weapons policies on the one hand, and arms control policies on the other.

Then, finally, we can turn to individual cases and find, for instance, that the Defense Department today carries on an inadequate requirements review, despite the fact that requirements review was identified as an acute problem in military planning in World War I; a problem which was inadequately handled then; a problem which was identified as an acute problem which would be faced in developing mobilization in 1940 and '41 and '42; a problem which was identified by a personal assistant to the Secretary of Defense at the time of the beginning of the Korean mobilization; General James Burns who had been involved in Army requirements planning in 1939 and '40.

As much as this has been a clearly identifiable problem, one can put his finger right now, on some clear cases of just plain inadequate handling of requirements review in the Defense Department. Why? Surely one of the reasons is that men have to live with each other in organizations, and it's much easier to allocate scarce resources by some kind of quid pro quo or rationing system, than to raise

the serious, sometimes profound and often unmanageable or seeming unmanageable questions of policy that can be suppressed in an allocation. Let me suggest within the limits of maintaining this as an unclassified lecture, a little more of what I have in mind here, finally.

Suppose the Joint Staff is faced with the question of allocating a military capability to various commands. Suppose it's missiles? You are, of course, confronted immediately with a requirement for four times or five times as many missiles - we're talking about long-range missiles - as are available. How to decide among these? One way it could decide, the first way it ought to decide, if important issues are thrust to the fore and dealt with as such in the Defense Department, is to raise the substantial question of strategy involved in premises like we need missiles for the third or fourth time around before striking 20 or 30 hours after the initial attack. We need aircraft which can go five round trips. We need things to load in them for five round trips.

These questions raise substantial issues of strategy. In fact, they tend to be decided by accepting the premises of the field commander, a judicious decision under many circumstances, and then dividing up what is available to these people. This is a substitution of an elementary political device - log-rolling, if you wish - used in a wholly different context, or some other term - quid pro quo compromise - whatever you want to call it, in place of dealing with the hard questions of policy involved. I say it's understandable in terms of the fact that people have to live with each other. The military are hardly exceptions to this. I would strongly emphasize this. Unfortunately, the Armed Services are not immune to the pressures that

most of humanity has to face too.

Here then, is a more precise kind of example of the mechanism of a system in which policies are likely to be suppressed, in which choices with important policy implications are likely to be worked out and accommodated down the line in the organization. Without attempting to argue in favor of any particular intellectual discipline, without attempting to identify wholly with operations research systems analysis, what I want to suggest is that with more attention put into dealing with the organization in these terms, building staffs which can ask penetrating questions and produce for the men they serve, important relationships viewed in terms of policy, this is a device which can substantially improve the making of policy at the top level. It can force information out of organizations which have an interest in not producing information in the form in which it is wanted. It can provide the President with choices which he is not likely to be confronted with properly staffed by the present system. I am intentionally vague about this because I regard this as a large step off into the vague future.

I suggest to you that this is being done in the Defense Department. I argue all of it on the basis that what we are talking about is national security policy which we need to view as an operation which involves the allocation of resources and men, the expenditure of funds, costs which have to be measured against gains.

The core of the Executive Branch in the White House still is organized largely on the basis that we are dealing with policy, not operations, and acceptance of the implications that foreign policy - the national security policy - means operations in the sense in which I have just defined it, I would submit to you, would lead to a

more serious concern with the getting, organizing and coping with, data of this operational character. I fully expect that there will be some substantial disagreements with this view. One advantage that I offer to you in conclusion is the one advantage which every responsible political official enjoys, or prefers, which is, that it leaves for him the choices. He likes to think, at least, that this is what he prefers. It leaves the future open for him. It provides him with an opportunity to decide. It avoids the pathetic appearance of a leading Army intellectual reading the Preamble to the Constitution, to find out where he is going.

QUESTION: Dr. Hammond, I am still a little confused from your talk, whether you would favor stronger committee management, or better-informed functional leaders in our government.

DR. HAMMOND: I think you have good reason to be confused because I am probably very confused on this too. I wanted to open this without going into any detail about the implications of it, largely because I had a hard enough time opening it with the time I had. I think one of the implications of this is to throw more weight to staff; to harry line people more. I'm not too happy about this, but I think it's the implications of the argument. Admittedly, looking at some of the things that are being done in the Pentagon, this is what's happening there. And as you must well know, it's uncomfortable. I suppose I'm arguing - I'm bound to argue that this is clearly the position I want to take.

The advantages that will come from getting a little more clear-headedness at the very top are worth the cost in harrying the responsible line people and

sometimes misinterpreting immediate detailed problems, at the top.

QUESTION: What would you comment on the Bureau of the Budget as an agency being able to handle these aspects for the President in a small way without managing implications?

DR. HAMMOND: I think if you move off in the direction of increasing the flow of penetrating questions from the top down one of the things you do is beef up the Bureau of the Budget somewhat. I should think this is one way of drawing some distinctions that might be useful here. You just conceive, say, of giving the bureau more manpower to raise the kinds of questions they have raised in the past. This would be unfortunate. One of the problems that the Bureau of the Budget has had, it seems to me, is the kind of data it gets allows only for the crudest kind of, say, trade-off analysis, without being very clear on programs.

As much as we've talked about program budgeting in the federal government, it has been a very crude program budgeting. Another way you can put it, you see, is improved program budgeting. The Hoover Commission tradition of program budgeting, you will recall, one of the favorite arguments of the second Hoover Commission was better program budgeting, ignoring the crucial question, which program are you going to budget? Of the many ways you can conceive of an organization and its functions, which ways are the significant ones, hence, which are the ways that you turn in a program?

I think we have available now, techniques for dealing with program budgeting on a considerably more sophisticated level than we do. Most of these ways come out of the techniques that have been developed by systems of operational analysis.

QUESTION: Dr. Hammond, it appears that the President in our complex times has been given more than he can really handle and keep track of. And we are casting about, looking for a means by which to assist him. In coming up with solutions and recommendations there appears to be more of a tendency to favor the Secretary - First Secretary, or No. 1 Secretary, appointed official - a man who would help him to wield Executive authority, versus the appointed official that already exists in name if not in fact. And I suggest that there is no question about what the President described in terms of scope - standard control, across-the-board coverage - why it certainly clearly places him in a chain of command where it belongs. And yet, there is a very definite tendency on the part of the Presidents not to use their Vice President in this manner - any Vice President.

Would you care to comment on that?

DR. HAMMOND: Well, there are two lines of comment that I could engage in here. One is to question the notion, as I did, in passing in the lecture, about the value of the whole proposal of having a second in command. With respect to the Vice President as the man, I think that's easy. Vice Presidential candidates are not chosen with this in mind, and so far as I can see, they're not going to be. It may be that if you had a long tradition of using the Vice President prominently as an important part of the Executive Branch, there would be more of a tendency to view him in these terms, and to choose him in these terms.

But the utility of the Vice Presidential slot as a way of balancing the ticket is just too well-established, so that, there is no reason to expect a President to have much confidence in his Vice President. He may have personal antipathies with

him, as indeed very often Presidents have. There are just too many reasons why these two men, in view of this political setting of their relationship, can't be expected to be a superior-subordinate intimate team.

As for the First Secretary business, at least in the proposals that came up that were published in the Jackson Subcommittee papers, and as positions were taken at that time in '59 and '60, I can't see that this is really very feasible. If you're going to have a strong President he's going to undermine the position of a First Secretary. If you're going to have a strong First Secretary you're bound to have a less active President. And I think you need a full measure of Presidential activity.

This isn't a very clear statement. If someone wants to pursue this part of it I'll be glad to talk about it. I surely haven't explained why I think this is the case. I think anyone who reads Dick Neustadt's book on the Presidency would see reasons why - well, let me say that I largely subscribe to the interpretation that Neustadt has of the politics of the Presidency. If we wanted to disagree with him this would be an interesting thing to talk about.

Perhaps the best way to make his point is to compare the American system with the British. There can be a series of associates to a Prime Minister in Britain, in the Cabinet, so that, you can, in a way, talk about the Prime Minister being first among equals. I think this is changing over time and the British are gradually developing more of a gap and the Prime Minister is becoming more and more unequal among equals - unequally strong. But the gap between the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Members is not greatly insurmountable. I think in this

country there is such a distance between the President and the power he can use, and any other official in the government, that you really can't put anyone up there with him. I don't mean that you ought not to. I don't mean that it's legally impossible; I mean that it's politically impossible. No one can stand there with him without the President either just going along and in effect becoming a captive, or pushing the man back down to the far more modest position that any other single individual is bound to have within the government.

QUESTION: Dr. Hammond, there has been a proposal that we have an Assistant Vice President who is selected by the President as his own man, who is Constitutional; that is, appointed on the advice and consent of the Senate, but who, in effect, is responsible only for the coordination of the Executive Department. This would seem to get over the hurdle that you have mentioned. In other words, he would still be completely responsible to the President and could be removed or downgraded if necessary. Would you comment on that, please?

DR. HAMMOND: Well, this gives me a chance to do some hedging here. Surely, it gets over the Vice Presidential problem. And I think this is one of the things that you had in mind, is posing too. We have had some precedence for this in certain areas. James Burns was a kind of coordinator on the White House level, for President Roosevelt. Steelman did it for President Truman.

Well, I would have to say some of the things that I just did, and obviously this isn't what I should do. I don't think a President can operate with a person who is in this position across-the-board, of his responsibilities. He is either going to undermine his assistant President by taking over functions, by letting people get around

the assistant, or he is going to lose much of his real stature as President. My feeling about this rests largely on my conception of the Presidency as being the point at which things are unavoidably focused, in which an enormous amount of power comes to bear from the political system; from badly organized political parties which have one national purpose, to elect the President; from a national public - I want to think of this in a sociological fashion - a national public - what does it focus on. He has immense potentialities for moving the national public. He is also the ceremonial head of the state; not just the political head. This is one reason he has such strength through the mass media.

We give a measure of confidence to any President, which is above our partisan interest; even as much as President Kennedy has inspired the animosity of certain classes of people through, say, his handling of the steel problem, he still draws a certain measure of confidence from these people. Then, the engine of the Executive Branch itself, and the relationships of the Executive Branch to Congress are so keyed to the position of the President, I don't think he can put anyone between himself and Congress, without Congress thrusting this person aside.

It would be forcing the President either to come down with his man time and time again, or playing him off against Congress. Maybe we can put it this way on this particular relationship. I think that if the President has an Assistant President there will be hundreds of highly-skilled politicians on the Hill who will regard it as a test of their powers as politicians to see how many wedges they can drive between the President and his assistant.

If you doubt this pressure, have you ever been a Public Relations man in the

Pentagon? Any Congressional Committee brushes you aside like that. The constant reorganizations that go on in the Pentagon or anywhere else in the government, in Congressional relations offices, is an indication of how much Congress objects to people being put in their way. In a sense, you see, this Assistant President is being put between Congress and the President too. If Congress can always deal directly with the President they're undermining the status of this man. If they can't deal directly with the President, I'm saying there will be a considerable amount of energy being put into seeing that they can. Now, maybe we can pick this up again.

QUESTION: In your study in this area have you been able to determine any relationship between the relationship, coordination and information between the growing complexity and pyramiding of government agencies, and if so, what is that?

DR. HAMMOND: Let's hear what we're trying to correlate here.

QUESTION: The question is the problem of the increasing coordination problem and information gathering with the physical growth of these agencies. What you're doing is running on a treadmill, so to speak; of getting nowhere; in fact, losing ground.

DR. HAMMOND: I think it is quite true. One of the reasons that I've taken this systems analysis gambit here is because it seems to me that one of the things that systems analytical techniques are intended to do is to get information without pyramiding, and to provide it in a form in which it can be used without building large staffs. The alternative has been, lacking any skillful techniques of data gathering you build pyramids. You have people clear with each other. You build coordinate offices which have no clear notion about what their function is except to coordinate

the people under them.

I think you get a good deal more flexibility, and in a sense this is the main thing I'm aiming at. You get a good deal more flexibility by concentrating not on the pyramiding of staffs to coordinate things they don't know what they're going to coordinate about, or what the methods of coordination will be, or what kind of data they will need to do their coordinating to concentrate on the techniques of getting and analyzing the data. And again I would suggest to you that one of the techniques that the current Secretary of Defense is using, is asking questions, getting the information gathered and analyzed without building staffs, using various kinds of staffs that exist, by putting questions which force the analytical work to be done outside of his own office.

You may want to argue that I'm wrong. I would agree with you though. You may want to argue that I won't get what I'm after this way. But I would agree with you that just building or pyramiding staffs is a very costly activity which can be highly debilitating to the efficiency of the system.

QUESTION: Sir, can you tell us what Ristonization is and why its functions can or cannot be applied to the solution of this problem?

DR. HAMMOND: I've always been a little confused as to what Ristonization is too. My understanding of it is that the Riston report to the State Department was intended to - let me see if I can have some fun putting this into military terms. Or rather, into a military setting. I may even get a barb out of it.

In 1950, the Air Force, in trying to establish organic legislation for itself, was faced with the fact that it had to have it - it didn't want it anymore, but it had to

have it - so, in the hearings it was, in effect, saying "We believe in Ristonization. All Air Force Officers are going to be one happy family." Of course, they were only kidding themselves because there were two kinds of people in the Air Force; there were those who flew and those who walked. Those of you who are in the Air Force and don't fly would probably want to say, "There are those who fly and those who crawl."

The Air Force, I think, wanted to avoid the difficulties of having different kinds - wholly different kinds of career patterns, career designations. At the very time they were saying we want one kind of officer; we don't want it like the Navy Line Officer and all those other kinds. They were saying this because they had their problem. Well, all right. The Foreign Service was set up as a group - an elite group in the State Department - which would be the corps career group. It grew to be a very small proportion of the State Department. By the post World War II period it was quite clear it was a very small minority of the State Department, and Ristonization was an attempt to broaden the scope of the meaning of the foreign service career by bringing almost every kind of official in the State Department with long-term career expectations, into the foreign service so that everybody rotated.

Everybody had some time overseas, so that the detail system applied to just about everybody. This, of course, caused all kinds of problems. One of the people I deal with over there is a man whose career group are clearly historians, who regards himself as a historian in the State Department, and he viewed with fear and trembling being Ristonized and sent off to Timbuktu to do something which wasn't at all interesting to him. I think this is a rather stylized interpretation of Ristoniz-

ation, and I'm not sure it can't work. But I would point out to you that the military are having a lot of trouble maintaining Ristonization in the Armed Services. On the whole, things are running against it, in the Armed Services.

The growing emphasis on ~~technical~~ capabilities, the conflict between technical skills and general skills, the conflict between the technician and the generalist, is one in which the generalist is fighting a very effective battle, but isn't winning, and he isn't gaining. I think this is the same issue in State and the same arguments are used against the generalist approach of the Riston position.

The way I've put it I intended to suggest that it isn't a clear argument one way or the other, but a matter of careful adjustment. I think this is largely the case.

QUESTION: Dr. Hammond, you mentioned during your talk that the contribution of these management decisions was something quite different from these major policy decisions. I got the impression that the deciding of whether to put tail-fins on automobiles or to develop an H-bomb were fundamentally different decisions from these major policy decisions you spoke of. Would you emphasize this to a point where we can understand it better?

DR. HAMMOND: I'm afraid this is one of the things I said badly. What I meant to say was that people who view major policy decisions in the way economists view marginal analysis, as a decision just to take the next step, are unable to cope with the large kind of policy decisions which have to be made with respect to weapons systems. Specifically I meant to include the decision about whether you go ahead and develop a weapons system, or whether you go ahead and buy it, as a major policy decision. But you can't decide that in marginal terms. You just decide are

we going to develop an H-bomb just a little bit? Or, it doesn't make much sense to say, "We'll develop the H-bomb for the next three months and then we'll see if we want to develop it any longer." You, in fact, have to make long-term commitments or else they don't make much sense.

Now, I have in mind specifically here - I have a hard time avoiding thinking of this when you raise the H-bomb problem - an article by a colleague of mine, Warner Schilling, in, I think, the Political Science Quarterly or somewhere - "The H-bomb decision how to decide without actually deciding," or something like this, in which he argues that President Truman's decision which he announced on the 30th or 31st of January 1950 that he was going ahead with the development of an H-bomb, was really a very minimal decision; that he hadn't decided anything long-term about it. He is showing that he was attempting to argue that even in this fundamental - this is more than a weapons system; it's a kind of decision out of which many weapons systems might come. Even this, Schilling interprets as a kind of marginal decision.

I'm willing to accept the general line of argument that people are always trying to minimize how much they stick their necks out. But to see this as just edging ahead, is to miss a great deal; in a sense, what President Truman decided then was that we'll just go ahead a little bit, but he was in fact setting in motion something that was far more than just a little bit. In a way he was disguising a major decision by making it appear to the people immediately around him that he was making a very tentative decision.

QUESTION: The Defense Department is an organizational expression, it seems to me, of the need to coordinate the three military services. As a practical matter

today, the three Service Secretaries are serving as Under-Secretaries, and the National Security Council seems to be expressing the need to coordinate the State Department, the Defense Establishment, and the CIA, in related activities. Do you see evolving what we might call a Department of National Security?

DR. HAMMOND: No. I think you've given the reasons, in a way. If you're as skeptical as you suggest you are about calling the Defense Department a department - in any case, you're suggesting that calling something an organizational entity doesn't make it so. There are always substantial problems of coordination. Surely, something with the scope that the idea of national security has in our government, is so large that bringing it within a single Executive Department, I think, would be impossible.

What you're really asking, in effect, is this question all over again, isn't it? We can have an Assistant President in charge of national security policies. What is an Executive Department? In a sense it's a decision about what the President's relationship is to a certain aspect of the Executive Branch. And I don't think that aspect can be developed - I don't think you can bring all those functions under one man in the sense in which we mean it when we talk about a single department.

QUESTION: Your emphasis on systems analysis as a way of using administration appears to me to be more effort at centralizing more and more authority at higher levels. If that is so, is this something you would desire? And if so, what happens to lower echelons of management during this process?

DR. HAMMOND: One aspect of this I tried to answer by saying that I'm trying to avoid pyramiding. I say I think it is a fair question to raise as to whether I am

or not. Maybe this doesn't avoid pyramiding at all. But that is what I'm looking for. I'm trying to be as candid as I can about the premises with which I'm working here. I'd just as soon you clobbered me here. I'd rather be clobbered here than in print where I wouldn't be able to say I'd been misquoted. So, if you can save me from later embarrassments I would be delighted.

As for centralization, you don't necessarily get the structure that goes along with centralization as an objective. Now, how much does this become centralized? I don't know. I really don't know. I don't object to centralization as such. I get rather tired with some of the arguments about the values about decentralization. I also get tired of the arguments about the values of centralization. On both sides they're superficial. Centralization usually means more coordination. Decentralization usually means more local initiative. That's fine, but if everybody is riding off in the wrong direction we don't like that either.

What I'm looking for is a way to allow local initiative within the coordinated plan. And whether this is the way you get it or not, I don't know. I think it is. If we can bring this down to a meaningful level of discussion about particular cases, then I think I will have accomplished something by proposing this sort of thing. The thing that intrigues me about it is that it's a device for raising substantive issues, for forcing, for instance, questions to be seriously considered about load factors on aircraft in SACEUR, and for a consideration of this vital question all the way up, if necessary, to the White House. I think it's a question that might have to be answered in the White House.

Now, if you just ask the President - if you stop his rocking for a moment and you

say, "Should there be enough for five round trips, one round trip, or three?" - why, that's absurd; he ought never to be asked a question like that. But if he's asked to consider what kind of strategy we are anticipating in Europe, that is, load factors will involve assumptions about warning times, about the nature of our threat, then I think this is an issue the President ought to think about. But it has to come up a certain way, formulated into certain terms. And hopefully, this is the way to formulate it. The hope here, you see, is that you get issues of substance pushed all the way up through the system. Or, you get people at the top reaching down.

Henry Stimson like to talk about reaching down; not going through command channels, but just calling up some quaking major and saying, "What's going on here?" Well, in a sense, this is what we're talking about doing, but doing it with people who are specialized in asking these questions - organizing the answers and putting them in at the top. And if the alternative to that is a line operation in which everybody at each echelon suppresses the evidence he doesn't want to use, and organizes the case in his own behalf, and compromises with the boys on the same level in the other shop so he won't have to go upstairs, I don't think that's a very attractive kind of operation. Surely, it isn't any more attractive than asking people to make decisions quite a way up the line, who are familiar with the context of the problem at the bottom.

I have some dim views, that is to say, about local initiative or flexibility at the bottom, because flexibility at the bottom often means that people are riding off in different directions, failing to see the large picture, and failing to acquaint people at higher echelons with a real picture of what's going on. Since I have, then, a

somewhat dim view about these things I'm willing to put up with some dimness in my view about change.

COLONEL MORGAN: Dr. Hammond, our time is up. Thank you very much for joining us this morning.