



## MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, Retired

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Mobilizing Manpower for the Armed Forces

6 November 1962

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## MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR THE ARMED FORCES

6 November 1962

ADMIRAL ROSE: Gentlemen:

It is not often that a military man can keep the same job for over 20 years with distinction, great credit and praise from everybody who comes into contact with him. But that is our speaker this morning; an old friend of our school, and I don't think he needs any further introduction.

General Hershey is going to talk to us today on the role of the selective service system in manpower mobilization. General Hershey, it's a great pleasure to welcome you back.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Admiral Rose; Ladies and Gentlemen:

I know that for you as students, this is a daily diet. For me it's an occasion. It's rather rare that a person who belongs to another century gets a chance to talk to tomorrow. I hope I'm not disappointed in feeling that I am talking to tomorrow, when I'm talking to you people. Because, if we have any future in this country you are going to have to provide a very great part of it.

I think that I might say that I have a little of the difficulty that a man had who was both a doctor and a lawyer. And as a measure of how much he impressed people he was always called "Judge" by the doctors, and he was called "Doctor" by the lawyers. Now, I find myself in a little difficulty here because I look at you people and yet I've read some of the things that have been written about you; and I am told that you are all experts in the military business; that you have been

chosen to come here because of your outstanding accomplishments, and therefore I don't know just what I'm supposed to do. I'm a little like this doctor. When I normally speak to the military I speak entirely as a civilian. I give them to understand the things that they ought to understand about trying to get along with the civilians. And when, of course, I go to the civilians I wear my uniform and I talk to them rather profoundly about the problems that we military people are engaged in. It's a pretty good combination. Now, when you are here in civilian clothes hiding your identity, I don't know just how to approach you.

I'm flattered to be here. You have some things that are quite common to us. Without trying to degrade you in any way, you are primarily engaged in thinking about being a service. You're trying, if you can, to mobilize the resources to support anything that the Armed Forces has to do. We are in the service business. We have no mission of our own except to carry out the things we're supposed to do for other people.

I had a fairly good training in that. Now, I don't want to leave any impression with you people that I'm an artilleryman; I'm not. I was attached, though, for pay purposes, to the Field Artillery for a very long time. I was an infantryman initially, but they needed artillerymen badly - and I'm afraid you'll think they needed them very badly - in World War I. I went to sleep one night quietly down in Mississippi, and woke up as a Field Artilleryman. But I did learn one thing in the Field Artillery. Most of the time we couldn't find out, of the people whom we were supporting, what they wanted. They didn't want us to shoot them, which we tried, generally, not to do. They wanted us to do whatever they wanted us to do, and some-

times we didn't find out very early.

But I did learn as a Field Artilleryman that you carry out the objectives of the people who are running the show and you do not try to run the show yourself. And Selective Service, if they know one thing, it's "All we've got to do is what somebody wants us to do." One of our difficulties is to find out early enough that they want something to be able to get it for them. And then, of course, when they change their mind, which is quite frequently, you see, the birth rate you can't move quite so rapidly. And we do initially have to go back there in finding our resources.

Now, I read the directive that was sent to me, and I thought as long as I was coming down here I ought to pay some attention to it. Normally, in making speeches, we try pretty hard not to say anything about our subject matter. It's not the best form these days to confine yourself too closely to your subject. But I thought that I would look at the directive, and I saw the word scope; I saw the word manpower planning for mobilization; I saw the word wartime; I saw the word peacetime; I saw the word quality; and I saw the word quantity; and I saw the word evaluation.

So, one of the problems that you are in, just the same as we are, is this peacetime-wartime. The directive left some impression that there were things that you thought of when you thought of peacetime. And there was, at a time in my life, when peacetime meant a certain thing rather definitely, rather identifiable; something that would enable you to describe it. Those days are gone. We mobilized in '40 when we were at peace. We demobilized in '46 when we were at war. It kind of mixes you up a little bit. You might confuse the enemy sometime.

Well, I don't want to go back too far, but let's go back before the last war - that

is, this last one we've had. I read on the same day that we were acting for authority to mobilize 150,000 reservists, and we had a call for 4,000. Now, I felt very sorry for our possible enemies because they, in the words of the old fellow we used to have on a little Lighter that worked in the harbor of Brest in World War I, when the skipper used to blow on the telegraph and say to the engineer, "Vich Vay you goin, forward or ashtern?" And I think anybody looking at authority for 150,000 mobilization and an actuality of 4,000 might very possibly say, "Which way are you going, forward or astern?" But, that's a part of our problem and it's a part of our world. Peacetime and wartime don't mean what they used to mean.

You've got war, and of course, we're not satisfied with war. We have cold war. We knew what war was. We didn't have to get into cold, hot, tension and three or four other things. It would have a definite meaning. But it hasn't. Civilian and military; I read a great deal about that in the paper, but the great difficulty I have is identifying which is which. Is the fellow who is engaged in making something that will kill everybody on sight, if he's a civilian isn't he a part of the survival business the same as the fellow who is wearing a suit and expects to pull a trigger?

In deference to some of our guests today I would say that I, as near-sighted as I am - have some difficulty with the dress that goes on today, of knowing male from female - at a distance, at least. And my concern is not entirely mine, because it hasn't been ten days since I read in the paper that the medical profession doesn't know any more for sure whether a person is male or female. It's nothing unusual. I've always known that most of us are half female because our mothers, of course, were. And if your father was Irish and your mother was German you'd be half

Irish, wouldn't you? And so, by the same token, I guess all of us are about half and half.

But, be that as it may, it goes into some of the problems we have in trying to figure mobilization. Now, first of all, we don't know when peacetime is and we don't know when wartime is. For instance, I might point out to you the four things that we claim we're doing. It's not always debate about that. We claim, war or peace, or inbetween, our problem is to try to see that the Armed Forces get some men. Now, in peacetime, so-called, we encourage them by every means we can to enter the Armed Forces, so-called voluntarily. We notify them at 18 that they have an obligation. And then we keep on, after they have come in and registered, pestering them with things that make them understand that it's still around and they haven't liquidated it. Some of them at different times in their career take note of it and then wholly become volunteers. Sometimes it's pretty late before they come to the conclusion that they're going to have to do something and decide, either because they think they can do better by buying than they can by selling, buy something that some recruiter has told them.

But it's our job to try to keep always before him that he has an obligation and that he'd better liquidate it. Otherwise we might have to give him personal attention and lead him to the place which we call induction. Now, there isn't too much difference between induction and enlistment; sometimes it's only hours. But one of our jobs is to see that they respond either to the incentives, or respond to the personal attention. That goes both for the regulars and for the reserves. I suppose at the present time, if we're doing well, we get five or six enlists for every one

we have to induct. If we had to induct a few more the recruiter could be much better. If I could announce here today that the call for January was going to be 50,000 I could endear myself to the hearts of all the recruiters all over the country. Because, if that was announced today, the response would be tomorrow or the next day and not 60 days from now. This is one of the strange things.

On the other hand, every time that you announce the reduction of a call, even if it isn't more than a thousand, you then slow it up. You slow it up not when the call is delivered, but when you announce it. That's the way the cookie crumbles, or whatever is said nowadays. My grandchildren aren't living with me and I don't keep up too much with just what you say these days.

Now, into the question of the quality part; the quality of the people whether it be in peace or in war. It's easy to say this and hard to prove it, but science has gone a very long way in being able to measure inanimate things, and it has gone a long way in being able to measure the rather obvious things about animate things. It has a great specialty in being able to find out what's wrong with people, and not very much capacity in being able to find out what's right with them.

In the Armed Forces quality doesn't mean the absence of defects. And yet we approach it about that way. At the present time a young man goes in to enlist and they begin to try to find out what's wrong with him. Obviously they don't care what's wrong with him except as it has something to do with what's right with him. Now, maybe science can't do much about measuring the things that are important. I don't know. I'm a little inclined to think that's true; but they haven't. But we could stop exaggerating the unimportant things merely because we can do so well measuring

them. After all, I guess we have to make a fetish of what we can do even if it's of no consequence.

Well, sometimes during the war - maybe this has a little exaggeration - but the Navy just had to go out and capture islands during World War II so that they'd have a place to anchor the ships that we had deferred people to make. There is many a plant that had struggled for two or three years to get their production up, and then did they like to stop when nobody wanted their product anymore? Certainly not. After all, when management has made these accomplishments you go on making it even if you have to throw it away after you get it done, because, after all, you've got to reward efficiency by letting them work. So, one of the problems to solve is to try to know when you're through with things.

I think we have some education people who are teaching some courses now at colleges for no other reason than they they've got some faculties that can't teach anything else and they aren't quite at retirement age. And somebody's got to take it. Now, that's all there is of it. I don't know about this school. I've looked over your curriculum; it could be.

So, the problem of trying to decide what quality you want is not simple. It's a lot easier to count them. And as they said during World War II, if they were warm they were acceptable. So, numbers are very simple. And we tend to exaggerate them. Quality is very difficult. In the first place, whose judgment are we going to use? A year ago we were helping to get some of our aliens who wanted to get into our services and couldn't enlist, in, by the method of induction. HEW was going to educate them so they could speak English, which they couldn't at the time

we first saw them. And immediately HEW said, "As soon as we have them speaking English enough to be soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines, we'll let you know." And, of course, the Armed Forces said, "As soon as you have taught them to the place where we can accept them we'll let you know." You see it's a very simple matter, but it was a question of who decided when a fellow had enough English to belong to the Armed Forces. And the whole question of quality is the question of who is deciding quality.

Well, it's very simple in our business. The Congress says that the Department of Defense will be the sole judge of who they let in. And that's fine; that's as it should be. Of course, if you're a praying man you might pray that they'll have enough sense to know that you can't demand quite as good a tomato on Saturday night late, as you could a little earlier, if you want tomatoes on Sunday. And it makes all the difference in the world about how badly you need people, on what quality you're going to insist on. I don't blame the Armed Forces at all, now, on insisting on quality. I blame them some because I don't think they know what they are looking for, but that is probably just personal opinion. And I don't blame the Armed Forces, primarily, because they've been carried away by the scientific world and they would be criticized a great deal if they didn't use all the scientific sense we have; that is, real, assumed, alleged.

And, of course, you people are down here trying to make up by management for what we may be short on leadership. So, this question, whether it be peace or war, of trying to determine quality is very difficult, and I think we've got a long way to go in our scientific world so we can begin to measure some of the things that are

important. Whether a fellow is dependable, most people would sneer a bit and say, "Well, what do you expect? We've got to wait and find out." But that's a lot more important than what degree he has of flatness of feet or even flatness of head. Of course, one is a little easier seen, perhaps, but we are lost also by thinking that how long a boy has gone to school may indicate something. And, it may. I mean, after all you can't say that you can ignore it. But we've gotten to the place both in the Armed Forces and in the civil government, and even in industry, where we assume a lot of things by length of tenure of time in college and how long he was tolerated by some institution of learning.

I see a little bit of it as a trustee of a school of engineering. Of course, that is where casualties are pretty high. But just the same we do not know as well as I should like to see, what we want in the Armed Forces. And we do not have the means - I hope some time we may have - of trying to find out who has the qualities that we are looking for. If we could do that and do it well I would have no quarrel with the Armed Forces taking only what they wanted. If I were a praying man I would pray sometimes that they'd get so they'd know. But the number of people who have to be discharged before they serve out their terms is a pretty good indication that we haven't solved it.

Of course, we do have the mixed system of taking them in. And I have every sympathy in the world for the recruiting service, because they're always under a quota which compels them to do a great many things they shouldn't. It isn't good for them and it isn't good for the Armed Forces. I don't know how we're going to get out of it. One of our weaknesses from mobilization is the fact that we have

never solved the question of the place where we take them in. And somehow or other, with our reserves we start out examining them when we let them into the reserves and the first thing we can think of doing when we want to mobilize is examine them again. Of course, you can keep on examining them and you're going to turn down somebody every day. And I fear with our machines and everything, that we've worked up so much system that we can use when we have time, that we get into the habit of thinking that we must use it, and then when we do not have time we do not know what to do.

This morning I went to read the paper and the power went off at 7:25, where I live. I'm a resourceful person. I hadn't anything much except in the way of a flashlight which is only partially working, to even read a telephone number to telephone some people and tell them the power was off. It's just some of our carelessness that we get into. And if the water had been turned off I don't know what I would have done because I don't know where to go to get even as much water as the flashlight furnished light.

So, we tend to get into the habit of having something approaching perfection in trying to get people into the service because we've got time. And then when we have to mobilize it's very difficult for us to break the habit because then time is the only thing that's important. Now, the Armed Forces, in this evaluation business, I don't know what to say. Obviously, we've either got enough people in the United States to defend it under any circumstances, or we haven't. And if we haven't, then it's our business to utilize what we've got to a degree that we can accomplish the things that have to be accomplished. And there are so many ifs in it - and not

only the if of where the war is going to be; it makes a lot of difference of whether you are fighting out at your fingertips or whether you're fighting right in close to your chest. Because, there are a lot of logistics that you need in one case that you don't need in the other. And a lot of it is the state of mind we get in and the willingness to do the things that have to be done; how much we can learn about utilization of the almost useless person; and I'm a little afraid that our education lately, with automation and a lot of other things, has tended to be to look for the best and not be able to know very much about the lesson good.

Now, I'd like to mention about three more things that we pretend to do both in peace and in war, although the last one is for the purpose of being ready to meet war no matter what it looks like. The second thing I'm going to mention, but will not spend much time on, the Congress in 1955, dissatisfied with what had been accomplished before that time in the use of the so-called reserves, gave to us the responsibility of monitoring - if you want to call it that - stand-by reserves. It was a little problem for awhile, of getting anybody into it, because it was a compromise in legislation. You can't blame the Armed Forces for not wanting control over everybody. You can't blame the people who are not in the Armed Forces for being worried about the Armed Forces having control over everybody, because they're worrying about where their manpower is coming from. And I don't think that the people who are not in the Armed Forces liked us any better than the Armed Forces liked us.

But with the common dislike of both of them we found ourselves being honest brokers. We found ourselves, as the monitor, that each side would tolerate that

we had something to do with. And so, we were given by Congress the responsibility of determining when a stand-by reservist was available. Congress retained the right to say that you couldn't use any stand-by reservists until there was an emergency. And when there was an emergency and the Congress said so, then you could use the stand-by reservists if the Director of Selective Service said they were available. And it was quite flattering to the Director of Selective Service to find that he was supposed to know where about a million and a half people were, with about a third of them changing each year. The notice I get many times from the Armed Forces is a sixth copy and it's a little hard sometimes to decipher who I'm getting.

But just the same, we have tried to keep categorized a stand-by reserve that ran somewhere between a million and a million six hundred thousand. And we've never had any test of how well we've done it. We had a few dozen that were taken last year by the reserves, under questionable circumstances. I'm not going to say that it was illegal, because the Supreme Court hasn't acted on it. Some people don't even accept that after they have, but that probably depends on where you come from. And so, we have the job of trying to keep track of a million one to six hundred thousand individuals who are continually changing, because they are coming in each year and going out each year. And many times we find out where they are and get them categorized about the time they complete their service. That will continue.

Of course, the Armed Forces, after having agreed to that, did what you'd expect them to do; they started out a few years back by not putting anybody much in the stand-by reserves, so that satisfied everybody pretty well. The Armed Forces

didn't give up control of them; they kept them in the ready reserve. Of course, they were the on ready ready, but that's neither here nor there. Their status was much more definite than their whereabouts. And not only that, some of them had the rather peculiar idea that they were in the situation as the young fellow was when he said to the girl, "May I have the last dance," and she said, "You've had it." Now, these boys kind of thought they'd had it. They thought that they had gone in and that they were out. And while they were in control in a unit they weren't very conscious of the control and therefore it came to them as quite a surprise a year ago when somebody remembered them; and it wasn't at Christmas either, and invited them to come back and participate. Of course, many of them had a kind of feeling that they'd been imposed on. The less you ask anybody to do the more he is imposed on when you ask him to do anything. There's no question about that.

We have more communications now than we used to and it's quite easy to let Congress know anything that's on your mind as a civilian. And it's quite the custom for some of us, perhaps, to get more excited when we hear from a Congressman. He's just trying to find out something to tell somebody who has asked him a question. After all, he can't be a statesman if he doesn't stay in Congress. It's a very minor thing, but I have a great deal of sympathy for the legislators:

Now, the third thing we do is try to do by indirect means, and so-called voluntary means, what some other nations on earth do by more direct ways. That is, we have been talking for several years about the number of people we ought to have in the Engineers and we haven't gotten; the number of people who ought to be scientists and who, for some reason, have not become scientists; and since Sputnik

went up we in Selective Service have given a great deal of attention to the school teacher, under the assumption that there was something wrong with the schools and it might have something to do with the teachers. And, of course, we have always given consideration to doctors of medicine and doctors of dentistry and some other people.

Now, what we call "channeling," is attempting to use the carrot which is a deferrment - and it gets to be a pretty thin carrot after everybody gets one - and the lash which is induction - and that isn't so big with 4,000 a month - trying to balance between those two things, a means of getting people to become engineers, to become scientists, to become school teachers; and having become those, to work at it in a place where somebody says it's in the national interest. I don't want to go any farther than somebody says so, because, what national interest is will be determined by some historian a century or so from now who will want to know nearly as much about it as we think we do.

Just the same, our problem as a service organization is to try to keep people in national interest in doing all the multiplicity of things that have to be done, in a civilization that has arrived at the point where it doesn't know peace from war, it doesn't know civil from military, and it doesn't know men from women. With those restrictions it's a little difficult to know exactly what is in national interest. It's a question, if you want to resolve it into finer points, do you leave a man pulling a trigger or making a trigger to pull. Well, you want both, of course, but the trigger puller without a trigger you know much better than I do how effective he is. And, of course, a lot of triggers with no pullers that's not good either. And, of course,

it's after all it's I guess what Socrates, Plato or Aristotle or somebody said about getting things in balance; not too much of anything. And most of us have never been bothered about having too much money. But there are some other things which we perhaps think we've had too much of.

Now, I don't believe and I wouldn't presume to impose on you people by attempting to say how well we have channeled people into these several things. In the first year, the re-deferred school teachers, we increased the male teachers in both the public schools and in the colleges, by about 15%. Now, I was asked by Mr. Vinson whether we claimed credit for all of it and I said we certainly didn't; I was just saying that the two things happened simultaneously. And whether our deferral of school teachers and the growth of school teachers had anything to do with each other I was willing to let history decide. I have read a history written by a fellow from Alabama, in which he said that when they studied to defer overseers on the plantations during the war between the states - for you people who come from down there - and the Rebellion or Civil War for some of the rest of us - the price of slaves went up because you had to have three slaves in order to be an overseer.

And when they deferred school teachers, you had to have eight students - there were some students who were actually torn in two, physically, by ~~different~~ teachers struggling to get them into their schools. Well, I'm picking on the South a bit.

Of course, in New York City that turned out 750,000 in World War II, into the Armed Forces, they compromised when they started to put the draft in '60 and '63 on New York City. After they had rioted and they had to bring people back from the Army of the Potomac and get the Pennsylvania<sup>reserve</sup>/in there to settle them, they

finally compromised and said, "If you behave yourselves we will not draft any more people from New York City." That was the way that was settled. So, the handling of the draft in the War Between the States, or the Civil War, wasn't so good, and there are people who don't think it's so good yet.

I spent a little time this morning coming down by reading some things that there are some people in one of the cities of the United States, who are not too well satisfied with the way we're running it at the present time. And one of the things - we get a great deal of advice on how to run it. It's surprising how many people take an interest in the way we run our business. And it sort of made me bold enough to come down and maybe even try to tell you how to run the Industrial College, because I don't know anything about it; I'm not handicapped by facts. But a great many times you people lose flexibility because you know too much.

Now, the fourth thing that we pretend to do, particularly in peace if there is such a thing, is to try to be ready to operate under any circumstances. And that gets into a rather broad thing because, in the first place, how to keep a local board, a state headquarters, or even our own staff here geared up to 4,000 a month, when three months from now they may have to furnish 400,000, is not entirely simple psychologically. They get so that they do their work so well and work up such a beautiful system, that they'd almost rather have the country perish than to have to junk a system that had - well, there are other people beside Selective Service who get into that one too.

But, somehow or other we've got to try to get our local boards to believing that their job is to furnish people. And here we run into some of our other friends. In

this country we're always afraid to tell somebody to do something. We'd much rather threaten him and have him have to do it, than to have him volunteer it. It's true in the acquisition of medical officers for the Armed Forces. We can induct people into the Armed Forces if they be doctors of medicine. We have, once or twice, but normally if we get them in we get them where we don't want them. Then, the flexibility of the Armed Forces is so great that they have no way much short of discharge and re-induction or re-commissioning, of getting a doctor commissioned. And especially, if he happens to be in one of the services and he has belonged to another, then you're just up against it, because we haven't quite got to the place where people are transferred from one place to another. I'm not arguing that they should be, but I'm merely saying that we have to try to exert force on individuals to go into the medical profession. So, we are a people who like to claim that we do everything voluntarily.

We have some organized groups in this country that are not in favor of telling people to do much beside telling them to fight. We've been a little slow in getting people up to that level. Therefore, when we have to plan to produce men under any circumstances, the question immediately arises are they going to be civilians or soldiers, and at a time when you can't tell the difference. If you're in catastrophe are we going around seeing a fellow shooting at some of the enemy and saying, "Just a minute, you're a civilian; you musn't be doing that." Or, if we see a soldier, a sailor, an airman or a marine, doing something that normally, under some well-organized civilian group, are we going to say, "Tutt tutt, that's a plumber's job," or some other sort of thing. And even if it's to save life, let's not violate

our principles.

Now, we can't assume that everybody we are going to someday order to go and do something, is going to go to the Armed Forces. And yet, that's all the Congress has ever given us authority to do. We found in the 1930s that if we'd only planned for Selective Service the things we had authority at that time to do, we'd have been in a pretty rough go during the '40s. It's a calculated risk, but planners must plan to do the illegal, because when the time comes that you have an emergency, it's an extension of law anyway, and the law of survival becomes the main thing. If you don't solve the problem of survival you will not have too much worry about some of the subsequent problems. So, legally or illegally, you've got to live first, and if you live you've got pretty poor judges if you can't figure that you did it legally. It's about time for a recall of judges then.

So, I don't normally summarize, but I would say that our role is to get people into the Armed Forces by frightening them or by taking them, particularly in peacetime, probably in wartime you'll have the problem, we hope, at least, of more direct action. We are going to try to keep sorted and ready to deliver a stand-by reserve. We're going to try to assist as we may the educational process by chasing people toward occupations, professions, etc., that we claim we need, and probably later on we'll have to chase them somewhere else when we find out that we've automated them out of where we've sent them, but that's another story. And we must be ready at all times to do whatever has to be done to see that people are not only in the Armed Forces, but are anywhere else that they have to be in an emergency, because <sup>if</sup> the emergency is great enough, then there will be very little difference be-

tween peace and war. There will be no difference between civilian and military. And I suspect, while we haven't done much of the drafting of the fairer sex, so far as obligation goes and danger goes, there won't be any difference between men and women, even if we can identify them by some other means.

And so, that is our role. It is a role at the present time where 85% of our time is in the bookkeeping business and in the threatening business, and 15% in actually putting somebody in the service. It could easily, tomorrow, the next day or a week from now, be a place where the percentages would change very, very rapidly.

That's our story, and I think that you have earned the right to breath, or coffee, or whatever you do, at the time that you get just a little fresh air after the first hot air application.

QUESTION: General, would you elaborate a little more on your role for stand-by reservists? Exactly what is the role of Selective Service?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, the legislature in 1955 ended up by saying "The Director of Selective Service shall determine the when stand-by services would be available." They had already said that the Congress shall determine when they are taken as a group. I don't know the reasons - all of them - for such unusual honor. Normally, the obligations that are given to the Selective Service System are given to the President of the United States. But they didn't choose in that instance to do it. And therefore, I find myself as the Director of Selective Service, engaged in something that is not in any way controlled by the rest of our law. Because, the law that has to do with the stand-by reservists - the 1955 Reserve Act - and there-

fore, all the penalties of our Act in no way apply to them. I have, as a matter of business, delegated to the local boards, the initial decision on the categorization.

Now, we have to say "categorized" because we categor<sup>ize</sup> people who have never been in and we categorize people who have. That's part of our stock in trade. If you don't have little things like that, almost anybody could learn your business. And so, I have delegated to the local boards the power to categorize initially, the veteran. Then, he has the right to appeal the same as a person who is being classified, to the Appeal Board. And if he isn't satisfied with that, he has the right to appeal to me.

Now, in the case of the registrant, the classification boy, he has the same role except that his appeal comes to a board appointed by the President of the United States who makes the final classification, which the Director of Selective Service does not. But in the case of the stand-by reservists, the power of the Congress went to the Director directly, and so I am stuck with it. Now, I don't know anything about how successful we will be. We have tried to visualize calls for people by name. We have tried to visualize the call of people by occupation, by profession, by even some peculiarity of experience or language or some other sort of thing. And when you visualize those it gets you into quite a twist.

Now, the simplest thing, of course, would be for somebody to call a certain number. Now, we had a little twist about a year ago, we had some people taken out of the stand-by reserve. And that gets into how a person gets into the stand-by reserve. A person can get into the stand-by reserve two different ways; he can get in when he has served in the active service on the ready reserve long enough that

he's not only eligible for it, but he must be put there. And there have been people who have said, "I don't know; some of the Armed Forces neglected to put people in the stand-by reserve and called them up last year." These are only a few people.

He can also be put in the stand-by reserve when there isn't something in the ready reserve for him to do. And in handling the critical skills they are authorizing the Department of Defense to induct for six months training, and later for three months training, people in the critical skills, and then putting them in the stand-by reserve with the idea of having them work in industry, in the places they're supposed to, under our direction. That led to some legislation which the lawyers are arguing about. Because, in the legislation which permitted the putting of a critical skilled man into the stand-by reserve immediately after his active duty period of training for three or six months, they said he may be taken back out. The idea was that if he didn't stay where he was supposed to stay we would put him back in the ready reserve and then induct him.

But there was at least one of the services that thought that this was an idea to take anybody out of the standby reserves who had not served the full time in the ready reserve. And over that there have been some discussions in Congress as to whether Congress will legislate some more to clarify what they meant. I have a little difference of opinion of what they meant, and the Judge Advocate and one or two of the services. They're only a small number of people, but it only takes a small number of people to make quite a lot of newspaper space, especially some times. Whether you're more confused or less, I can only guess.

QUESTION: What sort of illegal plans do you have for mobilizing the nation's

scientific talent, and what sort of advisors do you have in this area?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, we have all the advisors that government has and a few additional. First of all, they haven't been too active lately. I have a National Advisory Committee that happens to be composed entirely of governmental people. Colonel Rankin is back there and if he can't name them all he's in trouble because he's supposed to. Although I appoint them I wouldn't necessarily know all of them. But we have the fellow who heads the Bureau of Standards, the National Science Foundation, the Weather Bureau, one off of AEC, and several more who are on this committee. Now, at the present time they're not too active.

We do have a committee like that in each state. And, of course, everything from the advisor to the president, on scientific things, is available to advise us and a great many times do. In fact, I imagine that advice is one thing we haven't been too short of. Now, as to how we're going to mobilize these, we've always fought off special calls, somebody asking for a certain kind of scientist for us to induct. We've gotten into a great deal of difficulties. But one of the things we have done, up to the time you're going to try to order these people to do something, we have made them available first by deferring them, and then making them stay some certain place by telling them that if they didn't stay there they weren't going to get deferred. That's one of the ways to pin a person in a place voluntarily.

QUESTION: General Hershey, are there any plans for legislation to catalog the civilian component and place them in selective service in case of an emergency?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I'm not sure I know what kind of legislation you referred to. Do you mean - what do you mean by "cataloging them?" Passing a law saying

a teacher is a teacher? Do you mean with the idea of identification, or the idea of using?

QUESTION: I meant, in the event of an emergency you indicated that you do not have any authority to induct the civilian component in his vital job.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, we haven't any authority to compel a person to work outside of the Armed Forces, except by deferring him to do it and leaving him there. Now, of course, all during World War II - the Korean War never quite got to the pitch where we started talking about national service - but we went through a great deal of it in World War II; and, of course, we had the advantage of English experience and of some other countries. But I don't believe we ever convinced Congress that we were hard enough up for people in any of the places where they worked, that we had to resort to it. I don't think there is any question that we would resort to it in an emergency.

But, one of the difficulties; of course, it's a lot easier to induct people into something that's established, such as the Armed Forces, than it is to induct them into Boeing or some other place like that, because your question of controls there is quite different. It has always been a question in my mind how desperate things must be when you resort to trying to control everything and therefore getting into all the difficulties of management, or whether you try to go to the extreme of using "work or fight," if you want to call it that in order to get them to do what you want them to do.

I always think of the days when I was in the mounted service and used to ride around on a horse when I was the Officer of the Day. I'd get around a warehouse

and there would be seven or eight soldiers hanging around there. I'd ride up and say, "Who is in charge?" They said, "The Sergeant; he's gone to see where we're supposed to go." And one of the difficulties of control is that you never know how many people are around waiting to find out what they're supposed to do.

QUESTION: General Hershey, in mobilizing manpower for a large-scale war the reserves and the National Guard obviously have a part. What is your concept of that role, and their current adequacy to fill that role?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, the last thing first; I don't think they're adequate. I, of course, am prejudiced. I came from the National Guard. In fact, maybe you read that I entered the National Guard as a Private. I did because that was the only place they had vacancies at that time. And maybe you also read that I got elected an officer. I agree to that and I'm not embarrassed. Some of you fellows might not have made it if you'd had to be elected; but I'm prejudiced in favor of the reserve forces. They're not as large as I would like them to be, and, at the risk of their being angry at me, I fear they're not as efficient as I wish they were and I'm not saying it critically; there are a lot of reasons for it.

In order to have an armed force, I guess, whether it's the reserve or anywhere else, you have to have men in it, you have to have leadership, you have to have the training, and you have to have the equipment. And you have to have the equipment where the man is; if you have it stored somewhere it's not too good. A Fire Department that kept its engines in another city wouldn't be just the best in the world to put out a fire. So, I'll answer your last question first. I don't think that they are adequate. I think that we have to have not necessarily more in numbers. I'm not

quarreling with the number we have in the ready reserve. You've got too many for the state of readiness.

Now, of course, mind you, you're getting it right hot off the platter from a person who has no responsibility whatsoever for either the numbers, the reserves, or their state of training. Not only that, there are a lot of things I don't know about it. But you asked, and I happen to believe that this country can never have enough professional people in the Armed Forces to insure its safety. You can argue about that and you're just as right as I am. But that's what I believe. Therefore, you've got to have more people, especially in this age where you don't have time, you've got to have people who have familiarity with the things that they must use to either stop somebody from killing them or to kill somebody else.

I know it isn't popular and I've never sold any of them, I'm not so sure that we may not get things that are of such high caliber to try to handle them, that we can afford to hire people to do it permanently, and we're going to have to take some very high-powered people to do something else for a living and have them immediately available to use the things that they use. But that's a separate question.

I do want to bring out this; that at the present time we've got about 24 million people in this country who have had training; they're veterans. And unfortunately, we're getting up to 17, 18 or 19 million of them who are over 36 years of age. The one place that we're in terrible condition is between 18 and 26 which are our immediate ages that do the survival business, and we only have about 2 million of that group of 9 million who are in the service or ever have been. Now, we've got about 7 million who haven't, and that's the best proof that I know that there are too few

people in the reserves. We ought to have more people who are trained and who have not served. Because, the people who have served are patriotic, but they're not pig-gish and they don't like to be recalled all the time whenever somebody is in the hen coop.

And so, I think that our state of training is not what it ought to be because we don't have materiel and we don't have a lot of other things. I realize that we've got a different problem than either the Israelis or Switzerland. Those two probably offer the best example of the readiness of a civilian population to respond to the problem of survival.

QUESTION: General Hershey, the reading material we have for this lecture led me to believe that the voluntary system was sort of old fashioned. They speak of honoring and preserving the volunteer tradition as though we should take up the last volunteer and stuff and mount him. Do you think we should abolish the voluntary system and go to completely controlled selective service?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, you've asked me two or three questions. In the first place, you're asking a person who is prejudiced. I have lived under the volunteer system. I was a Captain once and it wasn't in the Navy either, for 17 years, so I got somewhat acclimated to that level of being an officer. And I had some men in my battery who were always volunteers. They weren't if they were conscripts. They were a great group. I'm not so sure any of them could get in now, but we were paying \$21 a month at that time and it wasn't easy to find, even in hard times, many people, and when times were booming it was hard to get them.

Now, there is a little difference between going completely to the voluntary

system and using some judgment about it. In the first place, at the time I was a junior officer the federal government never gave us the privilege of picking who we wanted out of the people between 18 to 26, which they have been doing most of the time since 1940. The Armed Forces, I believe, back in my day, would have welcomed the chance to have a little more effort to get hold of some people whom we never got hold of. But, we didn't, and we got along the best way we could. Now, in the first place, I have been away from the Armed Forces long enough so that I have some of the respect, memory and admiration - and adoration, if you will - that goes for a man who wears a suit. And I think we have cheapened it by going out in the alleys and taking youngsters who, many times, didn't know whether they were coming or going, in order to make a quota.

If you go to most any of the services and study the numbers they discharged in the first six months, you'll have a pretty good indication of the extremes the recruiters are driven to - and don't think I'm criticizing the recruiters; I'm not; I have the utmost respect for the recruiters; I have less respect for some people farther up the line who put things on him so that he has to go out and take people whom he knows are not the right kind of material.

And so, I have hoped - and vainly, I'm sure - that I would see the time when it was a privilege to enlist in the Forces of the United States, and it wasn't given out until the man had proved his worth enlisting. I won't argue whether it's six months eight months, twelve months, or what it is. When you have a chance; Congress says you can look them over, and yet you go out and run a system in which you try to inveigle people by, first of all, I frighten them. Secondly, you promise him

more. We've gotten, for instance, in the Medicos. When I started out in the old days the Medico started out as a First Lieutenant. Now, in order to bid against each other you services bid against each other until he has to be a two-striper in the Navy or a Captain in the Army before he'll ever walk in. That's where we've gone with our bidding, and he has to have a hundred dollars a month extra. I don't want to get in trouble with the doctors, but that's what we've done with the so-called competitive system.

I thought if we could only take the initial<sup>1</sup> fellow for all of the services and then not permit him to enlist until he has proved that he has some of the qualities by actual observation that we wanted. I think the Armed Forces could set themselves on a much higher standard than they can by going out as a suppliant and trying to inveigle people by a mixture of bribery and over-sales and a lot of other things, to try to get somebody into their service rather than somebody elses.

Now, I realize that I'm an idealist. As long as you brought it up, I'm going to try to read this. I don't know whether I can or not; I'm not much on the read. We had a fellow - we're facing extension next summer, you know - and we had a fellow who is quite an educator, who said that all we're getting in the Armed Forces by the draft is the dregs. We made a study of the individuals who came into the service by the draft, from the first day of January to the 30th day of June. And I want to read to you what we found. 6.4% of them were college graduates. 21.9% had at least a year of college. 63.7% had been through high school. And 35.6% had not; they were below. Not so good.

Let me read to you what the recruiters did at the same time. College, 3.4%.

Graduates. Some college, 15.6%. Graduated from high school, 58.1%. And 42% below high school level. So, you see, we lost in the final bracket where they had 42% who were below high school, and we had 35% the rest of the time; we were ahead. Now, that doesn't prove anything. Don't misunderstand me; I went to college; it wasn't top good a one, but I went to one, and I have no illusions about going to college, or any other school for that matter. It depends on the student. It depends on what he brought and what he took; and what he did with it after he had both. Therefore, the school to me doesn't indicate that the fellow who is talking about it; who was a former university president, and he was talking in terms of how much he had been to school.

I think we would have better people if we had a recruiting within rather than without. But don't think that I'm looking forward to the day when it will happen. But that's the way I think.

QUESTION: General, what future do you foresee for those who have been rejected by the draft either for mental or physical conditions?

GENERAL HERSHEY: That is a thing that has bothered us a great deal for several reasons. One is, as I said awhile ago, I don't think we know what we want and therefore when we reject a man, whether that's a real rejection is questionable. And so, from that standpoint we're in difficulties. The next thing is the psychological effect in telling a youngster he isn't fit to be in the service. In a world that tends to be an escapist world anyhow, in a world where everybody wants security with fringe benefits, in a world where everybody wants the government; why, if a dog barks at night you start calling the police; the absolute situation we're getting

in, in which we depend on somebody else to do everything that we old pioneers used to have to do for ourselves - in fact, out where I came from, if kids couldn't get up a tree fast enough to keep the wolf from eating him up, why, probably it was just as well that he was one of the selections. He was the kind of kid that somebody else would probably get later.

What I'm getting at is, we are in a world where we tend to be escapists and we in the Armed Forces help make kid an escapist by telling him that he isn't able to do something. Now, there is no question about the fact that <sup>if</sup> we have an emergency we're going to have to use somewhere between 50% or 60% of those whom we've already turned down. There's no question about it. And we're going to have to try to get as civilians, if you want to call them that for a moment, something out of most of the rest of them, because survival is something that comes as a result when everybody does something that falls into the pattern.

So, from the standpoint of our future, when we turn down a kid and won't let him into the service because he's a slow learner, what we do then is, when we have lots of time we don't take him; we'd like to save him until some time when we have no time in order that we can train him even less than we can now. I don't, on the other hand, want the Armed Forces to have to try to make citizens out of people who wouldn't otherwise make it. Although, frankly, in most of the years that I had a battery we were modestly working on trying to convert the useless into the useful. And, of course, we always thought the Navy with their higher rates of pay and their necessity for all the scientific things they used to talk about in those days, which mainly meant they wanted a smart 17-year-old kid, we thought that we suffered,

perhaps, in the recruiting business.

Now, we have tried - and I don't think it's necessarily going to help much - to split our 4-F's. We're trying to say that here's a fellow who, for the moment, we aren't buying, because he hasn't got something he ought to have or has too much of something he hadn't ought to have. So, instead of putting him in 4-F, if we think we can use him sometime we put him in 1-Y. At the moment we've only got about 400,000 in 1-Y for several reasons. One of them is we've only been running about a year. The people who have been examined since that time who would qualify in a time of emergency, we've tried to put in 1-Y. Of the rest - 2 1/2 million that we had, or more to start with, we haven't had the time or inclination to try to get back and classify them. And, of course, their situation has changed.

I do think that we're going to have to - in an emergency - use a great many of the people whom we turn down. There is no question about society, short of an emergency, having to use the ones that the Armed Forces can't use. And it's most unfortunate that the Armed Forces are in any way contributing to making a person less willing to accept the responsibilities of citizenship and do what he's supposed to and not begin to look for unemployment or something else to lean on because he says, "Well, the Army said I was no good." That's the way he translates it. It isn't true, but how you get a 4-F to feeling that he is much better than somebody else, I don't know.

I happen to have, in my rather close experience, one boy I know pretty well who served in the Navy during the war, one who is in the Marine Corps right now, and a son-in-law who is in the Army, and a son-in-law who is a 4-F. The 4-F happens

to be more successful in many ways than the other three plus me.

QUESTION: General Hershey, is there any connection between your office and the Civil Defense Planning function of the National Guard? And secondly, can we have your comment on the National Civil Defense Planning?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Let's take the first one first. Colonel Rankin sitting out there, who is Assistant Chief of the planning outfit, and we do have a great deal to do with Civil Defense. Of course, Civil Defense has been a little like the pea under the shell at the circus; it's been a little hard to follow just where it was. I don't say this in criticism. I have, or, I did have - I haven't got too much status now as a local Civil Defender. I was Chairman for two or three years, of the Montgomery County Civil Defense Board. And we got so good that people asked for our plan, and that proved to me that the country was in a pretty tough situation.

I say it in all humility; we did the best we could, but in the first place, we've got a problem. We live right beside a lot of people who live over in the District and a lot of them have a river they can't get across going one way, and we're sort of right in the line, so our flower beds are the ones that are going to have to take it when they take off in the other direction. And so, I appreciate the problem that the Civil Defense people have.

I have thought, and once said something to Congress about it - and I don't believe that Congress is too far off - I believe that we could go over to Congress and get Congress to compel 4-F's - and you'll say, "Why pick on 4-F's?" The Congress feels that there but for the Grace of God there goes somebody already in, because they were picked and didn't make it. And I personally think that if anyone wanted

to - and I don't think that too many want to - you could sell Congress on putting an obligation for training and service in the Civil Defense on the 4-F's. Now, why pick on the 4-F's? Well, it's because psychologically they will react. In the first place, they have never bought the estimate of the Department of Defense on the 4-F. They figure he's worth it. When they see him making \$50,000 a year or more, they kind of figure his nervousness shouldn't interfere with his service. So, I think it's possible to sell Congress on his service.

Now, what are the concepts of service that we've got to get in Civil Defense? We've got to get the concept the Mexicans use. For instance, the Mexican people have a man who takes training and reports on Sunday. I'm not quarreling - well, let's not get into that one - but there is a way to have compulsion when it's only intermittent. And some things we've got to someday in this country come to a realization that you can have compulsion that only works for two hours on Thursday nights, or it works two hours three times a week, or reserve one day a week or some other such thing. You don't have to take a guy and keep him and feed him and take care of him for the rest of his life merely because you have him do something for the country. But we've had a little of that concept.

Therefore, with the Civil Defense I think that we will never have a satisfactory Civil Defense until we compel people to participate. Now, as to the problem at the present time. One of the difficulties of Civil Defense is that nobody is very scared except once in a great while.

Now, I was out in the field when this last thing broke and did quite a lot of straying around for a day or two. I won't name the state because I don't want

to pick on states. But I went into a town about two o'clock in the afternoon just before the thing came into the news out there of Khrushchev's first kindly words.

And things were pretty tense. I went to a coffee at four o'clock and after that there was a news broadcast and everybody said, "Isn't it lucky that they got that over?"

Well, now, just as long as you have that attitude out of the public you can blame the poor devil who is trying to run Civil Defense, but he isn't going to get much of anywhere when the guy only digs when he's scared.

I happen to believe, of course, in delegation because we run our system pretty much of trying to set up the objectives, trying to set up some sort of pattern and let the people down where it is, do it. And that, I think, Civil Defense has tried to do. But Civil Defense has got a problem, and I don't think I'm telling you any secrets if I say that I don't think they have yet been able to solve it. But it hasn't been the fault of effort. It may be such a thing that there have been the bugles maybe haven't blown the same kind of a note on this level all the time. But when you don't know - even when I was in Montgomery County they changed the size of the bomb on us, the skunks.

We had it all figured out where you could almost live on the District line and do pretty well if they hit 11th Street - I forget where they were supposed to hit; and I'm not sure whether the people who are going to drop it knows just where they're supposed to drop that. But we had a place downtown here at 11th and something, and you could live on the District line. But then we understood they had a bigger one and then Rockville wasn't safe anymore. And that wasn't fair. I mean, you can see the problems that Civil Defense is up against. I don't think that they have

gone very far. The public would just rather go and watch television and see what the cowboys did 50 years ago, than to see what they're going to have to do a couple of days ahead.

COLONEL DAVIS: General Hershey, speaking for the Commandant/<sup>and</sup> the student body, may I thank you for an extremely interesting and effective, and I may add, entertaining presentation. And we particularly enjoyed your answers.