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A BETTER SOLDIER AND A BETTER CITIZEN

5 June 1947

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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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## A BETTER SOLDIER AND A BETTER CITIZEN

5 June 1947

GENERAL MCKINLEY: Gentlemen, this morning we are happy to welcome back Brigadier General C. T. Lanham. You will remember he was here on the seventh of May and spoke to us on Opinion Surveys in the Army.

General Lanham is the Chief of the Troop Information and Education Division of the War Department General Staff. If you will recall, that morning, the morning of May 7, he very cleverly put aside one very interesting phase of his work which he did not get away with because we have him back here this morning to finish up and tell us about "A Better Soldier and a Better Citizen".

I take pleasure in re-introducing General Lanham.

(Applause)

BRIG. GEN. C. T. LANHAM: Gentlemen, it is very good to be back with you again this morning. I am happy that the invitation I suggested was accepted by your Commandant and by you because, as I said the last time, it seemed to me that perhaps we were putting the cart before the horse, with regard to the little talk I gave you on attitude research. I do not see where it does much good to measure these attitudes in the Army if we do not do something about them. Therefore, in describing our activities to you this morning, I should like you to bear in mind the effect of opinion, not only opinion in the Army itself but also the opinion of the public.

Second, if this group corresponds, in general, to most military groups I talk to--and I have an idea you do--there will be a substantial number present whose reaction to the letter I & E is like that of a bull to a red flag. On the other hand there will be a few who believe deeply in the concept that underlies I & E. The remainder will know nothing about the operation or be apathetic to the whole idea. This will be an unusual group indeed if it doesn't break down about like that.

Therefore, I should like to ask all of you this morning to put aside any pre-conceptions you may have concerning this much misunderstood operation and give me a chance to present to you the things we are trying to do.

This morning I hope to tell you something of the philosophy that underlies this operation. I hope to tell you some of the objectives

we are trying to reach and why we are trying to reach them. I hope to tell you how we are trying to carry out these things. I would like to give you some idea as to the current effectiveness of this operation. And, at last, to attempt to show to you the significance of this operation to you as individuals, to our Army, and to our country as a whole.

First, then, let me start with this statement: The activities of the Troop Information and Education Division center on the mental, moral and civic development of the men of our Army. No modern Army today can afford to concentrate exclusively on training the bodies of its men to the complete neglect of their minds. It is my conviction, and it is a conviction shared by many officers in this Army, that the American people will not support any public institution if they believe that that institution permits mental stagnation and the inevitable moral rot that accompanies it.

Furthermore, we believe that if our Army is to survive on a voluntary basis in the Atomic Age we must certainly recruit a far higher type of man than we have in the past. To attract that type of man we must provide in our Army a healthier mental, moral and social climate, with full opportunity for intellectual development and professional advancement. I think that that concept speaks for itself. It requires a violent break with the past--the past as we know it. It is in this general field that we move.

Our activities are so broad and so diversified that it is extremely difficult to pin-point our mission. We have had many definitions but we found none of them completely satisfactory. Personally, I believe that the broad but simple statement that our job is to make a better soldier and a better citizen comes closer to the mark than any other statement that has come out of our shop yet.

But, by way of sharper definition, I would like to tick off for you a few of the intermediate objectives that we seek in pursuit of this larger goal.

First of all, we strive to promote the dignity and the integrity of the individual; this, in contrast to that traditional military anonymity that crushes the spirit; that impels a soldier to refer to himself as a "dog-face", as a "G.I."

Second, we seek to inculcate an understanding of the American ideal; to nourish that ideal and to foster an abiding belief in the future of our country and our way of life.

Third, we strive to supply a basic motivation for our men; a sense of mission. This, gentlemen, obviously entails a fulfillment of that desire in every man's heart to count for something; to be needed.

Fourth, we strive to answer the soldiers' "Why?". We base this on the very well-known fact that the American soldier can be led but not driven, and that to lead him he must have an adequate and an intelligent explanation of those things he is called upon to do.

Fifth, we strive to keep every man in our Army abreast and aware of the great national and world problems that confront us from day to day in order that each man may understand their vital importance to him as a soldier and as a citizen.

And, sixth, we supply in part the remedy for those ancient occupational diseases of the Military apathy, boredom, and, what I call, mental corrosion.

We will let it go at that. These are six points; six intermediate objectives that contribute to our pursuit of this broader goal of better soldiership and better citizenship.

How do we carry out these things? I imagine there are some of you here who will tell me that we don't carry them out; that they are very noble words but they do not mean much. We will talk about that a little later.

Let me tell you that the two basic branches of our Division, engaged in implementing this work, are called the Troop Information Branch and the Army Education Branch. First, let me discuss those activities that fall under the jurisdiction of the Troop Information Branch.

The first, and by all means the most important, both from the military point of view and the point of view of civic significance, is our weekly troop information program. That, I am sure, most of you are familiar with, at least in general terms. This is the weekly mandatory hour, required throughout the Army; one of the most controversial things, incidentally, that has ever happened to the Army; the one that has been probably more roundly damned than any other activity short of the B-bag in STARS AND STRIPES during the war. It is one of the few activities that people can name about I & E. Before I tell you what we are trying to do with that operation, perhaps I should tick off briefly some of the sins that that operation has committed in the past.

In the first place, the operation was not too successful. It is not altogether successful yet. The reason for that lies, primarily, with our officer corps. In the pressure of war, it was an impossibility to indoctrinate the officer corps, as a whole, with the underlying philosophy of this operation. The reason for it was the fact that a soldier needed to be armed with conviction, needed to believe that what he was doing was just and right, was important, and had to be done, a matter that every commander who led troops in the field soon learned was vital. He would much rather command ten armed with nothing but sticks and stones if they believed in what they were doing and believed in their country and their way of life and the monstrous thing again which they were fighting than he would a hundred who were completely indifferent to the issues involved, even though they might be armed with the best weapons the world had ever seen.

But our officer corps, by and large, regarded I & E as a long-haired operation. Accordingly, those officers whom they designated as I & E officers were anything but the cream of the crop. I think it has been the experience of most of you, that the I & E officers you came across during the war were rare birds. If Commanders found an officer who could not command a unit, could not hold down a routine staff job, and could not even get away with a minor job somewhere in the rear then said the commanding officer, "There's the ideal man to put in charge of I & E." He was forthwith assigned to that post. Of course, he had nothing to deal with except ideas, the most explosive commodity in the world. So, this was a fine man to place in charge.

The results of that thinking, which was widespread, are still with us. It is still a rare day that goes by that some minor explosion in this work does not occur somewhere in the field, either at home or abroad. There is always some Senator or some Congressman who hears about it. The next step in that chain is a letter to the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War wanting to know just what the hell is going on out there. Some of the things, I will assure you, have been pretty bad indeed, because this operation has repeatedly in the past jumped the tracks. It has gotten into fields which have been traditionally forbidden to the Army by the American people. It has gotten into politics. It has gotten into questions of social reform. In fact, it has involved itself in all manner of things that are not our business. These have been serious problems and serious handicaps to this operation; they made us many enemies in the Army and many outside.

On the top-side of this operation during the war there was the most brilliant assemblage of people I think I have ever met. The finest brains in this country were assembled to run it. There was

the greatest talent, literally, ever seen anywhere. But there was just one thing wrong with it; with all that assemblage of talent, there was only one Regular Army officer and nobody listened to him. These gentlemen, by and large, were simply civilians in soldier suits.

Many of these men had no idea what supported and sustained an army. The result was that many false and dangerous ideas were sponsored directly or indirectly by individuals or activities of this Division, such, I might mention, as "the democratization of the army". Indirectly, we might even refer to the Army caste system. Many of those things seeped out through the way some of these people, themselves, felt.

A second great drawback to this operation was the fact that the very quality of the brilliance of these people produced materials that were over the heads of John Soldier and a lot of the rest of us. The soldier man was simply not interested. There was everything, by golly, from flower arrangement down to aesthetic dance.

But that was the general "feel" of I & E in those days. It became known as a long-haired outfit--and it was long-haired! However, many of those gentlemen told me, that although the Regular Army considered them long-haired, when they got back to their own professions, they were going to be considered short-haired.

Finally the Regular Army moved in, and took this thing over. It has been a headache and a very dangerous job, I assure you. We have had quite a time getting the operation back on its feet and in the pattern where it can serve both the Army and the Nation. We think we are on the right track now.

All of which brings me right back to the point where I started the Troop Information Hour. We had written into policy, more than a year ago, the subject areas in which we can move. All areas of discussion that are not included in the regulations are taboo as far as we are concerned. That was the first big step carried out in this field.

The next thing we did was to try to get away from this hit-or-miss idea in Army talks and, instead, develop a series of talks in each of those areas. They do not run consecutively but any one analyzing our army talks over a period of six months or a year will see a definite pattern. By the series idea we produce an impact, a continuing impact. Some of these series I would like to mention. They are going on now and many of them will go on far into the future.

Perhaps the most important series is the one that develops the democratic theme: the great ideas and ideals upon which this country is founded; their significance to the soldier as a citizen; their meaning to this country. It is our firm belief that if the men of our Army do not have a deep and burning conviction in the great American faith; that if they do not understand our freedoms and the freedoms that they, as soldiers, are sworn to defend, then, surely, the American people are placing their faith in a broken reed, and so are we, the leaders of that Army. This is one of our major efforts.

A second one has to do with the importance of the individual, not only in our country but also in our Army. I am sure there is not an officer in this room who hasn't heard a soldier, at some time or other during this war--and, as a matter of fact, in peace--say, "What the hell difference does it make what I do? They have eight million more of these Joes". Well, gentlemen, all you have to do is multiply that philosophy by eight million and you know what we come out with. So, we attempt to stress the importance of the soldier--man, whether he be a rifleman or a man back at the port.

In pursuit of that goal we are running a whole series of talks on the theme, "How Important Is One Man?" We show that if you cut any battle fine enough you come to the point where the ultimate issue has been decided by one or two or three determined men, at a critical place and at a critical time. They seldom know they are at a critical place or at a critical time. They seldom realize the significance of their action. That can be shown historically in the last war, in this war, and in every war that has ever been fought where historical material or testimony of competent witnesses is available. It is an important theme and one that I think, we should stress endlessly, both in war and in peace. In peace, it is even more important to us unless we want to see the signs go up again, "No Soldiers And No Dogs Allowed!". We know what that means.

We also are running a series of talks we call the "Holiday Series". That simply uses each of the great national holidays as pegs on which to hang the development of our country, its free institutions, and our way of life as a positive affirmation of our belief rather than the "anti" point of view.

We are running a series of talks on "Know Your Army" a series that will cover every arm, every service, all of the components of the Air Forces and of the U. S. Navy. When this series is completed, every unit in the Army, we trust, will have available in its files at all times a complete picture of all of our Armed Forces and the importance of each in the manifold duties that each has to perform.

This, again, is an attempt to build pride in our Army, pride in our Air Forces, and pride in our Navy, and to strike a blow at those mutual jealousies and rivalries that always build up between arms and services, between major forces. There is not room enough in our national defense for such matters as that.

It has disturbed me a great deal to find that in some of our units, when we put out a talk on the Air Forces, if they are not Air Force units, those talks have been shelved. When we send out a talk to the Air Forces on the Ground Forces, they say, "We won't use that this week". If we put out talks on the Navy, some of the Ground Force commanders and Air Force commanders say, "To hell with this racket. We don't want any Navy Day business. We aren't in the Navy. Who won this way, anyhow?"

General Devers has taken a very positive stand on that; I hope it will be followed by General Spaatz of the Air Forces. General Devers has removed the optional requirement that the Army talk may or may not be used as the Ground Force Commander sees fit. They will be used from here on out because they represent a continuity of effort and we cannot afford to break that continuity.

Now, gentlemen, it makes no difference how fine the materials may be that are put out by the War Department in this field; they are going to be no more effective than the man down at the operating level, in the platoon or the company, who puts those materials out. And he is going to be no more effective than the degree of belief that he and his local commander have in this operation. Without command support, without command leadership, this operation, like any other operation in the Army, is sunk.

We realize you cannot legislate good-will and you cannot legislate understanding. Therefore, we are attempting to correct this through a systematic process of explaining to all officers in our Army what this operation is attempting to do. I would like to talk at considerable length on this Troop Information Hour, but if I am going to cover the rest of these things, I am not going to be able to do it in the time available today. I hope you gentlemen will have an opportunity to come by my office and see the work we are doing in this field. When you return to your units I hope you will make a practice of reading our weekly Army talks. You will find they are interesting. You will find they are stimulating. I hope, moreover, that you will see that they are carried out as the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff expect them to be carried out, both of whom are solidly behind this operation.

The second one of our larger Troop Information activities is the Armed Forces Radio Service. That is one that has not been criticized

either during the war or since the war we have had no complaints of any consequence. Many people do not realize that it is an I & E activity.

During the war it was the largest operation ever cranked up in the history of Radio, and it is still a tremendous one. We service all of our overseas garrisons. They are serviced by means of some 79 long-wave stations in the overseas theaters. In addition we utilize batteries of short-wave transmitters, owned by the State Department, in San Francisco and New York. Through these we service our Navy ships at sea, our own Army transports, and certain Foreign Areas where our troops are located. This, incidentally, is one more joint Army-Navy operation. The Navy pays about one-third of the cost and supplies about one-third of the personnel.

This Armed Forces Radio Service is not a straight "banjo-playing" operation. During the war it was, by and large, a straight entertainment job. If it was an entertainment job, it had no business being in I & E, which is primarily an ideological weapon. So, as soon as we took over this operation, we began to change the complexion of this and used this great instrument of information very much in the way that the radio is used in this country.

Ford, General Motors, and General Electric do not elect to pay these fantastic radio fees out of any spirit of altruism. They put on fifty or fifty-five minutes of a good show in order to get across a five-minute message about their product. Well, we are now using the Armed Forces Radio Service in much the same way. Our spot-announcements move in the areas and toward the objectives I have already described. But, in addition to that, the heart of our program lies in the field of Troop Information. We can only use so much of it. Our Troop Information shows run about four hours a week, between three-and-a-half and four hours a week. That is all the traffic will bear.

Now, in those, we resort again to the series idea in order to get impact and continuity. We cover the same areas I have been discussing with you: pride of unit, pride of Army, pride of Nation. We are operating currently, for example, a series of half-hour dramatization which we call the "Freedom Series", dealing with the basic freedoms in this country, such as the Bill of Rights. We have a series of half-hour shows which tell what these are, in highly dramatic form, through personal-interest stories and personal anecdotes. The second time over, we will show in detail how these basic freedoms may be attacked--and, indeed, how they have been attacked in the past--with the fundamental theme that freedom, as such, is indivisible, again trying to supply to the American soldier an intimate knowledge of his country and its way of life.

We are running, and have been running for nearly a year, a series of fifteen-minute dramatizations which we call the "Ambassador Series". These deal with the very difficult and delicate problem of soldier conduct. We feel, and our surveys tend to show, that they have done a great deal of good. I would like an opportunity to describe those to you in detail, but time does not permit.

When we were having so much trouble between the American soldier and the displaced persons, it became a very grave problem; an issue on which the Army was being hammered endlessly in the press, and on which the War Department was being constantly assailed with letters and resolutions passed by various organizations.

We undertook to do what we could to rectify the unsympathetic and understanding attitude on the part of these eighteen and nineteen year soldiers, who had not seen these people as the rest of us had seen them during the war. They simply did not know how they got that way or why. The result was that we worked up a series of fifteen-minute dramatizations. These have been running now for about a year. Each one starts out with a DP family before the war. It told the story of what happened to that family and how it got the way it is today. We know that they did a great deal of good in improving soldier relations and in promoting understanding.

We attacked the same problem, of course, through the medium of our Army Talks. We did the same thing through the medium of our soldier papers.

We have at least a dozen other series that move in the fields I have described. We have a series which we call "Pride of Unit", in which we recount the great exploits of the great units in World War II. We make extra platters of these and send them to the units themselves so they may have them and use them. We do that for the Marine Corps; we do it for the Navy and we do it for our Army units. These have been extraordinarily well received.

You must understand, gentlemen, that we do not distort the truth in any of these things. They are coldly factual. We deal only in truth, which is a Government policy. But we bring to the men, at home and abroad and in our hospitals, and through our Signal Corps libraries in this country, these stories that are constantly available to the local commander and to the local Information and Education officers by way of presenting facts in any one of these areas.

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Our third great activity in Troop Information is the soldier press. There are some 1300 soldier papers still in operation. These fall into two classes. There are the large theater papers, such as STARS AND STRIPES, The Pacifican, etc; but the great bulk of papers are the small unit papers. The big theater papers are devoted to bringing the soldier news and to promoting a better understanding of our country and of our Army and the place of our Army and of our soldier-man in a democratic society. The unit papers are devoted primarily to promoting pride of unit and that sense of oneness and unity that is essential to any organization. If you, as commanders and staff officers, watch these papers that are under your command, and control them properly, I assure you they will be of great value to you.

I am telling you no secret when I state that there were a number of very undesirable characters who managed to insinuate themselves into the various soldier papers throughout the world. There are some in Europe, there were some in the Pacific. When the whistle blew for V-J Day, these characters promptly went to town. You gentlemen all know what happened. Some of these people were bona-fide Communists, planted there for a purpose. One of the things that gave them a particularly favorable opportunity to work was a lack of formal written policy for the papers and lack of adequate military control.

I was not able to find any written policy concerning soldier papers when I took over the I & E Division. One of the first things we did was to put in writing what a soldier paper was for and how it would be used and what would be handled in it. We have had no trouble with our soldier papers since then--no trouble of any consequence. There have been one or two cases of bad judgment, but there has been none of the viciousness we all know so well during the war.

Some of the things that were done were literally incredible. On the way back from Europe to take over this job, I stopped in Paris for the purpose of checking up on the STARS AND STRIPES there. That was one of the first things I wanted to look at. I went to take a look at the B-Bag Department. I found a character in there about that high (indicating), a Private soldier. He was one of the weirdest young men I have ever run into.

I went over some of the files of letters that were sent in. I found just exactly what I suspected. This young gent had very carefully and systematically selected from all the letters just those that damned the officer all the way through. The letters that came back in rebuttal from other soldiers were simply thrown out. He

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never used any of those. Letters that were in any way constructive or suggestive, or had anything good to say about the Army, were not used. He had an ax to grind, and boy he was grinding it.

I think that will begin to show the great delicacy and sensitivity of this operation. Therefore, everyone of us who wears these things (referring to insignia) on our collars and shoulders must certainly keep a very close eye on all I & E activities because if we don't we are going to find some of these same worms crawling out of the woodwork and right back into these jobs. I can assure you they are a plausible, gullible lot. If we are not on our toes, they are going to get in again. You all know the damage they can do to the Army. You know the damage they did do to the Army. So don't just say, "Let's wipe out this I & E thing". Instead let's make it work to the interest of the soldier man, the Army, and the Country. And incidentally to our interest too.

I will pass on from that to our Motion-Picture Program. This is just about moribund because of inadequate funds. We will make few pictures this year. Last year our major movie effort was devoted to the problems of soldier conduct overseas, and soldier's role as a representative of this country, and the Occupation Mission.

We are doing a series of pictures on individual divisions still on the active list. We are making those largely out of stock shots in the Signal Corps. This is another effort of I & E in the "Pride of Unit" field.

Many of you are familiar with the Army-Navy Screen Magazine. Many of you are also familiar with the great films that were made during the war, but I don't know how many of you are familiar with those that have been made since. One of them, "Seeds of Destiny", was awarded the Oscar in Hollywood for the best documentary film in 1946.

We run posters which cover these same subject areas soldier conduct, discipline, pride of unit, pride of Army, sense of mission, and the democratic theme. These will be run in series in the future. They are all worth keeping your eye on, too.

We distribute special booklets and books, although our funds for this are getting very, very low indeed. I might mention, as an example of the sort of thing which we distribute, that just this last week we bought thirteen thousand copies of Hirsch's book, "The Soviet Spies", a record of Soviet espionage activities in Canada; the big Canadian spy trials. This was a condensation of those trials. It reads like a dime novel. I am sure some of you saw a condensation of that condensation in the READERS DIGEST. These will

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be distributed down to company level. They are available both at home and abroad.

I am going to pass on from Troop Information to Education. I can pick up those things later.

Our Army Education Program is the greatest experiment in mass education that has been attempted in the history of the world. I think you will be interested to know that the American Council of Education reported last month that, to date, in excess of two million men have received formal academic credit in civil instructions throughout this country for their work in the Armed Services. More than a half-million have received their high-school diplomas. To-day the Army and Navy have enrolled in USAFI (United States Armed Forces Institute) some 340,000 actively engaged in furthering their education. The United States Armed Forces Institute is the core of the educational operation for the Army and Navy. It offers correspondence courses, self-study courses, and group study materials. It offers counselling, advisement, testing, and a particularly remarkable educational measuring device called the GED, developed by the Army. This is the General Educational Development test which determines a man's proper educational level. This has been officially recognized in forty-six states, and the District of Columbia, as a guide for placing veterans at their proper educational level.

It has been such a remarkable measuring device that it is now being extended to the field of civilian adult education. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have adopted it at the last report I had and probably more have by this time. I would like to take just a minute to tell you what that means. It means that any number of citizens in this country and any number of soldiers and any number of officers, whose education has not been completed, who may have stopped, we'll say, after the eight grade, who may perhaps be thirty years old, are blocked from advancement in civilian life or in the Army to certain positions where a high-school education is required. These people are given an opportunity to take a General Educational Development test. As a result, many of them have been found to have the equivalent of a high school education and many others have scored at the first or second year college level.

When you stop to think of it, this is a perfectly obvious and reasonable state of affairs because a man doesn't go through life without learning something. He does not have to stay in school to do it. Educators are finding this out more and more. Accordingly, through the means of the General Educational Development test in civilian life and in the Army, we are finding that the average man's educational status, measured in absolute terms, is much, much higher than he thinks it is.

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The Army Educational Program is closely integrated with the Career Guidance Plan, with which you gentlemen are familiar.

Currently we are working on a program for the Army Air Forces to bring ten or twelve thousand of their officers who never had an opportunity to get any college education, up through the second year of college. We are working with the Air University on that. That will be extended to the rest of the Army.

We are still operating some 149 off-duty schools in the overseas theaters. There are presently in the Pacific areas twenty-six thousand men\* following courses in off-duty education. This is in addition to the USAFI enrollments. In Hawaii, which is not included in the figure, more than 2,000 are enrolled in off-duty classes. What has been done in the Pacific can be done anywhere with command interest and command support.

The significance of this to the Army and to the country should be apparent without any detailed comment from me. I think that any commander of men should interest himself very deeply in the educational program because, personally, I can think of nothing that should give a commander more satisfaction than seeing the men under his command constantly improving.

We have found, by means of our surveys, that your disciplinary rates, your VD rates, and so on, decline as your education level goes up. Your experimental UMT unit at Knox is indicative of that: it provides a positive program of activities that the men can do and want to do and that captivates their interest. In the unit at Knox, which has been operating well over four months now with some 650 men,\* there has been but one case of venereal disease. Incidentally, the signposts of the future are available in that unit for everyone to read who can read.

We are developing another project in education that I think will eventually reach every one of you gentlemen. This is a course in civic education, or citizenship, if you will. It will run somewhere between ten and fifteen hours. To date, we have the concurrence of most major agencies in the War Department, either in detail or principle, for putting this course on a mandatory basis throughout the entire Army. The Navy has also shown considerable interest in it.\*\*

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\*As of July 1947, this figure had increased to more than 42,000 in the Pacific.

\*\*Since this talk by General Lanham the Navy has definitely decided to include such a course as part of "boot" (basic) training.

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Gentlemen, I am not going into any more details of these activities, but this is what I want to point out to you: Everyone of these things I have been ticking off depend, first, and above all upon the effectiveness of everyone of us officers in seeing that they are carried out and that we are putting the right people in the jobs to carry them out.

Second, I want to point out to you that the impact of these things upon the public is literally astonishing. I was telling General McKinley this morning that it is impossible for me to fill the speaking engagements I am asked to fill. There isn't a day that goes by in my office that I am not bearded by two or three or four or five representatives of civic organizations throughout this country. My correspondence is loaded with such requests. I am asked to speak to such people, for example, as the top executives of THE NEW YORK TIMES; or the top executives of the Columbia Broadcasting System. I am asked to speak to State educational societies throughout the country. I am asked to speak before all of the large civic organizations and veterans' associations, all of whom are deeply interested in this problem because they believe this operation is bringing the humanities to the Army. They believe that for the first time the Army is beginning to regard the soldier-man as the psychologist regards him--not as a body with a number assigned to it but as a human-being with the same hopes, fears, and desires that all of the rest of us have. They realize that the Army can be and must be an instrument for good.

From our point of view I think our choice is very clear. We have a choice of just two things: we can have, if we desire, any army of a million men well-informed, alert, aggressive, progressive, interested in their work, believing in their country, and highly receptive to leadership; or we can wipe out this I & E concept that was set up initially by General Marshall and followed up by General Eisenhower. We can destroy I & E, its programs, and everything it stands for by not supporting it actively and intelligently in the echelons in which we move. If we do that, just as surely as I stand here, we are going to forfeit public interest and public support and that means that step by inevitable step we will go straight back to where we were as an army in the Twenties and the Thirties.

Now I don't think I need to comment any further on that to officers of your grade and service. You gentlemen know it as well as I do. You can remember, many of you, when the National Defense Act was passed, authorizing a half-million men. The same Congress that passed it passed just enough to give us about 250,000 or 220,000. That was progressively whittled down until, in the Mid-Twenties we got to an army of about 112,000.

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Many of you will remember the ration rate. It averaged around 21 cents a day. We had beans about three times a week. Many of you remember the impossibility of getting a bucket of paint or a car that would run. Many of you remember the signs, "No Soldiers and No Dogs Allowed". Many of you remember the type of man we attracted to the U. S. Army. (Don't take that as being a universal criticism because there were some damned good men in those days too.) But, by and large, you gentlemen know what they were. We had the unemployables. We had the snowbirds. We had the buns. You know what the turnover was.

That is what we will have again if we, the officer corps, do not elect to make this Army a healthier and a more attractive place to a young American. I think the ultimate criterion is, Would you want your son in it? You say, "Sure, I want him in--as an officer!". That's what Mrs. Jones says too--"I wouldn't mind if he is an officer". When we who know the Army so well can say truthfully, "It's a swell place for my boy. It'll make a man out of him. He'll finish up an enlistment a better citizen, and a better man morally, intellectually, and physically"--when we can say that then we will be building an army that the people of this country will support, respect, and admire. We can preach national defense until we are blue in the face, but, gentlemen, it isn't going to do one bit of good unless the people of the country say, "There's an institution that's on the up-and-up. I would like my son in it." If they do not believe that, you know perfectly well what is going to happen: "I don't want my boy in it, but Mrs. Jones that's fine for him, but not my son!" I think the issue is very clearly drawn.

General Eisenhower, who spoke at the graduation exercises the Army Information School week before last, said what he thought of this operation and he said it with plenty of emphasis. He stated, among other things, that he hoped very shortly the War Department would take the necessary steps to see that graduates of the National War College--and I am sure he meant this institution, too, the two senior ones in the Army--would attend the Army Information School. He wants his own son to go there. He thinks it is one of the broadest experiences an officer can have. I commend that thought of our Chief of Staff to you as indicative of the significance of this operation to the survival of our Army.

And, finally, I leave this thought with you; I mentioned it the last time I was down here. We are confronted with a situation in which two ideologies are just like that (indicating crossed fingers). They are in violent conflict. If we do not provide a positive, affirmative philosophy of our own way of life to the men of our Army, we are leaving an intellectual vacuum and something will fill the vacuum. This is scarcely a time to leave such things to chance.

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Now you can say that our people understand our way of life; that the men of our Army understand this country and what it stands for. Well, I contest that point of view. I don't know whether I mentioned these particular National surveys or not the last time I talked to you, but let me cite some figures from several as indicative of how well informed the people of the "best-informed nation of the world" are.

When General MacArthur went back into the Philippines a National survey indicated that some thirty million adults in this country never knew the Japanese had taken the Philippines! Gentlemen, think that one over!

I think most of you remember the transactions that took place at Munich with Chamberlain and his umbrella and Hitler, Mussolini and the rest; they were transactions that shook the entire world. That was the beginning, in effect, of World War II. Six months following Munich--incidentally that had been covered, God knows, through every medium of communication and was still being covered-- a national survey indicated that fewer than six million adults in this country had ever heard of Munich or could identify it in any way with what transpired there.

Gentlemen, the people who make up our Army come from the great American Commonwealth. They are going to know not a bit more than the people of this country know. If we leave an ideological vacuum in the Army, other ideas are going to come in.

I am sure that most of you must have seen the survey which was published in THE WASHINGTON POST about two months ago. It indicated that more than 70% of the people of this country did not know the term of office of a member of the House of Representatives of the United States or of a member of the Senate. Now these are the most elementary facts of civics. The matters I have been talking about here are not so much matters of civics as they are matters of civic education, basic matters of our national philosophy, of our way of life, of our fundamental freedoms, our civic liberties, and what we have fought for and will fight for again if the need exists. We have to do something about that. We are the guys to do it. We have an army of a million men. That army does not live in a social vacuum. Every act of every officer and every man is reflected on the public. Remember it!

I hope that a number of you gentlemen, or as many of you as possibly can, will definitely make application to attend the Army Information School at Carlisle Barracks. It is an intellectual experience you will never forget. Moreover it is a basic professional qualification for the army that is being created today. A qualification that will stand you in good stead in the years to come, both with the Army and with the people of this country.

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I have a lot more I would like to say. I am sure you will bring out some additional points in your questions. I know I do not have to ask if there are any questions; I remember the last time I was down here. Suppose you gentlemen let me have some questions. I have talked to you too long here already and I still haven't said half that I wanted to.

(Applause)

A STUDENT OFFICER: This may sound facetious, but I assure you it is asked in all sincerity; it possibly should be off the record.

It appears to me that instead of presenting the reality and the creative value of the military force as an instrument of national policy, the policy of the I & E Division is to decry the use of a military force as a sin and shame; with the further proviso that some day we might have to fight the bad boys from across the water.

Now the question I would like to ask, if my conclusion is correct, is this: Is that policy a result of conviction, political expediency, consideration of good psychology, or does the I & E Division have its orders?

BRIG. GEN LANHAM: That's quite a question. Thank you, sir.

First, on the question of national policy and foreign policy. Any matter that touches on the policy of our Government that we deal with in the I & E Division is cleared with those agencies of Government concerned before we can put it out.

(Discussion off the record.)

On matters of straight military policy, we clear through the necessary Staff agencies in the War Department, primarily OPD and G-3. If they are matters that deal with issues of concern to G-2, they go to G-2.

On the question of the United Nations--what you have to say, though you did not mention the United Nations specifically, ties in with that--the policy of our Government is to support the United Nations. The official policy of our Government, as stated by Senator Austin at a recent meeting of the United Nations, is that the United Nations hasn't a chance of succeeding unless there be a strong, effective U. S. Army in being behind the United Nations. That is the identical policy-line we follow.

Since every publication that comes from the I & E Division bears the imprint of the War Department it obviously carries the weight of

the Government behind it. Accordingly our Army Talks and other publications are regarded both at home and abroad as Government policy whether we like it or not. I might add that our work is subjected to the closest scrutiny by Congress, the Press, civic organizations, etc., indeed to such an extent that we had to put Army talk on sale in the U. S. Government Printing Office. We have to tread softly for we quite obviously can not risk the label "war-mongers". We cannot come out and say, "Let's jump on Russia (no matter how you or I feel) or Guatemala, or England, or France, or Czechoslovakia, or Brother Tito down there; none of them". We have to say what General Eisenhower says, which is that the U. S. Army and the United States stand for peace. We all want peace. God know I do. I presume you gentlemen do, too. I have had enough fighting for one war.

That is the line that is taken. There is nothing that goes out of the I & E Division that goes out as Buck Lanham's personal idea or personal whim at all. It is the official policy-line of the War Department, or of the U. S. Government, or both.

Does that answer your question?

A STUDENT OFFICER: Yes, sir; thank you.

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: I can elaborate on that further.

A STUDENT OFFICER: In the talks which you have in your weekly Hour on the American way of life, how do you prevent your discussion from getting into the field of politics with all of the consequent repercussions?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: That is a good question and it is the \$64.00 one.

In the basic regulation that governs the Troop Information Hour it is stated very clearly that since the time involved is so short--and it is a short period of time--the discussion leader must keep the issue involved to those issues that are presented in the basic talk, which is our Army talk. That is the policy-line to be followed. That does not preclude appropriate allied discussion, but it does give the discussion leader the background that is required to lead the discussion and to guide it.

There are certain topics that we cover that are not suitable for discussion because the men haven't enough background information to discuss them. After all, it takes some knowledge to discuss a thing. Talks of this sort lend themselves to the conference type of insinuation. Then there is the type where the group as a whole

know something about the subject and want to ask questions and participate. There are others used, such as panels and forums, where a group of selected people will present those things.

Now if discussion leaders are not carefully selected, some mighty funny things can happen. That is the commander's responsibility. The commander cannot pass that responsibility on. I & E is here to stay and commanders might as well recognize that fact. Also, they might as well recognize the fact that the I & E officer is just as much a Staff officer as any other Staff officer. What happens in the future is going to be dependent, in large measure, upon the effectiveness of the I & E program. Commanders will be evaluated on the effectiveness of their I & E work just as much as they are evaluated on any other aspect of their profession. The I. G. will soon start bearing down on this.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I would like to ask you about what the economy wave is doing to you; that is, as far as appropriations and personnel ceilings, and so on, are concerned?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: As a matter of fact, we're pretty much worried about what Congress would do to us this year, but when we appeared before Congress we had the best reception we have ever had down there. We expected it to be a hot session, but after they asked a few pointed questions and realized the type of work we were engaged in, we received their enthusiastic endorsement.

The Congress this year, in spite of the economy wave, never cut one penny from our funds for operations. However, we were cut in as part of the overall personnel reduction for the War Department. We have already suffered such severe cuts that this new one is a very serious matter indeed; but we'll work out a solution somehow.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: In connection with your entire radio station activity, does that come out of Signal Corps or your own money?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: It comes out of our own money; all of it.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I am glad to hear of your having that good reception up there because some of your long-haired boys were present in the room when I was up there during the war and they certainly didn't get a good reception.

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: I know they didn't. The Congress went into this Communist question. I presented them quite a statement of what we were doing in that field and told them what we intended to do. I told them that this whole deal was just what I told you: it is an ideological weapon that is extremely delicate and sensitive. If I & E is destroyed, particularly the information part of it, the

United States Army will simply be left unarmed in the battle of ideas. Wars may stop, but the war of ideas never stops. Ideas are there whether we talk about them or not and we had better do something about guiding them.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I am glad to hear about that.

A STUDENT OFFICER: You mentioned some of the publications, or referred indirectly to them, that were used during the war. I was wondering, are you sifting that educational material out?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: At my request all of the I & E materials used during the war have been screened at least four times by several different agencies: AGF, G-2, my Education Branch, the Information Bureau, and I have personally tackled many of the border line cases. I can not tell you off hand how many of them have been eliminated, but there have been a vast number. As a matter of fact, although some of these materials have been eliminated for more than a year, there are many people in the Army and out of the Army who still think some of them are current.

In appearing before Congress this year, several members raised questions concerning some of these materials. One of the points they consistently overlooked on those materials that came out during the war was this: at that particular time the Soviet Union was an ally. Materials were put out in accordance with the official Government policy and the War Department follows the policy of the Government. We do not make policy in that field.

Does that answer your question?

A STUDENT OFFICER: I just wanted to know if it is being screened out.

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: Yes, sir. I guarantee they have been screened. You bet your life they have. If they hadn't been screened I don't believe there would be any I & E today.

A STUDENT OFFICER: What effect do these radio skits have that constantly poke fun at the Service? Are you taking any action on that?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: To begin with, there is no censorship in the United States. We couldn't do a thing if we wanted to. Now you take our troops overseas, whom we supply with domestic programs from the entertainment field. We have agreements with all of the big domestic networks which allow us to take their best programs, de-commercialize them, and send them overseas in platter form where

they are rebroadcast for our men over there. If these programs are incendiary in nature or not suitable for our purposes we don't use them. But I have seen little of that.

(Discussion off the record.)

A STUDENT OFFICER: General Lanham, you didn't particularly or specifically mention the word "morale", but how does that fit into your mission? What cognizance is taken of it?

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: I & E has a vital morale role. That is implicit in everything I have said here. But, on the other hand, there isn't an outfit that we call the Morale Division. There is only one guy in the world responsible for morale in an outfit and that is the "old man". He isn't going to delegate that responsibility to someone else. Some of you will probably remember that when this operation was first cranked up it was called the Morale Division.

A guy would report to your outfit and you'd say, "Who are you?" He would say, "Me?--I'm the Morale Officer." "Well, son, that's what you think." There can't be anything like that. There's only one morale officer in an outfit and that's the old man.

However, there are any number of things that contribute to morale. I & E activities are among them. They contribute very, very definitely. The whole operation is designed to increase the moral effectiveness of the individual; the moral effectiveness of the team. All of that helps to promote morale: pride in self; pride in unit; pride in Army; pride in country; pride in the uniform; pride of profession; feeling that the job he does is important, is significant, is necessary to the Army no matter what arm of the Service he is in. The morale implication is a tremendous one.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I want to take this opportunity to thank you for giving us this fine, stimulating talk.

BRIG. GEN. LANHAM: Thank you very much. I appreciate your asking me to come back here.

(Applause)

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