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ALWAYS THE SEA

Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C

1954 - 1955

ALWAYS THE SEA

28 March 1955

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION--Rear Admiral W. McL. Hague, U.S.N., Commandant, ICAF 1

SPEAKER--------Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations 1

GENERAL DISCUSSION 43

Reporter: Grace E. O'Toole

Publication No. [illegible]
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D. C.

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ADMIRAL HAGUE: Gentlemen: I think you all realize what a tremendous personal as well as official pleasure and honor I feel in presenting to the two Colleges the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney. Admiral Carney.

ADMIRAL CARNEY: Admiral Hague and Gentlemen: In retrospect I am very glad that this meeting was scheduled for this morning rather than on Sunday. I realize that coming on Sunday would have been a sacrifice for you, but we also had an ACS meeting that took up most of Sunday and I would not have been available.

It is always a pleasure to offer some thoughts to the sort of contemplative group that is assembled here this morning, because all of you are free from the administrative chores that inherently conflict with creative and constructive effort. Those of you who have served in the various parts of the hive here in Washington understand what I mean. You have ample opportunity to imagine, to explore the ideas of your choice, to indulge in a free interchange of ideas, to experiment, and to theorize into

the abstract realms of tomorrow, including the strategy of tomorrow. Actually you are training yourselves for the objective and imaginative leadership that will be required if our country is to shape a bright and proud destiny for future generations of Americans. My offerings today are presented to stimulate thinking on some of those problems that relate to this business of strategy. When I speak of strategy, it is not military in character, because we can no longer think in a vacuum, militarily, about the strategy of our country.

Naturally, I am going to speak on the subject of sea power. One of the curious aspects of this subject is that organized sea power had been maintained in some degree for about 4,000 years before man made a determined effort to inquire into its governing principles and to analyze its influence on geopolitics and history.

Although our knowledge is fragmentary about some of these earlier adventures into the realm of sea power, we know that the Cretans exploited the peoples who lived on the shores of the Aegean Sea in the area that is now Greece and Turkey. We know that the Phoenicians were practicioners of what they called Thalassocracy which was taken from the two Greek words Thallasa meaning Sea and Krateo meaning Rule. We know

that the Greeks, despite the brief reign of the Persians, maintained sea supremacy during the Golden Age of Athens. We know that Roman sea power forced Hannibal to move overland across the Alps and brought about the ultimate defeat of Carthage. We know that Venice succeeded Constantinople as the great sea power of its era. Then came the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, the British, and latterly the Americans, one of whom was the first to discern the pattern of sea power's historic influences, Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Mahan's efforts had much to do with bringing our country out of a period of maritime lethargy and it was the result of his focusing the attention of his countrymen on the elements of sea power that aroused our national interest in the re-birth of a navy. He was largely responsible for bringing our people to the realization that their own geography, their trading interests, their national aspirations, and their political character left them no alternative but to assume a strong maritime posture. At no point in Mahan's many volumes did he infer that sea power was the only military power or that it was a sufficient force unto itself. In fact, he prophesied that, as the wilderness gave way to civilization, and as means of communication multiplied, all of the operations of war would become facilitated, more rapid and more

extensive. He thought that the most obvious light in which the sea presented itself was as a great highway available to those who had the wit to utilize it. Furthermore, he always hailed the advent of a new weapon, seeing it as a tool rather than as the herald of a new principle. It was his adherence to principles and his ability to prevent his thinking from being obscured by the limitations of the weapons he knew at his time that made so much of his writing applicable even with the change of weapons and weapons systems that were to come.

The addition of two new dimensions--air and sub-surface--have not really affected the soundness of his conclusions. For example, he pointed out that the basis for any military strategy is formed by a nation's geographical circumstances, its natural resources, its population, and the character and aspirations of its people.

Nations have often been classified as either adhering to a maritime strategy or to a continental strategy. Let us examine if any nation with a so-called continental strategy has ever achieved true and enduring greatness.

Certainly such was not the case with Napoleon's French Empire, nor was it true of Hitler's Germany. Nor is there an instance in history where a major nation that was strong at sea

has been defeated by a continental strategy. Of this, more later.

Because of the tremendous strength generated by Russia on the land, she heretofore has been considered a continental power. At first glance, the precedents of history might not seem to apply to Russia, yet, it is perfectly possible for Russia to overcome any of her continental neighbors, and her greatest adversary is a maritime power, or a combination of maritime powers. So that things boil down in their final appraisal to a continental power being restrained by her own maritime inadequacies.

I would like at this point to assure the audience that, although I have been delving into the past, I am not living in the past, and, in the course of this discussion, I will not only leave the past but will endeavor to project our thinking beyond the present into the future.

However, to bring this discussion along in orderly fashion, there are some additional things about the more recent past which are appropriate to the subject.

In a sense, World War II changed the detail, if not the composition, of the strategic picture, for a new dimension, the air element, had grown to maturity and was a powerful factor in the projection of military power. It was probably only natural,

with such major contributions being made in a new dimension, the air, for many analysts to conclude that a new and separate element of power, namely air power, had joined the strategic team. Air power was likened unto sea power. There was even a certain amount of plagiarizing of Mahan in developing thoughts and principles governing this new element. Extremists even saw this new element of strength as replacing sea power and land power.

And yet, it might be rather reasonably asked if the elements of air power were not in fact components or projections of military strength at sea and on the land. For invariably, the projection, the maintenance, the protection, and the supply of air striking power rests on the platform or springboard of either the land or the sea. So it is with all the creatures of flight--animate or inanimate--which are affected by the laws of gravitation. Air power habitually rests upon the land or the sea and must return to either the land or the sea upon completion of its mission. Much of its power must be devoted to support of the fundamental missions of controlling the sea and chosen areas on the surface of the earth.

The new air element is not a thing sufficient unto itself but, rather, it is one of several potent elements integrated with this thing we call military power, which is a synthesis of many

elements and components.

As magnificent an epic as it was, I could never understand how the coming of air power was accompanied by such a curious assortment of philosophies concerning the future uses of sea power--such shibboleths as naval forces becoming obsolete overnight, ships being bombed into quick submission, sea-based gun mounts incapable of dueling against shore batteries and land fortifications, merchant men being swept from the seas. It was almost as though the oceans covering three fourth's of the world's surface had evaporated and no longer existed either as a highway or as a barrier. All such slogans, of course, were to be erased in the bitterly fought campaigns of world war II. Surface ships fought notly contested gun duels all the way from Cherbourg to the shores of Japan, and fought them in Korea. Amphibious operations continued to grow in importance, magnitude, and complexity. Sea-air forces, by effectively combining those basic principles of mobility, surprise, and concentration, were able to gain air control against land-based air and they were able to penetrate land-based defenses.

The story of sea power in World War II is graphically illustrated by considering Germany's position after she had swept the Low Countries and France. At this point she held a

preponderance of ground strength; she had control of the air, and yet the 40 miles of English Channel proved to be an insurmountable barrier. The Allies, on the other hand, kept the continent under fairly effective blockade, retained control of the seas and, when they had made the necessary preparations, crossed the thousands of miles of oceans to land at places and time of their own choosing. It was within their maritime capabilities to bring much needed supplies to England and to Russia, to run the Axis submarine gantlet around Africa, and to bring sufficient military tools to Montgomery so that he could overcome Rommel in the desert war.

It was this same sea control that enabled the Allies to invade North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and, finally, to crack the continental coastline itself. It was sea power that provided the fuel and explosives for the crushing bomber offensive that contributed so much to the destruction of Germany's military and industrial might and final liberation. It was our own ability to utilize the sea that extended the fist of air power and land power to the chin of the enemy.

On the Pacific side of World War II, Japan employed the principle of surprise and battered our forces badly at Pearl Harbor. She was able to capture Singapore, the East Indies, the Philippines,

and the Solomons, and she presented a grave threat to Australia's security. Yet in sharp contrast, when she had been stripped of her sea power, she was unable to render assistance at her very doorstep--Okinawa. As long as Japan had the edge in sea power, our scope of operations was necessarily limited; and, as we cut down their margin of supremacy, our forces were able to move more freely.

Although sea-air power proved to be a very persuasive weapons system, it was by no means sufficient in itself to win either for the Japanese or for the United States. It took all of the forces, land, air, and sea, all of the knowledge, all of the tools and weapons systems available to us, to successfully complete our march across the Pacific. It was a blend of pilots and submariners, of merchant men and bazooka carriers--yes, and hand grenadiers--and backer-uppers on the home front that enabled us to win. It was the sum total of our industrial might, our carrier operations, our amphibious follow-ups, our bomber offensive, our anti-submarine patrols, and our hand-to-hand combat. In the final analysis, it was the team work of all hands, the joint and combined skill of all the Allies, that won for us the military victory in World War II.

I should point out, however, that it was sea power that permitted the multiple use of these same forces, that permitted a

relatively small number of troops in the Pacific to defeat a numerically superior force, for the Japanese surrendered with armies still intact, unbeaten, and, in fact, some of them untested.

When the Japanese lost freedom of sea movement and their troops were cut off, not only were they incapable of bringing these forces to oppose us, but they had the additional problem of trying to keep them alive until they could bring them into action. Literally thousands of Japanese soldiers were left to wither on the vine, helpless in the Southwest Pacific, in the Central Pacific, in the East Indies, and in China, without ever having the opportunity to bring their bayonets to bear.

The Japanese were not able to retain control of the sea as long as it was useful to them nor as long as it was useful to our allied forces who opposed them. When they lost their ability to transport their troops, they might as well have lost their troops.

Again I would ask you not to be impatient with my recounting of certain past events. I realize our grave preoccupation today is really with the future, possibly the immediate future. Our preoccupation is actually with the future of our country; but, in order to plan for the future, it is imperative that every drop of profit for the future be wrung from the past to the end that our thinking for the future may not discard anything of remaining merit.

There may be things we have done in the past that are not applicable today, and may be less applicable in the future; but there are principles, there are things from the past that will have an application. It is up to us to determine what they are and to use them.

Following the surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, we in the Navy reappraised the world situation as we saw it. We had swept our adversaries from the sea. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, our country was a sea power unequalled in the pages of world history. We could transport, land, and sustain armies at any point on the globe. We could build and support air bases wherever they were needed and, in addition, we owned numerous sea airfields of a self-sustaining and mobile character. We could assure freedom of sea movement, both to ourselves and to our friends and our allies, conversely, we could restrict the seas' usage if our national interests so dictated. In short, virtually all of the blue chips, as far as sea power was concerned, were in our hands.

As we studied the lessons of recent history, we continued to keep a weather eye on the future horizon--researching advanced types of weapons, guided missiles, improved aircraft, nuclear power, and many other possibilities which seemed to bear on the

safety of our country's future. That period from 1945 to 1950 can be considered from the Navy's point of view as an era of research, analysis, exploration, and development.

Then Korea came along. From the maritime standpoint we must approach this military contest with great discrimination, because the entire Korean War was full of anomalies--strategic, political, and tactical. Perhaps we should call Korea an abnormal war. None of the services was ever permitted to develop its full potential because of the artificialities that were introduced into the planning. Perhaps the gravest lesson that we can derive from the Korean War is the fact that limited peripheral wars remain a distinct possibility, and our military planning and posture must never be so geared to any single concept as to preclude our ability to deal with any Korea that may confront us in the future. As far as the Navy is concerned, any conclusions we come to must be carefully arrived at, indeed, because we were never faced with serious maritime opposition in the Korean War. And yet, that fact in itself was of vast significance, for, without a mastery of the surrounding seas, the allied position in Korea would have been virtually hopeless.

But what of the immediate future and the days beyond? The strategy of the free nations during this cold war has been,

is, and probably will continue to be, inextricably tied to the continued freedom of movement on the sea and in the air. A moment's reflection will authenticate this statement. Sea and air control of the Atlantic was the very basis for the formation of the North Atlantic Community. Twice within a generation, the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent land areas had proven inseparably related as causes of war and as factors in war's outcome. Control of the Atlantic seaways and airways was an elemental consideration in the projection and sustaining of military power in Europe, in the building and supporting of overseas bases and allied war industries, in the exchange of raw materials and finished products. In short, the Atlantic Ocean was and is the key to the economic and political survival of the Atlantic Community. Such a coalition as NATO could not have been contemplated without the capability for bridging the Atlantic Ocean areas and controlling them.

Similarly, as pointed out earlier, in South Europe, from the times of the Cretans, the Mediterranean Sea had provided the key to the fortunes of those countries surrounding it. It was only natural that both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would become the catalysts for concerted political and economic and military action.

Nor could the recently signed Manila Pact have realistic

meaning without sea and air arteries to sustain the people's determination. None of the multilateral and bilateral agreements in the Pacific would be realistic without support from the three-dimensional sea. Nor could the Chinese Nationalists maintain their government in Formosa, nor could the industry of Japan remain a bulwark in the free world; nor could South Korea exist at all, without a free opportunity to utilize the sea.

But there are even more tangible manifestations of the influence of sea power on current history. I refer to the billions and billions of American dollars being poured into foreign countries to develop their resources--in the Belgian Congo, for instance, and in South America. All these investments testify to our national faith in sea power, as do our overseas air bases and army installations, and the billions we have placed in the hands of our allies in the form of military and economic assistance.

How many of us have ever stopped to realize that every U. . airfield on foreign soil is a vote of confidence in our Navy's ability to supply and support that airfield, to provide a measure of security to the ally where the field is located, to bring raw materials from overseas so that our aircraft industries can supply that field with planes, to provide friendly seas over which to fly free of radar detection and interception by sea-borne enemy weapons? How many

of us realize that our nation--180 million strong--is committed in varying measure to the assistance of some 64 nations of the world, spanning six continents and three oceans, and constituting about 54 per cent of the world's population.

But there are even more tangible manifestations of local reference. United States foreign trade, for instance, both exports and imports have more than doubled since pre-World War II days. Here at home, U. S. Steel recently decided to build a half-billion dollar plant on the upper Delaware because of its direct accessibility to the ocean highways. Implicit in U. S. Steel's decision was our ability to control the sea, for the ore to be processed by this plant had to be safely transported across the open sea from South American ports. Plans are afoot to deepen the Delaware River channel so that commerce can be expanded for this industrial area. Without control of the sea, these plans would have little meaning; with it, the plans are sound and reasonable.

Again, I point to the recently approved plans for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway as an indication of both Canadian and United States interest in extending the ocean highways to the heart of the North American Continent. This seaway will provide an alternate route for low-cost mass movement of raw materials. It will provide access to shipbuilding and to ship-repair facilities

in relatively secure areas and will constitute a strengthening of our overall national security. I point these things up to demonstrate the faith that our private citizens have in the future use of sea communications.

What has been said up to now is safely applicable to the cold-war conditions under which we live, but--what of the possibilities of a general war in which the kick-off might be an atomic exchange?

This is a contingency that concerns all who think and all who must concern themselves with military matters, with problems of mobilization, in the civil defense of our own country, and with respect to the aspects of those factors relating to our allies.

But recognizing the importance of this contingency does not mean that any other contingency is properly to be ignored. Unless we are prepared to say that the war will be all over in a fortnight, we must have the where-with-all to continue the fight to that point where we will be able to control the enemy's governmental processes--the ultimate objective of a war.

This means that our nation must be able to weather the first shock, powerfully retaliate, and still have what it takes to continue the fight. Nor does the sea play an unimportant part in this philosophy, and, if we were to lose control of the sea, it will be just

that much easier for the enemy to win.

If Russia ever gained control of the seas, NATO and Europe would collapse immediately.

Now, let us take a look at the picture from the Soviet's viewpoint. In studying the Soviet expansionist movement, a significant pattern and, if you will, a weakness becomes discernible in their master plan. All of their territorial acquisitions have depended on ground communications. In the Baltic and the Balkans, in China, North Korea, North Vietnam, all are tied together with a network of road and rail. On the other hand, their lack of maritime preeminence was a factor in Greece and Turkey's joining NATO. This was, perhaps, the most significant Soviet set-back during the entire cold-war period. With one diplomatic stroke, the tip of the Allies' sword was brought to the Soviet's belly. It was allied control of the Atlantic and Mediterranean seaways that made it politically feasible for such distant countries to join the Atlantic Community.

Soviet efforts in Guatemala were a blue-water failure. It is noteworthy that not one single conquest has been made in the whole of Africa, or in the entire Western Hemisphere, or in any part of the Far East which is separated from the Asiatic mainland by blue water. Thus, when considered in this light, the current maritime aspirations of the Soviet Union become less of a mystery than a testimonial of their high regard for this facet of military

power. It is rather apparent, if they are to succeed, that the Red tide of expansion must become soluble in blue water. From recent Soviet acts it would appear that they think they have discovered this great weakness of theirs and at the same time are proceeding with what they think is the proper solution.

For further reference to their building program, which I have not treated here, I will be prepared to discuss it later if there are any interested questions.

In connection with the above, did it ever occur to you how many of the world's major cities lie on or very near the coastline? Cities like Casablanca, Cairo, and Cape Town, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, Calcutta and Bombay, Sydney and Melbourne, Manila, Tokyo, and London, all lie exposed to attack from the sea. And the cities of the United States are no exception. Within 100 miles of our coastline perimeter lie more than half of our major cities. Some 8,000 miles of coastal frontiers lie exposed to attack from the sea either by surface ships, submarine, aircraft guided missiles, or combinations thereof.

Is it any wonder that the Soviet Union has determined that its major stumbling block has been its sea impotency? Is it any wonder that she is determined to gain maritime preeminence, building all types of surface ships, more cruisers than all the

brains they brought out of Germany, would be developing new weapons of sea warfare that would challenge the best brains we have at every level, both scientific and operational? I think this thought has been brought home to us in the last few years after a tendency to underrate both their principles and their industrial capabilities.

To summarize the maritime situation from the Soviet's viewpoint, it is quite apparent that they have every intention of competing for mastery of the seas, at least in the areas they consider important to the fulfillment of Soviet aspirations. And for us to supinely permit this to happen would be the greatest blunder the United States could ever commit.

I have said that we must be prepared for the atomic-weapons contingency and the hydrogen-bomb contingency. It may be, however, that even the Soviets will conclude that the use of the hydrogen bomb with its incalculable risks of hydrogen retaliation would not be a profitable venture. They may conclude, for reasons of their own, not to use it. They may devise nibbling methods in such a way that the use of atomic weapons would not be invoked. Should this happen, and should we be caught without sufficient strength in the so-called field of conventional weapons and techniques, the futility of our position becomes readily apparent.

Now, for a brief look to the future with respect to the position of sea power. If the great major all-out show-down is forced upon us, there will be need for the unified effort of every man, woman, and child in the United States, and our allies, so that we can weather the shock, avert defeat, and struggle through to the most favorable conclusion that would be possible in such an Armageddon. There is the obvious necessity for guarding against surprise attack, as well as any treachery and subversion in whatever form they may appear. Implicit in the possibility of nuclear exchanges is the necessity for dispersion both for defensive and offensive purposes. Naturally, this is applicable to military forces to be projected from the land as well as the sea. Not one single advantage must ever be conceded to our potential enemy. Certainly, to gratuitously relinquish our power on the seas makes no sense whatever.

As to the navy that we will need to do our part in the overall task, I see a fleet which is capable of delivering a crushing blow on the enemy, which is capable of blunting and parrying the blows he aims via the sea at our forces, our territory, and our allies; a fleet capable of handling all of the fighting tasks incident to gaining and maintaining sure control of the essential sea areas and routes, a fleet which can do the maritime job called for by the Army

and the Air Force, taking them over and supplying them; naval forces which can perform the seaward extension tasks required by the Air Force for continental defense--these forces to be as modern as science and industry can make them, with their weapons and techniques appropriately geared to those of the sister services, to the end that the absolute maximum of America's military power is generated.

If it is atomic war they want, we in the Navy are prepared to make our contribution; and we will also be ready to perform the one-thousand-and-one non-atomic tasks that are involved in this very complicated business of exercising sea power.

When the historians of the future write of the little wars, they will still be concluding, without superiority at sea, the United States could have done nothing about it. If the historians of the future ever have the tragic task of writing the story of World War III, I am personally confident they will add another favorable endorsement to Mahan's conclusions.

Thank you very much.

CAPTAIN McCAFFREE: Gentlemen, the Admiral cordially invites your questions.

ADMIRAL CARNEY: That is not exactly what I asked him to say. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if you would comment about the relationship of the deployment and use of U. S. sea power in the Mediterranean in the light of U. S. political and military strategy.

ADMIRAL CARNEY: I like short questions like that, so I can give short and concise answers. (Laughter) It began at the end of the war when, from the point of practicality, the only forces that we could maintain in that area, due to the rapid demobilization, were naval forces. Also, it had the advantage of our being able to maintain a force that was considerable in size and feasible in its manifestation to people that otherwise were not agreeable to the maintaining of United States forces within their boundaries.

That always is a very difficult question, and, during my tenure as Commander in Chief of the NATO forces in South Europe, I came up against it continually. No matter how enthusiastic the Allies might be, there is always a deep down reluctance and a wariness on their part with respect to the stationing of foreign

forces within their boundaries. But, owing to the other usages of navies over the centuries, the visits of naval forces to ports no longer seems to be a matter of concern to them, or of fear. The landing of liberty parties that are essentially unarmed, except for the military peoples and shore batteries that cooperate with the local authorities, permits these ships to appear in foreign ports without any apprehension on their part.

When the NATO organization began, there was a considerable desire on the part of Greece and Turkey, particularly, to be taken into the club, in spite of the reluctance of some of the other partners, who felt that perhaps the arrangement was being extended too far, and perhaps too close. Our own people were very strongly of the belief that they should be brought in, and various discussions were held with the Greeks and the Turks prior to the Lisbon meeting, which was in February of 1952. The upshot of it was that they came in , and, by their own request they established for one another a command headed up by a naval officer, because they stated that their participation and their continued participation in the event of hostilities would depend solely on their ability to be re-supplied and supported from the sea, also to be re-supplied from the United States.

A look at the geography of the basin indicates quite clearly

that a majority of the communications would always be by sea. An inspection, beginning with the mouth of the Rhone and going right through to the western part of the basin, shows the difficulties of land transport. The bond, particularly on the north part of the basin, is almost essentially by sea in terms of large bulk transport. The roads don't exist; the terrain is difficult, it is easy of interruption. It can't all be handled by air; and the great bulk of whatever support they need, in terms of things and material and possibly reinforcements, is going to be by sea.

Therefore, it has been not only militarily but politically feasible for us to maintain tangible evidence of our willingness and our ability to keep those essential sea lines open in the event of hostilities.

The forces which we maintain there are not adequate to sustain the jobs which we envisage would have to be done. These forces would have to be augmented, and forces are earmarked for that augmentation.

There is another peculiarity of the maritime situation in the Mediterranean. There is no possibility, in my opinion, of the development of an indigenous tactical air capability for those countries. They can't afford it. They could not possibly create it and maintain it, as expensive and complex as it is today. So,

the air potential, the air component that we maintain in the successful fleet, is the best substitute which we can maintain as a country today to back up this very thin indigenous air capability in that area. It is by no sense a proper substitute, and, if it were achievable, it would be far better to develop its own land base, air organization, and concept, but it is not achievable. There is no possibility of its being achievable in terms of the budget stringencies of the countries involved. So it does constitute something of a tactical back-up.

This may seem to be a reason that we may have for nuclear capabilities. We cannot maintain deployed ground forces or air forces in those countries for the simple reason that we don't have the resources ourselves to spread around. We would be mal-deployed and over extended if we did. There are also political contingencies and factors that we would find, and a reluctance on the part of those countries, no matter what they say about their reliance on us, to have other people stationed within their borders.

This is the best evidence of the best military support the United States can deploy in that area.

QUESTION: Admiral, I would like to skip to the other side of the world. It has been said by some people that the reason

the Chinese Reds are so determined to get Quemoy and Matsu is that they are a very good place between the Mahan theory and the Mackinder theory of naval power. They believe the sea power could be a seaworthy extension of their land power. Would you enlarge on that point for us and tell us to what extent you think our type of sea power would be inhibited by that particular area, and whether or not it would be truly effective there

ADMIRAL CARNEY: This is another area in which sea power could be used and could be employed. As I pointed out in my talk, it is never a self-sufficient thing, and many times it has to be a substitution job. There are areas in which a far better aerial job could be done, if the facilities were available, and if the deployments could be made. But, if we went at it on that basis, we not only would run into an extremely costly venture in that part of the world but there are political difficulties that are applicable in parts of Asia, too.

The feelings of the Chinese about Matsu and Quemoy I don't think are related to brother Mahan's expoundings. They have a very sizable force deployed in those two islands. Chiang Kaishek and the people who are with him were driven from the mainland. Many of them have come without their families. There probably is no such thing as patriotism, as we understand

it, in China. The things that the Chinaman holds dear are his family and village, with perhaps some extended interest in his province. But all of those people are motivated by the possibility of some day getting back this land that they left and this land that they have a deep love and devotion for. I don't think that the average Chinese man would be content to resign himself to settling down forever on Formosa.

So there is this thought. It is an impractical thought in many ways. It can't be related to the reinvasion of the mainland under their own banner and under their own capabilities. They could not possibly do it. It would be witless to assume they could. Nevertheless it may be that the Communist masters are not going to be the masters forever. They have their own internal weaknesses, and there may be political opportunities for the return.

As to Quemoy and Matsu, these to them are a symbol of hanging on to something close to the mainland. That is one point. Also, if they are defeated on those two islands, and unless they are defeated under circumstances that lend some luster and glory to their own traditions, their self-respect and their self-importance, the thing would be a shattering blow to the people on the island of Formosa itself. The durability of their intent, the durability of their willingness to hold this island and to continue on for years

is something which has to be watched very very closely.

Quemoy and Matsu probably cannot be held by the Chinese if the oviets think Red China is willing to mount its full capabilities for their capture. That is an opinion on which I think the majority of the military people will agree. If they are to be held in the face of an all-out onslaught such as the Red Chinese are capable of mounting, and capable of mounting this spring, in my own opinion they will not be successful, unless there is some participation by the United tates.

Now, whether the participation that we are capable of putting in there would succeed and be sure of success is anybody's opinion. There are intangible and impenetrable factors to consider. How these people fight is something we can scarcely forecast. But here again, the elements which the United tates can throw in to assist in the defense of those related areas that have been very frequently discussed are matters of realities and are subject to pretty definite codification. It is highly doubtful that we would wish to become embarked in the employment of sizable ground forces in the area, because, since we are in it, the possibilities of our being definitely involved in war with China are not to be overlooked. Of course things have been done before without coming to the actual extent of war; but it is a possibility.

We have redeployed our ground forces to a considerable extent out of the Far East, so our position ground-force-wise is not what it was a year ago--not only Army forces, but the First Marine Division is coming back and is in the process of being redeployed in the United States today. It is almost necessary in your calculations to say that we would not throw in U. S. ground troops to that defense. That leaves the Air Force and the Navy to make what contribution they can.

The Air Force has capabilities in the medium bomber fleet. They have capabilities in the lighter tactical aircraft, the fighter bombers, and so forth. But the basic equipment you need for air defense of Formosa--the interceptor type aircraft as well as the bomber type--makes it a rather difficult problem for practical application to this particular area and for the defense of these two areas for the localized future.

I say again there is a contribution which the naval forces in the Western Pacific can make. I don't think that they are any guarantee of success within themselves, but they can make a contribution.

I am still relating this only to Matsu and Quemoy at this particular time. There is the further question as to what type of weapons you will use. If nuclear tactical weapons are employed,

NATO nations combined, more submarines than the rest of the world put together. Is it any wonder that she is practicing amphibious landings and dovetailing her air effort with surface units? Is it any wonder that the Soviet Union is proving extremely sensitive when these facts are brought to the attention of the free world? Recently the Soviet press has taken violent exception to our analysis of their maritime aspirations and intentions. This is in sharp contrast to their reaction with regard to our mention of their land and air capabilities.

Now the task that the Soviet Union has set out to accomplish in the maritime field is not an unambitious one. She must realize that quantitatively she can not soon surpass the total active and reserve fleets of the United States and the fleets of our Allies, although I am sure that she also realizes that it is the ready ships and not the reserve which will pose her initial obstacle. It is also possible that the Soviet Union is pursuing some technological advantage even though it might only be temporary for use in a limited area, for a limited time, for a specific purpose, to gain control of particular geographical areas. And, if we have been able to come up with new maritime inventions, ship-borne guided missiles, supersonic jets, atomic propulsion, atomic explosives, does it not seem feasible that the Soviets, combined with what technical

the fire power that is within the hands of the Air Force and the naval forces deployed out there is tremendous. If those same forces were to use conventional weapons, it is perfectly apparent that you would have to make a fractional application, which would be a startling thing in the reduction of fire power, the reduction of capabilities, and possibly of our successful participation.

Those are the factors as far as Quemoy and Matsu are concerned. With respect to all-out attack against Formosa itself, there are several kinds of attack. There could be air attack of a sizable character. There could be the possibility of a weakening of the political wall. There could be disintegration within Formosa itself, under certain circumstances. Perhaps that sort of attack over a time might be severe for the Chinese people.

As far as all-out attack for the seizure of real estate is concerned, invasion of Formosa itself, I think a complete contribution becomes greatly more significant. I believe sizable bodies of troops, sufficient to overcome any combat, together with some 24 divisions which the Chinese have, would be a type, in the face of the maritime strength we have, which they are not capable of realizing at this time.

QUESTION: Admiral, some people advance the relatively good-right-kick view that, if we had a submarine force in being

at the start of World War II, say, four to six times larger than it was, the eventual decision could have been assured by properly employing them. Would you comment on that point of view, and maybe also put it in reverse as to the present situation of the Russian capability and whether it is intercepting our superiority?

ADMIRAL CARNEY: If we had a considerably greater submarine force than we had, I don't think it would have been decisive as far as the Atlantic was concerned, or as far as Germany was concerned, for the simple reason that there were not sufficient targets. We were not dealing with a maritime nation. The shoe was on the other foot. In the Atlantic we hadn't the targets suitable for pro-submarine operations.

In the Pacific I believe we would have done considerably better early in the war if we had a greater submarine force there, because we were up against a maritime nation. This same principle applies as far as we stand today. We are a maritime nation. All of our international relationships are hinged, as I pointed out, on successful control of those areas, control of them for one purpose--moving people, things, and materials. The submarine constitutes a very serious threat against that through a continued movement. So, in the hands of the Soviets against our own avowed purposes and those of our allies, the submarine is a very powerful

threat and one to which we have devoted a maximum of attention for the last nine or ten years, since the end of the war.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you give us your views on the various proposals for disarmament

ADMIRAL CARNEY: Yes, very briefly. As things exist today, I would say it is a trap, as far as the United States is concerned.

Does that answer your question

STUDENT: Yes, sir.

COLONEL BARTLETT: Admiral, it is very difficult to understand how the Chinese Communists can be either so ignorant or so contemptuous of our power as their public statements would make you think. There may, of course, be the factor that they don't believe our public statements. Do you feel that ignorance or contempt or disbelief of our own statements have a bearing on their actions, sir

ADMIRAL CARNEY: I think that two of the things you mention very definitely do have a bearing. Look at the history of their recent ventures, beginning with the taking over of China itself and the United States failure to do anything about foiling that original take-over; their own success in Korea, their success in Indo-China. All of that certainly should encourage them to feel

that they are riding the crest of the wave, and I believe that, if we were sitting in a similar institution on the other side of the Bamboo Curtain, we would be inclined to go along with that idea. They have little reason to believe, based on the past, that we are inclined to really come to grips with the problem. Politically and militarily, from their viewpoint, it certainly is the smart thing to do to keep probing until they find out what the score is. It is a reorganized enforcement kind of thing which you learn with your alphabet.

They are flexible people. The Communists can change their tune as expediency dictates; but, nevertheless, their claims to omnipotence are such that, having made a public pitch, it can not be anything but very embarrassing to walk back and retract what they have said. I think it is to be expected that they will continue this probing until such time as they find out, or if they find out, that the United States has gone as far as it is going to go and is prepared to stop it.

They may be gambling on the fact that our psychology will be the same as it was during the Korean business, that, perhaps for the sake of localization and a fond hope that this lesser effort may work, we will be content to localize any struggle. That would be insignificant in its result militarily in terms of real estate, but

it would be devastating in terms of psychology with respect to our own end results.

They certainly can't believe that we do not have the capability of flattening them if it came to a showdown. But our own characteristic unwillingness to strike the first blow, something that has characterized everything we have done in my lifetime and long before that, would lead them to believe they can capitalize to great advantage on this attitude of sportsmanship which pervades all our thinking and which governs all our actions.

I think there is no greater danger to the peace of the world than this thinking on their part, because we like to parade ourselves as peaceful people. Actually, we are highly explosive people. The reaction of the country to Mr. Truman's declaration with respect to Korea was one of the most amazing psychological phenomena of all time. In not one part of the country was there any dissenting word. We fought every Indian tribe, we fought the Mexicans; we fought the British; we fought the French; we fought the Italians; we fought the Spanish; we fought the Portuguese, we fought the Russians; we fought the Germans, and anybody else that was around; and, when there wasn't anything else to do, we squared off for four years and kept our hand in by fighting among ourselves.

No more dangerous situation in the world exists than counting on the United States being peaceful, because we can have a mass revulsion of feeling and trigger off something that should not be triggered off. But I think it is highly dangerous because every indication in the past certainly encourages these people to keep on trying a little bit more.

CHAIRMAN Admiral, I would like to extend the Colonel's question on the submarine a little further. The submarine fleet of the Russians is basically a defensive measure in the sense of making them a maritime power. We read a lot about their increased cruiser program, and so forth, but we never read anything about the rest of the Navy today that they have to have to make them a truly maritime power.

Would you care to discuss, sir, why they are not building more of the type ships which would allow them to take, say, to the open sea and become a maritime power You indicated in your talk that you thought that was their goal, to build ships of the mine carrier type, the escort type, and things of that sort.

ADMIRAL CONWAY. A desire to make themselves felt a maritime power very logically led them in the first instance to concentrate on the submarine building. Their submarine fleet is not exclusively defensive. They have a great many ships that are

capable of extended controls and extended operations. They have roughly four categories. One smallest one is defensive and would be employed in a defensive role for certain particular areas under their control. They have a sizable defensive capability extending far beyond their own borders today. They have a building program of excellent submarines which will further extend that capability.

With respect to other types of ships, they have gone into a very sizable cruiser-building program. Most of the designs and characteristics were probably evolved before or during the war, and the ships have been completed more recently and have incorporated new equipment and new design features. They are also building a large number of very able, in the sense of being seaworthy, destroyers and escort types of ships, and these ships are being built not only in their own yards in Russia but they have become interested in shipbuilding activities in the Pacific, also in Siberia.

With respect to carriers, they have recognized the importance of the carrier in some of their own public utterances rather fairly recently. To the best of my knowledge they have not ventured on that yet, but, after all, this maritime effort was something that was interrupted again and again and has only been picked up in the last decade.

o I think that you will have to regard this as an increment in a long-range plan. But the fact is, they are building excellent seagoing ships. The fact is that their control is extending farther and farther from their own borders. The fact is that they have a very sizable naval-aviation component. Although they don't have carriers, they have sea tenders. They are devoting themselves with a great deal of intensity in the way of sub-surface and surface training. They are moving farther and farther away from their own bases, notably over a period of twelve months.

I would say that what you are witnessing is part of a building program that they will follow out to their fleets and to their naval components, things that are necessary to extend beyond their own particular areas that they can maintain under control now.

Their maritime strategy is naturally governed by their maritime resources. In terms of the forces that they have, it is rather logical to deduce what they can do with the submarines. They are able to utilize certain certain control on a sea area of rather narrow territorial waters, with very little extension of them for their own purposes. But I think that actually they are working with a terrific intensity to build themselves a fleet that will be a blue-water fleet.

QUESTION: Admiral, it is my understanding that the NATO

military authority sees a great difficulty in meeting the necessities for escort vessels to re-supply Europe in the event of war. How serious do you think that problem is, and what can be done about it

ADMIRAL CARNEY: Nothing can be done about it without a high cost. The types of ships that are needed cannot be produced overnight. Actually, although there is a shortage, and there will be difficulties in doing it, I don't think that the sea lanes will grind to a stop by any means. But they can't be replaced except by actually building the types they need. Many of our allies can't afford to go into extensive business, so the majority of it is going to devolve on the United States and those countries that have in being forces that can make any contribution--Britain and France and to some extent the other countries, in a very small way.

CAPTAIN [illegible]: Admiral, you seem to have given them all of the answers which the people can think of. On behalf of both Colleges, may I thank you most cordially for coming over, sir.

ADMIRAL CARNEY. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here.

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