SOCIALISM IN EUROPE

7 March 1962

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NOTICE

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Washington, D. C.

Dr. Robert C. Tucker, Professor of Government at Indiana University, and currently Visiting Professor of Russian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Research Associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, was born in Kansas City, Missouri, on 29 May 1918. He was educated in local public schools, and received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University. During the war he was in the Office of Strategic Services and later in the U.S. Foreign Service Auxiliary. Assigned in 1944 as attache of the United States Embassy in Moscow, he served with the Embassy until 1953, and subsequently with the Social Science Division of the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. Since 1958 he has been in academic life. His principal fields of teaching and research have been Marxist theory and Soviet politics. He is the author of "Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx," and numerous articles and monographs. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

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COLONEL SMILEY: Socialism is essentially at once a movement and a theory. It takes many different forms under different historical and local conditions.

Today in Western Europe socialism is changing rapidly from the theory and form it assumed in the past.

To examine for us the changing Socialist ideology, we are fortunate to have with us today Dr. Robert Tucker, Professor of Government at Indiana University, who will discuss "Socialism in Europe."

Dr. Tucker is also currently temporarily located in Washington, D.C., with Johns Hopkins University as a visiting professor.

It is my pleasure to welcome Dr. Tucker here for his first appearance at the Industrial College and to introduce him to this class.

Gentlemen, Dr. Tucker.

DR. TUCKER: Thank you, Colonel Smiley. Admiral Rose and gentlemen of the Industrial College:

The subject is European Socialism, and a good way to start might be by noting that 100 years or so ago this phrase would have been a redundancy, because socialism was European. The only Socialist movements or Socialist doctrines in the early 19th century were in Europe. As a social and political movement, as a doctrine, a form of thought, socialism was European. Europe was the place where it grew up and became strong and influential, and finally, as it were, lost control of itself. Anyhow, it finally ceased to be a strictly European phenomenon. It became in its way a Russian phenomenon and an Asian and generally non-European one, with many resulting changes.

I would like to get back to that theme a little later on, but first let me say something about the beginnings, and about the European

socialism itself. While notions of common property and communism in that basic sense of the term are, of course, very, very old in Western culture and can be traced all the way back to Plato's "Republic" and to the doctrines of the Church fathers, the term "socialism," as well as the term "communism," arose no earlier than around 1825, and it was in this period, the first quarter of the 19th century, that the movements that we came to call by the term "socialism" and the term "communism" arose in Europe.

I should say that in that early period nobody drew any distinction between the words "socialism" and "communism." They were two different words for pretty much the same thing.

It is rather hard to say just what was the essence of this early 19th century European movement of thought and action. Many present-day scholars believe that it was a reaction of intellectuals to the moral degradation and the material sufferings of the working classes at the time of the industrial revolution in the late 18th and early 19th century. And it is true that Socialist and Communist doctrines from the beginning somehow tried to link themselves to the working class, to the industrial workers, as the people that these doctrines had particularly in mind.

In some cases scholars--and I might mention here Martin Buber--have attempted to see in this early 19th century European Socialist movement a quest for new forms of community living, new social forms, in a society that was increasingly being ground out and hollowed out, as Buber puts it, by the rise of the modern impersonal nation-state and by the development of capitalist economics.

It is true here that some of the original doctrines of Socialists, such as those of the Frenchman, Charles Fourier, and the Englishman, Robert Owen, were concerned with new forms of community that Owen called villages of cooperation and that Fourier called phalansteries. But I think that we will not easily understand the origin, the growth, and even the present problems--some say present crisis--of socialism, unless we realize that it always, from the beginning, had a religious aspect. Perhaps this religious aspect was even the central characteristic of modern European socialism.

The religious impulse was reflected in the title of a book of one of the founders of the movement, Saint-Simon, in France. The title was "The New Christianity." The old Christianity, he argued, was not adequate any more. There was need for a "new Christianity" that would translate the ideas of the old Christianity into reality, particularly the notions of the brotherhood of men. Here we see the religious motif.

It seems to me that in doctrines of socialism and communism European intellectuals of the early 19th century manufactured, as it were, a new faith. It wasn't just a technique of social engineering; they needed a creed. The old religions weren't, somehow, adequate to their needs any longer. But they did need some kind of gospel, religion, creed, faith, and modern Socialist and Communist ideas were their way of responding to that need. Though they posed the problem of improving the material condition of the working class, which was certainly very bad in the period of the industrial revolution in many places, I think that the underlying concern was not with the material needs of men but with their regeneration, their spiritual needs.

This redemptive note, this religious characteristic, was present also, and very much so, in that version of socialism that proclaimed itself to be not only atheistic but materialistic, namely, the doctrine of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels--Marxism. This social credo, which developed in the 1840's in Germany, was destined to become the most influential single strand of thought in the whole field of European socialism. And I think that most of the scholars who work in this area would agree now--not all of us but most of us--that in many basic ways Marxism must be seen as a religious system of thought. It had certain characteristics in common with the great religious systems of thought in Western culture. For one, it aspired to totality, to apply to every aspect of existence. There simply is nothing, no field, that Marxism does not attempt to supply an answer to. Again on the model of the medieval religious systems of thought, Marxism is fundamentally historical: It sees the world as a story that has a beginning, a middle, and an end. And, like the medieval religious systems of thought, Marxism sees a theme running through this historical process. History has a meaning, and this meaning is connected with the regeneration of man that will come when, according to Marx, after a series of forms of society that are based on the antagonism of different classes, the property-owning class on the one side and the working class on the other, there will come a final revolution, which he calls the proletarian revolution, that will end all antagonisms, solve all conflicts, and bring men into a final state of happiness and complete bliss. That he calls the Communist society, beyond which there is no further development. This is the end. History comes to a finish in communism.

This grandiose doctrine, which viewed the working class as history's chosen children, so to speak, destined to save mankind by a revolution that was predetermined, just the way salvation is predetermined in the system of St. Augustine, this doctrine of Marx was a potent pretender to the role of ideology of a political movement, and

so, of course, it turned out to be. From the 1860's Marxism became increasingly influential in the European Socialist movement. Marxians, or, as they came to call themselves, the Social Democratic Parties, arose in most of the countries of Western Europe during the 1870's, the 1880's, and the 1890's, and during these decades they came to play a dominant part in working-class politics.

The leading one was the German Social Democratic Party. All the way from 1889, when the Second International was founded in Paris, to 1914, when the International broke up owing to the First World War, the German Social Democratic Party was the Marxist Party that set the tone in European socialism.

In France Marxism also was influential, though it had to fight other tendencies--anarchist and syndicalist, some associated with the name of Proudhon. In Russia Marxism became increasingly influential in the 1890's, though here, too, it had to combat the non-Marxian versions of Socialist thought. In England the Socialist movement, closely allied with the cooperative and trade-union movements, continued to develop in a pragmatic direction illustrated in the Fabian society that arose in the 1880's, and it never became strongly Marxist. Eventually there emerged the British Labor Party, which was non-Marxist, but nevertheless one of the most important Socialist Parties in Europe.

These European Social Democratic or Socialist Parties became mass parties, and they did a great many things beyond just contesting elections--though they did that increasingly. They developed a host of activities and subsidiary organizations. They provided the industrial worker, or aimed to, with a focus of interest and a center for his social life, performing in this sense the function of a church, and thus taking us back once again to the religious analogy. One of the historians of European socialism has remarked that membership in the Socialist Party was for many Europeans much the same as membership in a church, and a church whose own laws would insure its triumph. This refers to the 1880's and the 1890's. This movement performed functions that went far beyond what are normally considered the functions of a political party. For example, among the Socialists there were a great many who displayed the psychology of people who belonged to other kinds of movements in society, including religious movements. Thus, there were a great many teetotalers and vegetarians among the European Socialists of those years.

But, in addition to fulfilling all these subsidiary functions, the mass Socialist Parties increasingly engaged in politics. They began

to become politically influential and win large numbers of seats in Parliament in the elections in the democratic countries of Europe. These political successes created a very grave problem for the Marxist Social Democratic Parties, because they were officially dedicated to the overthrow of the very system in which they were having such political successes. Those that acknowledged Marxism as their ideology officially believed in the need for a revolution to overthrow the existing order.

Now, in practice they increasingly turned into reform parties, striving to come to power within the existing system and to carry out structural changes, such as nationalization of various industries, after having come to power by parliamentary means, and they tended to stress those elements in the later thought of Marx and Engels that could easily be interpreted in this reformist way.

I believe that, if we look at the basic doctrine of Marx in its classic expressions, such as the "Communist Manifesto" and "Das Kapital," he clearly is talking about a violent revolutionary overthrow, by means of force, and not a gradualistic reformist process whereby Social Democratic Parties increasingly acquire power within the system and reform it from within.

But, nevertheless, they attempted to reinterpret Marx as though he had been saying the latter. Indeed there were some statements, not so much by Marx as by Friedrich Engels, his partner, who outlived Marx by quite a few years, such as one to the effect that the ballot box had turned out to be much more effective as an instrument of activity than the barricades ever were. It was this same Engels, by the way, who, in a work written in 1875, commented that the military technology had reached its ultimate point in the new-fangled rifles that had been used for the first time in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and that this was the ultimate end beyond which military technology had no further room for revolution.

The tendency to associate socialism with the democratic process visualized the establishment of socialism in terms of reforms by a party that would come to power in a parliamentary manner, by the ballot box. This way of thinking became increasingly characteristic of European Social Democracy and socialism. Both the orthodox wing of European Marxist socialism that was represented by Karl Kautsky, its theoritician, and also the so-called revisionist wing of German Social Democracy that found its leading theorist in Eduard Bernstein, were essentially inclined to associate the achievement of socialism with the democratic parliamentary electoral process. It was over this issue of

democracy that the great split, or schism, took place between European socialism and Russian communism after the latter came to power in Russia in 1917. Lenin, the creator of Russian communism, in 1917 cast aside as odious the very term "Social Democracy." He insisted on renaming his Russian Social Democratic Party the Communist Party in order to signalize the split, the difference between them.

In the Leninist interpretation of Marxism, socialism should be put into effect not through the ballot box, not through parliamentary, legal, electoral means of gaining power, but by violent revolution led and organized by a Marxist revolutionary party that would spurn absolutely no means whatever, and once in power would set up a dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat, using terror when and if needed against its enemies, in order to hold on to power and gradually to transform society from above in a socialist direction, through such measures as nationalization of the means of production.

There was no more vociferous and determined opponent of much of this than the leading theorist of Social Democracy in Europe, Karl Kautsky. In 1918 and 1919 Kautsky argued in a series of writings that Lenin was betraying socialism and Marxism by the violent means that he was employing to establish it, by his betrayal of and turning agains the democratic process, and by his setting up of a terroristic dictatorship in Russia. All this, argued Kautsky, was un-Marxist.

Lenin replied with a pamphlet called "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky." As you can see by the title, he argued that he, Lenin, was the true Marxist, that Bolshevism was the true Marxism, that Bolshevism, the doctrine of the revolutionary dictatorship, using terror and force if necessary, was the true Marxism, and that Kautsky and others of his ilk were garden liberals who had misconceived Marx and now were distorting what Marx had said and transforming themselves into pseudo-Marxists. So the polemic went, and it signalized the split between European socialism and Russian communism that was to become in succeeding years a worldwide phenomenon.

Lenin set to work quite deliberately to encourage this split. First he set up a new, so-called Third International, a Communist International, and by various means of factional politics undertook to split the existing Socialist Parties of Europe and to splinter off the extreme elements that were inclined to accept Bolshevism, or his party's way of approach, his strategy and tactics, and to set up these splinter groups as Communist Parties, contesting with the established Socialist Parties the domination of the working-class politics of the given country. In

short, he set up Bolshevism as a model in strategy and tactics for Socialists in all countries, including European countries.

So there arose in most of these European countries, little by little, Communist Parties, normally formed by splinter groups of the earlier Socialist Parties, that were now encouraged by the Russian Communists to compete with the long-established Social Democratic Parties for influence in the worker movement. Hence, since 1917, socialism, instead of being a single worldwide movement with differing views and differing tendencies, has become split between two warring tendencies--communism on the one hand and Social Democracy on the other.

This had many consequences for European socialism, but two, I think, bear particular emphasis. One is that, while the European Socialist Parties in many cases remain inwardly divided between a more radical left wing and a more moderate right wing, the effect of the split that Lenin encouraged was to drain off from many of the European Socialist Parties the most extremist elements in them, and consequently to accentuate in these parties the reformist or democratic tendencies that had shown up, as we saw, much earlier. The effect of the split was to reinforce the tendencies that had already been apparent in the Social Democratic Parties toward democracy, toward the acceptance of the rules of democratic parliamentary politics as the basis of their activity.

Secondly, European socialism, precisely, or at least primarily, because of this devotion to democratic methods, failed to exercise a very far-reaching influence upon rising political movements in underdeveloped countries. This was not, I think, because of any antipathy for Socialist thinking in the underdeveloped countries--those of Asia, for example. On the contrary, the idea of socialism proved in many of these countries to be a rather popular European import among the intelligentsia. But the point is that conditions in many of these countries were simply not ripe for parliamentary methods, the parliamentary methods that were advocated by European Socialists such as Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, and the British Labor Party. The Socialist-tending intelligentsia of these underdeveloped countries was not particularly inclined to accept European democratic socialism, and this made them all the more inclined to take their socialism from Russia in the form of Russian communism.

They tended to be interested in finding some way of bypassing the long period of capitalist or bourgeois civilization, to use the Marxist term. They had no favorable conditions for democratic parliamentary development in their countries, many of which had never known any

kind of democracy. The European Socialists typified by Kautsky said, "Socialism means democracy. Socialism proceeds by democratic methods. Furthermore, socialism comes at the end, just as Marx said. First countries have to go through a long capitalist process, and when they become very advanced in technology, then they become ripe for further development along Socialist lines."

On the other hand, Lenin and the Russian Communists were saying something quite different to these countries. They were saying, "First, you can bypass capitalism, just as we did in Russia. You don't have to go through a long capitalist period. Capitalism breaks at the weakest link. Even a predominantly peasant country can nevertheless move straight over to the construction of socialism if a Marxist Party like the Russian Bolshevik Party comes to power." This suggested a very beckoning prospect of early success, as a possibility at least. "Secondly," said Lenin, "socialism requires a dictatorship of the proletariat, an iron dictatorship of a single party that sets itself up as the leader of the nation and that monopolizes political power for the purpose of introducing socialism from above." This was a rather crude and brutal gospel, but at the same time one that could easily stir up quite an echo in Asian intellectuals and others in underdeveloped countries where there seemed to be no prospects for democratic slow development.

As a result, European socialism during the interwar period did not have an influence in the Afro-Asian world comparable to that of Russian communism. Even where Socialist Parties did arise in Asia, they tended to develop a complexion, a flavor, a character, that differed considerably from European socialism. For example, there is in Japan a Socialist Party in addition to the Japanese Communist Party. But this Japanese Socialist Party is very different from the typical European Socialist Party of yesterday and today. It tends to be quite radical. It sees a great many issues in a manner very similar to the way in which the Communists do. Its intellectual character and its quality are decidedly different from those that typify European Socialists.

But if for these reasons European socialism was a rather poor competitor of the Communists for export to the underdeveloped countries, for influence in Asia, it did have an important future within Europe itself. It was during the years following the First World War that for the first time Socialists received their chance to hold office. Specifically, they came to power for a brief period, not very successfully, in England, and more successfully in Sweden. But it was after the Second World War that for the first time European socialism became a major force in European politics. It was customary in those years after 1945 even

to look upon the European Continent as a sort of Socialist continent, mid way, ideologically, as well as geographically, between American capitalism on one hand and Russian communism on the other.

The outstanding success story was that of the British Labor Party which, as you know, came to power in the aftermath of the war, taking over the leadership of the European Socialist movement that the German Social Democrats had held back at the end of the 19th and early years of the 20th century. It organized Britain's postwar recovery; it created in Britain the most thorough-going advanced welfare state in the world; it nationalized basic industries covering about 20 percent of the British economy, while giving freedom to much of the British Colonial Empire and helping to organize the Atlantic Community. And it did all this while preserving the fundamental democratic parliamentary processes of England.

In Scandinavian countries also, meanwhile, majority Socialist governments had come into being and were achieving similar results by similar methods. However, in most of the European countries, the continental countries proper, as distinguished from Britain and these northern ones, the Socialist Parties did not have any comparable success. One reason is that, unlike Britain, which has a two-party system, the continental countries, typified by France and Italy, are multiparty states. A Socialist Party in a multiparty state can rarely hope for office, save in coalition with another party that does not share its views. This forces compromise upon the Socialist leaders without enabling the rank and file to learn the lessons of government experience and responsibility. Consequently, in countries of this kind, such as France and Italy, socialism tends to be relatively weak and communism relatively strong.

This difficulty may be illustrated by the recent happenings in Italy where, as you know, a new government has been formed, a sort of center-left coalition that has the support of Nenni's party of left-wing Socialists, although this party is not actually represented in the government coalition. It is merely an informal arrangement. This enables the party both to give support to the government and at the same time not to have the responsibility for compromising its views by being formally a part of that government. It indicates the kind of dilemma that makes it so much more difficult for the Socialist Parties to succeed in multiparty continental states.

Since those immediate postwar years, however, by general admission, socialism in Europe has undergone a political decline. We see that the British Labor Party, after that great period of success, has

had a series of failures at the polls, and until very recently this had even begun to raise doubts in certain minds in England as to whether the Labor Party really had much of a political future. In France the Socialist Party is weak and splintered. It has lost about 25 percent of its prewar vote, and the membership is down from 353,000 in 1946 to a mere 79,000 in 1960. In The Netherlands and in Austria, Socialists share power with Catholic parties. In Germany they remain stubbornly and rather ineffectually in the opposition, though they are clearly future contendants for power. Only in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are they still the major political force.

If the problem were no more serious than this, European socialism would be well off, because, after all, these parties still do remain a very powerful and significant political force, with good possibilities in the case, say, of the British Labor Party and certainly in the case of the German Social Democratic Party, particularly if they can find dynamic and colorful leaders comparable to some of the outstanding leaders that the conservative parties have found in recent years. Under those circumstances these parties will yet still come back to power in Europe.

The problem, or at least the deeper problem, is that these parties have been forced, in part by their very success, to redefine what it is that they stand for and what it is that they want. In a sense, the greatest enemy of the Socialist Parties as political movements, has been socialism, or, to put it differently, the affluent society, the development of the welfare state, the solving of the problem of dire poverty. Most of what the Socialist Parties have historically stood for in the way of benefits for the workers--pensions, shorter hours, health services--are standard operating practice not only in England but in most of the European countries, and most notably in the Scandinavian countries.

What, then, do the Socialists want? What is the party program? After all, the party can't just say, "We are for what exists." The danger, in short, is that the Socialist Parties could turn, so to speak, into rebels without a cause.

In the face of this situation, over the recent years there has been quite a revision of Socialist doctrine going on. This revision might be summed up most briefly as the casting off of Marxian ballast. There is a revision of official programs. For a typical case we might look at the German Party, the SPD. It had a Party Congress in Bad Godesberg in 1959 at which it adopted a new party program. Now, this is the Marxist Party, the old party of Marx and Engels, but what it did was

to drop Marxism. They made their final break with the fundamental tenets of Marxian socialism. They no longer say anything about the class struggle. They no longer speak of the working class as the grave-diggers of capitalism--an old Marxian phrase. They no longer assume that nationalization, that is, the transfer of the means of production to public ownership, is the key Socialist measure to be taken if they come to power. They say that it may be legitimate in its place, but the key thing is not nationalization but the maintenance of public control of economic power. Public control and regulation of economic power, they say, is the key thing. Again, they dropped the idea that central economic planning is under all circumstances something to be desired. They say that they accept the free market wherever there is real competition. The basic formula now in their own words is, "Competition as far as possible; planning as far as necessary." Thus, they pose in their program the need for a mixed or balanced economy.

This revision of Socialist doctrine by the SPD, is indicative of the general tendency in recent years in the French, Belgian, Swiss, Scandinavian, and other Socialist Parties in Europe. They have all been revising their doctrine and have been doing so toward acceptance of a mixed economy. They have been redoubling their emphasis on political democracy as an unconditional value. They have tended more and more to renounce their traditional anticlericalism. For example, the Dutch and Belgian Parties now recognize the principle of subsidies to confessional schools, which they had always been opposed to in the past. And they have all tended to stress the need to build an industrial democracy by some sort of codetermination, as they call it, under which workers will be brought in some way into the processes of management. That is to say, the stress is on worker participation in management, economic, and other public processes.

All of this is significant, of course, but it is significant in a negative way. They are abandoning something. They are casting something aside--the old Marxian dogmas and slogans and phrases. But, as to what it is that they positively want, they seem to be pretty much in the dark, along with everybody else. The Socialists of Europe seem to be vaguely and uneasily conscious, along with the liberals and others of Europe, and I think we can say of America, too, that our new civilization, going through a technological revolution that neither Marx nor Engels nor anybody in the 19th century was quite able to foresee, has come along and presented all kinds of new problems, such as the problem of what to do with leisure, that leisure that the old dogmas and the old doctrines don't have any answers for.

They are groping for a new doctrine with a new set of answers. I don't see any reason to suppose that the Socialists will come up with those answers any quicker than perhaps some of the non-Socialists will.

Thank you.

COLONEL SMILEY: Dr. Tucker is ready for your questions, gentlemen.

QUESTION: Dr. Tucker, will you comment on the failure of socialism, the European brand, to succeed more in the United States, particularly in the period after World War I?

DR. TUCKER: Yes. I think that there was a period in the late 19th century, before World War I, when there was quite a flurry of Socialist activity in the United States. I come nowadays from Indiana. Not far from Bloomington, where the university is, is a place called New Harmony. New Harmony, Indiana, is a place where Robert Owen founded one of his Socialist colonies. There were quite a lot of Socialist settlements in America, and quite a bit of Socialist thinking and just Socialists transplanted from Europe, by means of emigration. It didn't take in America, I think, because of certain features of our civilization. One of them was the absence of rigid class distinctions comparable to those in most of the European countries. It began to develop as generally just a middle-class country.

Secondly, there were wide-open fields of opportunity for anybody who would be willing to work hard enough. He could achieve success and prosperity for himself.

Under these circumstances, which I would say are probably the most notable ones, socialism in America was a flower transplanted from Europe that soon faded. It never took in our soil.

I would say that this period after World War I, which is the period that you mentioned, is the period in which these underlying processes of the dying away of socialism in America simply became evident.

QUESTION: My question concerns the description you gave of the split between Engels and the Western European dominated front and approach versus Russian communism. May we take heart from this split or the present struggle that is going on between the Russian brand of communism and the Communist Chinese on the differences of doctrinaire approach, and on the world revolution by force or world revolution by evolutionary process?

DR. TUCKER: Well, I think that the question points to a very complicated problem that is well worthy of analysis. I think I would feel that it would be undesirable and perhaps a little risky to use the analogy of the 1917 split between Russian communism and European Social Democracy in a mechanical way, as we now try to think of the apparently growing split between what we could call Khrushchevite Soviet communism and Stalinist Chinese, Albanian communism. It is true that one of the ideological issues in this debate going on within the Communist world is the issue of the use of force. It is true that Khrushchev in the 1956 revision of Communist doctrine had gone back to the old 19th century Marxist idea that the transition of the Socialist Party could take place in some cases by what he calls peaceful parliamentary means. The present view, however, is very on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand, because the party program says it may take place peacefully, but on the other hand that they must not forget the possibility of the nonpeaceful path. It doesn't say that they prefer the peaceful or that the peaceful is in all conditions the proper or the desirable one.

It very carefully distinguishes between itself, this view, and that of the European Social Democracy by saying that at some point in the process, whereby the Socialist or the Communist Party comes to power, there must be a revolutionary transformation of society, and it suggests that the one-party system will have to arise, which, of course, the European Social Democrats don't do. They still, even after coming to power, go on fighting by democratic means to stay in power, whereas the Russian Communist doctrine of today, the modernized version under Khrushchev, still posits the idea that, after having come to power, this will be for keeps, by setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is a far cry from European Social Democracy, but still within communism it is a more moderate doctrine, or modern outlook, than that which is being defended by the Maoist wing in Peking, which undoubtedly has followers all through the various Communist Parties of the world, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is also, if I am correct, a scene of a political struggle at this time. The conflict is not simply between parties as, for example, between China and Russia, but is within the Soviet Communist Party also.

QUESTION: Doctor, you described the flourishing socialism in Europe as being partially due to the need of the masses for a religion or faith other than that which the Church had given them in the years previous. Can we look to another religion or faith or doctrine that

might grow up in contemporary times or in the future that will satisfy a need, not for the masses but for the people? The only suggestion I can see at this time is science or technology.

DR. TUCKER: I think you raise a basic, fundamental, and a most important practical problem, and I don't know the answer. But I do feel that the study of the kinds of phenomena that we have been talking about today is helpful in teaching us that man, who, as you know, has been called a political animal, a tool-making animal, a language-using animal, and various people have put forward various different ways of specifying just what is peculiar about him, might also be called a "faith-needing animal."

I think one of these definitions ought to be "religious animal," that is, somebody who needs to have some kind of faith or some kind of a belief system. And this doesn't mean that he always will. It just means that if he doesn't he'll be unhappy.

It seems to me that it may be that the greatest problem of modern civilization, the kind of civilization that is developing now in most countries, is that it disturbs the belief system and that it is very difficult for man to maintain any all-inclusive faith that gives a great deal of meaning to his life in modern civilization. The question is: Can this faith be recovered in some way? It seems to me that the absence of it probably lies at the very basis of the malaise and the uneasiness that is particularly visible in Western man in our era.

I don't know where the new faith is coming from, if it is coming. It seems to me that these old Socialist shibboleths, we see from this account of the events of the past hundred years, don't have much potential of revival as a meaningful, vibrant faith for masses of men in modern society. But science and technology you suggest. Well, I wonder if that, by its very nature, is capable of answering to this need. It seems to me that I would doubt whether the scientific outlook in itself could supply that need.

Where it is coming from, I don't know. It seems to me that there are all kinds of low-grade faiths clamoring for acceptance in this vacuum, supremely extremist ideologies, all kinds of malignant, sort of superpatriotic faiths. These are just many of the symptoms of the fact that modern man needs some kind of faith and doesn't have it, and all sorts of poor articles will compete for his concern and consideration in these circumstances.

Where is the genuine article? I don't know. And I don't know when it is coming. I think that in matters like this the only thing one can do is wait and hope.

QUESTION: You said a while ago that the Socialist Party in itself didn't take back in the late 1890's. Would you comment on the idea that perhaps it didn't take because it was not stimulated by the development of the two main parties we have now?

DR. TUCKER: You mean here in America?

STUDENT: Yes.

DR. TUCKER: Yes, I think this would be a further factor, beyond the ones that I mentioned--the absence of class distinction in America comparable to that in continental countries and England, and secondly, the great economic opportunity that existed in the late 19th century America, beyond what Europe could afford.

But over and above these factors, what we have seen in America, surely, is the growth of a social service state, a welfare state. Just as many of the Socialists of England and the Continent are at a loss to know what kind of program to put forward at a time when most of their old programs are realized, so here in the United States, it seems to me, there is very little room for anybody to worry too much about the old slogans when we have pension systems, social security, and increasing talk about old-age health benefits, and so on.

Most of the paraphernalia of the welfare state is as highly developed in this country as it is in most places in Europe. It seems to me that what we have now in the United States is no longer a capitalist system but something that I think one might call a postcapitalist system. This, of course, is a matter of semantics, but semantics can be terribly important. I think that, instead of calling it a capitalist system now we might try to think up some other word.

Of course the Russians hate this. They want us to go on calling it a capitalist system, and they ridicule, and laugh, and try to argue against every effort made by people on our side to say that we have something new, not like the old capitalist system, because they know that the old associations go on existing in the minds of many people around the world. So, therefore, they are very much concerned that we go on using the same old words.

QUESTION: Doctor, in your presentation you mentioned the relative stress of the British socialism versus the continental socialism, and the relatively strong position of the Scandinavian socialism. With the formation of the Common Market, and the possible entry of Denmark, Norway, and England, what do you think the impact will be on the overall socialistic system in Europe? Secondly, what do you feel to be the possibilities of a supranationalist Socialist Party as distinguished from nationalistic tendencies of some of the states?

DR. TUCKER: I wish I could answer those marvelous questions. I know that some European Socialists, for example, Dennis Healey in England, a prominent British laborite theorist and practical politician, has suggested that the formation of the Common Market may be a means of advancing European socialism by bridging this gap between the northern countries, where the Socialist Parties have had the experience of governmental office, and the continental countries, the multiparty states, where they have had these peculiar difficulties of coalition politics.

But, just how that is going to happen I don't quite see. I don't quite see what the basis is for his optimism that the formation of the Common Market will have an invigorating effect on the political position of European socialism as a whole. He does mention, however, that the Nenni Socialists in Italy that were at one time very closely allied with the Communists have made the first sign of a break on the issue of an integrated Europe. This seemed to have an appeal to the left-wing Socialists in Italy, and it helped dig the fissure between them and the Italian Communists.

Now, of course, the Communist Parties of Europe are dead set against all these measures of integration. The Russians are dead set against the growth of an integrated European economy, for rather obvious reasons connected with Soviet interests.

So this may be a fissure between the Communists and the European Socialists, but whether or not it will strengthen the Socialist movement in Europe I couldn't say. I would prefer to leave that question open. I do know that some Socialists hope that it will.

QUESTION: The Socialists were very strong in Germany before Hitler. The Communists have claimed that the rise of Hitler was due to the state of socialism. Is this true?

DR. TUCKER: Like all complicated things, and in all complicated matters of politics, to see some one factor is always very risky. So here it is true that at a period after the First World War, when the Socialist Party of Germany, the SPD, was very strong, it didn't make very forthright, vigorous use of its power. The leadership of the party was not very strong. But I don't think that the Social Democratic Party could be accused of exclusive or even decisive responsibility for the rise of Hitler. It seems to me that, if we want to assign responsibility within the field of German politics, surely the Communist Party of Germany, which was taking its orders from Moscow, specifically from Stalin, bears an even greater share of responsibility, because it was Stalin's policy at that time not to favor a united front of the Socialist Parties against the Nazi danger.

QUESTION: Doctor, in any discussion of political theory, it seems inevitable that the words "left" and "right" creep in. You didn't use the words very often, but their use would appear to indicate that perhaps there is the existence of some sort of spectrum which could be identified from left to right. Could you tell us briefly how you see this spectrum, if in fact there is such a thing?

DR. TUCKER: You mean within the framework of socialism?

STUDENT: No, within the framework of all political theory. For instance, when you mention syndicalism and anarchism, as offshoots of certain periods of socialism, it might be argued that anarchism could be to the right of a democratic process. Could you describe how you envision the spectrum?

DR. TUCKER: I am not sure how far one could go. It seems to me that these notions of left and right are of limited usefulness. Within that limitation they are so useful that we can't really talk without using them. Of course we know that it goes back to the period after the French Revolution, and the traditional connotations of left seem to be more radical and the right seems to be less radical and more conservative. Now, just in those general terms I think that the distinction has usefulness. But we can't categorize all the differences between the political tendencies, even within a movement, in terms of being more or less radical. There are certain qualitative differences. That's where the distinction has only limited usefulness.

QUESTION: Recognizing that Sweden is out front in socialistic programs, it would be interesting to hear your views on a comparison of the progress of socialism in the United States, versus that in

England, Germany, and France, taking into consideration not only the adoption of socialistic programs, like social security, minimum wage, and one thing and another, but also taking into consideration the fact that in those countries they don't have capital gains taxes, and that the United States has the highest rates of progressive income tax, also that the total government expenditures in those countries represent a lesser fraction of the GNP than they do in the United States.

DR. TUCKER: Well, it seems to me that what you are asking, then, is: May not the United States in some ways be farther along the road to socialism than some of these European countries are that officially recognize their own Socialist tendencies? I think the answer is yes, perhaps, but each thing has to be looked at in its own terms--for example, nationalization. While we do have TVA and the Post Office, and so on, we certainly haven't gone nearly so far in the field of nationalization and the transfer of the means of production to public ownership as, for example, England, or, presumably, say, Sweden, although I am not too sure of my statistics on nationalization in the northern countries.

But in other respects we may be even a little farther along, as in respect to the capital gains tax, which you mentioned. This becomes even more meaningful at a time when the official Socialists are abandoning the idea that socialism equals nationalization. If socialism ceases to be identified with the idea of nationalization, then more and more of the piecemeal sorts of things that may have been realized in other non-Socialist countries, or countries that don't think of themselves as being Socialist, may be in line with the new and more flexible definitions of socialism themselves.

So it seems to me that this is an open question that we have to look at in terms of a whole spectrum of specific criteria.

QUESTION: It would appear that if the Communist Party achieved its objectives it would be like the Socialists, a rebel without a cause. Do they address themselves to this problem?

DR. TUCKER: Very much so, and pose it in their programs. You know that the Soviet Communist Party has recently adopted a new program, the first since 1919, and the program poses the ultimate goal of a full Communist society. They now claim that they have achieved socialism but that they are in the transition from socialism to full communism, which will be characterized by the principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," et cetera.

They say that the foundations of this full Communist society will be built in the 20-year period from 1960 to 1980, but the ultimate construction will come only after 1980. This is a very, very serious problem. If we go beneath the surface here, we find a very, very serious problem. If communism were ever achieved in Russia, they would have to keep it a secret. Because, what would then be the function of the Communist Party? The Communist Party officially exists to lead the people to the promised land of communism. Its monopoly of power is wholly based in the argument on the need to give leadership to the nation in the march toward communism. If they ever admit that they have communism, there is no longer any basis for claiming that the party should have a monopoly of power.

Therefore, it seems to me that, if we look at the thing in terms of cold realism, communism can never be achieved in Russia. That is to say it can never be officially admitted so long as this party is in power that the goal has been realized. The goal is a kind of functional necessity for Communist Party power, or not just the goal but the lack of fulfillment of the goal. They need to have the goal in order to justify their claim to power. They need the nonfulfillment of the goal for the same purpose.

COLONEL SMILEY: Dr. Tucker, we are indebted to you, sir, for being with us this morning and giving us your very clear description of the history and development of socialism. On behalf of all of us here, thank you very much.

(29 May 1962--5,600)O'T/ijk:en