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WESTERN POLITICAL HERITAGE

Dr. Carl J. Friedrich

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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**WESTERN POLITICAL HERITAGE**

22 August 1962

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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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Washington 25, D. C.

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22 August 1962

DR. SANDERS: Today we begin the second section of the Foundations Unit, Contemporary Political Thought in Government.

If one were to list the most eminent scholars in the field of political thought in the United States today, the name of Carl J. Friedrich would appear among those at the top. He is presently the Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University. He is going to speak to us on Western Political Heritage.

This is Dr. Friedrich's second lecture at the Industrial College.

It is a pleasure to present Dr. Carl J. Friedrich.

DR. FRIEDRICH: Gentlemen:

I have been asked to discuss with and for you the Western Political Heritage. The little sketch which is given of the lecture and which you have no doubt read asks me to do in 45 minutes what I try to do in 72 hours at Harvard. Actually, it even asks for a little more than I try to do in those 72 hours. I do very much hope that you don't expect me to do it in 45 minutes or you will be sadly disappointed. The possibility exists, however, to do in 45 minutes a major sketch of the decisive issue that arises in connection with Western political heritage at this time.

Fifty or 60 years ago, if there had been a course of this kind--and of course it is quite characteristic that there was no such course--I am quite

certain that the course would not have begun with a lecture on the Western political heritage, because at that time people still felt very secure. They felt very certain of their ground. There wasn't any revolutionary challenge in the air. To be sure, Marxism was abroad. Parties existed in Continental Europe, more particularly, that based their activities on the Marxist ideology, but it was all looked upon as more or less of a Utopian enterprise, and everybody was convinced that if those men ever did participate in practical politics they would fit themselves into the great tradition of Western political heritage.

Today that's all different. You cannot act in politics and in public affairs without facing the underlying theoretical and philosophical issues. You cannot do it because of the challenge of the power of the Soviet Union and the peoples and governments associated with it, and you cannot do it because of the emergence of the new nations, many of them carrying in their backgrounds traditions utterly different and at variance with the Western political heritage.

Fifty years ago those nations were also there, but their political heritage was not taken seriously. It was considered to be something of the past, something that would be overcome by way of their adopting the Western position of traditional liberalism, and all would be well.

As you know, today the situation is not moving in that direction at all but rather is moving more away from it. Even in the United States and in Britain, and on the Continent of Europe, those who still represent in thought and action the Western political heritage are very much more sophisticated in their position regarding it. Nobody today, in a serious mood, in a critical sense of

appreciation, could possibly issue the kind of battle cries that were readily accepted fifty years ago: Make the world safe for democracy! As you know, it has become a joke, practically, to use an expression like that. It is done in order to characterize a certain naive person who hasn't got any idea of what is actually confronting us and how serious the issues are with which we are concerned.

Now, the difficulty with this exploration of the Western political heritage is that the body of material that has to be studied and has to be inwardly digested (as the old phrase goes) belongs among the most difficult and the most challenging material that one can put one's mind to.

I saw in the material that was sent to me about the Industrial College that your work is cleared for Top Secret. I was much amused when I read that, particularly with a view to this lecture. What I said last year when I was here I would still say, and that is that the material we are dealing with is Top Secret, but in a very special and difference sense than that in which that word is usually used. I can illustrate it to you best by recalling a real experience, a true anecdote, which my former senior colleague and student of international affairs, George Grafton Wilson, liked to tell. He was even back in the twenties, when that was quite unusual, an adviser to the State Department and handling, as a specialist in international law, some fairly confidential material. One day he got a telegram from the Department, saying in effect, "We are shocked to see that yesterday in a speech you used such and such information. You will understand that hereafter we will not be able to

avail ourselves of your services as much as we appreciate what you have done." George Grafton Wilson wrote back and said that he could very well understand their indignation because it would indeed be very generally admitted that anything published in the Congressional Record was Top Secret. And he gave them the page where that particular information was printed.

Our kind of Top Secrecy is of that same sort. Anybody could read it, but very few people do. So it has remained a secret, and I dare say it proves on the whole every year that it is going to stay a secret.

All I can do here is to open a small bit of the door and hint at a glimpse in the hope that from time to time you might find yourselves intrigued into dipping deeper into this material which has fascinated me all my life and to the study and reflection of which I have devoted a very large part of my professional existence.

As I said, the reason this has now become a vital matter and not merely a question of curiosity is that we are confronted with the challenge of totalitarianism. One reason why so many people, even in top policy positions in this country, and in other countries of the West, have been so inadequate in coping with the challenge of totalitarianism is because they have seen it in too short a time perspective. They have seen it as, of course, the totalitarians themselves like to present themselves, in terms of a challenge of a relatively short century, a challenge to liberalism, a challenge to humanism, a challenge, as the Marxists like to say, to the bourgeoisie. These are fairly recent movements in Western thought. If the totalitarianisms, both the Fascist and the

Communist varieties, were only a challenge to liberalism and were only a challenge to humanism, they would not be nearly as dangerous, and they would not be nearly as difficult to combat. Actually, the totalitarians challenge the entire Western political heritage.

This analysis, before I carry it further and show you what particular ingredients I specially have in mind, is further complicated by the fact that these totalitarians themselves are children of that Western political heritage. They are themselves derivative of that heritage. Take the Communists. They are far more important from our point of view today, and in the world in which we are living they are a real power and force. They, as you know, build on Marx. Marx was a very deep student of philosophy and history. Marx was a pupil of the German philosopher, Hegel. Hegel was one of the most capacious, if not one of the most lucid, minds that the Western history of philosophy has produced. Through Hegel you get into all the other ramifications and, more particularly, you get back to Plato and Aristotle.

All of this somehow got perverted in Marx and much more perverted still in the cheapened version of Marxism that is the ideology of the Soviet Union--dialectical materialism, as they like to call it. They have taken, for example, an intrinsically very subtle and complicated doctrine of the Hegelian logic and have perverted it into an instrumentality for general deception. The doctrine in Hegel's logic is one that I wouldn't dare take time here to expound to you, because we would not have enough time left for more important things, but the quintessence of it is that every statement implies its

opposite, that assertion and negation belong together, and form a whole, and that you comprehend truth only contemplating them both. In dialectic materialism, Marx prided himself on having put this doctrine on a realistic basis, and so, instead of talking in purely intellectual terms, which do make some sense, though not very lucid sense, they took this position that every movement is a countermovement, and the class-war doctrine is derived from this notion of Hegel and the dialectical materialism is a dialecticism that claims that matter is dialectically constructed, in the way in which Hegel had insisted that the logical process was constructed.

Well, I could go on and show you, by going through the Communist Manifesto, how practically every sentence has a history behind it that leads into the recesses of this Western political heritage, and in case after case represents a perversion of that Western political heritage. But it is there. And in trying to cope with the Communist challenge, one has to understand what it is that they are working with as an intellectual tool.

I have mentioned Hegel. Another towering figure in shaping the Western political heritage is Jean Jacques Rousseau, the Swiss-French philosopher who shaped the thinking of the French Revolution. A third one is Thomas Hobbes, who lived in the time of the English Revolution. These are key figures in the history of Western political thought, and each one of them can be shown to be represented in the Communist Manifesto.

I would like, before I go into a characterization of these strands that are of primary importance in the Western political heritage, to bring this a bit

down to earth by considering a concrete situation. I want to use as a concrete illustration of this manifestation of the Western political heritage in the conflict of East and West one which I happen personally to know very well because I have been involved in it. I was involved in it when I was Constitution Adviser to General Clay back in the days before and during the airlift in the late forties, and I have followed it since because of continuing participation in efforts in the unification of Europe and the development of democracy in Germany, and because it is at the present time probably from the point of view of overall danger the most serious trouble spot in the world. We have others that are nearly as dangerous, but bad as the situation, say, in Laos is, the overall position of the West and of the United States in particular is much less basically affected by a serious setback, let alone loss, in that part of the world than it would be by something in Berlin. And of course our policy has manifested that.

In Berlin you have the most explicit clash of the different phases of our intellectual tradition, for a variety of reasons. In the first place it is a city in Europe. In the second place it is a city that is a historical novelty, right in the territory of one power group but in part controlled by the other power. Consequently, all the ideas that are at work in both camps are churning in this relatively confined world of 2.5 or so million people.

Now, if you get such a thing as happened a year ago, the initiative that was taken on 13 August in dividing the city, as was done first by barbed wire and then by a wall, for many people it is just a material event. This is just something not very different from a farmer erecting a barbed-wire fence

across a piece of territory that is controversial between himself and his neighbor. Of course that part of it is there. It is a material event, among other things, and it is a material event with human consequence. But what is much more important than this material aspect is its symbolic significance. I myself am of the opinion that we lost a major battle on August 13 of last year, and we lost it because the people here--and not only here but in other places in the West--had no comprehension of what was at stake.

One thing, that I think in a sense is the most appalling thing, related to this incomprehension of what was at stake, was that the thing hit us unprepared. I don't know whether you have heard it. I came here to lecture to your predecessors and took the occasion to talk with some of my key friends in the Government about how this could have happened. The answer I got was, "It was a complete surprise." This happened after I lectured to your predecessors, in the afternoon of that day. Frankly, this appalled me more than what had happened, or rather had failed to happen, that they should say it came as a complete surprise. At one of them I shouted over the telephone, "How could it have been a complete surprise? We have lived with it since 1948. We wondered in 1948 whether they would do it, and we have been wondering ever since why they didn't do it. Now you say it came as a complete surprise.

In the beginning of July the Warsaw Pact powers met in Warsaw and they passed a resolution instructing Ullrich to do just that. And you say it was a surprise. Did you not hear about it? I read it in the newspapers." "Yes," he said, "We heard about it, but we thought it was just propaganda."

Now, this word is a key to the dangerous situation in which we live, the danger, namely, of mistaking the thinking of the enemy as just propaganda, that really, they are thinking like ourselves, they are thinking the way we do, and anything they say that deviates from that is mere propaganda. It is just the other way round. When they talk as we would, then it is likely to be propaganda, whereas their true thinking is quite different, and has to be understood out of its own perspective.

I took this declaration in the beginning of July at Warsaw very seriously, and since I had previously put in a memorandum about what I thought should be done in connection with the Berlin situation, I thought I would not make a nuisance of myself by coming back and talking about it again. Had I had any idea that this would not be taken seriously I would have done that. I could cite to you from the text of my talk last year what I said then, and you would say, "Well, this really was surprising," because I told your predecessors on the 20th of August exactly what now everybody says but which then was not comprehended. You might come back at me and say, "Well, they just said that to excuse themselves. They weren't really surprised." Frankly, I did myself find it so incredible that I didn't believe it. I thought this was just an out, that they were saying they were surprised because that was the best way to excuse themselves. But I learned afterwards, in September, when I returned to Europe and talked to some key people there, whom I can't quote to you, naturally by source--but they were decisive people--that this was indeed the case, that not only was everybody surprised but no plans had been made.

I think you will as military people agree with me, and I think that even every competent business man would agree with one, that part of effective operation in a highly competitive, that is to say belligerent, situation is to be prepared for the unlikely eventuality as well as the likely eventuality, just as if you go into a battle as a general you prepare for the loss of that battle even though you expect not to lose it. If you don't prepare, as we didn't in the case of Cuba, you are very much worse off than if you do prepare for what will happen in case you lose.

The other side was very well aware of the symbolic significance of this wall, and the depth of the misunderstanding that arose in connection with this particular situation is revealed by the fact--you may remember it because it was in the papers, though not very prominently displayed--that some of the key people here thought that they had won a great propaganda victory by the East Germans sealing off the eastern part of Berlin and erecting the wall. The propaganda victory was supposed to be that it proved that East Germany was a kind of a concentration camp, and you had to make a barbed-wire barrier to keep people in. They all wanted to come out. That was a daily demonstration of the failure of the system. Now they even had to put up barbed wire. This was felt to be a great propaganda victory.

Talk to some of the people in Asia or in Africa, as I have done last year, and see what kind of a propaganda victory that was. It makes no sense to them at all. The notion that this was a propaganda victory arises from thinking about it in terms of our Western political heritage and not in terms of the kind of

political thought that motivates the other side.

Of course none of us knows, and it is not my task here to explore how the thing will go on. But there is one thing I want to say to you in conclusion, having been close to European politics in terms of our American position in Europe, with which I have been very practically involved and concerned. I would say that nothing has damaged our position in Europe as seriously as the 13th of August since the end of the war, just as nothing helped our position in Europe as much as the airlift in 1948. The airlift in 1948 really made it possible for us to put the Marshall Plan across, and to stop the gaining of ground of the Communist movement in Europe, because at that time and because of that, everybody said, "They really mean business." Now the situation is just the opposite. The reaction has been, "They don't mean business." Actually, it doesn't prove any such thing, but in this world you've got to think in terms of the implications of your action much more than the mere material aspects of that action.

Now let me, with this concrete situation brought in and used by way of focusing the key idea which I am trying to bring to you, point out to you what I think are the three basic bodies of ideas, the three pillars, if you want to use that comparison, upon which such documents of our tradition as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of the United States, or the Charter of the United Nations, if you please, are resting.

These three bodies of ideas are peculiar to the West. I don't know whether you have ever had it called to your attention that explicit, detailed,

and ideologically worked out political thought, political theorizing, is a peculiarity of our particular culture. It is not to be found everywhere. For example, in India and China there are very few writings, not as in the West the very massive corpus of elaborate argument, but just a few Confucious-saying kind of things that you can put on a few pages, just sort of highlighting a few bits of practical wisdom. In India they have one book, the Altashastra, which is a sort of an Indian Machiavelli, but it is merely a compilation of practices without any real theoretical underpinning.

So this is a thing that complicates our situation, that, as contrasted with other elements of culture--music, art, literature, mathematics, and so on and so forth--political theory as we understand it is as peculiar a Western thing as is modern science, and much less easily assimilable, because of these underlying bodies of ideas to which I now want to turn.

They are three, as I said. The first, which I think is of crucial importance, is the Judao-Christian tradition. The second is Greek philosophy. And the third is Roman law. Let me say something about each of these, to make a bit more explicit what I have in mind. But before I do let me point out something else that you would run into if you began reading into the literature, into the writings on political theory.

One of the things that bedevil the student of these writings is that they are cast in several different languages, and these several different languages do not meet. When I say "languages" I don't mean French and German, or something like that. That's obvious, and that's simple. No. They are

languages of the mind. You have in the tradition of Western political theorizing the theologians--Thomas Aquinas, Richard Hooker, and so forth and so on. You have the philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle through Hobbes to Kant and Hegel. Then you have the law people--Cicero, Beaudin, Althusius, Grotius, and Pouvendot. Then, finally, you have the sort of historian, man-of-affairs type--Thucydides, Machiavelli--and a host of others.

These four groups of people with particular mental languages, ways of talking about politics, all have made their contribution, but they don't quite fit. What the one emphasizes the other leaves out. What the other emphasizes the first one leaves out. And you've somehow got to fit this together.

With this warning about the several languages in which the history of political theory is actually cast, let me say something more about these three major pillars upon which it all rests. I said the Judao-Christian tradition. The Judao-Christian tradition is responsible for three ideas that are peculiar to our Western politics and not to most of the politics of other peoples. It is the complex law, dignity of man, and what we nowadays in America call the separation of church and state, that is to say, a clear differentiation between politics and religion, politics as a secular realm to be clearly differentiated from the realm of religious conviction.

This is all permeating. The typical educated American or Englishman or German thinks in these terms as a matter of course. He thinks of course society rests upon law; of course society calls for respect for the dignity of the individual; of course religious conviction is something different from politics.

But it is not the least bit of course to Indians or Chinese or any of the other people who are now emerging from ancient roles in Africa and elsewhere. In all of those traditions not one of these ingredients is of primary importance.

So every time we express ourselves, assuming that this is believed in, we are not reaching the audience we are trying to reach. Things that were said in Washington and in London after the 13th of August by way of explaining the position we took made absolutely no sense to the people to whom they were addressed, precisely because they assumed these three basic assumptions of the Western political heritage.

Let me say similarly something about Greek philosophy, Greek philosophy as primarily represented by Plato and Aristotle. Tremendously important in this mammoth course that I mentioned of the 72 hours at Harvard, I devote almost a quarter of the time to an exploration of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. That will be done this fall--2-1/2 full months. Why? Because our entire vocabulary of politics comes out of these writers. Begin with the word, "politics." Where do we get it from? From Aristotle. The major work of Aristotle is called Tapolitika, and that's where the word comes from. So it is with a whole lot of other words that are crucial to our vocabulary. Take the usual discussion about forms of government--monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, tyranny, oligarchy--they are all Greek words, all out of this armory of the Greek political philosophers, all expounded in Plato and Aristotle. That's where we have them from.

It is not part of the rest of the world's traditions. It is only in the

West where this body of ideas has been cultivated and has been developed. That's why we now get all this weasel-word kind of talk. You know, in one place in Asia they talk about democracy with one qualification such as managed democracy. In another place you get another such weasel-word explanation. Basically they don't comprehend what it's all about. It's a good word, so they just qualify it and they they think they are part of that world.

At the same time I do not want to leave these very brief remarks about the Greek philosophy without issuing also a word of warning. Plato, more particularly, is also the originator of ideas which have borne evil fruit in the totalitarian movement, so much so that there are writers at the present time who would argue that Plato was the first totalitarian, and there are passages in Plato which indeed sound exactly like Hitler or Stalin-- complete subjection of the individual, absorption of man in society, regulation day in and day out, and so forth and so on. And yet Plato was an ardent enemy of tyranny. His whole political thinking revolves around the question: How can we avoid tyranny? But Plato lived in a time of decline, much similar to our own, at a time when the political order in Athens had gone to pieces, when democracy had been carried to excess and had become what a later Greek writer called autocracy, or the rule of the mob. And Plato, asking, "How can we get away from this disaster?" urged harking back to an older tradition. Plato was really in his heart of hearts an arch conservative, a man who wanted to reestablish the ancient Greek polis, the polis of Athens as it had once had been, on a religious foundation, now that religion had disintegrated, on a philosophical

foundation. And in trying to do that he overstated the position in such a way that it has been a source of major political misunderstanding in the Western political heritage throughout the ages.

Now let me say a word also about the third and last of these pillars. That is the Roman law. The Roman law is as important for us as the other two, although often forgotten, because it is not quite so theoretical, not quite so philosophical, not quite so general as these other bodies of thinking. But the Roman law was the law of the people with probably the greatest genius for precise legal formulation of political problems that has ever existed. The Constitution of the Roman Republic prior to its decline and disintegration in the days of Caesar and Augustus is a marvel of political realism in terms such as make sense to a contemporary American, in terms of the separation of powers, in terms of the protection of the individual against the power of the state, and so forth and so on. All of this has become part of our Western heritage by dint of the Romans in a sense discovering in their effort to legally make precise what is politically relevant as against the Greeks the transformation of law into political institutions. And in connection with that the Romans really discovered, without using actually these words, three ideas that have been keyed to the Western political heritage, namely, the state, the constitution, and, finally, sovereignty. The state, the constitution, and sovereignty are three conceptions without which the Western political heritage is incomprehensible.

And yet--and this is highlighting what I am trying to tell you--outside

your American world, including the British Commonwealth, of course, in a literal sense you can say there never was a state, there never was a constitution, and there never was a sovereign. None of these ever was discovered. The superiority organizationally of the West in the political field is due to the fact that the Romans worked out for us, and after a period of intervening chaos transmitted to us, through the corpus juris civilis, these key ideas which were resurrected and fashioned into their typical modern form by such writers as Beaudin and Althusius in the 16th and 17th centuries and by Grotius in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Now I want to conclude by drawing, so to speak, the sum of what I have said. I could elaborate, but you have another later lecture on the thing which will probably help you to do this to a certain extent yourselves. I don't want to elaborate but merely to point out that if you go through the position of the totalitarians, and more particularly of the Communist totalitarians, you will find that each one of these elements that I have just now mentioned has been what I call perverted. Each one is there but in a false sense, and our tremendous difficulty in dealing with the Communist challenge, more particularly, say, in Africa and in Asia, is due to the fact that these very large masses of people, originally and traditionally raised in an entirely different heritage, encounter the Western political heritage in these two rival forms. Fundamentally they don't understand either, but in view of the much more emphatic and much more belligerent propaganda effort on the part of the totalitarians on behalf of their perverted version, they adopt more readily this perverted version of

the Western political heritage, and I think you can now see why I myself believe that unless you really get to the roots of this heritage and its true meaning you cannot cope with their perverted challenge. If you merely accept their terms of trade, if you merely accept them in terms of an argument about capitalism and liberalism and the bourgeoisie, you will never get to first base. You've got to tackle these conceptions like law and the dignity of man and the constitution and the state in order to be able to effectively combat and eventually to bring to victory the true conception of the West.

In this connection I believe that there has to be--and I think it is implied in all that I have said and has been for many years in my teaching, as Dr. Sanders will confirm--a resuscitation of a belief in ourselves. We have to get away from this relativism which says all the traditions are the same, they are all equally good, and you just have to try to accept what the other people say and try to get along with it. No, no. I think it can be shown and shown on the highest, or if you prefer the deepest, level of theoretical and philosophical argument that this tradition is superior to what has been, that these people, for example, in India are not having just as good a heritage that is politically valuable. They have a bad heritage. If you take the position that their heritage is just as good as ours you deprive yourself of the possibility of combatting your true enemy, because the Soviet Union doesn't come and say, "Your heritage is just as good as ours." No, they say, "We know what is right. Forget about the Indians. Forget about all this nonsense of Hinduism

and so forth. We know. We are the future."

Unless we can rediscover a faith in the truth of our own position we can never effectively combat their challenge. But such a faith is not merely a matter of emotions. It is a matter of a search for these roots and an understanding of what they are, so that you can give testimony and you can argue. I have never hesitated to meet with any Communist or assorted other totalitarian, because I felt sure of knowing where their errors lay, so that I could, when they started talking, say, "Well now, wait a minute. You just said this. Now, what is your source?" And in terms of these conceptions that I have just been developing for you, I showed them that there is still a truth to be found which is better than the one they expound.

This is the conclusion of this very inadequate attempt to give some indication of what is the core of the Western political heritage.

**DR. SANDERS:** Dr. Friedrich is ready for your questions.

**QUESTION:** Doctor, would it be possible for you to give us in a few minutes some of the Asiatic thinking and traditions which would enable us to better understand their minds and their way of thinking.

**DR. FRIEDRICH:** I don't think that would be really possible. In the first place you can't speak of "the Asiatic," because there are a number of different ones. As I said to you in my talk, a very large part of the Asiatic tradition is not a tradition of thought in politics. It's a tradition of action in politics. It's elementary from our point of view. It's the kind of thing that the

Greeks both marveled at and criticized in the Persian Empire, which they thought was just out of the world of real rational comprehension. Sometimes people have made criticism of Aristotle because Aristotle didn't include these kinds of empires in his discussion. From our use of the word "politics" this criticism makes a certain amount of sense. But it doesn't make any sense when you think of Aristotle, because "tapolitika" to Aristotle meant that which concerned the polis. The polis was the Greek kind of developed political organization, and what went on in Persia wasn't part of it. Those were just, from the Greek point of view, despotisms in which the subjects were slaves, and which consequently weren't worth rational consideration.

The tradition is a relatively diverse one. Take for example the difference between India and China. In one sentence, you have in China the Confucian tradition which until the advent of the Communists rested upon the notion of "li," which is custom, which excluded all that we think of in terms of law and institutions, and so forth, because the solution of the problem of politics for Confucius was to raise an educated, wise man and then to turn things over to him and to let him decide on the spirit of the moment what would be the right thing to do under the circumstances.

It is a tradition which is truly different from that in India, where you have, out of the Hindu past, combined with the Buddhist inclination to flee the world, and talk about Nirvana and all as nothing, and so on, a very different kind of approach to politics.

So I don't think you can in a few words characterize this. But I think

also that, since these ancient bodies of thought are actually on the way out everywhere, all these people are searching for modernity, and the question is really not for them how to go back to what there once was but how to go forward into what will be.

Our issue is the one that I depicted for you, because the question is: Who will fill the vacuum that is opening up before them as they adopt a modern industrial civilization, which they are all determined to adopt and are going to adopt, come hell or high water? You can copy the physical instrumentalities, and the question is whether they are going to be merely instrumentalities, as they are for us, or whether they become a Frankenstein, because you haven't got the framework within which to handle them as instrumentalities.

QUESTION: You indicate that our heritage is based upon religion, philosophy, and law. These are all more or less intangible or thinking items. You indicate that the perversion of these basic pillars has given the Communists great advantages now. The uncommitted nations are all materialistic, as you indicated. They want something. The promises of food and things are what they are after. Will our revitalization of our intangibles, our principles, assist us in winning them?

DR. FRIEDRICH: I myself am inclined to think so. You see, it isn't merely religion, philosophy, and law, because they all have religion, philosophy, and law. It is the particular theoretical concepts that I indicated for you in these three great bodies that are at issue. You might say, although I don't

want to carry this too far, that in a way they are a little bit like children who think that this is a toy which you can appropriate. I am not sure that really to say they are materialistic is the right way of seeing it. They are not materialistic but they do need and want the benefits of the West's material culture. They do not comprehend that this material culture of the West is the result of thought that occurs within a framework that is intellectual and spiritual.

Science is not something that grows on every tree. It grows within the context of the ideas that were fashioned and that I hinted at for you in describing these traditions. The context of the organization that we speak of as the modern state was something that emerged in a slow evolution in the West over 500 years and was perfected in the 16th and 17th centuries. Precisely at the point at which this organizational framework was perfected with the aid of these ideas that I indicated to you did the scientific development become possible. The scientific development became possible through the liberating agency of the governmental and political organization that had been developed.

Now these people very frequently make the error of thinking that you can just take the fruits without the tree and without the roots. I tried to indicate by what I gave you as a very perfunctory analysis, I realize, that our job is to get across to them that it is this heritage that is the essential framework for the things they want.

Of course I am not talking pure theory. I mean, when I said what I said to you it was based on many years of teaching experience. I have in India a dozen or more able former students who are now doing this thing I was

talking about, getting across to their students in turn that it isn't merely the matter of the electricity and the atomic energy, and so forth, but that they've got to rethink the entire society before these things can be effectively controlled and used as the mere instrumentalities which they are, instead of allowing them to become the controlling element. The reason we are in this difficult position is the challenge of the totalitarians, because they are themselves the beneficiaries of this long tradition which they now in turn have perverted but which in their perversion they carry forward.

That is what I was trying to say. Now, it is obvious that you are not going to reach with that kind of highly sophisticated message the masses. I don't think you need to reach the masses. One of the great mistakes that I think underlay a lot of the failures of our work at OWI, and afterwards, say, for example, in the Voice Of America was that it was based on the notion-- and now I am talking about Europe, not even Asia--that you could accomplish big things by reaching the masses of the peasants in Italy. You accomplish nothing by reaching the masses of the peasants in Italy if you don't reach those who shape the thinking of these peasant masses. Only if you reach those can you also follow up with information to the peasants.

Coming out of the American tradition, where the common man has really come into his own and has something to say, they think this is the way you can cope with the problem in India or in some other country. It is the thought groups that you've got to struggle with and that you've got to win over. This is a very tough intellectual enterprise. This is, I think, the thing that

we need to do.

When I mentioned this some years ago to the then Presidential adviser on governmental propaganda, he said, "How right you are. But try and sell this to the Congress."

QUESTION: Your confirmation of the building of the Berlin wall catching this side by surprise and that no plans were laid for coping with the problem brings my question, which is: Had there been a different course of action, what would your suggested alternative course of action have been to cope with that situation once the construction of the barbed wire and subsequently the wall took place in Berlin?

DR. FRIEDRICH: You make an assumption there which I am not willing to grant, which you put in by way of your last clause, "once the wall was constructed." The point is that it should never have been allowed to be constructed. If you had been properly prepared it never would have happened. I had a rather interested schooling along this line when I worked with General Clay. He is a great believer in the old Roman dictum principius upsta--oppose the beginnings. You can often do something when you act right away, quick. But in order to act right away, quick, you've got to be ready, and you've got to be ready on Sunday morning at 3:00 A. M. That's exactly what they want.

I'll give you the two contrasts, just for the fun of it. When, at one point, Soviet soldiers appeared from nowhere and began digging up certain tracts in our zone and some people asked them what they were at they wouldn't give any answer and just went on. Of course the thing came through to General Clay

right away. General Clay did not concern the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of State. He reached for the telephone and called up the Russian Commander and he said, "I understand that your soldiers are over here digging up something. I am sure that this will be as much a surprise to you as it is to me. I'm calling you merely to say that if they aren't gone in 30 minutes we will open fire." They were all gone within 20 minutes. If there had been a long consultation because nobody was ready, I don't know what might have happened as a consequence.

Now take the contrast. They came on the 13th of August, which was a Sunday, at 3:00 in the morning. This itself is already a suspicious indication that they weren't feeling very sure of themselves, because it's well known that it's the thieves that come in the middle of the night and not honest, ordinary people. They put a few horses with barbed wire there by the Bandenburg Rator and they went away again. There were no Russians anywhere to be seen, just these chaps from the East Zone. They waited two hours and nothing happened. They came at 5:00 o'clock, or thereabouts, and they put some more, and went away again. Two hours passed, and nothing happened. Then they came at 7:00. They gave every sign of being very much perplexed and worried, but they did decide to do a little more and see what would happen. Nothing happened.

All this time you see, if we had had a definite plan--and I know what plan I would have had--things would have gone differently. I tell you what I think--this is, of course, purely speculative--was in their minds. We now have information--I have it from the top people in Europe--that Khrushchev himself

was very uncertain about this thing and evidently told Ullrich, "If you want to try, all right. I don't like it. I think we may get into a lot of trouble. You do it, because, then if it doesn't work, you've got to quit and see what you'll do with it. I won't have our people involved in it." I don't know, but I have very little doubt myself that if you had moved in the moment they put these first riders at 3:00 A.M. and had thrown them aside and indicated that you weren't going to put up with it, there wouldn't have been any more riders.

So you wouldn't have had this problem of which you speak, namely, what to do about the wall once we got it, because you would have been ready not to have it.

This is the thing that I was trying to indicate, that what matters to us in this lecture--since we are not talking about practical politics but matters in this lecture--was focused on this failure to anticipate. If you understood the totalitarian mentality you would never have thought that this was not in the cards. You would have known, as we did in Berlin in 1948, that this is what they would want to do, and it was just a question of what would seem to them an auspicious moment to try to do it. Consequently, you would have had your plans ready.

That was my only thought in this connection. That is to say the mentality of the totalitarian has to be comprehended if you want to cope with the totalitarian challenge. There is no excuse for being surprised by their doing something that was clearly in the cards.

Since we have raised the issue, I would like, at the risk of talking a bit too long in answer to one question, to make one other point. You know that this

whole thing goes back to November 1958 when the Soviet Union issued its famous proposal with reference to Berlin. Why was it done? Was it done primarily to get the Allies out of Berlin, which it seemed on the surface to be doing? I think myself, if you understand their thinking, you know that that wasn't their primary concern. In fact, I am almost as sure as I am sure that I am standing here before you that Khrushchev had no illusions about getting us to leave Berlin. He knew perfectly well that we weren't going to leave Berlin. But he had other objectives. Of course, if we should leave Berlin, fine. That would be just a windfall. But the real objectives were, in my opinion, two. The real objectives were, on the one hand to force the East German Regime upon the attention of the world, and to prepare the ground for an eventual recognition in fact, if not in law. The second objective was to sow discord in NATO.

I think myself that they have had a brilliant success with their first objective, and they have had very little success with their second objective. In fact, their second objective is almost the opposite. NATO was in very bad straits in November 1958, and the Soviet initiative pulled them together again. That is one reason, I think, why Khrushchev became so hesitant about the whole thing afterward, because he saw that he had gotten himself out on a limb with his so-called ultimatum about May 1959, and so on.

Let's look at the other thing. Had the people comprehended the real objective they would have had to act differently. As it was, we have done everything to play into the hands of the Soviet Union in achieving their objective of putting the DDR on the map. I think myself, there you have again the issue that really

matters to me. That is that you have got to understand the ideological foundation of the action before you can effectively cope with the action.

DR. SANDERS: We have run out of time. Thank you very much,  
Dr. Friedrich.