

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION COURSE  
January-June 1946.  
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GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Gentlemen, the speaker this morning is one of the distinguished citizens of the United States to whom the Army and the Navy and the Government in general look from time to time when they need assistance, particularly in the field in which this College is interested. Mr. Baruch was the outstanding American citizen until recently on whom we could call for aid in time of emergency. I just said to Mr. Hancock that it seemed to me that he was the crown prince, the successor to Mr. Baruch. His answer to that was, "Well, possibly Mr. Baruch would not like that"; but I am sure he would.

Mr. Hancock, among other things, was a member of the War Resources Board, of which he will have something to say this morning. More recently he has been the chairman of a committee of civilians, admirals and generals who have studied the problems of education in the field of industrial mobilization for the Army and the Navy, working on this committee with the Industrial College since last June. Our report is about ready to be submitted.

We in the College are extremely grateful to Mr. Hancock, as the country ought to be, for his interest in the business of industrial mobilization. I think we can safely say that among the civilians to whom we must look for guidance in this important work the country has no peer to compete with Mr. Hancock in the outstanding positions today in this matter of helping us solve our problems of industrial mobilization. Mr. Hancock will tell you from his long and profound experience what he has gone through in this industrial mobilization planning and give you some pointers as to the work that you have to accomplish in the next six months.

Gentlemen, Mr. Hancock.

MR. HANCOCK:

General, that halo does not quite fit; and I do not feel comfortable under a halo anyway.

I think I am going to follow a routine here which I like. I hope it will fit your views. I purposely did not prepare any talk, but made some notes. I hope I can follow them.

I first want to give you a bit of history. Back in 1926 we had the idea in this country and elsewhere in the world that we could be the gainers by lessening naval armament particularly. In that year we had the great naval disarmament conference of the world. There came over here from Britain a Lord Riddle, a great publicist, a man of high standing and much in demand by the public. One Sunday morning Lord Riddle left Washington on the train and settled down in a club car and very comfortably located himself, and was surprised to find his picture in the rotogravure

section of the paper. He was still in a bit of a glow when the conductor came along and asked for his ticket. He went all through his pockets, but not a trace of the ticket could he find. The conductor said, "You are Lord Riddle, aren't you?" Lord Riddle said, "Yes. How did you know?" "Well, I say your picture in the paper this morning, didn't I?" Riddle replied, "O.K. You did." The conductor tried to put him at ease by saying, "If you are Lord Riddle, it is O.K. with me if you don't have a ticket." Lord Riddle said, "It may be O.K. with you; but if I haven't a ticket, I am in a hell of a fix, because I don't know where I am going." I have my ticket here, but I still don't know quite where I am going.

Another reason for making these notes and talking from them was this: I did not want to try to temper any opinions. I find that when I start to write and rewrite, I take some edges off. I do not mind in this matter being a little rough, because you are going to take the edges off anyway; and if I start taking off edges and you take off some edges too, it will be too soft a product. So I am deliberately trying to keep in my comments and appraisals a little roughness.

In the First World War I happened to have charge of naval supply purchasing for the Navy Department. I was the man on the War Industries Board from the Navy in the Requirements Division. I made it a hobby, I suppose, then, and in the years since then when I was with Mr. Baruch, to work on naval preparedness, more than military preparedness. We had a part in the Hurley Board report of some years ago. It probably was so far back in history that some of you do not even know it existed.

The underlying bit of philosophy I have gotten out of all of this, having had a chance to watch two wars at very close range, is the conclusion, which may be a bit philosophical, but I think it is real, that Hegel was wrong when he said, "The only lesson we learn from history is that we learn no lessons from history." I would like to change that a bit. I think we do learn that history repeats our tragedies.

I think I learned that pretty clearly out of my experience in the last war. I should not say "last war." There is no last war. I suppose I should say "prior war" or "latest war." There were tragedies in the first war which arose because we did not know. We were not ready. We had no dream of the size of the job we had to do. There were tragedies in the second war in that we didn't learn from the experience of the first war.

Now, what should we have learned from that first war? What did we think we had learned? Wherein had we failed to carry conviction to the country; first, to the Congress, and, not less importantly, to the Executive? That is, gentlemen, the outline and scope of what I plan to talk about today.

Coming down from my home in Scarsdale yesterday morning I rode with Allen Clegg, head of the Rockefeller Foundation. I was carrying a bag and a portfolio. He said, "Where are you going, John?" I said, "To Washington." "What to do?" I told him about this venture today. He said, "Well, in medical terms I suppose you are going down to perform an autopsy.

He said, "We good medical men"--and he put himself in that class--"think the best way to learn is to perform an autopsy." That may be true in medicine, but I am not sure it is true in history.

One thing we learned in the last war certainly might have been put in various ways. One man said, "We learned that the elements of war are the four M's--men, money, morale and materials." That is easy to remember. Other men said, "It is the three M's. It is men, men, men." I stress the second concept so far as you are concerned, because I think the quality of the men on the job is the over-all important factor in any war planning. That applies not only to the Army and the Navy, but it applies to civilian industry as well.

There cannot be any defense for the kind of mistakes that were made in the previous war, the No. 1 war. If one wants to be softhearted he can say, "We had no idea of the size of the war. We had had fifty years of peace. Materiel became an important factor in war far beyond the capacity of man to understand and plan for." But the fact is, we had gone soft in both services. I know in the Navy Department we had gone soft. That is retrospect on my part. I did not quite see it then, but certainly it must be clear today.

We were afraid of men in industry in the last war. We had some reason for it, I think. The men in the services wanted to have authority and responsibility clearly lined out by statute or by executive order. Outside of the Services that was not thought of much in World War I. We were inclined to coast along and find out from the press who was the boss and who was the man who won the contest of strength. But after the lines of authority were laid down clearly, the Services were in full support of the civilian agencies helping in the war effort.

Also we did not know in World War I for what kind of men to seek. We went through this same kind of shaking down process until Mr. Baruch and the rest of them in the superagencies took it over. In the prior war, as well as in this war, there had not been any attempt to find the kind of man to do the kind of job that had to be done. We had to go through this trial and error method and political battle until we finally found the man.

Then I think back to the experience of all of us between the wars. You will undoubtedly be called upon to read the Hurley report. It was a well-set-up idea, by a joint Congressional House and Senate committee, public citizens, and service men. But the report was forgotten about by the time we came to the latest war--almost forgotten about.

Pacifism was rife in this country. It got so far that it invaded the War and Navy Departments. That is a rather broad statement and may not seem quite right, but it had gotten here. Here to my mind is the proof: The question arose about the character of the war mobilization planning; and, in order to avoid public criticism we stripped those plans down so that they would tell nothing and give no basis for an attack. Look it up in your history and see if that is not true.

I am not too critical when I say that. But we were politically minded. We had turned soft and pacifistic inside the two departments. We did not seem to realize the importance of fighting out these issues in the press so as to have public support of our plans.

I hope the tone in which I say that is going to carry a bit of courage and conviction to you men or the men who will guide the job in the future. The job, as I see it, is to sell the concept of a mobilization plan to the Congress, to the Executive, and to the country if necessary. But you cannot sell it by drawing back in your shell and being ashamed of your profession or ashamed of the job the Armed Services are to do in time of war. I could not quite say we were ashamed of it, but we did not quite know what to do about it in the services, and many civilians also did not. We just floated along with the tide, and military planning outside this College sank to a pretty low level, in my mind.

I think I recall the line from Emerson--I am not sure it is Emerson and I am not quite sure of the quotation, but the content is about right-- "God grant me the patience to accept those things I cannot change, the courage to change those which I can, and the wisdom to know the difference." I knew that line years ago, but I am frank to admit that all of us had the patience to accept the things as they were and we did not attempt to change them, though I think they could have been changed.

If you do not know the line from Johnson about courage, you might read this into your memory: "Unless a man has that virtue, he has no security for preserving any other virtue." When I look back on this comment I made about the period between the wars, I condemn myself as much as anybody else. I may have had the idea that war was remote--I do not know what--but the pressures around us were so great that we were all lackadaisical about the problems.

I am going to suggest to General Armstrong that he give you some night work and thereby save me some time, that is, get you to read a copy of a talk I gave here in 1939 and a copy of the report of the War Resources Board of 12 October 1939. That is the famous report which was suppressed by the Executive at the time. In fact it was ordered suppressed before it was prepared. The report itself was not so famous, but the fact that it was suppressed may have given it some notoriety. I will tell you more about that report as I go along.

In this period of uncertainty in both services regarding who was going to remain Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, Under Secretary of War, and Under Secretary of the Navy the European war started. The War Resources Board was appointed in August 1939. Date that back in your history now. The men on that board were under no instructions as to the time for filing their report. There was no sense of urgency about it at all. It was an hour a day, two days a week, kind of a job, if and when, as you please.

Well, I had been through the last mill, I thought; and I rebelled at the idea of our assuming that we could meet two days a week every odd week perhaps and do a job. Nobody else outside a few men in the War and Navy

Departments, so far as I am aware, had any realization of the need of moving fast and moving thoroughly. But when the issue was raised, of course the obvious answer was to push fast for a report.

But the report was not any more than an outline as to its objectives and purposes before the Board was informed that its report would not be released; that there would be three copies made--one for the President, one for the War Department, and one for the Navy Department.

I know that in two of those three places people have since tried to find that report and cannot find it. I also know that in my papers I have the last typewritten copy made before the final draft was taken off. It is all past history now. The report had quite wide circulation in the Services, but the original is not handy, so I have released my copy. The report will be available to you if you want it.

I do not want to take too much time to talk about the report and its contents, but it summarized a lot of experience and it told a lot of things that ought to be done that were not done until three years later.

Let us try to be fair at least about this appraisal of the situation in Washington in 1939 and 1940. Mr. Roosevelt was helping the British in every way he could without getting into the war. There certainly is no need to review the desire of America to keep out of the war at that time. I am sure an honest appraisal today would permit me to say that no man in public life could last if he had been prepared to talk war at that time. I recall the 1916 election had been won on the promise to keep us out of war, and I assume the situation was the same during the 1942 election too. I do not want any votes, and that is the reason I am frank about it.

Men everywhere were afraid to talk preparedness for fear of being charged that that preparedness move was a camouflage for a desire to go to war. And men, in their minds I fear, did not have that integrity of purpose and courage of conviction to face that charge.

Now, I know perfectly well that, if we had started in 1939, we could have had a year's head start on the materiel planning and thinking about it even if Congress had not provided appropriations. We could have had a year's head start in the planning of the organizational setup to handle these great civilian agencies that had to come to Washington in wartime. We could have defined their functions so we would not have had this overlapping jurisdictional fight for existence during the war.

One day over in the White House executive office--I will not name the man, but a gentleman there, an adviser, not a policy man--said to me, "John, I do not understand why we have all these jurisdictional fights in Washington." He was worried because he had to settle them.

He happened to have on the wall of his room a map of Africa. I said, "Well, let us just assume something. Let us run a glider over all of Africa now, with thirty men on board; and, as we go along--hit and miss--we just say to the men in the plane, 'You go overboard, and where you land you are king.' That is a nasty parallel to what was happening in Washington, but it is not too far from being accurate."

Just picture to yourself for a minute now the things we know about it. If we had landed forty men by plane all over Africa and said, "Boys, you are king where you land," you would have had forty border wars in five minutes, I assume. We had the border wars here.

The wars were not so important, but they annoyed men's souls. The important thing was that they delayed, and out of that grew the other extreme--the idea of a one-man war machine.

We want somebody to be given a sword and a mace to slam down on the men who will not cooperate. That does not work in a democracy either. That is always the way those things go. We get annoyed over the delays. Then we want somebody with a sword to cut somebody down who will not cooperate.

The only cure I can give you is to find the kind of man that does not need a sword, the kind of man people like to cooperate with, who is so fair-minded that his conviction carries confidence to his associates. If you cannot find that kind of man for your war machine, you cannot in my opinion, have a one-man war machine in a democracy.

It is so easy to start off with the theme that an organization is a sort of a pianola. We put a record on and it plays. But it does not work that way. Men have to have convictions carried in their minds before they can perform on the job.

Something can be done by discipline in the Army and the Navy in war; but I do not believe we can make it work in the undisciplined field of private initiative. I would not say that nothing can be done, but in the end the motive power comes from the free will of free men and does not come from discipline. I am talking, of course, about the relations of industry to this war machine. You will have a chance, I am sure, to review the multitude of kinds of setups we had in the War Production Board, and its predecessors alone during this war.

We were trying to change organizations and their functions so as to get rid of inefficiency but it could not be done. If we do not have faith in one man, we appoint two and guarantee inefficiency, no decision, and no wisdom. It only teaches me one lesson: that our organization planning has to be built around our men and around the men we have. We cannot, in my opinion, set up an organization plan and assume it is going to be a pianola and play itself. It will not work that way.

Then, after we got all the agencies set up, we got lots of debates and little of action. Then Mr. Byrnes was appointed to settle the argument. Now, I am a great worshipper of Mr. Byrnes. I will tell you a story about him when I finish this comment, to show you the basis of my appreciation of the man.

Mr. Byrnes had to settle those debates in the atmosphere of a judge in a debating society; and I say, frankly, that is a hell of a way to fight a war. Somebody has to have the information flowing up to him on which to make a judgment in advance, so as to prevent friction points from developing, rather than to try to cure them after they have torn the Nation to

pieces. That was not the concept here. It was the best that could be done, and Mr. Byrnes was a grand citizen; but it is the wrong idea to subject even as capable a man as Mr. Byrnes to that job.

Now my story about Mr. Byrnes to tell you why I am so fond of him. This will be off the record.

(Mr. Hancock spoke off the record for a few minutes.)

I think a part of your problem has been the growth of the idea of administrative law in this country. I hope none of you have had to live with it too much. I have, and it is not too pleasant a tool with which to live. But the assumption is that under administrative law the Congress is not wise enough to prohibit wrong acts; and therefore the Congress appoints somebody to decide in his own wisdom what is wrong. Now, that theme has been growing in Europe markedly and here for the last twenty years. It is the basis of a great deal of our governmental machinery in Washington. That theme of administrative law seems to have crept over into the plans for military mobilization.

The assumption seems to be somehow that when a statute is passed and a man is appointed under it, he has the requisite experience to act wisely. There are cases where it has happened. I would not want to go beyond that. But I only suggest the wisdom of getting clearly chiseled edges on the statutes which I hope you will have drawn over the years to cover these grants of powers to civilian and also war agencies in the event a future war comes. There is no time for debating on principles that could have been put down and could have been learned in advance of the need and could have been applied when the time of need came.

I am so pleased to find so many senior officers here who have had experience in the field and have seen these problems. If you do not get it done this time, I would like to take you out and shoot you all, because I swear to you that this is the greatest chance we have had, with two failures fresh in mind--I do not mean military failures, but two organizational failures and materiel delays. If we cannot put it down into understandable words that the man in the street can read, we are not as good men as we ought to be.

Now let me try to summarize some of the needs that I see today. My trouble ordinarily is that I just turn the tap and can keep on talking for months. You do not have the endurance and I do not have the courage to stay that long. But I would like to try to highlight some things that I think are important. I am not going to try to cover this whole map, but I would like to have you think of these. Then, as General Armstrong may plan, I would be very willing to answer any questions that are asked after the session is over. That will give me a chance to make my talk shorter if I talk of the things I am interested in, and give you a chance to ask questions on some things that you are interested in after I have finished. But I am working toward the close as fast as I know how.

The first thing that I see that ought to be done is to make an appraisal of the flaws in the assignment of duties and responsibilities to

each civilian organization, in other words, the scope and the policy. We ought to head toward the simplest possible organizational setup as planned for war and its nearest possible approach to being in skeleton form, ready for expansion in time of war, or in time of need, if you wish. Men must know where authority lies and where decisions are to be made.

There ought to be a current selection of personnel available for and competent to do the key jobs. I rather assume from some jobs I have been called on to do that there are no such files as that in Washington today. And yet Washington's job is men, the three M's--men, men, men. Yet we are trying to find men to staff General Lucius Clay's organization in Europe and for General MacArthur in Japan, and we have nobody in Washington with a record of those who might be available, and also competent. I think that ought to be one of the jobs. General Armstrong and I have talked about that previously and I know he has it in mind.

Next there ought to be an understanding of the functions of all war-time agencies to be established in time of war; and that understanding ought to be in the minds of all such people in government and industry and in the services. But the next time put it into the statute and do not make it subject to political pressure groups and amateurs in organization matters, who do not know the services or the service needs or the war mobilization program. Let us not fiddle around for a year or two if a next war comes. Let us not fiddle around with the uncertainty we had this time, because nobody knew where we were going and there was nobody who could tell them.

Then for you men in the Army and the Navy I counsel you to build your peacetime organization, particularly on all aspects of procurement, to parallel the civilian war machine, which in turn ought to parallel as best it can the organization of producing industry in America.

Next I think there has to be a new view not only inside the services but in the whole of government. There has to be, I am convinced, more down to earth specialization on this job of procurement. I take that all through the field, the whole field, from requirements to the last ditch--transportation.

I doubt very much if the men in the Navy I have known, and the men in the Army that I have known, have a chance to get experience through their fingers and hands as a part of their lives, except in a class room, to get experience with handling problems of logistics in general. I am reasonably sure they are never going to get it, unless that is made a special function of the Services. Even then it will not work unless the Services change their views.

The men who saw the Army in the last twenty years will recall that the men who gained advancement were the men who served with troops; that the men who got advancement in the Navy were generally men who served with the fleet. And rightly so. But this job of procurement and logistics in wartime is too important, in my opinion, to be handled by men on rotating duty. There is an old line in the Bible that might be quoted with a slight adaptation. "They that go down to the sea in ships"--and now I am going

to add--"and they that go forth with troops"--"they shall share and share alike." Until that principle is recognized--that logistics work is important and tremendously important in wartime, you are not going to attract the kind of men you need.

I am saying that out of a background of seeing this kind of problem in industry for some twenty-five years. I spent a little over fifteen years as an officer in the Regular Navy. Neither experience is adequate, but they both tell the same story, and it just could be that I am right in that matter.

Now for one bit of general philosophy. I have always seen that the happy ship is the taut ship; and I have seen that the happy organization in industry is the organization where the people can see an active job three years ahead. I would prophesy for you men that you have a happy life ahead of you, because this is the kind of job that is always going to be in process of being done and never be done.

I would not want to assume that I have given you a life-time job; but I can say out of my forty-odd years of experience since college days that I do not know any more engaging interest than the kind of work that you are taking on now. I have never seen any. I cannot conceive of anything more interesting than this kind of job.

Now, one final word. I have been around enough political matters, political groups, to appreciate all the more a chance to talk to you, because I do not know anywhere else in America where I can find as large a group of men with one undivided loyalty--a loyalty to the entire United States. I thank you.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you, Mr. Hancock, for that magnificent talk.

Mr. Hancock has emphasized the importance of men in the organization. I want to put a first question to him concerning the organizational set-up that was provided in the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan and to get his opinion as to its effectiveness in carrying out the mission of industrial mobilization. Could you answer that question?

MR. HANCOCK:

The plan that was set out in the Mobilization Plan was not followed. If it had been followed, I think we may have had a good organizational setup.

The rest, of course, is speculation. I do not know what would have happened if something had been done that was not done. But in general terms the thinking broke down because the men who were making the plans had no idea of what the service men and industry men know as line and staff organization. That is the basic thing that broke down. They did not know where power flowed. They did not know who was responsible.

One cynic, seeing the plan setup of the whole of the civilian war agencies in the latest war, said that it would have been a right concept if the chart headed this way (vertically) would just have tipped this way (horizontally). There was utter confusion about the functional or staff groups and the materiel groups, or line groups we could say, through the whole war planning. There was confusion about whether the controls should cut across materiel and all functions relating to it or whether the functions should cut across all materials. There was no decision as to who was the boss; and, still less, a decision as to picking a man who was competent to be the boss.

That is not said to be critical. The problem cannot be avoided in wartime. You can avoid a lot but not all. The men who have worked with organization problems can see it as plainly as can be. But those men were not in favor politically or politically acceptable to Washington during the period, let us say, 1938 and 1939, and until the end of the war.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Any questions, gentlemen?

DR. ANDERSON:

Mr. Hancock, in what way did the report of the War Resources Board differ from the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939?

MR. HANCOCK:

It was not markedly different from the mobilization plan as drawn by the Services. But the plan adopted by the Government was different from either.

DR. ANDERSON:

There certainly were some differences, were there not, in the recommendations?

MR. HANCOCK:

Very little. So far as I can recall, there was a definition as to the kinds of agencies needed, whether inside the War Production Board or outside. The thing we were all fighting for was the simplest possible kind of organization, set up first of all on materiel lines following the pattern of industry and backed up by the war producers.

I do not want to give you a distorted view. I do not want to depreciate the services at all. But I think modern war has shown one thing. The Services use the tools that industry has produced, which the Services helped to produce or to design in large part; but I think we in the Services were inclined to minimize the importance of building our organization around the existing groups, the men who produced the war tools. I think that concept is going to attract a little more interest. I am going back to a vague memory of six or seven years ago in trying to define this--the

file will be available and I suggest you leave it to your night work--I think there was very little appreciation of what had been done. That was not the pattern that was followed in setting up the war agencies, not by--well, use your own explosives.

A STUDENT:

Mr. Hancock, you stressed the importance of the procurement job and you thought that procurement was so important that it could not be left to rotating officers. Would you be willing to go a step further and say that procurement as distinguished from requirements is so important that it should be handed over to a central civilian government agency which functions in time of peace as well as war?

MR. HANCOCK:

No, I would not. I would cover the whole problem of requirements, procurement, transportation, storage and issue. I would stress this point, I think, to come back a bit: There is no term that is clear in my mind as to the scope of procurement. I deliberately threw out one word too--in the hope of being all-inclusive--logistics.

I think by the time that the officers, generalizing now, get to be around thirty-five or forty and have shown a capacity in this field, they ought to be trained for it. They should not be rotating afterward. They ought to be encouraged to do that kind of work rather than being encouraged to go to sea the day the war starts and leave the supply organization suffering all the way through.

Now, on the other aspect, do I favor it being done by civilians in peacetime, well, that has been attempted. I do not want to appraise it. You can make your own appraisal or ask anybody who knows. I do not think it would work.

The difficulty, I think, is this: There is very little allurements to a civil service job in Washington. Outside of the British Government, so far as I know, there is no allurements in that kind of job anywhere. I suggest, with all deference to Capitol Hill, that, if the pay is more attractive, we may assume you will get better men; but I suggest you may get more "lame ducks." That has been the way it has worked in my forty years of observation.

So I come back to saying, get the key men. I do not care where. I do not believe we can build up a civilian agency that can do the buying for war. There will be a better caliber of men to draw from in the Armed Services if they have been trained for the job. And I think they can do on the average a better job, even if they have not been trained for the job, than the kind of civilians you ordinarily get, with a very few exceptions. But I am sure, so far as my observation goes and what has happened in my lifetime, the service men, if reasonably well picked for the job, even with not much training, can do a better job than the civilian agencies in peacetime and will afford a nucleus for an expanded organization in wartime.

Do not forget that the men who are doing the buying and doing the planning must have the confidence of the men who are using the tools of war. If you do not have that, you have nothing. That is a strong statement, but that is decidedly so. Wherever a procurement organization does not have the confidence of the men who are using the things they procure, I do not care how good a job they do, they will not accomplish the needed result. War is won by teamwork and by confidence, I think, more than by any other thing, with the possible exception of morale, if you will.

A STUDENT:

I have a second question. How do you avoid or regulate the competition which exists between the procurement officers of the different branches within a service and among the Services? In other words, do you by necessity have to have a War Production Board or something similar?

MR. HANCOCK:

Sure; you have to have a civilian war agency. So far as I know, it never can be done inside the service. Procurement has to be coordinated.

I think, however, that that argument about competition is a pretty well-phrased screen. When we look at the basic concepts of group purchasing--I am not saying they are always carried out now, because I know they are not--we see that there is a time up to which competitive bidding will serve adequately and fairly for all concerned. The thing is to have somebody who has the judgment and the understanding to be able to say at what time it does not serve the need. Any mistakes that are made are pretty well washed out by any ordinary war tax law if renegotiation does not get them first.

Now, the whole difficulty in that field of super layers of power affecting prices is that, when you try to cover up mistakes made by the procurement men on prices, you guarantee that we are going to have bad buying. I could not create a more effective plan if I were trying to make procurement men, let us say, a bit careless about the prices they pay for goods when they know they have two screens taking care of the problem after it gets by them. One is the renegotiation board and the other the tax law.

I think some preliminary work has to be done somewhere, maybe here, to decide what is the basis of a fair tax law and what is the basis of a fair profit in wartime agencies in awarding wartime contracts. Until some basic concepts of that kind have been cleared up and put into the statutes, you are going to have a lot of confusion in the field. Many men will err too far on the side of private industry. Many will err too far on the side of limitation of profits.

I only suggest one thing; that, whether profits are inequitable or not, they are the most powerful motives in the production field. If someone can find a better incentive, I am all for it. But I do not know where it is yet. I do not want to see profits so curtailed as to involve losing a war. I am not for big profits either. I would give industry the chance

to make it and then tax it away viciously, surely fairly but firmly. The fun of getting it is what makes things go.

A STUDENT:

You urge us to crystallize our mobilization plan and do all in our power to have that plan made into statute. Is it not true that the Joint Planning Board prior to this war tried with no success at all to do just that? Do you recall what the difficulties were that they encountered?

MR. HANCOCK:

Well, first, they were not as good men as you are. I really do not recall the difficulties.

First, basically, America does not like to think of war. But it takes a fixity of purpose and it takes wisdom. Do not forget also that I said this job will never be done. It will be in the process of being done. You are not going to arrive at heaven in a single bound. All I can do is to give you the direction and get you on the beam so far as I can in that direction.

I do not recall the difficulties beyond those and the fact primarily that nobody made it his business to do it. It was everybody's business literally, and that meant it was nobody's business. There were no crusaders for the idea of getting this done after 1924, as I recall it. I believe the Hurley Board was in 1925. There were no crusaders for the theme after that. Everybody was busy, I think, trying to avoid a depression or trying to get votes or the usual matters and problems of life. It is going to take somebody to be a crusader. I think it can be done. I do not know. It will be done only if men like you try it. It will not be done if you sit and wonder whether you can do it. That is the best answer I can give.

A STUDENT:

I have another question closely related to that one. I would like to know what your explanation is of the failure to activate the Industrial Mobilization Plan by not declaring M-day. And, whatever your explanation of the cause may be, how can we avoid it next time?

MR. HANCOCK:

I do not know. I am trying to find an answer to that one. I do not know why it happened the first time, let alone how to avoid it the next time. But I will try to sketch for you a little bit of the background of it.

I think you will recall that Secretary of War Woodring was in Panama when Under Secretary Louis Johnson and Acting Secretary Edison of the Navy at that time wanted a war resources board. Woodring came back from Panama and said, "There will be no war resources board in my department."

It was a popular question around Washington whether the two men were talking to each other at that time. I did not take that too seriously. But I do recall that neither one was here in May of 1940 or thereabouts. In other words, there was not much continuity in the civilian setup, the top policy-making setup, for either War or Navy at about the time this issue arose.

We happen to have a great genius for that. Go back to the first war. There was almost the same thing in the War Department, as I recall. Mr. Garrison resigned under dispute with the President about the draft and Mr. Baker came in. So we seem to have a genius for changing the secretaries of War and Navy in the face of war. That is one of our great traits. That is partially why we had trouble.

**GENERAL ARMSTRONG:**

Mr. Hancock, is not one of the reasons a characteristic of the American people? I am just reading a remarkable book by Professor Randall, of the University of Illinois, on the life of Lincoln. It concerns principally his war years. What I see in there is exactly what you brought out here, and that is that Lincoln's hands were absolutely tied after the question of Sumter came up. Even if he had had the possibility of doing anything, there was not much chance of doing any constructive operation at all. His hands were tied, because, if he had taken a single action, it would have been considered a warlike move.

Now, the point I want to put to you, Mr. Hancock, is, are we not always going to face that unless we get more realistic and say that the nucleus, at all events, of the top civilian agency--the War Production Board, or whatever you want to call it--should be established in time of peace, because, if we wait until the emergency to set up such an agency, there is always going to be hesitation and people saying, "You cannot do it, because it will make our potential enemy say we are taking a warlike move." Now, that, I think is fundamental; and I would like to get Mr. Hancock's views on the subject.

**MR. HANCOCK:**

You and I work in cahoots. But let me find a note. I hoped I could get by without telling the reasons for it, but General Armstrong made me bring it out in the open.

You may recall one point that I made. Here is the way it went: I had spoken first of the simplest possible organizational setup as planned for war and its nearest possible approach to being in skeleton form, ready for expansion when and if needed. This is the reason for that statement. We always shy away from it and hate to face the issue, for some reason. If we do not get those things down in a skeleton form, then it is too drastic a move and we somehow or other just cannot swallow a thing like that when it comes time to do so.

I think also we can fairly say this: I did not say it then; so I am not critical. But as I look back to the summer of 1940, I think I can

appreciate a little bit more the position of the men who came in as secretaries of War and Navy and the under secretaries of War and Navy. I marvel they did as well as they did, because this tremendous machine is a hard job for anybody to understand in a hurry, and the man is going to spend a long time before he is able to know on whom he can rely or on whom he should rely in the organization. That we have done as well as we have is a great tribute to all concerned.

I am partisan, I admit; but I think the war was won by the Armed Services and American industry and not by Washington. If I were going to pass credit around, there is credit to spare all over; but down in my heart I do not believe that the Washington war machine outside of the Services did anything like its share in bringing about the victory. Others will disagree, I know. Maybe I am partisan, but that is where I think the credit goes.

It is just so easy to get things down on blueprints, but I have never yet seen a blueprint that will turn anything around and make it go anywhere. It takes men to do that. That is why I stress men so much in my talk.

A STUDENT:

I am not completely satisfied.

MR. HANCOCK:

That is good.

A STUDENT:

General Armstrong said they passed a Selective Service Act, but I do not see why we could not have declared M-day and the Industrial Mobilization Plan at the same time.

MR. HANCOCK:

I agree with you. I would just change a word. I did not catch your point. I am sorry. Washington did not see it. I have quarreled on Capitol Hill with everybody in my political party there, the one that adopted me, because they could not seem to see the point.

Back in the summer of 1939, as I recall it, or 1938, they gave the War Department the pitifully small sum of about eleven million dollars for educational orders, trying to test out the production of leading war tools, and the war abroad was on in 1939. All we could talk about here were the two extremes, black and white--we are or we are not going to war, arguing whether we would be engulfed in the European war or not be engulfed in it. Nobody sat down to take the middle course. Nobody had the courage of conviction to do it, nobody in the Government. They had to see it in black or white.

They could not talk preparedness in any event. Go back over the record and, so far as I know, there was nobody trying to differentiate except

to get on either team, over here or here, right or left, if you will. One group was determined to get into the war if it could. The other group was determined to stay out if it could. Preparedness to one group meant going to war. It did not have to mean going to war at all, and yet there were perfectly competent men up here in Congress at the time--that is not hindsight--who were not able to see the issue in that term.

If we had been half as resourceful, as I see it, in selling a preparedness plan as we were in political issues, it could have been sold to the country very easily, I think. But I do not know.

A STUDENT:

Mr. Hancock, you bring out Colonel Franklin's point a little further. In the First World War we had a wartime draft. It was the first time we had an honest-to-God draft law that was really effective early in the war. This time we worked on a draft law that was started before we actually got into the fighting. Does not that point the way that we are about ready, if we unfortunately have another world war to fight, that we can have industrial mobilization written into the laws of the country prior to getting into the war? Or at least when we start it? I would say, prior to it. Are we not trending that way now? Can we not develop it to the point that we can have it? I think that is what Colonel Franklin has in mind--that now is the time to start to work on industrial mobilization.

MR. HANCOCK:

That has been my text right through--let us get going. I think the time is ripe now. But I am sure if we wait ten years, history will be forgotten by that time.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

I want to say that that is the thesis on which we operate here today. We are not waiting. We propose to get something out of this class that will be reasonably constructive and sufficiently good to do something about it, because it is unquestionable that, especially in an atomic age, we cannot wait. We, Colonel Franklin, are definitely working on that line of operation.

A STUDENT:

Is it not a fact that the reason the thing happened as it did was because the organization of the Armed Forces was such that the leaders in both forces were line officers and the first thing they think of is troops? Is it not a fact that if we had organized a little more power in the material branches of both services, we could have brought that to the front a little more strongly and maybe at the time we talked of industrial orders, educational orders, we could have had enough power to put over an organization that would have carried us on through. We would not have been fighting at the end of these educational orders for some way to put the men who got the educational orders into the business? At that time we still had competitive bidding. A good source is established by some means.

or other, but what can be done with that source after it is established? If we had had the backing that the people in the line had with this draft law, by giving us some central agency that could pass upon changes in procurement that were obvious at the time, I think we could have had all our systems of purchase lined up at an early date and could have had a much more orderly production of the things we needed in the war.

MR. HANCOCK:

I agree with all you have said. But the trouble comes back--I say this out of self-criticism--to the fact that I think our service men generally tend to insulate themselves from the problems of industry. I know very few officers who would take a day off and go to visit the plants in the various types of industry. I do not know of anything else that would be quite so helpful as to get out and get a feel with your fingers of how things are done and why they are done that way.

I think a part of our problem has been this problem of rotation. Men get thrown into a job in a hurry in war. They do the best they know how, with little time to think about it. But until this whole field of logistics planning, to my mind, is put in the hands of--God forbid the word--career men, men who are rigidly screened and competently trained and held to high performance of duty, there will be no good plans.

I always find that for some reason power flows to the men who can use it. If the procurement men in the Services, had had the competence to envision this and had won the confidence of their services, the results would have been different. They made the very best effort. But I am not sure they made the very best effort to do all that could have been done to gain confidence.

And confidence generally comes from competence. The men who know how to do their jobs are the men given confidence by others. I cannot say whether that is true in the Service. But pretty generally I know that in corporation life the second assistant vice-president, if he has the stuff, is the boss except for his title on the books. The man who is competent is the man who can swing things. It is not only a matter of salesmanship. It is a matter of just downright hard, fighting knowledge of the stuff.

I think there is a lot to be done, partly in the recasting of service ideas, along the line of which you speak. I think there has to be a recognition that the wartime job is a different kind of job from the one that men would get experience in in the Services in peacetime. The procurement job of the Services in peacetime is a fine training ground, but it gives almost no measure of the kind of problem that comes in war.

A STUDENT:

It seems to me that the biggest problem that faces us is getting the Industrial Mobilization Plan accepted as a statute. Just backing up for a minute, granting that it is the job of our Government and that we are either in a state of peace or in a state of war or in a state of transition from one to the other, it seems to me that it is more of a coalition

job with the other departments of Government, and not just one that can be handled by the War and Navy Departments. I was wondering if you have any suggestions as to how we might best sell this thought to some of the other departments or other people and the agencies or interests in the country who are not interested in minority, selfish interests, but are interested in the problem as a whole.

MR. HANCOCK:

I hoped you would give me the answer to that. I think the first thing to do is to find out what you believe in, after study and examination, if you like. If you once find what you yourself believe in, you can sell it. You can sell it if you believe it and have confidence in it.

I had an interesting experience a few years ago, a new one to me. I have appeared before many Senate and House committees on contract settlement. I believe if a man goes up there immersed in the subject, knowing it as well as anybody can know it reasonably, he will win by being sincere. I cannot guarantee it. I do not know anything else in life that can be guaranteed. But I swear we will not win any other way, and there is a good chance that we will if we try it. It is worth the effort. I know if we do not try it, we will not win.

Now, the question is how we influence other departments. How do we influence any men anywhere in life? We influence men ordinarily by knowing our stuff and being straightforward. I do not have any aptness in the field of psychology. I do not know about such tools. The only tools I have to work with in my problem are to know definitely what I want and why I want it and then be straightforward enough to convince other men that that is what they want too. The motive power comes from that. It is team play, if you like. It is not solely intellectual. It is conviction, confidence and earnestness. There are some men who can help out on publicity and some men who can help out on public relations. That is out of my field. I do not know anything about it. It is too heavy a tool for me to use and I would probably cut my own throat if I tried it.

A STUDENT:

Bearing in mind what you said about the wave of pacifism after the last war and the result it had in severely limiting the activities of the Services, it appears to me that this is the time, if we are ever going to do it, to educate the public. From what little I know it is my conviction that if the American public wants something, it is going to have it; that if we can sell it to the public, we will get somewhere.

It is a tradition in our Military Services that army and navy officers do their job and say nothing. But when every other large organization in the United States uses publicity to the greatest extent and the Armed Services depend on virtue alone, they usually come out second place.

The point I am trying to bring out is, we cannot be propagandists; but it seems to me that, if the problem is as important as it is--and I think most thinking people think it is--it at least deserves the thought

of some type of public educational campaign. I think we have enough facts to show to back it up. I think it is one of the things we have never done.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

I think, gentlemen, that I should announce to the class that you have sitting over here on my left flank the Commandant of a new school in the Army. I think you would be interested in that, Captain, because it is a school that was started up to train officers in public relations. So at least you see on the Army side that there is some agreement with your view that public relations must be emphasized.

I am delighted that General Palmer is here with us this morning, so that he has had a chance to listen to this discussion and hear at least one important phase of the army and naval activity.

MR. HANCOCK:

I am surprised a bit that the question comes up, although it is a natural question. But I think if any man in the service were on duty in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Detroit, or where-not, if he made known to a few friends his interest in any field, he would be in demand as a public speaker at a dozen lunch clubs in twenty-four hours. That is not manufactured propaganda that we would be creating in the Services. I am sure that when I was down here on contract settlement, I turned down four hundred invitations to speak all over the country. I did not ask for them, did not want them, and did not have enough time for them. But I am sure that if the men in the Service had an interest in this field and would talk to two or three friends, in any city where they have duty, and if they carried the conviction to the businessmen they could get more audiences than they could dream about, because the American public, businessmen particularly, love to have luncheon clubs, and they love to be talked to. It is far more easily to listen than to read. There is great genius in America for organizing luncheons and club dinners, and what not. It does not require any organized effort to educate people in that field.

A STUDENT:

The only thing there is that the problem is so big that I feel a lot of officers in the Navy, and, I imagine, a lot in the Army, do not have the facts at their finger tips. I certainly think that within the Services educational material based on the level of the layman and not of an expert along these lines would be highly effective as a means for these various officers in putting across logical ideas. I mean, we have a lot of information, but most of it is on a plane entirely too high for a Rotarian luncheon or anything like that. I think a certain amount of that information would be very valuable.

MR. HANCOCK:

That is right. All I can say is that, if you get on fire with the idea, it will spread. As I said in New York City, if anybody has confidence in it, it is bound to spread.

DR. ANDERSON:

In connection with that matter of selling industrial mobilization to the public you probably recall more than anyone else how good the old Industrial Mobilization Plan was. But some of the industrial mobilization efforts were very much criticized by certain circles, we might say, liberals and labor, on the ground that it represented simply one section of the community. Are we going to get the support of those people who have hitherto been hostile and whose support, it seems to me, just coming to political mathematics, is necessary if we are going to get any adequate preparation in the industrial field?

MR. HANCOCK:

I think your question almost answers itself. I think the danger of it is that we get deterred by the difficulties at the start. I think we made almost no effort, so far as I know, the last time to meet the criticism regarding the Mobilization Plan. We just blow our horns and then say no more. I think we can make a splendid argument in support of a realistic answer made by the Army and the Navy.

I do not want to get into the age-old problem about labor. It has always been a problem for the men in the Services, as it is today for men in industry too. But I believe that a well-thought-out plan of bringing men into procurement with the career idea will get support better than anything else of which I know. You cannot jam controls down peoples' throats and should not be able to jam them down in a democracy. But I believe you can get their support in advance if you know what you want and if you have a program. But you cannot go out and sell labor a bit of philosophy described in words that do not have chiseled edges. At least I think it is worth the effort.

I would like to see somebody get to Washington once who did not need any money or votes. I think that is the reason that Mr. Baruch has the influence that he has in this country--that he is beholden to no one. It would be a great thing if somebody could think of the interest of America alone disregarding pressure groups. That is what I had in the back of my head when I spoke about this body here being interested in America alone. The pressure groups are here, but somebody has to toll the bell some day on some pressure groups, and I would like personally to find the politician in a democracy who will do it. There must be someone who will do it.

This is only a plea for straightforward thinking and courage. There is nothing more important, in my mind, than having a mobilization plan, publicly supported; and I think it can be done if you try it.

I do not believe it was tried in the last five years. I was not in the circles trying it; so I do not know. But so far as I am aware, attacks were made and we all began wondering, "How fast can we get this out of the Mobilization Plan?" That was a part of the whole setup of no continuity of policy. I certainly do not blame the men who had the jobs to do. But that is the state of facts as I see them.

A STUDENT:

Have you any suggestion on a peacetime proving ground for the men and the organizations that would be responsible for industrial mobilization in time of war?

MR. HANCOCK:

Yes, I have. General Armstrong and I have talked about it, at least, of a proposed course for training under this College, if I get your question rightly.

The General and I were talking sometime ago and we said, "Let us make a little survey, a little Gallup poll, of our own. Let us find out if industry would welcome men from the Army and the Navy going out to learn how they do procurement planning, accounting and all the rest," the whole field of our work here. I think we both hoped they would. We feared they might not. I was startled to find the result. So far as I know, the last time we talked neither of us had talked to a man from industry who was not enthusiastic about it. I think the score would show that about twenty-five important executives of the twenty-five that I talked to were enthusiastic about it. I have been startled to find how keen they would be to know the men in the Service and help to give them their whole experience.

Personally, I think it would be a great thing for industry too in the event of a war to have a feeling that there are men in the Service in whom they have confidence. There is nothing that will make action so fast and so good in the field of production as to be able to go to someone you know and get a definitive answer to your problem. I believe that can be done for the good of the Service and for the good of the men in the Service and inevitably to the good of industry. I am not trying to emphasize one any more than the other.

A STUDENT:

Some of the early planners that I have talked to have told me some of their experiences. One of the things that they did seem to agree on is that they never had any money with which to do anything. They could not get out and travel and make contacts with industry the way they should. They seemed to be limited on their telephone calls. There just seemed to be no money available.

Now, there is a tendency probably for that thing to grow again. I am wondering whether the War Department or somebody should not give some thought to having a larger appropriation given to this industrial planning, so that the quality of men that you speak about who should be in the organization will be attracted to it and will not be needled to keep their expenses down and so forth.

MR. HANCOCK:

That is part of the reason you men have jobs. You know, I think back some years ago to an experience I had in a warehouse in the last war. I

came down a corridor in this big building and I heard as fine a line of Irish colored profanity as I ever heard in the Navy. It was directed toward the men who made this particular chinaware and packed it and who had the shipping list wrong and all the rest of it.

I said, "What is the trouble?" He repeated to me in shorter words what he had been swearing about. I said to him, "Pat, if you would stop to think about the thing, you and I would not have jobs if there were none of those troubles." And that is part of the answer.

Having grown up in a farming country too, I recall so well that the squeaking wheel gets the most oil. If you are going to be quiet about your shortages, you are not going to get any oil. You will have to get out and talk where it will do some good. Things are not automatic in this life. We have got to get what we want by talking about them.

I suggest that you men do not quit on your actions before Congress and do not sit back and wait for one man to carry the ball for the War Department and the Navy Department. You can mobilize a lot of opinion if you know what you want and have the courage to say so. But you cannot get it if you are held by discipline and the bosses do not do it.

I am a bit of an outlaw and I do not mind speaking my own mind on problems like this. The War Department may say "You are crazy, keep quiet." But I am still saying, if you cannot go to Congress, if you are stopped by governmental rules from doing that, someone is going to take the responsibility; but I do not believe the service men have tried over the years to do what they could to present their case.

A STUDENT:

Mr. Hancock, you recall that on the basis that the First World War was going to be a short war we merely broke the ground from the point of view of the Army and Navy on industrial mobilization. Then, proceeding on the fact that we did have some fairly sizable industrial orders for this war which broke the ground for our industrial expansion--and this has been a logistic war-- is it or is it not true that within the Departments of War and Navy they have set up logistic agencies which can be developed and expanded to more or less carry on the program and what they need more than anything else today is the program?

MR. HANCOCK:

I do not quite get the content of that question. I believe that the Services have done a good job. I still feel, however, that in this field of planning what the Services have learned about requirements has been since February 1942. I may be wrong on that, but that is my impression. I think that because I spent two days down here sweating it out. But when I got through, I did not carry any conviction to my listeners about it either. But six months afterward the men in the War Production Board with whom I had been wrangling for two days and making myself disliked all around said, "Good God, if we had listened to you six months ago, we would have been six months ahead today."

I do not believe the average officer today--and I put myself in that group--had any awareness of the need of requirements planning until the need arose in this war. Here I can tell you of an experience in the last war. We did not know what kind of a war we were going to have, not even remotely. The biggest Navy plan heard of which I can recall from the time Bernstorff got his passport in January, 1917, contemplated a Navy of one hundred thousand men. I could be slightly wrong, but that is about right. We had done some amateur planning over the years. We had found out what kinds of supplies--and in what volume--were used by every ship in the American Navy and the Merchant Marine. Well, Bernstorff got his passport and we were certainly at war by April. What to do about it?

It looked fairly clear, not too clear, no decision, that the Navy would have maybe five hundred thousand men, and what to do? We just figured we would use twice as much in wartime as in peace and with a Navy five times as large as previously planned, we added a zero to our requirements tables.

That is literally what happened. Afterward we got a chance to measure the rate of flow and knew what we were doing. But, so far as I am aware, the needs of requirements planning broken down into raw materials particularly were not realized fully by the men and we did not get any awareness on the part of the Services. What I am really saying is, it is a very important problem.

It is also so important that the man in the service does not get a chance to get the best experience in peacetime and we have to get help from industry in training and giving experience to the Service Men.

I believe that industry will go out of its way to further develop the work and experience with any man that could be assigned to that kind of work as a result of these training courses here. If we can sell this idea of specialization, we can get somewhere.

A STUDENT:

Did your personal Gallup poll indicate that, if we were able to have a statute that would set up a skeleton WPB, the kind of men we would want for the chairman or the members would be willing to serve in an active capacity?

MR. HANCOCK:

They would not have to serve in an active capacity in the first place. I think you could work out a plan. I am not trying to find the answer today to these problems. I think if you would make a survey of a hundred men who were here during the war period in key positions, they could tell you who the best man for those jobs are. I believe you could have them spend a week or a month a year on getting familiar with the job. You could not get them to take a full-time job.

A STUDENT:

In connection with the adequate training of personnel to handle the logistic procurement end of the war emergency, do you not think that with this concept of training reserve men who come from industry, men who, for instance, were executives in the automotive industry, who had lived with the private automotive industry over a long period of years--that for them to hold reserve commissions is the answer to the procurement problem in that field so far as the armed services are concerned, rather than to take Army officers from their regular duties and send them out to an automotive plant to learn the automotive business in a matter of three years or a year? There you have men who have spent their whole lives in industry. The question is, why was there not a better utilization made of these reserve possibilities?

MR. HANCOCK:

I will agree with you that your top operating men in procurement in the field can be reserve officers, quickly brought in because they know their business and background. And I also am convinced that, if you have thirty or forty reserve officers of the most competent type in the world in their own field, if they do not have policy men for over-all decisions on policy, price laws, contracting, et cetera, there would be hopeless confusion. I would not propose any less utilization of those men. I would suggest that because a man knows the steel business or the cement business or the banking business or any other business does not necessarily qualify him for a top job here.

There is no job quite so hard as to assay men. There has been no way to determine those qualities of character that make a man able to carry the courage of his convictions to his associates. That is the kind of appraisal that has to come from the executives. I do not believe we can ever wait for this indefinite pool of reserves to be utilized for that kind of job; I am not trying to outlaw it. I do not know--but I doubt that you can pick men out of a pool of reserves, no matter how competent they are, for the top jobs on planning and policy. That ought to be the most carefully selected thing that is done -- for the heads of your civilian war-time agencies, your key men.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Mr. Hancock, I think that anything more in the way of taking your time and asking you any more questions would be an imposition.

I want to thank you, sir. I think you have given us many things to think about. That is what we hoped you would do--give us many interesting leads.

These students are, unfortunately, still so new here that we have not had an opportunity to indoctrinate them in the concepts that we now hold of the functions of this College and of what we should accomplish. But I do want to take just a moment to say that we in the Army Industrial College--and, as I was a part of it for five years, I should say that I,

like Mr. Hancock, accept some responsibility for what went on in the old days--in looking back see how perfectly obvious we operated too much in a military and naval vacuum.

We propose to do something about it. In fact, we have already done a great deal about it by organizing advisory committees to the Army Industrial College from many industries, from engineering societies, from the social sciences, from labor. We are not operating down here in any kind of a, as I say, military and naval vacuum.

We have with us this morning Mr. Borchard, who is on the Senate Military Affairs Committee. He has been with us before. We have had meetings and we have them constantly where we have representatives of the State Department, the Department of Commerce and the Interior, all of which have some measure of responsibility in this job of industrial mobilization.

We propose as the years go by to increase the participation in this College of civilians. I constantly quote the words of Clemenceau when he said that war is too important a matter to leave to the generals. The only difference I would note is, why did he not say something about the admirals? But we do thoroughly believe that we need people like Mr. Hancock, Troyer Anderson and all the other civilians that we have closely associated with us.

I assure you gentlemen that we appreciate the responsibility of this problem--to build up civilians of influence and intellectual capacity in this country as advisers and assistants who will cooperate with us on this teaching job, on this fact-finding job--that we think is elementary for the Army and Navy Munitions Board on the planning end of it, to bring about a mobilization plan that is acceptable to liberals, labor, industry and everybody; and, if it is not, to know why.

Mr. Hancock, I thank you for your fifteenth or twentieth appearance or whatever it is at the Army Industrial College, not only on our Board, but also as a speaker. I want you to know that we are eternally grateful to you for presenting the gospel according to Mr. Hancock. I assure you that this lecture will be read constantly in the months to come by these gentlemen; it will be a guide to us in the essential work that we are doing for our country. Thank you very much.

(19 February 1946--200)