

THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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Industrial Mobilization Course

LECTURE

Organization for Mobilization and Procurement

Lecture IV: "War Department policy and supervisory organization for procurement and supply during World War II (OUSH, WDGS, ASF Hq. and AAF Hq.)"
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I. INTRODUCTION.

In view of the exalted station of you gentlemen in this audience and the parade of big and glittering "names" which have preceded me on this platform, it is my humble opinion that this is a Helluva spot for a Pentagon Corporal like the present speaker! This conviction is strengthened by consideration of the broad scope of the subject for this period. You will notice from the outlines of the lecture that the speaker is scheduled to cover, under the head of "War Department Policy and Supervisory Organization for Procurement and Supply During World War II", not one, not two, not three, but four of the top echelons of the War Department! These are the Office of the Under Secretary of War and the War Department General Staff and the Army Service Forces Headquarters and the Army Air Forces Headquarters. You will, therefore, understand why the present speaker was very glad when General Eisenhower stated here two weeks ago that junior officers in the War and Navy Departments with a background in procurement and related matters, might make some small contributions to the work of this group. Far be it from me to question an opinion from

the "big boss", as General Eisenhower himself called the Chief of Staff when General Marshall was Chief. Even so, I must request any "wise guys" present please to refrain from asking why anyone posing as familiar with all these top organizations has not long ago been appointed Chief of Staff himself. It's an embarrassing question, one I can't answer myself and, anyhow, Captain Lovenstein has already spoken with some feeling upon the subject of the recent "freeze" on promotions.

You will recall that in the last lecture hours on Organization for Mobilization and Procurement, Lt. Col. Kenny sketched the general War Department organization before and after 1942 and explained why it was thought necessary to make some changes. With Col. Kenny's remarks as a background, during this hour we shall attempt to cover the general picture of the division or demarcation of functions which were actually carried out by the four top War Department policy and supervisory organizations involved in procurement and supply, functional relationships between these organizations, and several questions for later analysis and evaluation (particularly by the committee on Organization and Administration). It seems both necessary and advisable to repeat some things covered by Col. Kenny. Only a general coverage is possible in fifty minutes.

In this discussion it seems necessary to take an entirely objective and unbiased point of view, inasmuch as it will be essential to deal with certain jurisdictional, and perhaps personal, differences. Here again it will be recalled that the Chief of Staff called for objectivity in approaching the work of this group. Anything less would defeat the purpose of this course. The fact that the present speaker once served with the Army Air

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Forces and the Quartermaster Corps of the Army Service Forces, before coming under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, gives him a certain amount of neutrality of attitude toward three of the four organizations under consideration.

II. HISTORY BEFORE 1942.

It is impossible, in my opinion, to understand the actual organization and functions of these four organizations during World War II without some understanding of their history. Accordingly, a very brief outline of this evolution will be presented before the actual functions and organization existing during World War II are taken up. This history must be rapidly brushed over because of scarcity of time and the hardness of seats here.

A. First, the Pre-World War I Period:

Before the first World War, supply bureaus of the Army had a tradition of autonomy and independence reaching in some cases as far back as the days of the American Revolution. The QMC was set up in 1775, before the United States it-
/self. It is not surprising, therefore, that immediately after the creation of the General Staff in 1903 difficulties in defining its proper role in the War Department organization beset it, which were to continue to the present day. There seemed no doubt that it had been the purpose of the authors of the act creating the General Staff, and of Congress, that the Chief of Staff should exercise supervisory authority over the supply bureaus. Whatever the intent of the law the supply bureaus did not take kindly to the new administrative authority of the General Staff. From 1903 to 1917 the history of the General Staff was checkered, with the result

that on the Eve of World War I it was neither an outstanding planning agency nor a successful supervisory body. It had been reduced in both personnel and functions.

B. Next let's consider the World War I period:

The necessities of World War I brought new vigor to the operation of the General Staff. Under General Peyton C. March, the General Staff actually ran the War Department. The war brought on the necessity for a vigorous central direction and coordination of the autonomous supply agencies. As a result there was created after some evolution a single Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division within the General Staff, under an Assistant to the Chief of Staff with the title of Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. Under General Goethals, the Panama Canal builder, this Division not only coordinated and supervised the work of existing supply agencies, redistributed existing functions among bureaus, and created new agencies to handle new supply problems, but also took a vigorous hand in operating responsibilities, including those connected with computation of requirements and the centralized purchasing of non-technical items. Steps were taken to decrease inter-service competition, duplication of facilities, etc.

C. 1920-1931:

After the first World War consideration was given by the War Department and Congress to the type of organization which the Secretary of War and his military aide, the Chief of Staff, were to have in exercising administrative supervision over supply services. The various supply services were virtually unanimous in condemning the powers exercised

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by the General Staff through the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, General Goethals, during the war, particularly during the last year thereof. The Chiefs of Supply Services apparently felt that no supervisory authority was necessary other than that of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The Assistant Secretary of War at that time, Mr. Benedict Crowell, argued that the functions of the War Department could be divided into different classes: the military functions and the supply functions. Mr. Crowell thought that the Chief of Staff should advise the Secretary on military matters only, and a Chief of Munitions should advise the Secretary on procurement and related matters, and give orders to the proper supply bureaus. The Chief of Munitions should be a man with wide industrial knowledge and experience, as procurement was a business, not a military problem. During the war Mr. Crowell had been Director of Munitions and, therefore, above General Goethals, but it was clear that the relationship was a personal one and that Mr. Crowell had no considerable administrative organization directly exercising supervision over supply activities, just as Under Secretary Patterson did not have one in World War II. Consequently, the animosity of the supply bureau chiefs was directed toward the General Staff and not toward Mr. Crowell, the Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions.

As a result of its investigation, Congress passed a National Defense Act on June 4, 1920. Section 5a of this Act charged the Assistant Secretary with supervision of procurement and related business of the War Department and with provision for industrial mobilization. The General Staff, however, was to be responsible for "supplying and equipping" military

forces as well as planning for the mobilization of the manhood of the nation and its "material" resources in an emergency.

There was obviously ground for considerable dispute over jurisdiction in the supply field between the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War. Various efforts were made during the following years, beginning with the Harbord Board in 1921 to clarify this jurisdictional question. The efforts of the Harbord Board and others resulted in a sharp theoretical distinction between military aspects of supply and the industrial aspects of procurement and distribution. All questions about the characteristics and requirements of Army materiel, as well as preparation of the budget and supervision of transportation, storage and distribution were to be considered problems of the G-4 Division of the General Staff. All decisions on business or industrial questions in the supply program were to be the province of the Assistant Secretary of War. It should be noted, however, that the distinction drawn did not rule the general Staff out of the supply field. In fact, in the ensuing years, not only planning but administrative supervision and coordination within the supply field were considered proper functions of the General Staff. Thus, the authority in directing and supervising the work of the supply arms and services exercised by G-4 of the General Staff became very real.

As a result, the supply arms and services of the Army reported directly to G-4 Division of the General Staff on matters related to requirements, storage, distribution and transportation but reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of War on matters related to procurement. In other words, the supply arms and services had two bosses on supply questions. On certain phases of their work they had to look for direction to G-4 and on

the other phases to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

In theory, the dividing line between G-4 and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War may have seemed fairly clean-cut. In practice the relationship proved an overlapping one. This was perhaps inevitable. The planning and approval of types of equipment and determination of requirements for equipment could not well be divorced from consideration of production and procurement problems and adjustments of demand to meet production capacity. It was scarcely feasible to plan military equipment in the vacuum of desired military characteristics and quantity -- time -- place requirements in ignorance of practical procurement aspects. Nor was the dividing line between G-4 and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War satisfactory in planning the mobilization of industrial resources, since their statutory authority appeared to overlap here also. As a result, we find that as late as 1930 the Chief of Staff thought it necessary to comment emphatically in his annual report upon the jurisdictional controversy between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Apparently the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had interpreted its authority over "business" activities of the War Department to include the transportation and storage of supplies. The General Staff felt that control of supplies after their acceptance by the Government, including their storage and transportation, must rest with military commanders responsible for military results, just as military personnel must be under General Staff control.

D. 1931-1942:

The controversies previously described were compromised in practice as well as theory about 1931. From that point on, it seems generally

agreed that the G-4 Division of the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War worked together on related problems. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War undertook planning for procurement and industrial mobilization, as well as supervision of current procurement. It had a Planning Branch and a Current Procurement Branch. G-4 confined its activities to logistical matters. (Incidentally, in Army lingo the word "logistics" does not include procurement, contrary to Navy usage). Nevertheless, the possibilities of conflict were latent and continuing. The overhead organization of the War Department had two separate staffs directing and supervising supply operations. This dual control presented no great problems during peacetime, when procurement was of small volume. But, beginning in 1940, the increase in the size of procurement operations led to difficulties in relationships between G-4 and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. At about this time, that is, on 6 December 1940, Congress repealed Section 5a of the National Defense Act of 1920 and gave supervision of procurement activities to the Secretary of War. It created the position of Under Secretary of War and provided that the Secretary might delegate authority over procurement to this new official. Thus, quietly died the previous statutory provision for dual authority over materiel. Nevertheless, with the wartime growth in the size of the Office of the Under Secretary, to which supervision of procurement had now been delegated by the Secretary, and its physical separation from the General Staff, difficulties arose from the division of supervisory activities between the General Staff and the Under Secretary of War. This was one of the several reasons for the reorganization of

9 March 1942, which provided a single command over procurement and supply, and which has been described by Colonel Kenny. Another reason was to relieve the General Staff of administrative details.

III. ACTUAL DEMARCATION OF THE FUNCTIONS EFFECTED BY THE REORGANIZATION OF 1942.

A. It will be recalled that even after the reorganization of March 1942 the Commanding Generals of both the Services of Supply (later Army Service Force) and the Army Air Force were to report to the Under Secretary of War on procurement matters. It will also be remembered, however, that those parts of the Office of the Under Secretary of War that had previously been engaged in functions related to procurement and industrial mobilization, after the reorganization of 1942 came under the direct command of the Commanding General, Services of Supply. (Later Army Service Forces).

As a result, the activities of the immediate Office of the Under Secretary in the supervision of procurement and related matters became greatly restricted during World War II. The Under Secretary's Office did review some "important" new basic policy regarding procurement and related matters, settled difficulties between Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces and did some work in connection with contract forms and the expediting of production funds for industrial facilities. It exercised supervision over clemency for military prisoners, matters of military justice, claims and other non-industrial activities delegated by the Secretary of War. The Office of the Under Secretary also coordinated activities with Congress and with interdepartmental and super-agencies and represented the Secretary in relations with numerous outside organizations, especially

those concerned with procurement and related matters, industrial mobilization, and demobilization. And most important, naturally, was the fact that the Office of the Under Secretary supervised the Army Industrial College.

Since September 1945, the Office of the Under Secretary has been reorganized to undertake anew its peacetime functions of planning for procurement, industrial mobilization and related matters. You received a circular relating to this reorganization, War Department Circular 279, dated 15 September '45.

B. The War Department General Staff continued to formulate some broad basic policy and plans and to coordinate some activities in the supply field but its supervision of supply activities was greatly restricted. The Army Service Forces took over most of the supervision of the determination of requirements, (through the Army Supply Program and Supply Control System,) research and development, transportation, storage, distribution and construction, matters in which the General Staff had formerly taken a strong hand.

The General and Special Staffs continued to play a part in coordinating research and development of new materiel (New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff), approved standardization and classification of some materiel and provided the troop bases and equipment allowances used in determining requirements (G-3 and G-4). It also established broad policy and directives for coordination of logistical activities such as storage and distribution, maintenance and repair, transportation, international aid and some construction, (G-4). The War Department Special Staff had a special Planning Division doing some planning

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affecting industrial mobilization and demobilization.

C. After March 1942, the Army Service Forces Headquarters provided a single command over determination of requirements, procurement and related matters, storage, distribution and transportation. In view of all that has been said previously about the unsatisfactory results obtained from the divided authority over supply matters existing before March 1942, the advantage of a single command will be readily understood.

D. It must be remembered, however, that the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, reported to two bosses. They reported to the Chief of Staff on such military logistical matters as requirements, storage, distribution and transportation and to the Under Secretary on matters related to purchase and production. The real advantage of this system over that preceding it was that under the new system only two commanders (CG's of ASF and AAF) reported to the two bosses, whereas previously all the supply arms and services had reported to two.

E. In view of the history of World War I, already discussed, it can be seen why some agency was considered necessary to bring about uniform policy and supervise the application of policy by the various operating or technical services of the Army. While the operating services specialize in purchase of certain commodities assigned to them by higher authority, they all carry out certain common functions. They all must wrestle with problems involved in research and development, determination of requirements, contract placement, pricing, renegotiation, termination and property disposal, the financing of contractors, manpower controls, storage and distribution and others. To bring about some sort of uniformity of procedure

and avoidance of overlapping among seven technical services and the Army Air Forces, it was obviously necessary to have an over-all "control" organization which is charged with formulating uniform policy and supervising its application. This was the function of the headquarters staff divisions of the Army Service Forces, which, quite naturally, was organized along "functional" rather than commodity lines.

F. This same need for uniform policy and the supervision of its application led to the practice whereby the Under Secretary of War, under his delegated authority to supervise procurement and related matters, appointed various staff directors or division heads in the Army Service Forces Headquarters as "special representatives" for formulating policy and/or supervising certain operations of the Army Air Forces in fields related to procurement. Thus, the Directors of Purchases, Renegotiation, Readjustment, and Industrial Personnel Divisions acted as such "special" representatives. This organizational device was necessary because it would not have been feasible to appoint the Commanding General, ASF, who was on the same level as the Commanding General, AAF, as special representative of the Under Secretary on policy for the AAF.

G. The Army Air Forces Headquarters formulated considerable policy and supervised activities of the Air Technical Service Command and its field functions relating to procurement and supply. The Army Air Forces, however, relied on Army Service Forces Headquarters and the Army Service Forces Technical Services for many operating functions, as well as staff policy and supervisory functions, including some related to items "peculiar to the Army Air Forces". For example, the Quartermaster Corps

of the Army Service Forces supplied the Army Air Forces with textile and food items, some of which were "peculiar to the Army Air Forces", the Ordnance Department of the Army Service Forces supplied the Army Air Forces with bombs, guns and ammunition, some of which were "peculiar to the Army Air Forces," the Signal Corps long supplied airborne radios, the Transportation Corps of the Army Services Forces supplied the Army Air Forces with transportation of materiel, and the Army Finance Offices, under the Army Service Forces, paid Army Air Forces contractors for materiel.

IV. THE NEXT QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE STRUCTURE OF WAR DEPARTMENT POLICY AND SUPERVISORY ORGANIZATIONS AFTER THE REORGANIZATION OF 1942?

A. First, let's look at the War Department General Staff. You will note from the chart here beside me that there are five major divisions in the War Department General Staff and some twelve units of the War Department Special Staff (latest count). The five Divisions are G-1; Personnel; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Organization and Training; G-4, Supply; and Operations (No no.). The Divisions of the General Staff in which we are most interested in connection with supply are: the Supply Division, known as G-4, and the Organization and Training Division, known as G-3. (The use of the letter "G" was copied from the British by General Pershing, first in France and later here). The Supply Division; G-4, is divided into several branches which themselves are divided into sections handling such functions as have been mentioned previously in connection with the Supply Division.

B. Next, we might look at the Office of the Under Secretary of

War. From what has been previously said about the functions of the Office of the Under Secretary from the time of the 1942 reorganization of the War Department till about V-J Day 1945, it will be readily understood that the Under Secretary's staff was compact and only large enough to lend such assistance and advice to him as was necessary. The Director of Production, General Knudsen, reported directly to the Under Secretary and the Under Secretary also had a staff of advisors both military and civilian who specialized in specific fields of interest to the Under Secretary. Those advisors enabled him to keep in touch with the very broad field of his interest. For example, he had advisors on Congressional activities, on construction, on contracts and facilities, economic warfare, labor, military justice, transportation and distribution, and contract appeals, in his immediate office. In addition, he used as advisors the directors of Army Service Forces Staff Divisions. Of course, it must not be forgotten that General Somervell himself was looked on by many, including perhaps the Under Secretary, as a sort of General Manager or executive Vice-president to the Under Secretary. His office immediately adjoined the Under Secretary's and it has been claimed that, figuratively speaking, it was never closed.

C. Let us look next at Army Service Forces Headquarters' organization, details of which are shown in charts in Army Service Forces Manual 301, and elsewhere in your desk sets. Related functional staff divisions in Army Service Forces Headquarters were grouped under "Directors." Those divisions under the Director of Materiel, the Director of Supply, the Fiscal Director and one Division (Industrial Personnel) under

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the Director of Personnel are of greatest interest in connection with industrial mobilization and procurement. Under the Director of Materiel there were the Purchases Division, Production Division, (after V-J Day, combined into a Purchases and Production Division and, still later, into a Procurement Division), Research and Development Division, the International, Renegotiation and Readjustment Divisions, whose functions are indicated by their names. Under the Director of Supply there was a Maintenance Division, a Distribution Division, and a Storage Division and under the Fiscal Director and Chief of Finance, there were several divisions dealing with various accounting, receipt and disbursement problems related to materiel contracts. The Control Division attached to the Office of the Commanding General, Army Services Forces, handled matters of organization and administration which would be of interest to the Committee on organization and administration. On Monday, Colonel Millett, who until recently was in this Control Division of the Army Service Forces Headquarters, and who has returned to civilian life as a Professor of Public Administration at Columbia, will address this group on matters of organization and administration.

D. Finally, we have the Army Air Forces Headquarters' organization, details of which are shown on a chart in your desk sets. Related staff divisions were grouped under five Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff. Those divisions under the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-4, are of most interest in connection with procurement, industrial mobilization, and related matters. Included are Research and Engineering, Supply, Air Quartermaster, Air Ordnance, Air Chemical, Air Installations, Air Engineer, Air Finance, Readjustment and Procurement, and Price Adjustment. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 3,

however, furnishes troop bases and allowances used in determining requirements for Air Materiel. The Organization Branch, an office under the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 4, handles Organization and Administration.

V. DEMARCATIION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SELECTED PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS.

Details on this subject may be found in Tab H of the report on "Studies for the Planning Activities of the Under Secretary of War", put out by the Army Industrial College on 16 August 1945. This is included in your desk sets. Tab H is a very thorough chart, a chart to end charts. Of course, as author of the chart, I may be biased.

A. To bring out the activities of each of the four top organizations in which we are interested I have selected a number of functions related to procurement and supply. I shall try to show the part played by each organization in carrying out these functions. The previous discussion has already indicated the functions.

1. The first functions necessary for procurement and supply are research and development of new and improved materiel and determination of requirements (quantity, time, place.) You will note from Tab H of the afore-mentioned report that G-4 worked with the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, with overseas theaters, and with domestic field forces on the need for research and development. It also worked with the New Developments Division of the War Department Special Staff. The Office of the Under Secretary had little continuous direct supervision over research and development during World War II. Army Service Forces Headquarters acted on directives from the General Staff and initiated research and development on its

own. It supervised and coordinated research and development for all the technical services. The Army Air Forces Headquarters likewise supervised and directed research and development which was actually carried out at the Air Technical Service Command Headquarters laboratories at Wright Field, Ohio. In determining requirements or quantities needed, G-4 worked, under the Combined and Joint Chiefs and with G-3, to develop troop and deployment bases and allowances. These were used by Army Service Forces Headquarters and the technical services in supervising and computing requirements, first under the Army Supply Program, later under the Supply Control Program described here yesterday. The Army Air Forces Headquarters and War Production Board computed air materiel requirements for items procured by Army Air Forces. Army Service Forces Headquarters consolidated the Army Procurement Program (Air). The Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces collaborated in determining requirements for materiel procured for Army Air Forces by the Army Service Forces.

2. Let us next take up matters connected with procurement directly, such as contract placement, pricing, renegotiation, termination, and inventory disposal. In connection with each of these the General Staff did little or nothing. The Office of the Under Secretary confined its activities to reviewing some important new policy on procurement and related matters, having liaison with Congress and other outside agencies, settling differences between Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces, and keeping in general touch with operations being directly supervised by Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces Headquarters. The Under Secretary appointed the Director of Purchases as his "special representative" on contract placement and pricing policy

for the Army Air Forces. He also appointed the chairman of the War Department Price Adjustment Board, and the Director of the Readjustment Division, Army Service Forces, as his special representative to carry out policy on renegotiation, termination and property disposal matters for the Army Air Forces. It is obvious, therefore, that Headquarters, Army Service Forces, was actually a policy organization for both Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces in these fields. It also supervised Army Service Forces operations in these fields. Army Service Forces Headquarters, furthermore, had certain liaison, review and clearance functions in these fields. The Army Air Forces Headquarters formulated policy for the Army Air Forces within limits of the Procurement Regulations, Joint Termination Regulations and the Renegotiation Manual put out by the Army Service Forces Headquarters. In the field of material and manpower controls, which are procurement and production functions, G-4 did little or nothing. The Under Secretary's Office undertook little continuous direct supervision in this field. It did keep in general touch. The Army Service Forces Headquarters, however, did considerable coordination, consolidation, supervision and liaison work with the War Production Board, Army and Navy Munitions Board, etc. Furthermore, the Director of Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, was "special representative" of the Under Secretary on manpower controls related to Army Air Forces procurement. Army Air Forces Headquarters carried out supervisory and liaison functions, presented material requirements to the War Production Board and formulated policy within limits of the broader policy formulated by the Director of Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces. Storage, distribution and transportation of materiel are

considered logistical and, therefore, military functions. G-4, therefore, made broad policy and issued directives for coordination of storage, distribution and transportation incident to logistical activities. The Office of the Under Secretary did little or nothing in this field except to try to keep in general touch. Army Service Forces Headquarters and Army Air Forces Headquarters formulated broad policy, supervised stock control and allocated storage space. In the transportation field one Army Service Forces technical service, the Transportation Corps, acted for both the Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces.

VI. SOME IMPORTANT TUGS-OF-WAR AND ATTITUDES WITHIN THE SUPPLY ORGANIZATION DURING WORLD WAR II.

Any discussion of these organizations would be incomplete without mentioning certain psychological factors and jurisdictional questions which will affect the future supply organization of the War Department and, therefore, your committee work. Consequently, some of these tugs-of-war will be treated briefly:

By and large, relations of the Office of Under Secretary of War with other supervisory organizations was surprisingly harmonious. Under Secretary Patterson and General Somervell were "close" physically and personally. Relations with the Army Air Forces were not as close but were friendly. The Office of the Under Secretary of War tended to let them alone.

A. Of course, since 1942, there may have been a very few individuals within the Office of the Under Secretary of War who have not liked the reduced importance of their Office since the reorganization and who

felt that some of the old functions of the Office which were taken away by the Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces should have been retained by the Under Secretary. It has even been stated by one individual that the Office of the Under Secretary of War could have been "moved out of the War Department" during the later years of World War II "without being missed." There is also a feeling among some in the Office of the Under Secretary of War that G-4 would like to increase its supply (and procurement) activities again at the expense of the other supervisory and policy organizations.

B. There are, undoubtedly, some in G-4 who regret the reduction of the supply activities of the General Staff and who feel that the Army Service Forces took over too much of the supply job, that the technical services have been too autonomous, that the supervision of procurement delegated to the Under Secretary by the Secretary should actually be under military rather than civilian control, and that G-4 should exercise an integrated control over all supply matters for the Chief of Staff.

C. The technical services, with their traditional independence, and corps esprit, have tended to resent the supervision of Army Service Forces Headquarters in some respects. Old-line officers at the operating level in these technical services sometimes feel that they would get along beautifully if Army Service Forces Headquarters would just let them alone. Some also tend to feel that some personnel of Army Service Forces Headquarters have an "ivory tower" psychology far removed from the "practical realities" facing the man in the field.

D. Army Service Forces Headquarters personnel, as you might expect, have tended to feel that the technical services often exerted too much of

an urge for independence or autonomy and that this resulted in interference with uniform application of the policy formulated by the Army Service Forces Headquarters, and in inter-service competition, duplications, wastes and inefficiencies. Some favor abolition of the several technical services and centralization of all War Department purchasing.

E. Some Army Service Forces Headquarters personnel in key positions felt that more procurement and related services for the Army Air Forces should be handled by the Army Service Forces. In fact, some top-ranking officers in the Army Service Forces feel that the Army Air Forces should administer no procurement or supply whatever, except that which is necessary for the organic functioning of air combat units. In other words, they would have the Air Forces reduced to training and combat activities. They do not agree with the argument of the Air Forces that the necessity for quick development of new air materiel means that a single command over all air combat forces, air training, and air materiel procurement activities is essential. They point out that no such single command over ground combat forces and procurement for ground forces was exercised during this war and that the divided responsibility for combat, training and procurement between Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces worked out to the satisfaction of the users of materiel, that is, the Army Ground Forces.

F. Many high-ranking officers in the Army Air Forces Headquarters, however, are thoroughly convinced of the necessity for a single command over the use and the procurement of air materiel. For they feel that

without such a single command it would be impossible for a combat unit, in, say, England to get quick service on a request for development of, for example, a new and better oxygen tank. During World War II the Air Forces were able to get extremely fast action in translating initial requests for development of new materiel from combat areas into maximum production of satisfactory materiel. They feel that if the Air Forces relied on the Service Forces for procurement of all materiel peculiar to the Air Forces, the division of responsibility between the users and the buyers of materiel would lead to greater delays and dissatisfaction. As a result of this conviction among some higher ranking Air Forces Officers, they strongly believe that any effort to turn over to the Army Service Forces all procurement and other supply functions not "organic" to air combat units would be a great backward step. They point to alleged dissatisfaction of some ground combat forces with the service they received from the Army Service Forces in furnishing improved materiel. They, therefore, favor increasing the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces over procurement and supply of materiel to be used by the Air Forces, and not turning these functions over to the Army Service Forces.

VII. SOME TENTATIVE IMPRESSIONS AS TO EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICY AND SUPERVISORY ORGANIZATION.

What was the policy and supervisory organization trying to do and how well did it succeed?

In evaluating the effectiveness of the policy and supervisory organization for procurement and supply, some impressions arrived at by a group of officers at the Army Industrial College, which recently made a

report to the Under Secretary of War, might be mentioned. This is the report on "Studies For The Planning Activities of the Under Secretary of War" to which reference has already been made. The present speaker was a member of this group of officers and agrees with most of the impressions mentioned although not all. There were some questions on which he rendered a minority vote but, in general, he agrees with the following conclusions:

A. The policy and supervisory organization for procurement and supply succeeded in formulating uniform policy, effecting considerable coordination and centralization of controls, making possible some War Department unity in relations with outside agencies and aiding in a brilliant supply job, but the continuation of a high degree of autonomy within the separate procurement or technical services and the Army Air Forces partially frustrated efforts at uniform application of policy.

B. This led to confusion and unsatisfactory relations with contractors, especially those contractors selling to more than one service.

C. Such contractors had to deal with different procurement offices with different organizational nomenclature, different inspectors, expeditors, cost supervisors, surplus property officers and negotiators.

D. Confusion for contractors also resulted from differences in drawings and specifications, engineering and tooling requirements, standards of inspection, packaging requirements, and the implementation of price, renegotiation, and termination policies.

E. Despite efforts at uniform policy and supervision:

1. Interservice competition for the means of production resulted in some excessive stockpiling, lack of balance in production and decreased effectiveness of material & manpower controls and delayed the production and construction programs.
2. Duplication of procurement organizations resulted in waste of personnel, office space, and funds.
3. Relations with civilian agencies and Congress were rendered difficult by the existence of a multiplicity of operating services.
4. Continuation of decentralization of procurement operations was found desirable; the large number of procurement offices in major centers, however, was not conducive to uniform treatment of contractors.

VIII. SOME QUESTIONS FOR COMMITTEE STUDY AND EVALUATION DURING PHASE V OF THIS COURSE.

A. What should be the organizational relationships of those responsible for determining requirements, those responsible for procurement, production, and related matters, and those responsible for storage, distribution, maintenance and transportation. We have seen some of the controversies and problems which arose in connection with these questions during the history of War Department supply since World War I. Would a return to the pre-1942 status be desirable?

B. & C. In connection with some of the so-called tugs-of-war

and psychological attitudes previously mentioned it may well be asked to what extent they are indications of organizational defects and to what extent they are more or less inevitable? The answer to any such question obviously would be tied in with the question regarding proper relationships of those responsible for requirements, procurement and related matters, storage, distribution, maintenance and transportation. If it is found advisable that the division of responsibility between the General Staff and the Under Secretary which has been followed in the past be continued in the future, perhaps a certain twilight zone of authority may be unavoidable. Furthermore, it might be argued that many of the attitudes mentioned previously are indications of the inevitability of conflicts between aggressive leaders and "empire builders." Since such aggressive individuals are vital to any great supply job undertaken under pressure, would it ever be possible to set up a system which would not be dominated by empire building and personality conflicts? Perhaps the only way to eliminate such human factors would be to eliminate people. The atomic bomb may do this.

D. Finally, it may be asked to what extent the tentative expressions as to effectiveness of the supervisory and policy organization during World War II mentioned previously are accurate, and to what recommendations regarding future organizations do they lead? What is your own experience in connection with some of these questions and what experience of other responsible persons should be considered in answering such questions?