

MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR THE ARMED FORCES

21 September 1954

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, USA, (Ret), Director of the Selective Service System, was born in Steuben County, Indiana, 12 September 1893. He received the following degrees from Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana; B.S., 1912; Ph.B and A.B., 1914. He holds honorary degree of LL.D. from Ohio State University, Tri-State College, Oglethorpe University, Allbright College, Lafayette University, and Columbia University. He has also attended Indiana University, 1917, and University of Hawaii, 1935-36 and is a graduate of the Field Artillery School, 1923; the Command and General Staff School, 1933, and the Army War College, 1934. He was commissioned first lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1916 from the Indiana National Guard and advanced through the grades to lieutenant colonel in 1940. In recognition of his work in preparing plans for the Selective Service System, he was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940. He became deputy director of the Selective Service System, 1 October 1940, and director, 31 July 1941. He was awarded the DSM by the Army, Navy, and American Legion for outstanding service as Director of Selective Service during the war. He was promoted to major general on 28 April 1942. On 31 December 1946, he was retired but recalled to active duty on the following day, 1 January 1947. He has been Director of the Selective Service System since its reactivation on 24 June 1947.

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ADMIRAL HAGUE: Our speaker this morning, Major General Lewis B. Hershey, USA, Director of Selective Service, of course needs no introduction to this or to any other American audience. However, there are one or two points that I would like to accentuate.

In the first place the Selective Service System, as we know it, is very much, if not entirely, the brain child of General Hershey. He has been associated with it from the very beginning of its operations, becoming director very shortly after they started. That was back in 1940 and he became director in the summer of 1941.

The fact that he has been unchanged in that position for some 13 or 14 years, while administrations have come and gone, both at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and up on Capitol Hill, speaks volumes for the confidence of the American people in the manner in which he has done a job which has affected, and continues to affect, every family in the country.

The only other observation I want to make is this: I want to refer to Colonel Price's lecture here of yesterday morning, in which, among other things, he gave us a very good picture of the distribution of our population. He called attention to the deficiencies in the age groups 15-20 and 20-25, and pointed out that those deficiencies were due to the falling birthrate during the depression.

You will recall that he told us that the birthrate trend was reversed sharply in the latter part of the thirties and during the forties, and that today we enjoy a healthy growth of our population. I don't recall Colonel Price, among the reasons that he gave for this change in the birthrate, mentioning the Selective Service System. But I have heard our speaker familiarly referred to as the second father of his country.

I don't believe that we could put on our curriculum here at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces without the assistance of General Hershey. Certainly we have enjoyed his help and assistance all the time I have been Commandant here; and he was an old friend and contributor to the Industrial College long before that.

General Hershey, I am sure you know what a great pleasure it is for me to introduce you to this class.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Admiral Hague, General Niblo, and students: I am always a little embarrassed to be introduced as the second father of his country. It is true that statisticians probably will be able to say that the Selective Service System and the increased birthrate existed at the same time. What their relationship is, probably is something you can gather as well as I can.

It is always a very great pleasure to come to the Industrial College. About 1937 or 1938 was the first time I ever came here, and I think I have seen every class since then. There was a time--wartime--when you didn't have a class here. But whenever there has been a class, it has been my very great privilege to have been with it. This is the only institution that I have had the privilege of seeing so often. In going around all over the country, I am always pleased to meet those who were courteous enough, and maybe because the rules required it, to have been here and remained through the time that I spoke.

This morning I shall try to think aloud with you a little about where we are, some of the places we might be going, and some of the ways we might use to get to the places toward which we are going.

In spite of the decline in the birthrate in the thirties and in spite of the fact that we haven't quite gotten to the place where the birthrate of the forties has become a major factor in manpower availability, if there is one thing that has been outstanding during the past year, it is the fact that the manpower pool seems to have increased. And the reason is not very hard to see--low draft calls. I want to talk a little bit about the effect of low calls, not only now, but about the shadows they may cast over anything we do in the future.

If some individual in the Selective Service System were seeking ways to work, the theory that he ought to welcome low calls would appear to be a good one. Obviously, if you carry it to extremes, the best time to run a Selective Service System is when you are not taking anybody. You are not stepping on anybody's feet, at least not at the moment. You are not deviling anybody. Even if you are not popular, at least you ought to have some sort of negative popularity which you never have normally.

We have had low calls. We have had calls as low as 17,000 or 18,000 a month, and not running much higher than 23,000 or 25,000 a month. The result has been that the manpower pool has increased, which is favorable. Or is it? I remember that a man who occupies a very high position in the Government at the present time, although not the highest, was at one time a candidate for Vice President of the United States. He telephoned his kid out in California--I don't mean by that to leave any impression about who this might be--and said: "Well, son, your father has been nominated for Vice President." The son's response was the question "Is that good?" So, therefore, when you have low calls, I think it is very fair to raise the question "Is that good?" Is the low call of itself a good or a bad thing? These are some of the things I am going to talk about this morning.

I don't normally let an audience know what I am going to talk about, because I think I ought to be perfectly fair with them. When I don't know what I am talking about, I ought not to be telling the audience what it is ahead of time. They ought not to have the right to know more about the subject than I do. But it is also unfair to leave the assumption that I do. On the other hand there will be times when I really don't know what I am talking about and you will not know what I am talking about. I hope then that you will give me the credit of being attuned to this scientific age and realize that I am profound when you don't understand me, rather than merely stupid.

So we have low calls. What are the effects of low calls? One of the very obvious effects would be that if you take less out of the pool, the pool increases. I don't like the word "pool," by the way because the thing available manpower is least like today is a pool. It is a river. It moves and changes. You can measure it at any moment and telegraph or radio to someone what it measures, and by the time they get the message it is wrong, because availability has changed, it has moved on from what it was at the time you measured it. And I don't care whether you are measuring it by age, capacity, or what. By whatever way you measure the manpower pool the answer is no longer true by the time anyone knows about it. Presumably a pool, though I suppose there is evaporation, should remain somewhat constant. But the manpower stream is never constant. It is always changing. That is the one great truth about it and the one least frequently understood.

If we take less water out of a stream, there should be more in it. Is that good? Well, yes; it is a resource if we need it. But it

remains undeveloped--it is an untrained resource. Whereas the more you take and the more you train, the more people you have who, theoretically at least, having had the benefit of the training, ought to be more valuable for survival than they would be if they were not trained. They would not be "in the pool" of untrained availables, but leaving them "in the pool" is from one side a bad thing--it is leaving them untrained.

Let me irritate some of you by saying that a long enlistment period saves money, saves training, saves you from worry and labor unless you go out of your head issuing the same orders to the same guy, continuing to tell him what to do. But the longer your enlistment period, the fewer people you have in the country who are trained. If you were to have everybody who serves in the Armed Forces serve for 30 years, you would have few recruiting problems, but a very questionable organization, I am quite sure. You would have the very minimum of people who had been trained because you wouldn't train anybody else, and the few who had received training would be too old to use it in a war. So there are two sides to this long-term enlistment question. You don't hear very much about one of the sides very often. But whenever you have long periods of service, granting that the numbers of people remain constant, you borrow very heavily from any trained people you have in your manpower stream in case of mobilization.

So the pool, the stream, is larger.

Now, one thing that could be good about it, in my estimation--not in everyone's--is that, properly used, it does make available people to train in order to have a nonveteran reserve, which we do not have at the present time. We have more people in the reserve at the present time and fewer callable under most of the situations that are likely to occur than we have ever had before in our history. Why? Because the individuals you have in your reserve have already had it. At least they think they have. There is a difference of opinion. Some people think in two years you haven't had it. If you haven't had two years, ask the fellow who has had two years. This thing of being called back the second or third time is irritating to the people that are being called back.

Obviously, if we are attacked and have an all-out mobilization, you are going to call everybody. That is what we think. We never have but that is what we talk. But who knows that we are not in a

period of permanent disturbance? I don't care whether they are "Carols" or whether they are "Ednas" or what you are going to name the disturbances--hurricanes or tornadoes. If we do not respond well to small disturbances, this same opponent of ours will keep up the small disturbances. It is only a stupid opponent that does the thing you want done. There was certainly a lot of shaking of heads around 1950, when we were all dressed up to go somewhere, but the somewhere that we had to go was not the one that required clothes of the kind we had.

It is about like the doctor who didn't know how to cure anything but fits. So in order to cure them he had to get all his patients to throw fits because he didn't know how to doctor some of the other things they had. In 1950 there we were with an all-out mobilization plan and no reason for an all-out mobilization. Or we were ready with a plan for no mobilization, but that wasn't it either. I am not so sure that we haven't the problem of continuing for a long time to be ready for small mobilizations.

That is why I have long supported a readily callable, nonveteran reserve. You are going to have some veterans in there, but they are going to be in there because they either like it or haven't any more sense, or whatever the reason is that keeps a lot of us hanging around the place we hang around. I am not going to discuss or go into that, because there isn't any logic in it. I think if we get logical, we will probably get licked, because most of the people that protect the country are not logicians. A logician generally finds that he has something more technical and scientific to participate in than hostilities.

So we have more people, and therefore I think we have a right to believe that, if we want a nonveteran reserve, we have some people that we can use for it. Whether they will be used or not, I can't say; but it is one of the possibilities that last year was indicated, because less numbers have been taken out of the stream. I would say that on the whole it is good, but it does have the implication over the years that, if you continue to take too few people today, you are going to have too few people trained, or fewer people trained when you really need them. And that certainly is not good in a situation that may require everybody's effort to survive.

There are some other things that happen when you have small calls. The rejection rate immediately rises. Don't ask me why,

except we are human beings. There is no logic in it, there is no equity in it, but there are many ordinary behavior patterns in it.

When three people want a job, you are more selective than when nobody wants it. If 30 people want a job, then of course you can be quite selective. It is the most natural thing in the world for the Armed Forces to be more selective when they are taking in only a few than when they are taking in a large number. You can talk about equity and the necessity for everybody to do their part and everything else as long as you want, but they are still going to go on behaving like human beings. Even scientists and professional people, no matter how high up they get, still have the same prejudices they brought from the farm or wherever they came from, because, thank heaven, they still remain human beings. That is, the better ones of them do. So the rejection rate is bound to climb.

I can be contradicted, and successfully, in anything I may say on rejection. There is no use trying to talk technically or scientifically about the manpower stream or the manpower pool, either in numbers, quality, or anything else until you arrive at some conclusion as to what a man is, that is, how to measure one and we don't know that yet.

At the present moment we have almost 2 million people, most of them under 26 years of age, who have been sent, or have gone on their own, to an induction or examining station of some kind and been examined and have been declared unacceptable. Are they men or aren't they? It just depends. For the purpose of the Universal Military Service and Training Act, as the legal people like to say, they are not men, because they are not acceptable. You can count them in the stream if you want to, but not to fight. You can't count them as people to be in the Armed Forces. As long as you are talking about providing men for the Armed Forces you just can't count them; certainly not for that.

Of course you say, "Well, they can do everything else." But can they? Will they? Will anyone require it of them?

Now, a man comes for examination and is turned down; he is unacceptable. There is something wrong with him or with the fellow that turns him down, or both. Do you suppose that he goes out then, especially in this paternalistic society that we are said to be at times, expecting to do very much when he can prove, any time he wants to, that he feels bad, that he is not well, because he has been told that

he is not acceptable for the Armed Forces? I knew an old fellow we used to have in the Army, and he would ask people, "Are you sane?" They would say, "Sure." He then would ask, "Can you prove it? Have you got papers to prove it?" When they said, "No." He said, "I have." He could produce papers showing that he had been found sane. He had quite an advantage, of course. We had quite a few of them in the Army at the time I was in it who probably carried such papers.

But if you had given him a paper saying: "You can't do the things that other people do. Don't lift heavy loads. Let somebody else lift them. Don't try to run or you might get out of breath. Don't try to take care of yourself. Let the Government do it, because you are not acceptable for service"--do you think he would have been trying to show himself useful? That is one of the terrible things that happen to our people. Many times they grow willing to be found unacceptable, and sometimes they get to believe it.

There was a yarn told on the oilmen. An oilman went to heaven one day and asked for some space. He was told that, due to conventions and other things, the place was filled up. Finally he said, "May I go in for half an hour and just look around? I'll come out if there isn't any space."

He hadn't been inside very long before everyone began pouring out of the pearly gates. St. Peter called him and said, "You can have an apartment now. I have lots of space." "Oh," the oilman said, "I don't want it now." "By the way," St. Peter said, "How did you get all those people out?" "Well," said the oilman, "Those people who left were all oilmen. I told them they had discovered oil in h---," and I added, "the more I tell it and the more I hear about it and the more I think about it, the more I think it is probably true."

We have a lot of these boys go up and perhaps do not answer the questions that are on the test sheets, because 600,000 of the 2 million rejected were not turned down for any medical reason, but because either they didn't answer enough questions or answered incorrectly the things that are on this little sheet. Sometimes to be able to succeed in being unsuccessful, requires perhaps more brains than to get the thing right. To get it wrong right sometimes takes more intelligence than it does to get it right.

So therefore, these people, after they have made themselves believe that they can't take this heavy burden of citizenship, begin to

think, "Why should I take any other?" Is that good? It is doubtful. And yet it is one of the things that small calls inevitably will promote.

I don't want to say too much about this rejection business. I am very proud of the 16.5 million that we inducted, or frightened, or both, into the Armed Forces during the war. We had men who went in with very brown necks--they had the hot breath of the draft board on their necks; they finally volunteered. Some were there by minutes and some by hours ahead of us. And I am very proud of the numbers that have gone in during this more recent Korean event. But I am not proud of the 5 million that the United States said were not acceptable for service in World War II. I am not proud of the additional 2 million that have already been declared unacceptable since 1950.

Now, that loss of manpower, to me, is not good; it means that somehow or other the leadership of this country in its Armed Forces has come to accept the fact that it is not able to use a large percentage of its citizenry. You can quarrel with statisticians and other people over whether it is 20 or 22 percent of the draftees that are unacceptable. It actually is nearer 35 percent. But anyway when out of three you get only two men that are acceptable, it puts a very heavy duty for survival on the rest of the citizens.

There is something wrong with the people or something wrong with the procedure. It doesn't make any difference how lousy our citizenry gets, it is what we have. It is what we are going to have to live, or die, with. If we don't use it rightly, we are likely to die with it. It doesn't make any difference if we do have machines now for measuring things--when we didn't know them, they didn't matter. It doesn't help very much to be stupid, scientific, or technical enough not to know the answers, but to be able to make a very good statement of our ignorance.

We have certain kinds of people, and they are the ones we are going to have to use. Thirty percent or so of them not being used is too much. I don't quarrel with a little sawdust at the sawmill; but when the cutting gets to be 30 or 40 percent sawdust, I want to be looking around to see who is running the place, and what kind of trim the saws have. Probably I would start with the manager, because I think there is the place to look for action. I think we have a very unfortunate lack of solution of our utilization problems when 5 million, very few of whom were over 35, could not be used in World War II; and when this time 2 million were lost, very few of whom are over 26.

If the leaders of survival in this country can find 2 million in the prime military age that they can't use, what do you suppose they will find from 26 to 35 and from 35 to 40? Among those over 40 they probably wouldn't find anybody they could use. They probably would be more certain about them however than they were about those under 26. We have not solved the problem of manpower utilization. And low calls accentuate that failure and make it worse.

Whether they turn down 50 percent, as I have seen done, or 70 or 80 percent, as happens sometimes, out of a group, is not as material as is the fact that habits are being formed that are going to take the threat of disaster to blast out. People get habits. That is the devilish thing about behavior. Complacency is only one of the things that we need to take into consideration today. We also have to consider the habits we form that are hard to get out of when we have to start rolling with the punches. One of those things now is the wasteful habit of rejection. It would take precious months to blast it out and get the different services to realize that they have to take a lot of people they now turn down.

So I don't think it is good to have small calls if it results in a higher rejection rate in a country that has not yet learned, or not yet somehow or other found the leadership, to use the less fit. It is all very well to say, "Let them do something in civil life." But what? The supervision in wartime is worse in industry than it is in the Armed Forces. If the Armed Forces can't get anything out of some individual, what can you do with him outside? When the Armed Forces have admitted failure and told him that he is not capable of doing much, he certainly goes out and follows instructions. So I think it is bad.

There are a few more things we might worry about, and do. It is a strange thing to have an individual who is running the draft system worry about volunteers. I never expected in 10 years, that I would come to the place where volunteers for induction--I am not talking about people who either do or should enlist, but about volunteers for induction--would be the problem that they are and have been during the past year.

Again the problem was caused by low calls. And here you are going to have a solution: "Why don't they go in and enlist?" But that is your problem. You ought to tell me why they don't. You are the people who are trying to get them to enlist. The people who have enlisted in the last four years enlisted for a lot of reasons. But the point

I want to bring out is that one of the things that has complicated our operations and given us false ideas for either large or small mobilizations is the fact that for the last several months many of our people have been making drives for more volunteers. That sounds fine, but what does it do?

One of the problems is the farmers. I suppose not more than half of this audience is either supporting a farm--probably less than half--or being supported by one at the present time. But we have had a problem always with farmers. It is a political problem. It has very little to do most of the time with food production. The situation at the present time is a very good example. With the warehouses and granaries and everything else bulging with surpluses, we seem to have some very belligerent people in support of the contention that we ought to keep deferring farmers.

We have had a war on in our own organization in the last year and a half trying to cut down the number of farmers deferred. We have cut them down from about 136,000 to somewhere around 50,000. Sure. Still, with the big surpluses that we have, how can you justify leaving someone behind to raise something that we already have more of than we know what to do with? But it is not an economic question. It is a political question.

So, as we start cutting down, we get on to our state directors, who get on to our local boards. Some of them have more, some less. Some states have 7,000 farmers deferred. I know of one state that has one. It doesn't happen to be New York City either.

But what happens in the volunteer business? Here's a fellow that we deferred four or five years ago. We deferred him when he was farming 100 acres; it was early in the Korean War and we had more people than we could take right away. Also at that moment he was raising something that somebody said we wanted. Now he is farming 300 acres. Can you imagine anyone so stupid as to defer him with 100 acres and not defer him now with 300?

He is married now. Unfortunately for him, his children were conceived subsequent to 25 August 1953; so he couldn't get any place on that. Here he is facing the music. He goes in 1-A. Not voluntarily, but he goes. He says, "When am I going?" His Board replies, "Well, we don't know. We have several volunteers and they are ahead of you." He is 28 or 29 years old. Congress said that if he is deferred

under section VI of the act, he is liable up to 35 to be called. Here the man is 28. If he is going into the service, he ought to know it. But you can't send him in now, not unless the local board has a call for more than the number of volunteers if it has any individuals who have volunteered for induction. You usually have some volunteers for induction--youngsters 18 years old, just out of high school--who want to "get it over with" before they start anything else.

There is another thing. It is only a minor irritant. It doesn't mean anything perhaps at the moment except irritation. But the situation does give to some of the pressure groups--and the agriculturists are one of them--the opportunity to say, "Look at how stupid you are. You don't need this man." Presumably it is a case of equity. But you can't even send him in equity, because we have some volunteers going ahead of time in a call too small to accommodate those who ought to go.

I came back here to the United States from Guam about a month ago. We brought back 24 inductees. We had to bring them back to Honolulu to give them their basic training. We have only one corporal of the Army on Guam. So the Marines have to induct the inductees for the Army and then send them back to Hawaii to be trained. It just shows you that we do have a little bit of unification in some places. You probably don't know that the Marines can induct you into the Army. They can. Go to Guam sometime and try it. But, anyway, the point I am trying to get at is that of those we brought back, all 24 were volunteers for induction, and there were 168 more we couldn't bring back. They are waiting for their chance to go with the call. Even a group of 24 was a little more than they were entitled to. So there you are.

And so, what do you suppose the engineer is going to think--one just out of school, or has been out two, three, or five years--when he says to me, "What justification have you for taking me when you don't need anybody?" What do you say? Well, as a matter of fact, probably it does mean that we should be a little easier in our deferments. But whenever you begin to get the habit of easy deferments, then, when war comes and we have large mobilization, they don't lose the habit. They will say, "Well, you need me a lot more now in my job than in the Army; obviously, production is going up." So round and round you go.

The scientists, the engineers, and the farmers--the skilled and the professional people--all get their claims in. All those pressure

groups increase their pressure and have more, at least better-sounding, arguments during a time when you have low calls than when you have high calls. But let's pass to the organization itself--I mean the Selective Service System--which has to keep itself ready to do things.

What happens with low calls? Well, we have the Bureau of the Budget. And I don't blame it, because probably like the Budget folks some of you would believe that the Selective Service System should receive money from the Federal Government for operation on the basis of the number of inductees. Sounds pretty good, doesn't it? In other words, a fireman should be paid on the basis of the number of fires he attends. That could be why he might have to start a few once in a while.

Now, what happens? Well, I should not go into this, because some of you might not like it. But, you know, there is always some discussion, at least at this time of the year, about what the active forces are going to be, starting a year from this present July.

That doesn't always get settled immediately; and it doesn't get left as it was settled very often either. But that is just the beginning of my troubles. Whether we are going to have 3 million, 3 million and 6, or 2 million and 5 is a problem. Regardless of how it is settled, I am no better off. Why? Don't think I am critical. I am not. I would say and do the same if I were a recruiter. If it should be predicted that we would need 1 million men in the next year, and you were one of the recruiting boys, wouldn't you ask for money enough for a million men? Sure you would. Isn't that natural? If it should turn out that they didn't need as much as a million, well, you can always use the money. And that is true. So therefore the recruiting people are going to set their sights for recruiting at the whole number we need.

What does the Budget say to me? It will say: "You don't need any money. You are not going to have to take in anybody. We already have the recruiting people asking for money to fill the whole need." They did that last year, but they didn't fill the whole thing.

Then the battle goes on. We say, "Well, we ought to have money for 600,000." Somebody says, "You don't need any money at all." They grudgingly gave us money enough for 300,000.

There are about 1.2 million kids getting to be 18 every year. We have to register them whether we induct anybody or not. Of course I suppose we could just close up the offices except for the days they notify us they are coming in to register. But there are about 3,000 of them born every day; the offices are not open on Saturday and Sunday; so the registrations have to be distributed through the rest of the week. A few boys do enlist before they are 18. That swells the enlistment total, makes it appear that we have fewer to deliver, but you don't get any more people in the usable pool nor is the number we have to handle reduced. We have to register and classify them anyway as soon as they come out.

We register most young men around their eighteenth birthday. What is the next thing we have to do? We make out a registration certificate; this required by law to evidence registration, but some say they are used so they can buy liquor and one thing or another-- show they are of age, drive an automobile, and a few other things.

The next thing we do, we send each a questionnaire. You might say, why do you have to send a questionnaire? Well, Congress said we have to classify them. In fact, we don't do quite what Congress said. Congress said we should classify them at 18. We dally around and don't classify them until they become eligible, at 18 and a half. The time between 18 and liability for induction is six months. They put that six months in there so we could classify them before they became liable; so we could use them promptly when they became liable. But we don't. So we send out an 8-page questionnaire to each of these boys.

From that group 3,300 come in every day, including Sunday. It takes somebody to mail the questionnaires out, and it takes somebody to receive and prepare to classify them. Of course we have an IBM machine in the main office. But how much of this can be done there? Our offices are scattered all over the country, in 4,000 different places. Congress says we have to have an office in each county.

So the first thing we have to do is register them. Then we give them a certificate. Then we classify them. And then, of course, we have to let you physically examine them. We have to notify them where to go. We have to pay money for them to go and take the examination. We have to pay money for them to come back. And then on all who enlist after that, we lose all that investment we have in them and get no credit. It is wiped out, because these people want to give us money

only on the basis of what we induct. What we induct gives no fair idea of what we had to do with the approximately 2 million that enlist above what we induct. Yet we have the question of money with low calls. They say, "You don't need any money with low calls."

Then we have to lay off clerks--that is fine; saves the Government money. But this call goes up to 30,000 or 50,000 as has been the case. What do we do then? Go out and hire some more clerks? We can't always hire our old workers. Without funds we had to let them out of our service. And it is more difficult to hire people after you fire them. Is that good?

What is the effect on the people who do not get paid? A fellow that has anything to do is not going to stay on a job for which he doesn't get paid. About 90 percent of the people who work for us have been working for nothing for 15 years. But they never kept on the job as are the clerical helpers. You can get people to stay on the job if you pay them for doing no work. But as soon as you get a fellow working for nothing, he is not going to stay. If he does, you are not going to want him.

What happens then? Well, without clerical help we begin to lose our board members. So what? If you have to go to mobilization tomorrow, either limited or otherwise, if we don't have bonds, you don't get the people you need. Even if we get new clerks, or new members, with the raw material, we don't get back the lost experience. It takes a long time for the local board member or clerk to get to the place where he really knows things. We make remarkable demands upon these people. Neither the State Department nor our general counsel can tell you what the obligations are on aliens, because they are very complicated; and yet we expect 4,000 local board clerks to be able to tell somebody in Angola, Indiana, whether he can go to Windsor, Canada, over the weekend. It might involve something international and maybe some of them won't get back. But you expect the local board clerks to know all that in 4,000 places, working three days a week, and sometimes losing half a day when we have to economize a little because the calls are down.

All those things are things to worry about. Why do we worry because we have to let somebody go? We wouldn't if we thought we would never have a mobilization. But I have to tell my people that they have to be ready for calls of 10,000 or 400,000 with no more than a 60-day notice at the best. That is just about the degree of flexibility we ought to have. It is not very easy to maintain.

I would like to say in summary that our last year's operations are encouraging, because we can get more people and do it if we just have enough sense to get ourselves a nonveteran reserve. The supply is developing. The last year has been all right for our people who are in the service if they can understand that the high rejection is merely something for today and must be abandoned immediately tomorrow. But it seems they never will. So that is bad.

We have tended to let the public get a little more complacent about this than I like to have them. We have been compelled to lose invaluable clerks whom we might need if we had to mobilize and mobilize fast. I think we have probably suffered a similar loss of experience among people in our Armed Forces. It is a rare situation today for us to encounter people in the service who have had anything to do with the work in a period of mobilization.

One of the hardest things in the world is to convince people who see an organization running under a peacetime setup that it cannot do the same things in a war, whether it be all out or part out. One of our great difficulties today is to get the local boards to be very careful now, when they have lots of time, and not adopt practices or create habits which in increased emergency would have to go out the window; to know that time is always precious when you have to move and move fast.

I guess I shouldn't say this, but there was an Executive order signed yesterday. Some of you might have seen it in the papers. It is on graduate students, who happen to be one of the pressure groups. That Executive order should have been signed in June of 1953. I am not blaming the President. There are about 30 agencies of this Government that kick Executive orders around before they ever get a chance to be signed. But do you suppose if we had been in operation when calls were high and things had to be done, that we could mess around 16 months to get something signed?

Unfortunately, that is not an exception. There is an Executive order on aliens down in the Attorney General's Office. It went down there before that other one. I know it has been there longer because it went there during the last administration. It is still down there. That is one of the things, the kind of action, that you get when calls are low, that are merely indicative of the feeling: "Well, we have lots of time."

I will now answer your questions. I thank you.

QUESTION: General, I agree with your proposition that low calls are not good. But how do you get them up?

GENERAL HERSHEY: That is quite simple in my book. Maybe it is a little different in yours. The first thing I would do is to add from 10,000 to 30,000 to the call each month.

I am not going to argue this 4-month business. If you can train them in 4 months, we will get three groups trained in 12 months. That is wonderful. I happen to buy 6 months as the time to train a fellow in. I think it should be that time. If at the end of that time you wanted only 23,000 of them in the active Armed Forces, I would give the difference between that 23,000 and what we took in, whether 30,000, 40,000 or whatever it was, an opportunity to enlist in an organized reserve unit, which includes the National Guard and the Air National Guard.

I would hope that after three, four, or five years I would have, in addition to the 3 million, or whatever it was, that we had in the active Armed Forces, we would have around a million or a million and a half in the service-callable reserves. The keymen would undoubtedly be the people who stayed in because they wanted to--that includes noncommissioned officers. The rank and file would be the nonveteran reserves. Therefore in my book they are available for calling out on little fusses.

So the way I would do it is to get the calls up immediately. In fact, I would have done it three or four years ago if I could have. I think we have a law under which we could have done it. There is some argument on that. Section 4(d)(3) of the act gives the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force authority to issue regulations, which must be approved by the Secretary of Defense, which permit anything short of two years. I would be specific there and say six months.

After six months' minimum active duty, give them permission to enlist in organized units for two and a half or three years, and in the meantime, look them all over yourselves and decide what you want in the longtime forces--sell them from the inside. I am not for too long enlistments. I want to have a few more people trained. I do not worship quite as much as some people do these long periods of service. I happen to believe we need a permanent service, but not everybody

in the permanent service to be permanent, because I don't want old first-class privates or even old corporals.

So, without getting too far into this reserve business--which I believe in very strongly--I believe in a permanent force, a force of service-callable reserves and selectively-callable reserves. The service-callable reserve must be constantly ready--no one in it who is going to be deferred. Get them out first. None of them has to be physically examined, none of them mobilized. The first thing you don't do is to start a lot of paperwork and physical examinations. I would like to see the paperwork done beforehand.

The last thing is the selectively-callable reserve, which comes in screened, presumably by our organization; and we use them as unit replacements or to build units in the second year of the war.

QUESTION: You mean, then, that you would have early outs on those short-term people that you are going to put in?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Of course. Let's leave the professionals out of this for the moment. I happen to have more faith in our professional forces than some people have. Probably I don't know much about them. But I happen to believe that you can get the individuals that you want to enlist after they know what they are getting into. I don't think you have to take frightened kids in darkened alleys and get their names on long-term paper in order to build up the Armed Forces.

Obviously, I am for a smaller force than you have. But I will have a larger force when the chips are down, because nobody will leave me, because they will have known what they were getting into. That's the trouble with some reenlistments at the present time. What do you expect of the guy who enlisted for three years in the spring of 1951? What do you think he was doing? Getting into something? He was trying to get out of something. You don't have to pitch your recruiting on escapism.

I wouldn't let a man enlist and wear the suit of the United States permanent force until he had by trial demonstrated his capacity to do something. I don't happen to believe you are doing that now. There was a time when we had to get them in the market because we had no compulsion. But now the Government has said, "You can get all of them for two years; but you don't have to take people for longer terms who aren't worth anything."

I think that is one of the things that is very unfortunate. I think the Armed Forces are not doing nearly as well for themselves as they could. I think one of the things they have lost a little faith in is in thinking they can't get people to come in. I challenge that. If that is true, we ought to make our permanent forces something a man will go into when he knows what it is.

If we can get a little more willingness, a little more trustworthiness, even with a little less formal education, we will have a stronger, more virile, and better fighting force. That is just an old man talking.

QUESTION: General, how do you feel about UMT as a means of supplying your nonveteran reserve?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I have been for UMT since 1908. At the present moment I don't want to hear anything said about it, because I want to accomplish exactly what it was intended for by talking about providing for a nonveteran reserve. It will be UMT all right, because it is going to take everything we have. But we have to keep 3 million in the active forces and 1.5 million or so in the service-callable reserve. The only reason I object to UMT is that we have some people on the Hill who get a little bit disturbed about it.

Another reason I get really disturbed about UMT is that there are about 90 different definitions of what UMT is. I think we had better stop calling it UMT, because we don't know what we are talking about. But we can get the effective force that we want if we get a competent callable reserve. It must be service callable. It must be ready. It must be outfitted. Congress is not going to vote immediately for money for 3 million in the service callable.

In the first place, you can't tell Congress that you should get such a thing for 10 years. They're not going to delegate authority away out to an indeterminate time like that. You will be just putting a lagger around the neck of whatever you try to get. You won't get anything.

First of all, I happen to believe in an expanded Selective Service, not because I am making a living out of it, but because you aren't going to be able to avoid it. O.K. If you have an expanded Selective Service, then what is the need for UMT? If we get legislation on the reserve, you can make changes in what you have now in order to provide a service-callable and a selectively-callable reserve, to furnish people en masse to man the Armed Forces on a 2-year basis; and then try to sell them an enlistment after they get in.

I believe in recruiting, and I believe it all ought to be done within and not without. I don't care how you reenlist a man, but the other fellow--the original enlistment--who has not served, you never can be sure of except to enlist within and not without. I may be prejudiced on that score, but that is what I happen to believe. When I get through, we will use all our people. It is going to take all we have to keep 3 million in and 1.5 million in the service-callable reserve, and the remainder obligated to become unit replacements and to be used for all-out callup.

But I think that the instrument to use to get that is an extension of Selective Service, because Congress is going to have to buy that whether it wants to or not. But just as soon as you get separate bills, you will find them in separate streams. When you get through, you will have one and the other will still be in committee. Therefore we have bills of three pages, double spaced. That is the way I see it this morning. I probably am seeing some things wrong. I think you can expand the Selective Service to provide all of the nonveteran people that can possibly be trained during the next five years in the Armed Forces.

QUESTION: You mentioned the input, General, into this selectable stream. What is our rate of outgo or depletion of inventory by reaching into an age where we don't usually select manpower?

GENERAL HERSHEY: At the present time they tell us they are going over the top at 35. Whether this is wise or not is neither here nor there, because Congress put that on to be sure we got them. They thought we might miss a few if they left the liability at 26. But at the present moment our output above 35 is obviously much more than the intake at 18, because of the birthrate of the people who are all the way from 23 or 24 up to 35 years. The birthrate of those is much lower than the birthrate of the others now. Of course the birthrate now is increasing very rapidly. By 1960 I believe there will be 1.5 million males becoming 18 every year, instead of about 1.2 million that we have now or the 1 million that we had three or four years ago.

So we are getting into a place now where we are beginning to get some of the effect of whatever it was that had some influence on the birthrate in the forties. The forties were much better than the twenties, and the twenties were much better than the thirties. In the fifties we don't seem to be doing so badly. Is it in Montgomery County

where we have 14 times as many students as we had seven years ago? When you get your tax bill you can tell.

MR. POLUHOFF: General, would you give us your opinion of the limited reserve?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I don't know whether you would call it limited or not; but if you mean what my opinion is on taking people we are not taking now, I am very much in favor of it. Of course I would be, being in the procurement business. I have to listen to people who tell me they can't use this fellow because he is nervous. He is making 50,000 dollars a year, but the services can't find anything for him to do. When you get down to brass tacks, if the fellow isn't pretty lousy, he is some help somewhere unless the people that command him haven't enough sense to know how to use him.

When it comes to survival, and the services are roaring about being short of manpower anyhow, what do we do? Do we deliberately make ourselves a third shorter than we are now, when we already admit the shortness?

Another thing that worries me a great deal--I am getting to have worries--is when somebody says, "Of course we are going to take them all in. No question, when the chips are down, we are going to take all these people." I say, "Let's take them now." But we haven't got the time now. Of course when the chips are down, you don't have anything to do then except survive. It's a little easier to take a guy then, but it takes three times as long to train him. And that is a problem. When the chips are down, you don't have the time to spend at the rate of three times as much as you do now.

I went through this once before, in about 1938 or 1939. General Dahlquist and I occupied a couple of rooms over in the old building that I think somebody built when they came back from the battle when they lost Washington. First of all, he got optimistic and tried to get the War Department--we had a War Department at that time--to put a battalion on the west coast and one on the east coast, in recruiting and training centers to try to train some of these fellows who were a little stupid. Well, we didn't get anywhere with the battalion, so we tried to get a company. They didn't have the time. They didn't have the money. We had to hurry on this job. This was in 1938 and 1939. In 1942, 1943, and 1944 we didn't have the time either, because we needed the men.

Not only that, but I have read some studies which the Army has made on the people that it had. Some of them did pretty well. Some perhaps didn't do much better than the average. But certainly every man you got was one more man than the ones which you didn't get. We have 600,000 at the present time that have been turned down, not for physical reasons, but because they either knew too little or too much.

You folks know in driving around our downtown streets that we have a lot of signs saying "one way." Sometimes there are three signs, two pointing one way and one the other. You have to read the fine print, watch all these circles. We have lots of boys around town driving delivery wagons, taking flowers, candy, cooking materials, all over the town. They know the things they have to know. But you have nothing in the services that they can do. You just don't have the things that they can do. They know more than some of the people making lots more money or even studying in some of the schools around here.

Like the farmer, when the lost guy said to him "You don't know much." The farmer said, "Well, I am not lost, though."

I think the answer is "Yes" to that question.

QUESTION: General, I understand that one of your proposals is that all persons available be taken in and then divided into three categories--the active forces, the callable reserves, and the replacement reserves. By what criteria do you propose to determine the classification of an individual?

GENERAL HERSHEY: An individual doesn't get into the last one-- we can settle that pretty quick--the fellow who never had service doesn't go into the selectively-callable reserve; not until he has had a little trip.

There are in my book a couple of ways he can get there. One way is, he has to spend at least two years in the service. There are a lot of people who think that isn't long enough. If you can get three, well and good. In my book he has to spend two years in the active service. That is one way to get into the selectively-callable reserve.

Another way in which to get into the selectively-callable reserve is to have already served two years in the Armed Forces.

Another way he can get in is to serve three or four years in the permanent forces.

Another way he can get in there is to have served--I would buy three and a half or perhaps even three years in an organized service-callable reserve unit. I don't just know what the ratio ought to be between the fellow who comes in and makes a career for at least two years and the fellow who tries not to quite make a career of it. But my idea is that everybody gets six months. After that he would be eligible to go into an organized ready reserve unit--service callable.

Next, there has to be a vacancy in an organized unit. You can't just put him in; you must have a particular place in a particular unit to put him. If there is no vacancy and he doesn't want to wait, there is only one thing for him to do--go ahead and spend two years, unless he wants to enlist in the permanent forces. That's the reason I think the permanent forces ought to be selling a career in the permanent forces, within the active forces while they get a look first at a wide field to choose from.

I suspect some of the services might say, "We don't care to get our reserves from something of this kind." And I have sometimes, when I have been a little weak, been willing to go along with those services if we would immediately mobilize men through enlistment and give each six months. But just trying to earmark a lot of people they don't intend to train isn't a very pleasant thing.

I observed, when I was in the National Guard, a fellow who used to spit on his pie so nobody would steal it. I think a great deal of the behavior of some people who enlist people for a service and then try to hide them is not dissimilar to what that fellow did in the National Guard. You can't have someone hogging off the market, getting his mouth more full than he can chew. The thing to do is leave the guy in the pool until someone can use him.

I have four children and I know something about what the defense establishment is up against. I know some of the children of the defense establishment. I have seen them behave as they ought to behave. They look out for their own interest. At least they think they do. I doubt it sometimes.

I wouldn't let a guy get into the selectively-callable reserve until he serves a basic training for six months, plus two and a half or three years in the service callable, or serves two years with the permanent forces.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Hershey, you have given us a very interesting and highly informative talk. On behalf of the college, thank you very much.

(20 Dec 1954--250)S/sg