



CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Dr. Ernest Griffith

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Reviewed by: Colonel J. H. M. Smith, 17 October 1962

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2 October 1962

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Reviewed by: Col. J. H. M. Smith Date: 17 Oct 1962

Reporter--Grace R. O'Toole

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COLONEL SMITH:

I think that the subject of Congressional Influence on National Security Policy and Programs is certainly a subject with which many of you here are a bit familiar. As a matter of fact, I know several of you in this group whose experience in this connection has been highly personal, especially at budget hearings time.

Our speaker this morning is certainly, in addition to all of his other qualifications, an expert witness to and a student of the subject of congressional influence on national security.

Dean Griffith, as you have seen from his biography, has been for nearly 20 years in intimate association with Congress, and he has been able to look at our subject with perspective.

So it is my privilege to introduce Dean Ernest Griffith of the American University.

DEAN GRIFFITH: Mr. Chairman and Members of the Industrial College:

I learned 10 minutes ago that you changed your readings from last year. My lecture had been built around the readings of last year. In the last 7 minutes I have been busily engaged in reorganizing what I am going to say. If it seems less severely disciplined and structured than it should be, you will bear with me.

There was a famous athlete once at a university which was noted for its "All-Americans," and also for a certain doubt on the part of some people that

some of these "All-Americans" met the necessary academic standards. Perhaps a little light was shed when one of the professors who failed one of these athletes gave his usual makeup examination. It was on the Bible. The examination always ^{was} to name the Kings of Israel, and that was all. This year he asked the athlete to name the major and minor prophets. The answer was, "Far be it from me to draw invidious distinctions between holy men, but the Kings of Israel are."

Now, I am somewhat in that same position as that athlete this morning. Having prepared one so-called address I shall have to give you another one, and do this more extempore even than I normally do.

The role of Congress in the national security policy is one that is particularly puzzling to members of the Executive Branch. In the first place, of course, it is puzzling to Congress, and what is more important, perhaps, in a way, it is puzzling to the students of constitutional law. Our Constitution is, if not deliberately ambiguous, at least ambiguous as regards the respective roles. If you can draw the distinction between the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief, which is a constitutional power, and the role of Congress that provide the rules and regulations for the government of the armed services, you are better than any constitutional lawyer who has yet lived. Oh, there have been partisans who have drawn up briefs, but you were treated this past year to a very good example of ambiguity in connection with the seventies, in which the question has smoldered and from time to time blazed into light of whether Congress, for example, has the power to force the Executive to spend money which it did not want to spend. It

was up for discussion, and you know that this resulted in a drawn battle. My guess is that it was a drawn battle because neither side really wished to pursue this to its ultimate conclusion because it wasn't sufficiently sure of the outcome. So the compromise was, as you know, that Secretary McNamara said that the Department of Defense would appoint a committee or commission which would take a long and thorough look at this and that he would retain an open mind, with the possibility of revising his judgment.

I mention that, not because I am saying that McNamara's judgment was better or worse than that of Congress, and this will be true throughout everything I say today. I am using the differences between Congress and the Executive in the national-security-policy field as a basis for illustrating the respective roles of the two as they see them, and the twilight zones between the two as they have developed in practice, rather than to pass judgment, which of course I would be completely incompetent to do, upon the merits of the particular questions involved.

You realize, of course, and I do not have to tell you, that the image that is suspiciously frequent in the minds of the representatives of the national-security agencies in the Executive Branch is that Congress is a bunch of incompetents with no access to classified data and that it is meddling in things that it should not meddle in. This is the standard picture.

I shall speak a little later about some very important modifications, as a matter of fact, in this picture of Congress, but for the moment I will table them until later. I hope that you will in the questions press me on this particular point, but, while you press me, ask yourselves the further question as to whether there

is therefore a fear of government in which democratic action through representatives is thereby correctly and properly executed. We are dealing here with a problem of government which is larger than the immediate issue, larger even than the United States, but which is one which has dogged governments down through the centuries.

I want to take a minute or two to give you the image which Congress has of you, just so you will understand this a little bit. There has been a succession of episodes within the last year or two to which I draw your careful attention. Within the past few years the Department of Defense, having given all-out defense for a particular policy with reference to Reserves, has reversed that policy no less than twice and perhaps three times, and having done that, has not left, necessarily, in the corporate memories of the Congressional committees and the individual memories of those whose tenure on those committees exceeds the tenure of any Secretary of Defense or Assistant Secretary of Defense, or even any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least in the recent history of our country, a corresponding feeling of certainty, when the Department of Defense appears to be certain about a particular issue.

Also, you may remember that the Defense Department has substituted, very recently, for the mobile missile the fixed silo. Having convinced Congress that it should appropriate vast sums of money for the former, there is now a shift. Again I am not passing judgment on the merits of it, because this kind of shift in a sense makes a member of Congress feel more sure of the Defense Department, that it is openminded and that it is not committed irrevocably to a weapon system,

in that the people who make the decisions have in a sense a vested interest because they are familiar with it. This is part of the image.

There is also an image in Congress that the Defense Department tends to stretch its authority and distort the intent of Congress from time to time. The most important single instance of this recently was in the transfer of a certain number of functions to the Defense Department central office or central establishment from the three constituent units in the field of communications and in the field of intelligence. There was a definite feeling on the part of the members of Congress. Except for one remark on the floor of the House by Congressman McCormack, an important remark, the Congressional Record would indicate that the McCormack-Curtis Amendment was intended to apply to supplies, and supplies only. Again I am not passing judgment on the merit or demerit, but only saying that this extension beyond that which most members of Congress on the Armed Services Committee believed they were recommending and voting for has created a kind of catlike quality of examining in detail every proposal made by any executive agency--please, gentlemen, we are not talking just about Defense--to make certain that there are not sleepers in the proposal/^{on}which Congress one of these days would rub its eyes and say, "Did we give them authority to do this?"

These things, if you wish, are part of the warp and woof of the unfavorable aspects--the uncomfortable, perhaps, rather than the unfavorable--of the Congressional image of the Executive Branch. There is, of course, and you know this, a far more overriding image of great admiration for the men, both civilian and military, who have led the Department of Defense, and among many quarters

for those who have been the other constituent members of the National Security Council. Please, I do not want you to think for one minute that I am exaggerating this. I do say that when the Executive Branch in fact approaches Congress it must bear in mind that there is a history there which has been important and is important in this image. You are projecting yourselves into a particular image in which there are certain smoldering aspects which, if there is complete candor, will not burst into flame but which, if there is not and if there is a suspicion that there is not, are there to handicap the necessary rapport between the two branches of government.

Now, so much, then, for image. Now for the actual role of Congress. What does it conceive its role to be? And "it" is not the whole of Congress; "it" is the responsible leadership concerned with national security policy, the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Subcommittees on the Department of Defense, the space and the outer space committees which are under different names in the two Houses, to some extent the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, and bits and pieces of certain other committees, sometimes special committees, as well as to some extent, perhaps, the party leadership. Congress--and this is something which I think you are familiar with--relies very heavily upon a division of labor with its resultant specialization of competence among its own membership. So, when I say "Congress," basically I mean those instruments which Congress has itself created within its own body and staffed to perform particular functions.

So, in these terms, what does Congress feel is its role in national security policy? There are a number of episodes. I could string them together if there

were time and if I had brought them along with me but, having supposed you had read them, I didn't. There are a number of instances which show that Congress sees its role in one negative sense and then there are perhaps four affirmative proposals. The negative is that I think that for the most part Congress does not believe that it has the responsibility to introduce an affirmative policy over against the Department of Defense or the National Security Council, or whatever the instrument is at the given time, on which the President relies. It does not regard itself as having the necessary competence for the necessary access of classified information to do this. It would probably draw one exception here to affirmative policy, and that is in the field of organizing in the Executive Branch, in order to produce and carry out a defense policy.

As a case in point, the genesis of the National Aeronautics and Space Act indicates that Congress is assuming an affirmative role, not particularly in saying whether we should go to the moon or to Mars first, not that kind of thing, but how the space activities in the Federal Government should be organized. It made quite a little change at that time. I think it changed the Administration bill in one or two rather important points which are now in operation but were not in effective operation under the last Administration. If I seem critical, I might say at the outset that I am a Republican, so this is not to be taken as partisan criticism. Congress visualized a structure in which the primary organizational problem was relating the activities in the civilian space field and the activities in the military which necessarily overlapped a great deal, and it used the device of the Space Council, which was virtually a dead letter until Lyndon Johnson took

the chairmanship of it, as a device for that type of clearance, coordination, preventing the overlapping and the feeding of one into the other. How it is working I have no knowledge of.

In any event, if you examine the Administration proposal for setting up space activities and compare it with the legislation that finally emerged, you will see in the matter of organization that Congress did regard and does regard itself as having a role. To a considerable extent, for example, this criticism of the enhanced activity of the Defense Department as over against the three constituent departments is an evidence of its peculiar interest in organization. Do not think for one minute that, even among those who are specializing in this field, there is unified opinion. There is only a feeling that this is the sphere of Congress, in which Congress should receive a recommendation before it is put into operation, if the recommendation is drastic and if it, somehow or other, finds a door through which to enter.

Now we will turn for a few minutes to the more affirmative approach of Congress toward its role in national security policy. Clearly it feels it has a function to accelerate, if it believes there is a lack. When a spokesman of the Defense Department indicated that the latest Soviet space flight of the two astronauts had no real military significance, and when it was indicated by Administration spokesmen that we were not concerned--and I have the quote here , if anybody is interested in it--with the military aspects of outer space, the members of Congress couldn't buy that. So this acceleration function began to pressure, as it has all through the whole history of the outer-space deliberations. There have been other examples in the past of Congress regarding its function in the defense field as one

of speeding it up.

A second and somewhat related function is that of trying to have the Defense Department make up its mind, not by doing two things but by doing one thing for the same objective. In connection with certain aspects of the Missile Program it was clear that Congress had this in mind. Whenever it senses an intra-Defense Department dispute in which there is apparently a standoff between two of the constituent departments and there is an attempt to delay an answer, the hounds of Congress are in full cry after that kind of a fox. In other words, gentlemen, Congress wants you to make up your minds on these things and not to ride two horses at least in tangential directions if not in opposite directions.

The third, and one of the most important functions of Congress, as it visualizes its own responsibilities, is the review function. Some of you may remember the Denston Resolution. It was tied into the confirmation of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The confirmation, if I remember correctly, was made dependent upon an agreement on the part of those nominated that, if at any time one of them felt that a decision of the Joint Chiefs and of the Secretary of Defense did such violence to what he felt was the better policy in the security of our Nation, and that, if Congress asked him, he would give his own personal view, in executive session, if desired, but would give that.

This is perhaps not defensible in terms of military discipline, and certainly not defensible in terms of the monolithic structure which the Executive Branch would like to present toward Congress when it is advocating something. But, gentlemen, Congress sees that this is terribly important, and the memories even

of some of the Congressmen there at the present time reach back to the time at which the French General Staff assured the French Chamber of Deputies that it had nothing to fear, that the Maginot Line was adequate. Congress does not say that it should necessarily change, perhaps ever change, a policy, but that, if among the authorities themselves, there is a different of opinion, it may be wise to pass this in review once again. Part of its image, not merely by any means of defense, not merely by any means of government only, is that it knows, the more experienced ones know, that those in positions of authority tend to have vested interest in particular ways of doing things. When the vested interest might, just might, come into conflict with the safety of the United States, it is always a good thing to have the lines of argument thoroughly discussed and reviewed. That is the view of Congress.

There have been a number of instances of this. One of them was the policy for a certain number of years of the Executive Branch to downgrade both the possibility and the desirability of arms limitation or arms control. It was felt to be necessary that Congress should pick up this particular strand, devote expert attention to it, keep it before the public eye, and continuously explore opportunities for its solution. I may add that the Executive Branch came around to that idea. But there was a time, I think it is correct to say, when in the Executive Branch you could count on the fingers of two hands, and perhaps even on one hand, the number of professional people who were working on this problem at a time when Congress had 25, under the Humphrey Committee in the Senate.

This is the kind of thing I mean by review. I will give you a little episode

which will focus attention on the kind of thing I mean. My first association with Congress intimately, of course, was when I went to Capitol Hill in late 1940. Early in 1941 I received a telephone call from a new freshman member of the then Military Affairs Committee of the House. He asked if I would please tell him whether air-cooled or water-cooled motors or engines were better in combat planes. The Army was insisting on one type, I forget at the moment which. This particular episode was not in the speech I had expected to give, but I remember the episode. Who were we? We had no specialist in national defense, and certainly none in aeronautical engineering. But we did have a library, and we looked it up, and we found that we were the only military power of any consequence that was not building both types--even our own Navy was. We found a second fact, which was that in an aeronautical journal we found a statement that neither type had reached its full development. We reported those two things to this freshman member of Congress. In an executive session of this committee I understand that the then War Department representative had rather a tough time explaining away these two facts. Now, whether there was cause and effect or not is not for anybody to say, but six months later they changed the policy and worked on both.

Now, one of the important things was that that freshman member happened in later years to be the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Vice President of the United States, and this pattern moved upward in his sphere. There were many other Senators and Representatives who had it, too. It is the pattern of questioning decisions which are probably all right, but questioning them. And the convention grew, and I think now rules, certainly in the Senate, that these questions

are not frivolously asked. Usually the witnesses from the Defense Department are given them a week in advance of the hearings. Congress has no desire, the responsible members, at least, to embarrass the Defense Department, but it does regard its role as reviewing these decisions. It knows it is in a period of rapidly changing weapon systems in which the things that are on the drawing board today are probably obsolete tomorrow, let alone operational.

In this kind of situation, with the chips down and the stakes high, Congress sees its role as reviewing policy.

Now let's turn from these concepts of its role to some of the things that are less lovely or that seem to you to be less lovely. Let's meet first head on the criticism of the competence or the incompetence of Congress. I call your attention to two or three facts at this point. One I have already mentioned, which is the durability of members of the Armed Services Committees, their long memories, the measure they have taken of particular persons as witnesses, and the extent to which they have a feeling that a man who has appeared there is trying to handle them or be candid with them. If the former, woe be it to him. I'll speak more about that later.

I think the figures show that about 80 percent of the members of Congress are Reservists on active participation in Reserve programs. In other words, once a week many of them are high up enough so that they receive the briefings that accompany the rank which they hold. I have no doubt that it was this that lay back of the questions and criticisms on the part of Senators Goldwater and Cannon in recent weeks, certainly in part.

Point 2. It is even reported that there are leaks from the Pentagon to Congress. Far be it from me to say that is a factor. There has been known to be such leaks in the past. In other words, there are pipelines. There is the open policy of expecting the top-level witnesses from the Pentagon, if requested, to give their own views and not merely the official views. There are ways and means by which Congress learns when there is difference of opinion.

In the third place, Congress has a staff. For example, the senior specialist in national defense in the Legislative Reference Service, Colonel Donnely, was-- I forget his exact title but he was--I believe, Director of Research for the policy planning in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then he performed the same function for NATO. In addition, of course, the members of the Congressional staffs have full access to the collections of the Library of Congress, which mean they have full access to all published material on the part of military critics and in military journals. This can be digested for them and questions can be asked based upon these digests and analyses.

The two Armed Services Committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the space committees have their own professional staffs, certain ones of whom have had long military careers and who, by being in a situation in which they can devote their entire time to the study of these problems, have acquired additional competence. I think that in general they and the Legislative Reference Service staff have found the Defense Department extremely cooperative.

I know that when I was Director any important report on any question that

was presented to Congress we would route to the Defense Department to make certain, not that we were not out of line with policy—that wasn't the question, because these reports did not make recommendations; they analyzed problems-- but that we had not overlooked some extremely important matter. Of course they could not disclose the Top Secret, except possibly to Colonel Donnelly, but what they could do was say, "This particular sentence you may wish to modify, and if you will look at the column on such and such a date of Hansen Baldwin, it may give you some indication of the reason, or if you will look at the report sent from Moscow by such and such a newspaper correspondent, you may wish to cite that correspondent in some modification which you might want to make." There are subtle ways in which Top Secret material, which is Top Secret largely because of the source from which it came rather than because of its nature, can be bypassed in that fashion, so that those responsible on Capitol Hill will not be given incorrect information or misleading information.

There have been examples. The most striking one was, of course, the atomic bomb, in which in an extreme fashion steps were taken to make certain that Congress did not block but reinforced the efforts of the Executive Branch. You may remember that the Appropriations Committees began to discover that there was something like \$2 billion missing, unaccounted for, in the appropriations of that particular period, and began to ask questions. At that point the Executive Branch took the extreme measure, as I understand it, of calling in the Chairman and the ranking minority members of the Appropriations Subcommittees and put the situation before them under pledge secrecy, a pledge which was kept. So

these men went back and told their colleagues, "Don't ask these questions," and they didn't. In other words, there is a great deal going on informally of that type of responsible disclosure under pledge of confidence. That means also, you see, that at times--and this is reserved for very important matters--Congress is at least acting on the basis of information which would be as adequate as that upon which the Defense Department is acting, even though possession of the information is confined to a very, very small number, and perhaps even to one man.

So much, then, for the competence of Congress. I rest this case on their long experience, on their continuous continuity in touch with contemporary affairs in the defense field, and upon the presence in the committees and in Reserve in the Legislative Reference of staff which is to a very great extent of an extremely high order.

A second criticism on your part is of interference, a criticism in many instances well taken. Its excesses are part of the price you pay for the gains from some of it. Part of this is the difficulty in shutting down a military base in a member's district or State. The only strong strand in our Federal Government which still remains of attention to local needs is in Congress. We must remember that in the larger setting in the working of our Government--I do not mean that we should yield to it if it is contrary to the national interest but we should recognize it for what it is--there are some interferences of that type. In other words, the Congressman believes that he is there to represent his own district. Sometimes all he wants is to indicate to his district that he has fought for them, or to the

person in question, if it is an individual, that he has had a review of the man's case.

Time and time again, so many times that I have long lost count, when I was on Capitol Hill I would receive a call from a member of Congress, something like this: "Here in my office is a very important constituent. I'd like to have you see whether you can find a place for him in the Legislative Reference Service." Then he would praise the constituent. I'd say, "I'll be very happy to talk with him. Send him right over." It took about five minutes. Within 30 seconds the telephone would ring again and he would say, "You understand I don't want you to give him any special consideration. I just want you to hear his story and see whether you can use him. I want you to make the best appointment." In other words, he wants the man to have his day in court but he doesn't want any special consideration.

In the 18 years with Congress--I want to pay this tribute to them--I can recall only six instances out of some 1000 vacancies and 2000 members of Congress in which I was under real pressure, from a patronage standpoint. I need hardly say we did not yield, but I'm just simply saying that a lot of the individual intervention is partly to make a record but partly for another reason--which is again part of the image of Congress, which is that this Government of the United States is a great colossus of a bureaucracy, and in the routines in a bureaucracy the individual is likely to be lost sight of. The Congressman sees this intervention function of his as making certain that the individual has his day in court, just that for one moment the spotlight of consideration is focused on that man.

Probably the decision that had been made was all right, but maybe it wasn't.

In any event, this is the humanistic side of government, the human side of government.

If you want an example of this, you look at Congress's own employees. You will find a very considerable fraction of them which are completely patronage as far as Congress is concerned, although certain sectors have been singled out, such as the great majority of the committee professional staffs, to be filled on a nonpatronage basis, but in those that are filled in patronage you will find a lot of examples. You will see a great many cripples there. Are they useful to the Congressmen politically? No. The Congressmen feel sorry for them. A large part of the patronage is eleemosynary and not political. The Capitol Police Force at one stage was made up of a very large component--and I am not certain that it was not a majority--of young men who were in the law schools in Washington in the evening. Was that political? No. It was a desire to give a young man a break educationally by giving him the opportunity to work. Oh, I don't mean that the Congressman is wholly oblivious to possible political implications thereof. Don't ask too much. I'm just simply saying that you do not understand individual intervention with reference to persons or districts. You do not understand the Congressman's image of his function. This applies in the security field as well.

Another criticism that you have heard, less so lately, because Congress has done a great deal to put its own house in order in this regard, is the treatment of witnesses from Defense and other departments. In the first place it

must be understood that something over 60 percent of the members of Congress are lawyers, that among those 60 percent a very considerable number have served as prosecuting attorneys and district attorneys in their local county or State. To a lawyer, particularly to a prosecuting lawyer, truth emerges in two fashions, one in the battle of protagonists, in other words, in having a public fight in the court room, with the judge and the jury looking on, and also in the pressing of witnesses to make certain that they know what they are talking about and are telling the truth.

The Congressional hearing is the legislative counterpart of the courtroom. Into it are carried ways of behaving that these members in the past have been accustomed to. I'll give you a case in point. I was present once when the late Senator Langer gave a witness a terrific grilling, pressing, pressing, pressing, in almost an ugly fashion, and the witness answered courteously. He obviously knew what he was talking about. At the end Senator Langer changed his mood completely. He went up to the witness and shook his hand and said, "I congratulate you. You have convinced me."

Now, that does not apply to all of the crossquestioners. So I make a second point under this heading. There are in any group of over 500 men a certain number of blackguards. I think there are less now than there used to be. There never were many. But I beg of you to realize that the man's colleagues have taken his measure long before you face him and have taken it in a better and a more profound fashion. While the courtesies of Congress, the conventions of Congress, for the most part do not allow censure of one member by another in public, if you do face

that kind of a committee member, even if he be Chairman, bear in mind that you are then talking not to him but to two things: One, his position in the Government which calls for respect, and second, and in practical terms more important, to the other members of the committee who are watching to see how you handle yourself and whether you know what you are talking about. They will take care of him in executive section.

I have not for one minute, in dealing with these three principal sources of criticism, tried to whitewash Congress. When I talk with Congressmen, as I did and still do, I present the Executive point of view and the difficulties of the Executive. When I talk with the Executive I present the Congress's point of view. In other words, what is necessary here, gentlemen, is that the two branches of government shall come to understand each other better, respect each other more, and operate in terms of the assumption of a common patriotism and a common desire to reach the truth. If that be violated now on one side or now on the other, the overwhelming evidence--not the newspaper evidence, because newspapers thrive on controversy, they thrive on the exceptions-- day in and day out is that those on both sides have the interests of the country at heart. Not always does one side know what is in the mind of the other or how to deal with it. I am here just to make a few suggestions about how to deal with Congress.

One or two further words and then I will throw myself open for questions. How does Congress make up its mind? In other words, what is the legislative process in the decisions that are made? In the first place, I suggest that personalities and personal relationships initially play a very great role. Perhaps it

should not be so. I am sure it is never so in the Executive Branch, but they play a great role in the Legislative-- who happens to be committee chairman; whether the witness from the Executive has created confidence in the past or does so in the present. These personal relationships follow certain patterns. In most instances, although not in all, if there is a very important appropriation, the Chairman of the subcommittee normally likes to go over that appropriation with the representative of the agency requesting it prior to the hearing. Particularly, you see, he may have been briefed by his staff to say, "Here are some things on which we need some more light." This is not universally true, but there are any number of informal conferences that take place, sometimes in the member's office, sometimes at the White House. There has a regular pattern emerged at the higher level at the White House, in the regular conferences between the party leadership in Congress, if it is a partisan matter, and the President, and the leadership of both parties in a particular subject field if it is something like national security policy or foreign policy which is nonpartisan.

These personal relationships are terribly important and should not be overlooked. Maybe these take place at one of the numerous cocktail parties or diplomatic receptions. They can take place on the golf course. They can take place in different ways. A great deal depends upon whether a member of the Executive Branch, because he merits it, has the real confidence of a member of Congress whom his colleagues trust. You can say, "Look, you can believe in this man. If he says so it is so, to the best of his knowledge." Partly, the legislative process in Congress is personal.

The second point I want to make—and I have made it to some extent already-- is that there exist at one point or another in Congress professional staffs of very great competence. I will give you the Congressional attitude toward this. I think I can remember word for word the provision in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which created in the Legislative Reference Service senior specialists in the different branches of Congressional interest. It put this proviso in--that the whole staff of Legislative Reference should be subject as in the past to the Classification Act except that the grade assigned to the senior specialist should be not less than the highest grade in the Executive Branch for those with research and analytical responsibility who did not have administrative responsibility.

Now, that has stuck, and it has made the Legislative Reference Service possessed of the highest percentage of super grades of any unit, I believe, in the Federal Government, with the possible exception of the Council of Economic Advisers. It was for many years, but I have no recent figures.

That is from your standpoint all to the good, because it means that there is professional competence on the other side. Over and over again, while the questionings will be to the point and will be to some extent ruthless, if the facts are there you will find Congress reinforcing your judgment and not differing with it.

I remember the Marshall Plan than which there was perhaps no important issue before Congress and our country at that time. Congress in one way or another had 25 specialists working on this at the same time that the Executive was working on

it. These specialists were in touch with those in the Executive Branch, comparing notes, challenging each other's figures. Over 200 members of Congress themselves went over to Europe and investigated one aspect or another, so that at least in the House of Representatives there was an authority from first hand knowledge on the floor of the House on everything that mattered, whether it was the steel production of Luxembourg or construction in West Germany.

They specialized. They divided up the work. When it went to the floor of the Senate, Senator Vandenburg stood there and said, "Back of this lies not only the research of the Executive Branch but the finest staff work I have every known in my history in Congress. You can trust the figures, gentlemen." And it went through the Senate, I think, 92 to 2 or something of that kind. In a great national security issue the effect of the staff of Congress was to give confidence in the Executive Branch, among other things.

Well, I see my time is up. I will close with just one other point about Congress in making up its mind. I spoke of the personal factors. I spoke of the research. I spoke of the experience among the members themselves. In a curious fashion, whatever the measure is, when it goes through and ultimately comes out in legislature, you will normally--not always but normally--find the majority of both parties on the same side. You will always find that in some fashion or another expertness has been built into the measure. You will also find, if you look closely, that no measure can go through and obtain the signature of the President that is definitely hostile to at least the rank and file of labor. No man can be elected President of the United States without carrying a certain

number of the great industrial States. No measure can go through Congress-- the President would veto it--that is hostile to agriculture. Between 60 and 66 of the Senate seats cannot be filled without the concurrence of substantial fractions of the farmers or those who are dependent on them in the villages. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 230, a clear majority in the House of Representatives, are either themselves from suburban and wealthy middle-class districts or from the small towns and the rural districts, and they will see that no measure hostile to business goes through.

What do we have? We have a legislative process which in the end is not majority rule by a particular economic group that might have for a given moment a majority. We have a process in which research is brought to bear at various stages, in which the Executive Branch has its day in court and its day out of court, with Congress retaining the final word in the decisions.

So in this field, particularly, of national security policy, we have worked out an instrument of government which basically could be spoken of as government by consensus, not government by executive fiat, not government by Congressional muddling or meddling, but a government in which you have forced Congress to convince the President or the President will not spend the money or he will veto the bill, and you have forced the Executive Branch to convince Congress if you want the appropriation through.

We, almost alone of the governments of the world, have a government which has a structured, a built-in device or devices for responsible criticism, informed and responsible criticism, for carrying conviction on the part of the branch that

did not make the original proposal, on the basis of the merits of the case.

I have tried to give you as best I can what seem to me to be the principal aspects of the role of Congress in this day and age. Believe me, gentlemen, I was not there for the years I was there without arriving at an intense admiration, respect, and affection for the overwhelming majority of those members who face, as you do not face, the necessity of dealing with constituents, but who have, believe me, the same dedication to our national interests that you have.

COLONEL SMITH: Gentlemen, we have a few minutes for questions. Dean Griffith is ready.

QUESTION: There is a constant complaint from the Executive Department on the amount of time required by the senior officials to appear before the Congress, compounded by the requirements for daily legislation and appropriations. Do you feel, Doctor, that there is anything that can be done to reduce the time required by the senior officials in the Executive Department?

DEAN GRIFFITH: You put your finger on a highly relevant criticism. You ask if something can be done. There are members of Congress who are well aware of this. I do not have recent pipelines on that subject, or perhaps, for that matter, on many subjects, since I have left there, but Congress is concerned with the overlapping or committee jurisdictions, again, particularly with the advent of the space committees.

Frankly, I am not sanguine that anything can or will be done.

The other side of the ledger is to look upon this to some extent as part of the education of the public. You educate the public through drama and headlines.

You may just have to live with this. It's like crabgrass. You may have to live with it.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the role of Congress as expressed in the Stennis Subcommittee account of the cold war exchanges?

DEAN GRIFFITH: I am sorry. I am not sufficiently familiar with that to do that.

QUESTION: Sir, I believe you stated that about 60 percent of the members of Congress are lawyers. In scientific circles for the last 10 years or so, or perhaps longer, there has been increasing uneasiness on the part of scientists who feel that they should bear some social responsibility for all of these magic things that he has developed. Would you comment on the tendency of the scientist to offer himself for public office and thus take a part in government in the legislative role, and give us any value that you might have on the statistical fringe and the number of scientists in Congress?

DEAN GRIFFITH: I think the number in Congress is so negligible as not to amount to enough to affect things. I do not know the recent count there. A Congressman's job is a full-time job, and science is out of date in a year. Congress employs scientists on its committees. It is because some members of Congress feel, with an assist from the Air Force, that NASA has become too filled with the point of view of the scientists and not enough with the military that this particular aspect of outer space has been passed in review, or is being reviewed in Congress. This is an example, a very recent one.

Now, I am not going to predict the end result and whether there will be any

change, but it is clear that Congress feels that listening to the scientists can be overdone, if the scientists are interested only in research for its own sake.

I haven't answered your question. I would simply say that there are certain occupations which necessarily will be overrepresented in Congress. In the first place, no one can run for Congress or go into Congress who is not of independent means unless he is part of a party machine which will look after him, or unless he is in an occupation which he can pick up when he returns. That eliminates for the most part school teachers and physicians. A lawyer is a member of a firm customarily with something between 25 and 102 partners. It is good advertising for the firm to have a member in Congress. He can pick up where he left off. It is even reported that some retainers will go to his firm because he is in Congress. In fact it is known that that is so. So that there is something weighted in that direction.

The average business executive cannot leave and come back and pick up. The labor leader, with the infighting for power that goes on in labor unions, dare not leave his post. So there are whole groups not represented.

Now, I think that with the scientists the principal reason is that temperamentally he is not interested in public affairs, just as in other occupations. The lawyer is. It is his bread and butter. He probably was a government major in college and followed that with law school.

That's just a little bit of the way things are.

QUESTION: Doctor, you mentioned the internal disciplining process which Congress occasionally exercises, and also the need for Congressmen to see first

hand what goes on. Would, for example, the alleged abuses of this junket privilege by especially Adam Clayton Powell or Mr. Passman come within this internal disciplining process?

DEAN GRIFFITH: There is a great deal of talk in the corridors on Capitol Hill about the undoubted abuses. They are at the present time trying to deal with this through public opinion in Capitol Hill circles. I would say that the more exposures on the part of the columnists the more those who are trying to clean up Congress in this regard will succeed. Bear in mind, however, that members of Congress, and Representative Powell is one of them, owe their tenure in Congress not to their colleagues but to their constituents, and these things may not impress the constituency too much, as over against the way in which a Congressman has succeeded in creating the image of fighting for the kind of things that Mississippi is fighting against.

QUESTION: It appears from time to time that in certain particular instances a single member of Congress through the rules or through his overriding authority has undue influence either to block measures or to alter them in such fashion as to reduce their effectiveness. Speaking again of this internal discipline, what is Congress's view on this sort of thing?

DEAN GRIFFITH. It is a complex view, depending largely upon the respect and the regard which they hold for the individual member. Let us call names at the moment. There is no doubt of the influence of Congressman Passman on foreign aid. There is no doubt that his colleagues rightly believe that the man is sincere in what he is doing. There is no doubt that a large part of Congress is glad to have

a watch dog, as he is, in connection with foreign aid.

You ask what Congress does about it. It goes to the Senate. You will see in the next few days what the effect is. It is reported and commonly believed in Congress that the Executive Branch does not request more than it wishes for foreign aid but more than is necessary. This is not confined to foreign aid. It is expected that the Appropriations Committees will wish to make a showing of economy. The fact is that foreign aid, give or take a couple hundred million, has consistently been in the neighborhood of \$4 billion year in and year out for the last X number of years. It is also known that all sorts of other devices, World Bank, and some of the other international lending authorities, have been found that make it possible to increase that figure beyond the figure that is carried in the actual appropriation for mutual security as such, or foreign aid as such.

So I think you have there the case study of a man whom Congress is glad there are not too many of in Congress, but they are glad there is one, you see. They respect him for this reason.

But they take ways and means to be sure that he is only one among many in influencing the final decision. So I say that what emerges is a consensus.

Now, I take that illustration because it is in the paper this morning. There are times when the motivation is less exalted than in this instance. You have to recognize that the Appropriations Committee is made up of a particular breed of cat, that it is the one place in Congress that is charged with the responsibility of bringing in the overall economy, the overall budget, of the Federal Government, and looking at everything from that standpoint and not merely from the function

to be performed by an appropriation.

There are certain things that are quite useful--unless there are some Army engineers here who might differ. You will see in the paper this morning that the so-called Pork Barrel Bill has just passed, and it has \$200 million of projects in it that were not approved by the Executive Branch. When this comes up to the Appropriations it has to go through another filter. It is important to many members that there be an experienced member representing their particular district after the next election. What happens? There is, I believe, a shelf of projects which have been authorized running into the billions, not just minor ones, for which almost no money has ever been appropriated, nor will it be.

This is not known about the Pork Barrel. Certainly the Pork Barrel is political to a very considerable extent. Certainly it is. But you see you can thank the organization of Congress for having a second filter through which these projects go. This is the role of the Appropriations Committee.

You do have other examples of people who, for personal reasons or otherwise, exercise an undue amount of power and utilize it for their own ends even, and they belong to this category which I think by and large the members of Congress deal with up to a point. They can't go the whole way on all of this.

QUESTION: It has been reported in the papers recently from up in New England that we may have an unusual association between a member of the Senate and the Executive Branch. How do you analyze this? Will this cause an unusual reaction on the part of the Legislature?

DEAN GRIFFITH: So far as I know there is no parallel in history on the basis

of which I could answer that question. In the event of the election between the two royal families of Massachusetts turning out as you suggest, the aforesaid gentleman will be a freshman Senator--so will the other one. If he wishes to belong to the club he will comport himself accordingly. If he does not I think his colleagues will have ways of dealing with him. They may have to adapt those ways to his channels to a center of power which they would not otherwise have to do. This is pure conjecture. He isn't there yet.

QUESTION: If the Congressional Committee is in reality in the pursuit of truth, isn't there a case to be made for the Executive Department having the right to cross-examine the witnesses or members of the committee?

DEAN GRIFFITH: There is a case there, yes. The procedures do not allow for this. I think you will find as part of the personal relationships which I mentioned that on every committee--not necessarily every subcommittee but every committee--there will be a member of Congress who will be happy to put the questions to witnesses which the Executive Branch would like to have put, and to bring up in executive session of the committee the kind of questions they would like to have asked of the members themselves. This is standard practice. It is part of the unofficial way in which Congress arrives at a consensus.

I think it is now true to say that every bill which any committee in Congress plans to take seriously, of any importance, goes to the Executive Branch for the comments of the Executive Branch often before hearings are held but certainly before the mark-up stage.

Congress is in a position to do this. This is a certain security which it did not

have before it had its own staff. It ~~feels~~ that it has there partly among its own members and partly among its staff people of competence to audit the views of the Executive Branch.

COLONEL SMITH: Dean Griffith, on this encouraging note, I thank you on behalf of all of us for a very fine presentation and very frank answers to our questions. Thank you, sir.