

THE NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

M. William P. Durkec

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Reviewed by: Capt. Casclazo Date: 30 Jul 63

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The National Civil Defense Program

25 October 1962

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
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

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25 October 1962

COLONEL INGMIRE: General Griswold; Admiral Rose; Gentlemen:

The major civil defense functions of the Office of Civil Defense, Civil and Defense Mobilization, more familiarly known - perhaps only known to us as OCDM - was transferred to the Department of Defense by Executive Order in 1961. This brought a considerable surge of enthusiasm and interest in civil defense, which I venture to say has been overtaken by the events of the last few days.

To speak to us this morning we have Mr. William P. Durkee, who, previous to his taking over his present position, was assigned to the Department of State. It is a pleasure to welcome to the combined audience Mr. Durkee, the Director for Federal Assistance in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense.

Mr. Durkee.

MR. DURKEE: Thank you, Colonel. Let me say at the beginning, that Mr. Pittman who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, is very sorry that he himself could not be here to talk to you this morning. When the Colonel introduced me and said that civil defense has been overtaken by the events of the last few days let me say that that seems to be the history of civil defense. We're overtaken and then we're undertaken, and that's part of our problem.

Let me give you some of the background that has gone into what we have now on hand in civil defense; what we're trying to do, because I think some perspective is essential to the understanding of the kinds of problems that we have and where we go

from here. You're all aware that civil defense was a vital function in the Second World War. In England I remember there were many jokes made about the fire wardens and those men in the steel hats that used to run around just before the war. I was over there shortly after the war began and a little after it stopped, when those gents got into action. They developed different ways of doing things in Civil Defense as a result of the Second World War, and from the experience in England particularly. Those were all focused in the Civil Defense structure that was created in the United States after World War II, starting back about 1950.

There was enough interest in the country here at that time to establish the FCDA, the Federal Civil Defense Agency, and to pass an Act on Civil Defense, which is still our statutory authority. The Act at that time placed the responsibility for civil defense on the states and localities in this country without very much federal responsibility. It also was based in theory and assumptions on World War II experience with a Civil Defense structure based on an ability of people in the country to move freely, the major task being to defend against blast damage, fire control, debris clearance, and mass casualty care.

Not much doctrine was changed in the intervening period from 1950 until last year. Many of the lessons of the development of new weapons techniques and the existence of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver those weapons were not incorporated into Civil Defense. It is true that there was a good deal of thought, then going on about it, but it never got really imbedded in the bureaucratic structure and got any kind of effective implementation in real activity.

When the present Administration came to power, one of the Acts that they took

in civil defense was to, in effect, reinstitute a civil defense program asking that it be up-dated, asking that the Congress of the United States, in May of the first year, for a substantial increase in funds for civil defense and transferring the responsibilities from the OCDM to the Department of Defense. It's clear, then, that a new base has been created. What have we done with this base, why have we done it, and where does it lead us, I think are things that you would probably like to know.

To begin with, we had to find out whether there was any real reason for civil defense. I think that you would assume, as we have assumed ourselves, that it would be silly to do something that is not useful. So that, we've been conducting over the past eight or nine months, a whole series of activities in the Department of Defense, using all of the latest intelligence; using target analysis techniques; using, in fact, all the information we could get about what the consequences of a nuclear attack on this country would be for Civil Defense.

Tomorrow I know many of you will hear Joseph Romm from our office, who will be dealing in some detail with the techniques of examination and study that have gone into our work, and so, I won't get into that this morning. Suffice it to say that all of our studies show that in any nuclear attack, aside from the blast and heat, which would certainly kill millions of people and about which it is not very practical to do anything, a major killer would be fall-out radiation. In fact, our studies show that over the foreseeable future in any conceivable range of attacks an effective system of protection of the country against fall-out radiation would save about 45 to 120 million people, depending upon the range of the attack, who would otherwise be killed without this protection.

Now, this is a very clear finding. At one end of the range it means the saving of a substantial body of people, and at the minimum end of the range it means a substantial number of people for the reconstruction of society in this country. At no time have we talked publicly nor will we talk publicly that Civil Defense is any panacea or that Civil Defense makes warfare in any way a possibility or an event which any sane person could welcome. But it does have, if it's implemented properly, a lifesaving potential which is significant for this country.

Now, in 1958 the National Academy of Sciences Civil Defense Committee, after extensive study, declared - and I must say when I say "extensive studies," many of these studies are new; some of you know better than I do that the study of radiation itself is still a new science. We found around the country as we've gone to try to develop our program, something which shouldn't surprise us. But for example, among architects and engineers there is almost no understanding of radiation or radiation problems, so that even in the design of new buildings where this may be a problem, they have to learn something for the first time.

In any event, the National Academy of Sciences which was following this subject declared in 1958 that there was no technical reason why protection from fall-out of radiation couldn't be achieved. These were the conclusions of our studies and it is upon this base that we reinstated the Civil Defense Program in this country.

Let me tell you what the sum and substance of that program is, and I will tell you a little about some of our administrative problems and a little about the structure through which we work. If fall-out radiation is a feature of a nuclear war about which you can do something, what do you do, and what do you do about blast and heat

about which it's much more difficult? Let me deal with the more difficult phase of it first.

Our analysis of the problem of blast and heat, I think, is one which you can make yourself, without very much study. We determined it would be very difficult to do anything about blast and heat effectively. When I say heat I mean fire too. If you tried to do something it would be very expensive. If you tried to do something, and even if you were willing to spend the money on it, it would be very difficult to manage. Because, in this period of missiles and short warning-time there would be very little time to get to the shelter that would give you that kind of protection.

Even if you achieved all of these things, the magnitude of expenditure and the nature of the system that you would have to create would make it certainly competitive with active military defense expenditures. And for all these reasons we projected this approach. There are those still in the country who do advocate this, but this is not our program.

Our program, therefore, is for fall-out protection alone. The first leg of this program is to do a very sensible thing, we think, which is to find in the country all the present buildings and structures that have any capacity at all to give protection against radiation. We've set up certain standards, scientifically arrived at, and we have decided that maximum protection would be achieved for the greatest number of people, by having a hundred protective factor. That is, a protective factor in terms of your shielding from the radiation, which would make the radiation inside a building 100% less inside than it is outside.

What we've done, in a word, is to train the Army Corps of Engineers and the

Bureau of Naval Yards and Docks, who have in turn trained 1,500 to 2,000 architects and engineers around the country, and for the past six or seven months we have been conducting an inventory of all existing structures in the United States that could give this kind of protection. Now, in the process of doing this - and it has been kind of complicated - we have isolated a total of 500,000 buildings in the country that had, potentially, this capacity. We went through a process by which these building structures were analyzed, and about 200,000 of those structures were dropped out of the initial analysis. A total, then, of about 350,000 buildings were actually analyzed and what we call "Fosdick Forms" created on these buildings.

These Fosdick Forms are, in fact, a rather complicated series of architectural and engineering notations on the building structure itself. In order to process this thing as rapidly as we could we had to invent a way of getting it processed by computer machines and we have done that by way of the Bureau of Standards and the Bureau of the Census. In effect, we've been able to make computations on these machines by machine in a second what it manually would take an architect or engineer about eight or ten hours to do himself.

The result of this has been that we have gotten and now have in our hands, the first phase of this national inventory. This shows us that there are spaces for at least 60 million people in the United States in existing buildings where you and I could go tomorrow morning and get this kind of protection. They are located in about 112 or 115,000 buildings. What we're doing now in relation to this space is what we call "Phase II." We're having architects and engineers in the Corps of Engineers go back to the buildings as a result of the findings and computations of Phase I, to do

two things; one, to locate the actual area locations of the spaces in the buildings and mark them; and two, make calculations on what improvements could be made in that building which would increase the radiation protective capacity of that building and cost it out. We are at about the half-way mark in this process.

But what we've created is a technical resource in terms of existing buildings which are in existence and which could be used right now. In addition to the hundred protective factor space in these buildings we also locate what we call "sub-standard space" which is space which would give a lesser percentage of protection, but which is still very useful and much better than nothing. This goes down to what we call the 40 protective factor.

Well, now, all these resources exist and what are we doing with them? In order to make this space available and in order to make the system sensible, we had to make certain assumptions. One, that in a nuclear attack all effective outside help for any area of the country would be cut off. Two, that people in the shelters, because of the nature of fall-out radiation which would virtually cover the entire country in any sizeable attack, would have to live in the shelter anywhere from three days to two weeks. Three, that if this were the fact, we would have to put minimal supplies in the shelters in order for people to survive if they have to stay in for this long a period.

So, what we had to invent, what we have invented, and what we have now produced is a system of austere survival supplies which we propose to put into these shelters around the country. They're composed of water drums, medical and sanitary kits, food packets, and radiological detection instruments. They are being produced now

by about 500 different manufacturing plants in the United States. It's a most complicated logistical exercise. The medical kits, for example, the various components of them for 60 million people, have to be produced in a variety of different manufacturing outlets as do the sanitation kit articles. They, in turn, from the many sub-manufacturers have to be sent to a central point for assembly, and after assembly they have to be dispatched to 81 federal warehouses around the country which are shipping points. This seems simple so far. It is relatively simple, as complicated as it is.

Our real problems begin when we start talking to municipal governments, private building owners, about what we're trying to do. Let me, before I dive into that, give you an idea of the kind of structure within which Civil Defense has to work, because I'd like to have you have an understanding of the difficulties of getting something like this done.

All 50 states in the country have civil defense structures. There are around the country 913 political subdivisions that have an organized civil defense structure below the state level. There are spent every year about \$12 million on the part of the federal government and something like \$15 to \$20 million on the part of state and local governments on civil defense in an organized fashion. Now, this isn't a bad structure, and there are some very good people in it. It has never had much attention in the states or in cities. The personnel has generally been of unequal quality.

Before the Office of Civil Defense got this program, the OCDM introduced a new feature into the civil defense structure around the country, the application of the merit system in relationship to the donation of federal funds. This has resulted in

a great improvement, we believe, in the quality and caliber of the civil defense people, so I think a reasonable judgment on this is that 50 states do have some civil defense - unequal, but do have some; major metropolitan cities do have some civil defense; and there is a base enough for us to build on, which is what we're trying to do.

Our problems begin when we try to define what the respective roles of the federal government, the state governments, and the municipal governments are. We are authorized by the Congress to make matching fund grants for Personnel and Administrative expenses, for the expenses of what we call "Emergency Operating Centers and for Hardware" - that is, Civil Defense hardware - to match funds appropriated by state or municipal governments. This matching funds program really says that the federal government will give money if it believes that money can be effectively spent, but the federal government has no authority over the states nor over the localities about the kind of civil defense program they'll have. We can't give directions to any states. We can't give directions to any municipality.

Now, any Civil Defense Director in any municipality is also the subject of his own legislative and appropriations procedures in his own community. He has to appear before his City Council. He has to get funds appropriated and he has to have something to tell the City Council he thinks ought to be done in his community. I can assure you, as you probably already know, that there is not only a great deal of misunderstanding, but in the past there has been a great deal of reluctance on the part of City Councils to give any money. This has its ups and downs.

When the President came back from Berlin last year and talked about civil de-

fense in July, there was a sudden upsurge of interest. There has been very recently, a very sudden upsurge of interest; in fact, in the last two days. Let me give you some examples. In order to use the space that exists in these buildings we've had to invent a new kind of legal document which has never been in existence before. It is, in effect, an agreement between the federal government, a local government and a building owner, that in time of an emergency the space in his building could be used as a public shelter and that right now he will allow the space in his building to be used for the storage of supplies that would be used by the people who would inhabit his building in time of an emergency.

Now, this has been a hell of a thing. When it started out it was a five-page document and no building owner in the country could have understood any part of it. We have now reduced it to one page and the initial reaction of the Lawyer Associations and the Attorneys General of the various states was that it was impossible to do this on one page and there must be something wrong with it. They've been crawling over this document and we have piles of communications this high on it, but nobody has been able to destroy it. We are using it and it is effective.

But for a Civil Defense Director, what we're asking in your hometown is for a Civil Defense Director to go around - say, if you were in Washington D. C.; I can't remember the exact figure, but I think there are around 3 to 4,000 buildings; it might not be quite that large - maybe it's a thousand; let's say it's a thousand. The Civil Defense Director has to go around to a thousand building owners and make them understand what this program is and why he needs that space; make the building owner understand that he ought to give up some valuable storage space in order

to take these supplies. He has to, if the building owner agrees, get this license signed. He then sends the license to us and we go through a great rigamarole in terms of reporting this license and making it trigger off a mechanism which gets supplies into a federal warehouse for this Civil Defense Director to get into that building.

He has to have his municipality agree that they will maintain these supplies which are in this building, and then he has to do something more which is to get his municipality agree to actually undertake the expenditure to have those supplies taken out of the warehouse and put into that building. Now, this is a hell of a problem.

Let me give you one specific example of how it goes up and down. In one city in the United States, up until Sunday, the mayor said, "You will go and get the licenses by yourself; I'm not going to help you. You will not be able to use any city trucks. You will not be able to use any city employees." This was a city which had, let's say, about a thousand buildings and the Civil Defense structure in the city was composed of four people led by a woman. On Tuesday morning the Mayor called the woman and said, "I'm going to give you help. You can use my city trucks. I'm going to send license letters out to all builders in this community asking them to sign up. And, incidentally, could you give me a list of all the buildings in this city which have this protective space in it? In fact, I'd like it in three copies. I want one for my office, one for my home, and one for my pocket." That's a true story.

Now, this program which we've created is not a crash program and we're frankly faced with the problem now of having the shelter survey half done. We've got all the basic survey done. We know where the buildings are that this space is

located in. We're in the process of actually locating the space in these buildings. The supplies for these buildings - 37 million of them - have been ordered. They are still in the pipeline. We have started putting supplies in buildings in about 22 to 24 cities. We will not be able to, for obvious reasons, catch up with the sudden demand that these buildings be stocked and that everything be marked. There is no way that we can do it and we're going to have to explain that we just can't do it this way.

There are some things we can do, however, to make civil defense more effective and more clear in this situation. We can point out that this is the program, which is what we are doing. We can also point out the fact that even though we've located all of this building space this is not the entire solution to the problem of civil defense in terms of protection against radiation. There are many areas in the country, particularly rural areas, where there are no buildings. The Southeast of the United States has very few buildings of this kind. In these areas a home shelter or a temporary shelter of some kind which you can create in a reasonable period of time, are the only protection that you could get against fall-out radiation.

We have issued publications on the subject. The Department of Agriculture has a very good service through their extension service, into the rural areas, capable of giving technical advice on these subjects. We're going to have to rely on the Civil Defense structure which has the information, to inform citizens who call, that this is the alternate way for them to get protection in areas where this kind of building that we've been talking about either does not exist or is not located within a reasonable distance of it.

Now, as you can imagine, there have been all kinds of requests coming in in the last few days. The booklet that was issued earlier in this year, in January, entitled "Fall-out Protection," does cover all these subjects. Just the same as with the rest of this, those books have been lying on the shelf. I noticed when I came to work at the office yesterday, in the Pentagon, that we'd had a supply of these booklets at each one of the entrances. When I went out on Saturday it was a very large supply; when I came back on Tuesday morning it was almost gone. This is true in the rest of the country. So, in spite of our intention that civil defense not be a program of ups and downs we have to be realistic and know that it does have ups and downs, and to deal with the situation as best we can.

Let me deal with a few of the other - and I'm just really trying to hit the high spots as I go along on this - aspects of civil defense which are important, but which aren't quite as dramatic as the shelter situation. One of the problems of effective action in the kind of civil defense that we're talking about, is really two things. One is the technical systems that we try to create to give technical capacity to do the things that need to be done, and the other thing is dealing with the human element which is trying to make people understand what the problem is.

Now, we've had two kinds of problems in this relation. One is the public problem that I've been briefly speaking about. But even more important is the problem of dealing with the professionals in the field who are now having to change their ideas about the way to do things. And this is damned difficult. They still think that evacuation is a feasible course of action. This is the only way they can see to deal with the subject of saving their people in a metropolitan area from the effects of nuclear

warfare. When you point out to them, all right, this is all right if you think that you really can evacuate, you assume that you're going to have enough warning time to do so, you will have to have prepared for you in the evacuation area, suitable shelters to protect the people in that area from fall-out radiation which would reach them even though you're out of the blast and heat range of a nuclear weapon.

They simply haven't thought about those things. They haven't prepared for such eventuality, so we have this kind of problem. That's one problem. The other kind of problem that we have is the actual problem of creating the systems and the people to run the systems which would be essential in any effective civil defense other than the protection against the fall-out radiation itself.

Now, there are two actual systems. One is a radiological defense system. As a part of the kit in each shelter, and around the country in addition to the kits in shelters, there are 150,000 - or we proposed the creation of 150,000 - monitoring stations. I'm sure you're all aware that the nature of fall-out radiation is such that the ordinary senses are absolutely no use to you; you've got to have special equipment - these instruments - to tell where it is, what the intensity of it is, in order to protect yourself against it.

Within a building, for example, radiation monitors using these instruments are absolutely essential to monitor the radiation that's coming in the building, because as the radiation declines outside, the people who were crammed into the building space can move to outer areas as the intensity of the radiation goes down. Also, the radiation monitor will be able to tell the people in the shelter when it's safe for them to go out. The radiation monitors in the monitoring stations that we are

creating, will be for control purposes and getting a national radiation pattern. We have got to train people to use these instruments. Nobody in the country, virtually, knows anything about these instruments. So that, this is a really difficult task. You can't train people to use these instruments overnight. We calculate that a minimum of five to six hours to train just a simple monitor is necessary, and the instructors who it's necessary to train, to train others, will have to receive a much longer course and will have to be certified to use this sort of training stuff by the Atomic Energy Commission. So, we have this enormous kind of training problem.

In addition, the technical needs of a really effective warning system are clear. There is in existence a warning system which depends upon an open line plus a siren system at various points throughout the country. We know from both research and actual experience, that the sirens themselves are simply not effective means of warning the population, of an attack. It's not effective, really, for two reasons: One, there is a great deal of confusion about what the siren actually means; and on many occasions, even in the course of an ordinary day if a siren went off you would not even hear it.

There has been work in progress for some years on what is called a "Near System." That's an electro-magnetic system of warning which would in effect put a warning device into every home in the country. Exhaustive studies have shown that the installation of such a system is technically feasible. It would work. You can create a generating system and a system of putting a little black box in everybody's home, technically. But the problems are two-fold: One, expense, and two, how you would actually get it done in the country. We are at the point in this program where

we have a system created and we are testing in about eight locations in the United States, with the cooperation of various utility companies, a near system in operation. That is, the generator and the actual installation of some instruments in locations to test how the system works, what the maintenance problems are, what the operational problems are, and what the financial problems are.

As you can imagine, a great deal of complicated managerial questions are involved. Should the federal government assume the whole cost? If it assumes the whole cost what is the responsibility of the utility company itself for the maintenance and operation of the system? If they won't maintain and operate the system should the federal government do it? If the federal government should do it, how should it do it? Who would they have do it? There are a million questions of this kind. The essential intention of this system is to create a reliable warning system for the country as a whole.

Now, these are the two essential systems in addition to communications that go along with the shelter system itself. I think you're all aware of the technical reasons for CONELRAD in terms of detection of aircraft which has long since vanished from the scene. We're working with the federal communications system to in effect broaden the spectrum of CONELRAD. That is, making available a broader band of radio frequencies for use in a civil defense emergency, and this program is in process. We are also hardening various strategic radio sites around the country against fall-out, for the same reason that we have a fall-out program. If we don't give fall-out protection to radio stations as well as anybody else, radio stations would not be operative in an emergency of that kind.

So, these are the essential programs that are underway, and the reasons for them. Let me say a word about relations with Congress. They're even more variable than our relations with the public. The first budget in Civil Defense that the President asked for got a good deal of money. We got money for this shelter survey. In the last year we went back as a part of the Department of Defense, for an extension of this budget. Mr. Romm, again, will be speaking to you in some detail on the budget and the budget's break-down of our program, tomorrow. Suffice it to say that our legislative program was two-fold - one, requesting funds to continue the development of such systems as the near system; to continue and complete the survey both in terms of the actual physical survey and of the procurement of supplies for it; in other words, the extension of the present program.

There was also a request for the creation of a new program. This was to authorize us to make special payments to educational, hospital and welfare institutions around the country, for the incorporation of shelter space in new buildings as they are constructed. Now, one of the extraordinary things that we found in the shelter survey is, that it is very - and this is the thing that architects and engineers are just learning to understand - that with building design you can build in protection against fall-out as a matter of course in the construction of the building. And that the additional cost of so building in a design is often much less than the difference in cost between various bidders you get for the same job.

For example, the incremental cost may be 5% of the total building cost and when you get various bids from various contractors on a job of this kind, the range of bids is much larger than the 5% than it would cost for this kind of protection. So that,

there is going on in the country, a great deal of intensive work led by the American Institute of Architects, on this problem of building design and then incorporation. What we therefore proposed to the Congress was, that we be prepared to pay for a certain portion of this incremental cost in institutions which have difficulty in financing their operation.

Now, the legislative procedure is such that Civil Defense has always been treated separately from military appropriations in the House - the Independent Offices Appropriations under Chairman Thomas. Chairman Thomas - and also this new program called for new legislation, so that Chairman Thomas was able to say to us when we went before him for money, that because the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate hadn't authorized the legislation, "We're not going to give you any money and we can't even consider it for this incentive program." He went a little further than that, though. He said, in effect, "I don't think Civil Defense ought to be anything but research." He's been saying that for 10 years, and he cut us down to almost nothing.

The President then sent a letter to Chairman Thomas and to Mr. Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee - Senator Russell - Senator Hayden - and he laid it on the line. He stated very clearly that this was an important program and that he would like it backed by Congress. This was responded to by Congress in two ways. One, the Senate restored the funds and there were a significant number of statements made by leading Senators on the Senate Floor, which, in effect, said, "Look, this is a sensible program. Two, it's time the country fish or cut bait on this. Either we are going to do something about this - and it's practical to do something; it has been

demonstrated that it is - or let's all forget about it. We have a responsibility to do this. We can't be forced into something by public opinion. Public opinion isn't going to demand this; we have to give the leadership in this ourselves."

This was reflected in the Senate action where a vote was taken on Civil Defense appropriations, I think, for the first time, in which 68 of the Senators voted for the Civil Defense Program and 14 voted against it. Chairman Vinson and Chairman Thomas finally restored a substantial part of our funds. Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee announced, in reply to the President's letter, that he was holding hearings on Civil Defense early in the next session and he wished to start with another aspect of our program which was the construction of shelters in federal buildings.

So, all in all, I think the last year has seen some changes in the confusion and difficulties about these things. One, Civil Defense has been transferred to the Department of Defense. It is a civilian program; it is not a military program. The advantages of being in the Department of Defense are enormous. All of the military services have been magnificent in their support of us; magnificent in the resources and assets that they have given to us to enable us to do the things that we have done. We ourselves believe - and there is a joint task force in the Department of Defense now studying this problem - that an effective civil defense is a mighty important backing for effective military defense. If civilians need the kind of protection we are talking about, so do military people.

We're inclined to believe that an effective civil defense is not a deterrent in itself, but it certainly lends credence to any deterrent. If people are prepared to take

this kind of action they're prepared to do what's necessary in the hard world of this kind. Two, we have created the outlines of a practical civil defense structure which doesn't create a "White Elephant" called Civil Defense, across the country. It is built into society as it now exists and it is practical enough to give real protection. And three, we've had opportunity enough to bring to new committees of Congress, some idea about what Civil Defense is and what it needs to be, which, I think, has never been done before.

Let me conclude by saying that the Russians have gone through very much the same kind of sequence of thinking that we ourselves have. If I could, in a capsule form, give you their thought processes, as we understand them, from the various intelligence we have on the subject, it would be roughly this; Mr. Khrushchev and Mikoyan, and whoever else has been following this said, "The weapons are too horrible and we can't do anything about them. There is nothing we can do about them." I think that has been the reaction in this country, both officially, and public.

A little more thought led them to believe that they ought to try to do something about it and they went through the same kind of analysis we did - if you want to do something about it what can you do and how much would it cost? And they came out at the same end in terms of extensive blast or fire protection programs and have, in fact, developed - and a little later, than I think we have - a program of fall-out protection in existing structures.

And when I've told you these things, those of you who have access to the classified reports on this subject, I think, will find this spelled out in some detail.

Well, that's my story this morning. I'm sorry it has been a little incoherent,

but somebody stuffed these papers in my hand last night as I went home and I haven't even had a chance to study them.

QUESTION: Of the structures which are capable of resisting radiation, what percentage are located in areas which would be considered to be prime targets and presumably subject to heat and blast damage?

MR. DURKEE: Did everybody hear the question? Of the buildings that have been located in the survey, what percentage are buildings in what would be considered prime target areas for blast and fire?

The 112,000 buildings which have been located are largely in metropolitan areas; this is clear. The analysis that I gave you of lifesaving of a shelter system ranging from 45 million to 120 million people who would die if they didn't have this protection, but who would not be killed in the blast and fire, assumes a whole range of kinds of attack. This is net savings no matter what kind of attack. One thing I think the Department of Defense has concluded without any question here, is that you can't do the kind of assumed target analysis on the kind of judgment that you have just made. You can't assume any particular place is going to be a target.

No matter what the target is - let's say, for example, that you had an effective anti-missile defense system around the metropolitan areas to prevent blast and fire damage. The missiles that could be delivered, not at those cities, if they were ground bursts against military targets or any other targets outside those city areas would still produce fall-out which would drift in and kill the people of that city just as effectively - not quite as rapidly - so that, even with that kind of system you

have got to have protection against radiation to have any kind of effective defense. So, my response to you is, that if the city with those buildings which only give fall-out protection, is an actual target, the people in that city would be killed, a very large part of them, although there is some blast protection in some of the larger buildings.

QUESTION: Sir, it would seem apparent that shock and fear are two devices by which you seem to get action in civil defense, and get an awareness on the part of the American people. Do these two persuaders have any place in any design or program that you are now contemplating?

MR. DURKEE: Well, we have not been at liberty to launch them as weapons; I'll say that. I think our problem is how to capitalize on them, and I think it's difficult. I would assume that we have reached a new level in public understanding now, and probably will have a more sustained public response than has been true in the past. At least, I hope so. But it has been hard to capitalize on fears as an effective way of accomplishing very much. We're hopeful that it will turn into an intelligent and continuous interest. I suspect that it will.

QUESTION: What responsibility does your office have for planning for maintenance of civil order, and if you do have responsibility would you give us a clue to your thinking in that direction?

MR. DURKEE: Let me read to you what the responsibilities which were assigned to the Department of Defense are. The Secretary of Defense was ordered specifically to develop and execute the following programs: A fall-out shelter program, a chemical biological and radiological warfare defense program, all steps necessary

to warn or alert federal, military and civilian authorities, state officials and civilian population, all functions pertaining to the communications including a warning network reporting on monitoring instructions to shelters and communications between authorities, emergency assistance to state and local government in a post-attack period, including water, debris, fire, health, traffic, police and evacuation capabilities, protection and an emergency operational capability of state and local governmental agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of government, and programs for making financial contributions to the states.

We have assumed that our responsibilities cover the kinds of tasks which you relate. Law and order, which I think is the subject of your question, is first and foremost the responsibility of the local authorities throughout the country. The local law enforcement agencies have a very clear responsibility in these circumstances to maintain law and order, and we are telling them so. Now, one of the things that this means for us is that we have to work with policemen and firemen to make them understand what the nature of such a nuclear catastrophe would be, and the kind of responsibilities that they have to assume. This isn't always easy.

I recall very recently we had a school in Battle Creek for some firemen around the country and they were top firemen. We lectured to them about civil defense, about fall-out, and tried to indicate, without rubbing it in, that even a fireman is going to have to take cover and he might not be able to fight fires. When we got through making this presentation one fireman got up from the audience and said, "Well, that's all very well, but I'm a fireman and damn it, I'm going to fight fires and to hell with fall-out." It's just another example of the real difficulty of making

understood what the problems are.

QUESTION: My question pertains to the warning system. You mentioned sirens. In the metropolitan area the sirens go off and this essentially means turn on your radios and prepare to take shelter. Now, what is the warning system as pertains to radio today? You mentioned CONELRAD and now we're turning on our radios. How do we get these supplementary warnings or instructions?

MR. DURKEE: There are two warning signals in existence. One is the signal which says turn on your radio and get instructions. The other is take immediate cover. Now, the purpose of our work with the Federal Communications Agency is to increase the capability of getting radio instructions out in response to that first warning signal. As you know, we've been heretofore confined to two channels. The practical effect of this work now is to make the whole spectrum of radio broadcasting channels available to us. But at the same time we have to take steps to protect the capability of the broadcasting industry to perform these broadcasts during such an emergency, so that we have a program, as I said before, actually building in fall-out protection for the transmitter and operating stations in selected locations.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the program, if any, of any of our allies - Canada and the NATO countries particularly. Do they have any?

MR. DURKEE: Canada has a program which is a very close parallel of ours, and they are following our developments very closely. There is a close liaison between us. I don't believe that they have yet launched a national shelter survey of the kind that we have, but in all other respects they are pretty close to us.

I think the United Kingdom has not done very much. They do have some system

of emergency control centers around their countries, but they still are relying on some form of evacuation and haven't given much attention to fall-out. The French government has given much more attention, and in fact, they've gotten a booklet out which is very much similar to ours. The German Government has taken steps even in advance of us in making mandatory fall-out shelter construction in new buildings, I believe, both private and public. I'm not exactly certain of that. The Swedes, Norwegians and the Swiss have a much more advanced civil defense program than we do.

QUESTION: Do you recommend any changes in the policy of the financing of Civil Defense at the federal and state levels that might make it more successful?

MR. DURKEE: That's a hard question. The automatic response, I guess is, to say yes, more money would do a lot more good.

QUESTION: The states and localities are always pleading poverty - they have no money. Have you decided what it would cost the national or federal government?

MR. DURKEE: I think there are obviously some localities where federal funds would make a difference, and I think some federal funds are necessary. But I must say I don't think that the problem of civil defense, except insofar as I've explained it to you already, is a matter of money. I think it's a matter of intent and will, and although we could use more funds, by and large the major problem is not funds but the determination and purpose to get something done. It's on this assumption that we've based our request for funds and I think for any practical future of this program people have to understand and want to get done what needs to be done, and money is simply a tool in that direction.

QUESTION: Most of the public construction going on in the country today is in schools. These are locally financed. Does your office provide any financial support and direction to local governments in connection with providing shelter facilities in these schools?

MR. DURKEE: The major purpose of the incentive program about which I spoke very briefly, was to authorize us to provide payments to schools for the purpose of building fall-out protection in the school buildings, either by modification of existing buildings or incorporation of such features in new construction. Congress has not yet heard hearings on this legislation. The President has asked for hearings and we are hopeful we'll have hearings in the next session.

In the meantime what we are doing is working with the American Institute of Architecture and have in the course of development now, I think, something close to 200 designs for shelter construction in schools, which we are making available to school construction authorities and these school boards across the country. In other words, we have paid for the design work and are making these designs available. Beyond that we have no authority to go.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the use of reserve forces in the Civil Defense Program and whether or not any changes in the laws are necessary?

MR. DURKEE: I mentioned that there is a joint task force in the Pentagon. Ourselves, the Armed Forces and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are studying the whole range of problems, both in relationship to Civil Defense support of the military and military support of Civil Defense. One of the conclusions that has been arrived at and is being acted upon now in a tentative fashion is the use of stand-by reservists in

Civil Defense. There is a tentative recommendation which has been accepted, provided that it is a practical matter on both sides, that standby reservists can be used by Civil Defense authorities and get point credit for their service in Civil Defense.

The Armed Forces are making an inventory through their channels and we're doing the same through Civil Defense channels to get some idea of the numbers and the skills that are necessary to put this program into effect and there is going to be a real need for it. And the desire to undertake such work, if it is there, I'm sure will cause it to be put into operation. This has not generally been made public, although it has gone out through Civil Defense channels.

QUESTION: It seems we're not doing anything but talking about schools where we really do need protection. Now, maybe we should go back to work on some of these slab foundations. It's nice that we do have structures in federal reserve areas but at certain times of the day it might be tough to get into the city, as we have learned it is to evacuate and get out of the city. We conceivably are setting up a situation where we are adding more bonus points for cities as targets by just being the only place where we can save people.

Most of your brochures say that individual shelters - using existing structures where people live probably makes the most sense for saving the most people, and it turns out to be a reasonably cheap thing, done on an individual basis. Is there any thought given, other than some mention of motivating people to build home shelters by giving them some sort of incentive program like writing off their income tax?

MR. DURKEE: There has been some thought given to that. The reason that we have not recommended that a write-off on income tax be granted is because the

benefit of such a write-off would accrue on an unequal basis. Those that could afford to put in such shelters would get the benefit of the write-off, whereas those who wouldn't get the benefit of such write-off in terms of their income would get no benefit from it at all. So, it would be, in fact, an unequal incentive and not applied uniformly across the country.

Now, there have been - and we have recommended to the various states that a tax on such home shelters be not applied in the regular fashion; that no extra taxation in terms of property taxation be levied against the building of such shelters, and many states are, in fact, following this procedure. This, although it's no incentive, it's at least no penalty if such a plan is followed.

QUESTION: You discussed the shelters. However, I have heard nothing about other essential services that need protection too. For instance, a blast in a big city would knock out the water, electricity and gas services completely. It's quite possible that fall-out would not yet commence to ruin the water supply in the adjacent areas for some time. Yet, if a blast happens your water supply is going to be knocked out because all your pipes are going to be busted, the water will run through the city and there will be no more water pressure. The gas is going to feed the fires and make them much worse. And electricity is going to be completely zero also. How about a fail-safe system which would automatically shut these things off when they get blown up?

MR. DURKEE: Well, frankly, there are a hell of a lot/^{of}systems which would make it much easier for us to protect ourselves that you could put into effect, but nobody has told us that it would be very practical to get the money for yet. We are

studying problems of just this kind. We, for example, are making an inventory through the - working with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, about the water supply, the pumping stations, and the whole structure in the country, so that we can get some idea of what kind of problem it will be, and applying various kinds of attack to this system to see what would be left and what kind of problem that you have. We're doing the same thing with power stations.

You've very graphically given an account of the situation that would occur in a community that was next to the blast and heat area. If you have a community, say, that's 50 or 100 miles away from it, that hadn't been a target, which has independent grid systems and which has its own water supply, the danger to them is going to be the fall-out which will come in a half-hour or two hours. They have to go under cover. None of those essential services are affected by the blast and heat; they're still in existence. But unless they have fall-out protection at the power station - at the pumping station - for the personnel, the personnel in those are going to be killed. And the system, insofar as it depends on the operation of the system by those people, would not become operative.

So that, we're specifically now looking at what it takes in order to protect the public utility systems from fall-out in order to keep them going. We will then get to the blast and heat after that as they come up.

MR. MUNCY: Mr. Durkee, on behalf of the Commandant and the two colleges, we thank you for an excellent lecture, most thought-provoking, and delivered under extraordinary conditions.