



NATIONAL MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING

Mr. Edward L. Keenan

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Reviewed by: Colonel Edgar J. Ingwire 19 November 1962

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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
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Reporter--Grace R. O'Toole



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COLONEL DAVIS: No study of human resources can be complete without a look at our manpower mobilization planning, because the nature of previous conflicts has always allowed time in which to mobilize the required manpower. But the nuclear age has changed all this. Our manpower mobilization plans for tomorrow must compress to the minimum the time needed to marshal this valuable resource.

We are indeed fortunate to have as our speaker this morning the man directly responsible for the National Plan which will govern the mobilization of our manpower in the event of an emergency.

It is with sincere pleasure that I present Mr. Edward L. Keenan, Director, Manpower and Services Office, Office of Emergency Planning. His topic is National Manpower Mobilization Planning.

Mr. Keenan.

MR. KEENAN: Colonel Davis, Admiral Rose, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces:

I was looking over some of the material that had been presented on manpower by myself and others in earlier years in preparing for this conference, and some of it seemed a little bit out of date in light of the activities of the past two weeks.

We have talked before here about the necessity of having a plan that is different from plans we have had before, plans that will assure survival if we

should be subjected to a thermonuclear attack, plans that should be understood not only by all government people, military and nonmilitary, but to the extent possible by the whole country. In all honesty, I am not sure that we have achieved that objective. Although we have a National Manpower Plan and we have taken a number of steps to see that people are familiar with it, I think when we stopped to look at our whole card about 10 days ago none of us felt that we had achieved anything like the degree of readiness that we must achieve.

I would like today to talk a little bit about some of the complexities in the manpower area. I would like then to describe the structure, the organization, that we have established for administering manpower programs in the event of a real emergency. I would then like to talk about the relationship of that manpower structure to other elements of preparedness, particularly as it relates to the management of other resources. Then I would like to spend just a few minutes talking about the state of readiness in this area, and, of course, allow the usual time for questions.

Of course our manpower mobilization planning, as is the case of any other resource, is directed toward the overall objective of making certain that we have the capability we desire under any set of circumstances, and, of course, the circumstance that is the most difficult to plan for, with the economic consequences of nuclear attack.

We know fairly well that system for mobilizing manpower for limited war. We have to do that and we have to be ready for a new kind of mobilization that none of us has ever experienced.

The end result of all this planning that we are undertaking and have been undertaking in the past few years must cover, therefore, two somewhat divergent and to some extent different, if not irreconcilable, capabilities--first, a unity of action decentrally taken but centrally coordinated to the greatest extent possible, and, on the other hand, the almost direct opposite, the complete need for flexibility in administering manpower programs, because, if we should suffer nuclear attack, it is entirely possible that the manpower situation will be quite different near attack areas than it will be from those areas that are spared.

We may have plenty in the midst of shortages and shortages in the midst of plenty. The problem will be how to bring people where they are needed from where they are under nuclear conditions.

In contrast with many resources--single-purpose resources, mechanical resources, gasoline, food, construction and production--we are not dealing with a static, a material thing. We are dealing with a resource that is human and fluid. The occupational makeup of our work force changes all the time and, just to divert for a moment, it is going to change more than we have ever known it in the past in the next 10 years. We have all looked at the trends in occupations. We know that in the midst of the unemployment that we have today there are pages after pages of advertisements for openings, even though we have this unemployment. We are short on brainpower. We are short in the new occupations. We look at the want ads in the paper and we see the names of jobs that we don't understand, occupational titles that didn't exist 6 or 12 months ago. We are going to have more of that kind of thing. Though our great strength is

our productivity and our skills, the fact that we get so much more out of our work force than does any other nation in the world, we must realize that if a real emergency should come the shortages we would have would be in the very same areas where we have shortages in relative peacetime today--our scientific occupations, the technological skills, the new and poorly understood term, technician, where we need thousands and thousands more and where the military would need thousands and thousands more if we had stepped-up mobilization.

These human beings can't be stockpiled. Some of these occupations we can't train for overnight. It takes a lot less time to build the laboratories than it does to train the men that we need in them.

So we have the strength of our diversification, our productivity, and our skills at the same time that we have the shortages in the rare-bird skills today.

Another principle that we have to keep in mind when we think about manpower and the mobilization of manpower is the interlocking relationship between this resource and other resources, how a decision in one resource area affects another, and whether or not it is wise to plan a complete program for one resource without at some stage of the game making an overall resource-management plan. We wouldn't be too well off to end up with cadres of manpower available for specific tasks if we didn't have the transportation, the gasoline, and the specific skills of the manpower needed to carry them out.

Although we generally speak of manpower as a resource, perhaps the resource that would be the most critical under nuclear-attack conditions, manpower is also a service. It is both a resource and a service.

As the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning brought out so specifically when he addressed this group, I believe, September 28, there is another principle that we must keep in mind as we look at manpower and other planning. That is that, in the kind of situation we may face, this planning could not be done nor could the program be administered solely by the Federal Government. We have in the past based all our planning on the fact that the Federal Government, in the event of a national emergency, does the job. They put into effect those controls that are needed in the economy--controlled material plans, economic stabilization measures. The war powers are Federal powers. But we must recognize that in a nuclear-attack situation there would be a period of time--and how long a period of time no one knows--when the Federal Government as we know it could be relatively inoperable. It could be out of touch. It may not be able to put into effect those measures that the country would ordinarily look to the Federal Government to put into effect.

So, as a part of our planning in the manpower area as well as in other areas, we have to think in terms of self-executing responses. We have to think in terms of the State and local governments being prepared to exercise functions that they have never heretofore exercised. It is entirely conceivable that for some period of time State and local governments would have to administer Federal laws. They might temporarily have to carry out specific Federal responsibility. As I move along I would like to talk a little bit more about that.

As I hinted in early remarks, when we think of thermonuclear war and prepare for it, there seems to be a need to discard concepts that we have had in the

past that are based on dealing with the problems of a conventional war or a limited war. Yes, under nuclear attack we would have to abandon some of those concepts. But we can't throw them away now because we may have a limited war and not a nuclear war. We have to keep both kits of tools handy--the techniques that we would use in a limited war and then techniques to convert to an entirely different type of situation.

Obviously, in planning for these kinds of things, and recognizing that States and localities might have to assume responsibilities that they have not heretofore assumed, we cannot in the Federal Government provide detailed guidance for every locality and for every town and village in the United States. Not only does the economic and social fabric vary from area to area, as does the industrial capacity, but it would be practically impossible for the Federal Government to attempt to outline blueprints in those details.

But we can lay on the principles, and we can attempt to achieve understanding of those principles, so that if we were in a cut-off situation people would know how to act and to operate not only for their own survival but in the national interest.

I might add here that, as we talk about emergency planning and civil defense, the things that we would do to respond to an emergency, we are talking about how government as a whole would respond. Emergency planning and civil defense, the functions that we are carrying on today, are staff functions for government. It is government itself and the responsible people of government who would have to be responsible for the real actions in the event of an emergency--the

President, the Governors, the county commissioners, and the mayors of our cities and towns. It is the line of command, not just a few staff officers, who must understand the basic philosophy of our plans and the basic operating mechanism that we hope will be ready if we ever have to use it.

I would like to talk about a few principles in manpower mobilization before I get into the specifics. As I have indicated in these early comments, we are thinking more directly than we ever have before in terms of joint planning between the Federal Government and the State governments and local governments. In the manpower field this is most appropriate, because we are looking in the manpower field to the United States Employment Service as the heart of any manpower operating responsibility, as the heart of the wartime manpower program in the event of an emergency, and that service is set up on a Federal-State basis in its peacetime responsibilities. It is a Federally financed and State administered organization that not only handles the employment service program but administers the unemployment insurance titles of the Social Security Act. It has as its base some 1900 local offices with a staff of some 40,000 or 50,000 people, trained State civil servants, around the country.

So this cooperative Federal-State system which exists in manpower fits in completely with the kind of Federal-State system we are thinking of in the overall emergency planning field, in the overall job of readiness, where we are looking for a partnership arrangement with the States and the Federal Government to assure that that government continues and to be sure that they understand the substantive part of the job.

One other principle that is very important to us in our manpower planning work is the principle of voluntarism. Our basic plans are built upon it. There are a number of things that management and labor disagree on in this country. One of the things that they have always agreed on is that they don't want controls in the labor market if they can be avoided. Although there were efforts made to secure passage of national service legislation in World War II, we got through the situation without it.

We have met with management and labor. We have developed our plans with management and labor, on the assumption that we will handle manpower through a voluntary system just as long as such a system will work and to the extent that it is possible we will stay with it. If we have to do some things that we have never done before in this country in the handling of manpower, certain controls going beyond the so-called voluntary controls of World War II, which some people in the labor movement called voluntary compulsion, which is an odd term, we assume that we will get acceptance of such things only if those who are affected understand that they are necessary. In other words, management and labor must understand, if we have to go beyond our traditional controls, why these things are necessary and help make them work.

The philosophy of Annex 30 to the National Plan for Civil and Defense Mobilization is built on that concept. The National Manpower Plan, this Annex 30, however, does provide that if the security of the United States is threatened personal services may be required.

Another principle that is important in our manpower planning and important

in the overall emergency plans that are under way today is the principle of, to the greatest extent possible, using agencies that are in being, not depending on establishing shadow organizations. There have been plans in previous years that involved setting up a number of so-called wartime agencies, presumably after the bell rang. I think we have arrived at the conclusion that, if we can't figure out where to place functions today, and if we can't get existing agencies of government to do some planning for carrying out the wartime organizations that would be necessary to administer those functions, we wouldn't have much luck doing it after the bell rang--if you can imagine the chaos postattack of attempting to establish a whole series of new emergency agencies. So the push is all in the other direction. The President of the United States last February issued a series of nine Executive Orders, and there are some fifteen more in final clearance that will be issued in the near future, giving to nine departments of the Government specific responsibilities in certain resource fields.

The last principle that I want to mention is that this planning should be and is going on within the context of some agreed-upon assumptions--a national planning basis. The planning basis that exists today is Annex 1 of the National Plan for Civil and Defense Mobilization. That is several years old. It is being rewritten. A draft is in circulation now that brings this planning base up to date. This is not a classified document and we hope in the near future to amend Annex 1 of the National Plan and disseminate this information widely around the country so that we are all planning on the same set of assumptions.

I have attempted to outline some of the overall considerations that make manpower a little different than other resources, and I have set forth a little of the

philosophy and a few of the principles that are behind our manpower plans. I have mentioned briefly the structure. I would like to talk now a little more about the structure. I mentioned the nine Executive Orders that the President issued in February. One of these Executive Orders, No. 11,000, was a delegation to the U. S. Department of Labor, a delegation that authorizes the department to take on the total civilian manpower planning job.

This is not a separate function. In the old days, when OCDM and before that ODM were operating, delegations were made by the Director of that agency for a mobilization planning job to the other departments of government. The President's Executive Orders are a little different philosophically. He has said to these departments, "As a part of your peacetime job, as a part of your regular job, not as some extra curricular activities but as part of your regular job, you are responsible for civilian manpower mobilization planning." He has said to the Secretary of Commerce in their Executive Order that he is responsible for production planning and to the Secretary of Agriculture that as a part of his day-to-day job his department is responsible for planning for the management of food in the event of an emergency.

So we have a greater delegation than we have ever had before, and in manpower this means that the Department of Labor has the whole job of planning, management, proving the mobilization base, coming up with some ideas on worker incentives, coming up with procedures for handling claimancy on the part of other agencies who need manpower claimancy procedures, and coming up with, as they have in past years, a system for the movement of manpower from one part

of the country to another in an emergency.

The Department of Labor, as I indicated, has a far-flung organization to carry this out. There is another very important part of the government machinery that is tied in to this civilian manpower planning job of the U. S. Department of Labor, and that is the Selective Service System, with its approximately 4,000 local boards that are in existence today, with unpaid board members but paid clerks, and a classification system that has existed for many years and now covers a substantial segment of the male labor force in this country, and where these people are classified--and this is a development of the last two years--in a system that is related to the Department of Labor classification system.

The Selective Service System's primary responsibility, as I am sure you all know, is to procure military manpower. But they have a secondary responsibility, to assist in the civilian manpower field. There is an arrangement, an understanding, an agreement between the Selective Service System and the U. S. Department of Labor for using their organization to secure, to locate, to find workers by skill or workers by bodies, if that is what we are looking for.

So we have these two great organizations as the primary structure for the administration of manpower measures in the event of an emergency.

We have one other piece of machinery that is set up in Annex No. 30, that is a part of this wartime manpower plan, and that is a system of labor-management committees. We have a National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee. It is the committee that I mentioned earlier that we worked with in

developing this Annex 30 and got a degree of understanding and acceptance from them. We have in the field eight regional labor-management committees who advise the regional officers of the Labor Department. We have below that a system for appointing, on an emergency basis if necessary, a whole series of local labor-management committees. As it happened, we met with the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee on the 23d of October, the morning after the President's message on the Cuban situation. We put the finishing touches at that meeting on this plan for appointing these committees. We can appoint them on a standby basis now, or we have a procedure to put them in locally if we should be subjected to a surprise attack.

These committees would carry out the job of helping the Government administer manpower controls as necessary on an area-by-area basis. Under certain types of situations, where there was time, they would act as an appeal group. In non-bombed areas postattack we would be faced with the job of moving great quantities of manpower perhaps to the periphery areas of bombed sections of the country, perhaps to other areas of the country where some type of survival or military production was immediately necessary. We would have to use certain controls to move that manpower. Undoubtedly there would be measures put into effect to take ablebodied manpower away from less-essential employers and to restrict the job movements of workers, restrict their employment opportunities, no doubt, to the most critical occupation they possess in the most essential industry. There would be employers who would protest taking ablebodied men away from them, or attempting to, and although we think that in the period immediately after

an emergency most workers would respond voluntarily and do what they were asked to do, there would be some who might not. As time passed, also, it would become more difficult, particularly if the problem was moving people quite a distance away from their homes and away from their families.

So we provide this piece of machinery, this labor-management committee, so that, if a worker is asked to do something and feels it is unreasonable, he has the right of an appeal before any further musts are put on the situation, an appeal, as it were, to a jury of his peers. They will make a decision, a recommendation, at which time the Government can go on to the next step. This is a very important part of the machinery. This group might also assist, although it is not their primary job, in other facets of administering the manpower program in the field--the determination of priorities and what comes first.

I will talk about that in just a moment. There is one other plan, though, that the Department of Labor is coming up with now, that we are putting hopes on as a practical plan for improving our state of readiness in the future. The department is calling it the Preassignment Team Plan. We have experimented in the old Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization with this plan in the past. But we now want to do a lot more about it.

Basically it is to line up during this preattack period cadres of people for specific postattack responsibilities, cadres of people--not volunteers but working people--with their present work forces, their present foremen and their present supervisors, taking groups out of industrial plants or whole industrial plants and lining up for that group a postattack task that resembles as closely as possible

their peacetime work. This is relatively easy in the construction industry, and the Department of Labor, through its Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, has several programs going now, where they have lined up cadres of people for specific tasks in construction--the building trades groups. We want to see that expanded to welfare, to feeding, and to many other postattack jobs.

Not only would this assure us of a degree of readiness now that we can't get any other way but it would also tend to assure that first things would come first. For example, in lining up these cadres preattack, we would not line up any workers who are now employed in manufacturing establishments that are slated to make essential survival items. Those workers and their employers would be told that that was the most important thing they could do and that they should not become rubble clearers or that they should not become welfare workers, if they are in a plant that is making, for example, hypodermic syringes or something of that kind.

This plan also would allow us to get away if we could mobilize 20 or 25 percent of the work force this way from the age old and very inefficient method of relying on volunteers. Relying on volunteers postattack is chaotic business at best, and there would be no assurance in that kind of system that we would be using people at any place near their full skill. But, if we can line them up pre-attack we can at least get them working postattack in something that is related to their most critical skills. This is what we must do, because we can't afford to have nurses working at less than nursing skill and our skilled men working at day-laborer skills postattack.

So we are asking the department to move forward as rapidly as they can with this system both for the construction industries and for many other trades and services this year. As the year progresses we are hopeful to bring in the Department of Agriculture and the department of HEW in implementing this plan in the field.

It is not our ambition to attempt to line up 100 percent of the work force, but if we can get 25 or 20 percent of the work force lined up through this cadre approach now we would have a state of practical readiness that has been unknown in the past.

I have talked about the structure for manpower. Let me just speak for a moment about the structure we have in relating manpower to the overall management of resources and what can be done and what we are trying to do to make this more effective in the field.

As Mr. McDermott mentioned, and I referred to this earlier, we are looking to the States and local governments to assume certain responsibilities that have not been theirs historically--the management of resources and perhaps the imposition or the administration of certain control measures. This varies a lot area by area. In manpower, which is my primary subject this morning, with this far-flung system of public employment offices, the Bureau of Employment Security in the Department of Labor has been able to get out what they call a defense readiness handbook, a fixed set of technical instructions that are in the hands of all 1900 of these offices. So if the bell rings they know what to do about them. They have laid out for them there employment stabilization plans and ceiling programs

and other devices that will move manpower.

Let's look at the field of economic stabilization. I know you will have a lecture on this later in your session from someone who will do a lot better than I will on this. But, just to make my point, there is no Federal agency today that administers anything like price control or rationing. There is no place to put them. So we have to have a different kind of preattack plan in this area. The Federal Government is getting up the basic mats for rationing so that they can be distributed all throughout the country. But, if we should suffer a surprise attack, somebody other than the Federal Government has to set up the machinery to do that. States and local governments would have to set up rationing boards, and they would have to set them up overnight. Gasoline and food would not last many hours unless they were rationed. And we have to have the plans in being now for that to be done.

As to transportation, knowing what our resources are in transportation, and figuring out preattack what we would have and how we could best utilize it is something that can be done now. We can figure that out.

We can analyze all of our resources locally if we put our minds to it and come to at least some rough conclusions on what kind of shape we would be in locally if we should be subject to bombing.

So we have come up, as I am sure Ed McDermott mentioned, with a plan for the State and local emergency management of resources, often referred to as the Comprehensive Program. We have an organization and planning guide which is just off the press, which outlines this program in some detail, and a handbook,

an appendix, that goes with it that gives all the Federal guidance that we can get our hands on today in the different resource management fields. There is a section on manpower, there is a section on construction and housing, there is a section on electric power, there is a section on fuel and gas, and there is a section on transportation.

What we are asking the State governments to do is this: We are asking them to appoint a State emergency planning director and a committee which will be known as the State Emergency Resource Planning Committee, to figure out what their plan is for an emergency and to tie that plan into Federal planning. We are asking that this committee at the State level be composed of both private sector and public people and that among others at least the chairmen of all these task groups in these areas that I mentioned, these 14 or 15 resource areas, such as economic stabilization, manpower, production, et cetera, be on these planning committees.

We would give to each of these task groups the Federal guidance that exists to date. It is all reference to the National Plan, it's reference to other documents that are in existence that have been issued by the Federal agencies. We say, "Here are the Federal plans we have to date. In some areas they go further than they do in others. But here they are. Start with these. Tie them into your plans. We, the Federal agencies who have staff people in the field will have them sit and work with you and help you to perfect your plans, so that we end up with a coordinated plan, Federal, State and local, with the general rules of the game understood, so that the local people know what the U. S. Department of Agriculture's

responsibilities are for food on wholesale stocks, and they know that they have to do the job with respect to retail stocks and they have to have a plan to do it, and to write such a plan."

This we don't have, a coordinated Federal, State, and local plan. This is what we want. This is the thrust of our program emphasis this year with the Federal departments and with the Governors. Forty-seven of the Governors have established these emergency planning directors; 16 States have already established the committees. Those figures were of about a week ago. I think in the last few days there have been 4 or 5 more committees appointed, and I expect now that Governor Rockefeller's Committee on Civil Defense and Recovery has met and looked into the state of ~~preparedness~~ you will see the State governments--or you have seen in the past 10 days the State governments--take a new interest in civil defense and emergency planning, and I think you will see them wanting to sit down with the Federal Government now to see if we can't figure out a practical, realistic plan for the management of resources, for the management of resources not on a piece of paper that will be deposited in a safe in Washington but that will exist locally where resources, after all, have to be managed.

We must take our plans out of the planning state and make our plans more operational. We must get our plans, manpower plans and plans in all these other resource areas, out into the hands of the people at the State and local government levels who would administer these plans if a bomb did drop and would administer them not only to insure their own survival but in a way to insure their neighbors'

survival, and in a way that would insure the recovery of the country. People at the local level must understand that food may have to pass through their town to get to the next town. They can't stop it all. They have to understand that certain transports will be rationed between their town and 10 other towns and maybe three other States.

This has to be understood preattack. We have to have written plans and understanding or we will have chaos postattack. So we are attempting to take our fairly well developed manpower plans and tie them into resource-management plans in all these other areas and to have a viable set of plans at the State and local level so that, if the worst should come, the States and communities of this country can administer their resources, can manage their resources, so that they have had some planning experience in determining priorities and urgencies, and so that local and State governments know that they may have to decide between this claimant and that claimant as to who gets manpower first, as to gets the transportation first, and as to what facilities go back into production first.

So that is our program emphasis this year--to tie manpower in with these other resources and to press for capability that we do not have today in the field, where the mobilization job has to be done if we should come up against nuclear war.

Thank you very much.

COLONEL DAVIS: Gentlemen, Mr. Keenan is ready for questions.

QUESTION: Is any attempt being made to bring the national civic organizations, such as Kiwanis, the Lions, the Rotaries, the Junior Chambers of Commerce, and so on, into the active planning?

MR. KEENAN: Yes. I think we will have to do more about it. On this Emergency Planning Program that I talked about, where we have issued this guide, we had a series of eight regional conferences in the spring. A total of about 3,000 attended those eight meetings. Before we had the conference we invited the Governors and their top staffs and talked about the necessity for doing this kind of thing. Before we had those meetings we met with the national officers of a number of organizations--service clubs, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the AFofL-CIO.

Now that the Governors have responded and have set up these emergency planning directors and committees, we have been talking about going back to these organizations and getting them to give it a further push in the State. We made one contact with them and a lot of their State people attended these regional conferences. But I think we have to do more now that the States have responded to let these organizations know what specifically they can do to help us, and I think we will be doing that.

QUESTION: Mr. Keenan, what success are you having actually at the local level, and how long do you estimate it will take for their plans to be effective?

MR. KEENAN: Well, I can tell you what we have had to date, but how fast it is going to move now I don't know. It has gone relatively slowly. We weren't

sure how to go about it ourselves and we tried it on an experimental basis. The State that started first is the State of Hawaii. Due to the fact that they suffered bombing, and isolated as they are, they leaped at this. They were very responsive. So we went out there and helped Governor Quinn of Hawaii to organize 14 task groups. They have been analyzing their resources and they are just coming up with a report. That will be the guinea pig on a State basis. The report will be ready by January 1 at the latest. They have had some 320 people serving on task groups and committees and they are coming up with this.

The other area that has moved fast is the Southern half of Nevada. Governor Sawyer of Nevada decided to divide the State into two parts. We set up a piece of machinery for Southern Nevada. One of the first things we ran into there was: When you look at part of a State what do you do? Incidentally, we don't call it the Las Vegas Plan, either. We called it the Clark County Plan for a while, and even that has some overtones. So now we call it the Southern Nevada Plan. They ran into a jurisdictional question right away. We've got something rather interesting there. We are going to have to face up to this in other areas. We've got a signed agreement between the County Commissioners--I don't know how many counties there are down there--and all the cities and towns, setting up an emergency government for the Southern half of the State, with an executive, and so forth. The first draft of that study is completed. We have it in the office. We are going to fan that out now to the Federal departments and see what they think of it.

So they are the two that are really going. About five other States have met

and organized--Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico--the Kansas meeting is in about 3 weeks and the Missouri meeting, I think, is in about 2 weeks. A New Hampshire program is under way. The Governor appointed a committee in New Jersey last week and about six or seven Governors appointed committees just this last week in light of the Cuban situation. So my guess is that it is going to move a lot faster now. But how fast we'll have to wait and see. I guess there will be a rash of activity.

QUESTION: Do we have any plans to use the manpower of our allies, such as Canada and South America, particularly doctors and so forth?

MR. KEENAN: Yes, I should have mentioned that in my talk. We have made several efforts to look at the whole free world manpower situation, and we have an understanding and an arrangement with Canada. We have looked at the Latin American resource. We haven't any formal arrangements there. We have had one discussion with the Mexican government, and we have made some tie-in with the State Department and other groups in terms of all free world manpower. We have more to do there, but we are taking it into account.

QUESTION: In the post-nuclear-attack situation there is a good possibility that martial law will prevail in many areas. What relationship will there be with maintaining the military operations?

MR. KEENAN: Well, the closest, obviously. We are working on the assumption that we want civil government to function wherever it can function. The military agree with that. There is an annex to the National Plan, No. 7, that sets forth some general rules. We are pressing hard for State and local

governments to come up with lines of succession, to assure that civil government will be in existence in the greatest number of places.

We realize that in an area next to a bomb drop, in that kind of chaotic situation, other things are going to be called for. The general understanding is that the military will come in where civil government is inoperable, where it can't function, and they will handle the situation until such time as civil government can come back.

But, as the military have told us when we have talked to them about it, they are going to have a war to fight and win, and they don't have the manpower to take over in places where they don't have to. We are looking to civil government to call upon the military for assistance, but we are hopeful, and we are planning on the basis that in the great majority of situations civil government will be in business.

QUESTION: Will you explain the relationship of the U. S. Employment Service to the Selective Service System in emergency planning?

MR. KEENAN: As it stands today, and with the laws and rules as they are today, the U. S. Employment Service is responsible for the mobilization of civilian manpower, and the Selective Service will help them do the job. They will, upon call, locate people and send them to the U. S. Employment office. There is no regulation authority on the books that gives Selective Service any responsibility now over civilian manpower.

Now, the way Selective Service operates is, they make a great contribution on civilian manpower. General Hershey, I am sure, will explain this in detail.

They are deferring skilled people, people with critical skills in essential industries. This keeps people in the civilian economy and it is a vital part of manpower mobilization. But they don't have the authority to draft anybody for civilian use.

QUESTION: Mr. Keenan, the Executive Reserve Program has been in existence for a number of years under the Department of Interior. Would you comment on this, how it fits into your new plans?

MR. KEENAN: The National Defense Executive Reserve has been in existence since 1956. It consists of about 2600 men and women who have signed up to become full-time government employees in the event of the declaration of a civil defense emergency--in the event the bell rings. They have signed up and their employers have agreed that they will become government executives. There are 16 departments or agencies of the Government that have units. The largest unit is the Business and Defense Services Administration, BDSA, of the U. S. Department of Commerce. It is the standby production agency. BDSA would become the WPB if we got into another situation. They have a very small peacetime staff. They depend almost entirely on reservists.

The Department of Interior has two or three units--electric power, gas, and minerals, I believe. We in OEP laid down the general policies for the Executive Reserve, but each department that feels it needs an augmented staff is responsible for enlisting its own people and training them.

There have been three national conferences of this group. The last one was just two weeks ago. In fact, it was October 22, the day the President made his announcement on Cuba. We had about 1000 or 1200 of the 2600 National Defense

Reservists in Washington. We met in the morning at the Interdepartmental Auditorium and we had a banquet that evening at the Statler Hotel. In the afternoon, in between the morning and evening sessions, the reservists met with their own departments. We asked the departments to have, as near as they could, a shirtsleeve session and to try to instruct these fellows specifically on what their jobs were and where they would report in the event of an emergency.

This Cuban thing has accelerated interest in this. I know several departments are having their Executive Reservists come to field meetings here in the next few weeks to talk on specific D-Day assignments. I hope that covers what you had in mind.

QUESTION: Mr. Keenan, how are you tied in from the standpoint of taking national advantage of the teams that the Industrial College is sending around the country, giving one-week courses in local areas?

MR. KEENAN: We have in past years written all the Federal agencies advising them about this so that they could get it out to their field people. We have made efforts through writing to Governors to get key State and local people advance word of these conferences so that they could attend.

I can't give you any figures on how many of them have attended. We've publicized them and asked people who are tied in with State civil defense and State emergency planning to take advantage of it whenever they could and to register and attend. A number of local officials have attended, but I don't know how many. We think they are awfully good things. We try to get civilians who are interested in our program to attend them.

QUESTION: Are there any prearrangements as to who will handle the National Guard? Will it be the Governors or the Emergency Committees?

MR. KEENAN: There are some arrangements on that. Certain units have been designated for certain functions. I am not in a position to name them. I am not sure I recall them, anyway. Certain ones would be called upon first for Federal duty. They have been advised. They know which ones they are. I am not in a position to go into any detail on that.

QUESTION: In the event of an attack, do you foresee that regional interest may run counter to interregional or even national interests? If so, how would you enforce a national interregion plan?

MR. KEENAN: Well, we work on the theory that the highest level of government extant would be in control, if civil government was in control. It is hard to visualize a situation when all of the regional capability of the Federal Government would be out of business. We would look to those regional offices that existed to carry on the Washington part of the job. There are certain basic Federal authorities that would be given to those regional officials that would allow them to be in a control situation with respect to the transportation of goods and services across State lines. There are certain authorities in the field of stabilization, and so forth, that would be given to these Federal officials.

The other thing that we are trying to do is to talk through with State people now what some of these problems would be and get understandings and agreements on how resources would flow through their States and in some cases around their States.

I don't know that that is a completely satisfactory answer. This gets into some darn tough business. Take the City of Los Angeles, for example. You think of all the things they grow out in California. Los Angeles could feed itself for only a very few days. There would be a tremendous food shortage in Southern California. There has to be some understanding now where that food is coming from and how it is going to go in. The Department of Agriculture last year proposed some further stockpiling of foods around the country. They could not get the appropriation. This is an area where a lot more has to be done. There has to be the Department of Agriculture's approach to get written understandings with each Governor as to how this is going to be done.

This is true across the board in all these resource areas. So we are going to work out what we can through this program that I have been talking about this morning preattack, and then we will depend upon the Federal legal authority to be administered through the Federal regional officials that are still in existence if Washington is out of business.

QUESTION: Sir, since the draft board has no legal authority over the civilian labor, does anybody have any legal authority to order them around? If not, do you plan any emergency legislation to get someone?

MR. KEENAN: Nobody has any legal authority today. There is nothing on the books. As I say, under Annex 30, if the security of the country is threatened, we could require personal services. There are three or four ways of doing that. If we got into a limited war first, there is a draft national resources act which at some point in time would be submitted to Congress, and that has in it

certain manpower controls.

Now, if you didn't go through a limited war period, if we had a surprise attack without warning, you would face the problem of what you would do if Washington was bombed and Congress was not in session. Then we would rely upon the war powers of the President. There are plans, as you know, the C Plan for limited war, and the D-minus Plan for nuclear attack. There are parts of the D-minus Plan that deal specifically with manpower, but some step would have to be taken first through an Act of Congress or through an Executive Order issued under the war powers of the President to make it legal to do those things. Neither of them exists today. They would back up materials in the plan as to what we would do.

So we need legal authority through an Act of Congress preattack or, if Congress is in session postattack, an Act of Congress, or an Executive Order of the President. I wouldn't say there is complete agreement, but we have thought through different techniques or things we would use. We look at it thinking that, if the voluntary system doesn't work, what we would need is the authority to see that those people who didn't do it voluntarily did it. We would still face it on our present plan, but we would put some penalties on those who didn't do what they were asked to do.

In World War II there were some interesting devices tried without legislation. Area labor-management committees in some places put in regulations that a worker couldn't leave a job unless he had something called a statement of availability. Employers could not hire workers except through the employment

office. We imposed ceilings on less essential employers and took away their ablebodied workers. There wasn't any Federal law on the books. In some parts of the country it worked amazingly well.

Those techniques of limiting job availability, taking away ablebodied men, would be the techniques we would use. What you would need would be legal authority to see that people followed them if any of them didn't. So we have the question of legal authority.

COLONEL DAVIS: Mr. Keenan, speaking for the Commandant and the student body, thank you for a fine presentation on our most difficult subject.