

## THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

29 August 1963

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## NOTICE

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CAPTAIN McCUSKEY: Admiral Rose; Gentlemen: This morning we approach the end of our section of study designed to refresh and broaden our knowledge on contemporary political thought and government. We have heard distinguished lecturers from this platform, and we have, in our discussion groups under the tutelage of visiting professors, pondered the subject area; which has included an extensive study not only of our own governmental system, but those of Great Britain, other Western European nations, and the Soviet Union. So, it is appropriate that we close out this section of study with a lecture on the "Theories of International Politics."

And here to perform this mission we have a distinguished professor and well-known writer in the field of international relations whom we welcome to this platform for the first time--the Professor of International Law, Columbia University--Dr. Quincy Wright. Dr. Wright.

DR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Captain McCuskey. It is a pleasure to talk to the Industrial College. I have lectured to other similar institutions; the National War College, the Army War College, the Naval War College and the Air War College, so, I am glad to finish my record meeting with you in this beautiful building, particularly to discuss the "Theories of International Politics." I've written on this. Some of the things I say you will find expanded in my book called, "The Study of International Relations."

International, World, and Domestic Politics

To begin this discussion I want to talk about the meaning of terms. The term "International Politics" I think should be distinguished from the term "World Politics," which you'll often run into, because it carries certain implications. When you speak of international politics you think of a world divided into sovereign

states. It is international; whereas, the term "World Politics" might have a broader applicability. We haven't always had state systems in human history. During the Middle Ages, for instance, Europe was a feudal system which pyramided up to the Pope and the Emperor at the top, with various grades of feudal principalities below them. So that, politics in this world consisted to a considerable extent in politics between the Pope and the Emperor, who would be at the top; quite a different system from international politics.

Thus, the very term "International Politics" carries that picture of a certain structure of the world which we are talking about, a world of sovereign territorial states that are in contact with one another, and in relationships of both conflict and cooperation. All of those things are implied by the term, "International Politics."

Now, international politics in our world is, of course, distinguished from domestic politics. In fact, that is a most important distinction because sovereignty implies complete freedom to organize a system of domestic politics. As you know, the United Nations' Charter requires the United Nations--and presumably other states--not to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. It implies a division; that there are international problems in which states should or must observe international standards and that there are domestic problems in which they are sovereign. Of course, we have something similar in the Constitution of the United States, where we distinguish Federal problems from State problems. It's the same in international politics. But, it's very difficult to make this distinction.

I believe at one time the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, got into some trouble with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate when he said "There is no longer a real distinction between domestic affairs and foreign affairs." Well, that didn't go down with some of the Senators; they thought that maybe Dulles was trying to take too much on for the State Department. However, today it is difficult to define this distinction. You can define it from the point of view of international law. According to international law a state can consider any matter whatever within its domestic jurisdiction unless, in respect to matter, it is under an international obligation, either a treaty or a rule of customary international law. You can draw the line that way, and as a matter of fact, the International Court of Justice did draw that line in the famous Lotus Case, where it said that the state under its sovereignty can consider anything within its jurisdiction except insofar as it is

under an international obligation--either a treaty or a rule of customary international law.

Well, that is a good legal definition, but a great many matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state--according to that definition--are of actual concern to other states. Take such a matter as armament building. Unless it has a disarmament agreement a state is free to develop what arms it feels necessary for its defense. It can build its armaments as big as it wants. Within its own territory it can develop a defensive, and even an offensive system. It can receive aid from other countries. However, as witness the Cuban situation in 1962 where Mr. Castro exercised Cuban domestic jurisdiction in inviting the Soviet Union to set up missiles for the defense of Cuba, as he said, we thought that that concerned us. That is simply one illustration of how domestic politics--the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction by a state--may actually be a matter of very great interest to other states. That's one of the great problems we have to deal with in international politics.

Should we have a system of strict nonintervention, living up to the requirements of international law and the U.N. Charter, and say that while a state may discuss and attempt to exert influence it may intervene or take forcible measures against any other state only in case the latter has violated an international obligation? Well, the states especially the great states don't do that. Where they think their real interests are involved they are likely to take forcible measures.

This is the first point I want to make, the distinctions between world politics, international politics, and domestic politics. The latter distinction is fundamental in the theory of the world in which we live because the idea of national sovereignty depends upon it but is an extremely difficult distinction to maintain in practice.

### International Politics and Related Studies

Now, I want to distinguish international politics from other studies having to do with international relations and first from international economics. The two clearly run together. However, I think there is a difference. I would understand, by politics the effort of a group to carry out its objectives or to achieve its values

against the opposition of other groups. In politics we think of opposition between human groups. In domestic politics of the United States it is the opposition of the Republican Party to the Democrat Party; or of candidates for the Presidency each struggling to win factions of their party so they can get the nomination, et cetera.

In international politics, of course, it is one sovereign state against other states or one alliance against another. This opposition of human groups is the essence of politics.

On the other hand, in economics, I think the essence is the opposition of man to nature. When people act economically we think of a group trying to maintain its values and carry out its objectives against the niggardliness of nature. That is a phrase that economists sometimes use. So, economics tends to the cooperation of people in large groups so that they can overcome the niggardliness of nature in a more effective manner. Here again, however, the distinction is not easy to make, because this struggle to increase the welfare of man by exploiting the resources of nature to a greater extent often tends to the exploitation of one human group by another. And so, we have opposition between great corporations, other economic groupings, and even states in their economic activities against other economic groupings. And so, international economics tends to develop into international politics.

I think the basic difference between these two phrases--economics and politics--is an important one to have in mind, but the distinction is one which is difficult to make very precisely in practice. States may develop resources to increase the welfare of the people but they may do so to increase their political power. Economics may be an instrument of politics, and conversely politics may be an instrument of economics.

We ought, also, in the second place, to distinguish international politics from international law. In speaking of international politics we usually think of what states actually do to forward their interests. In speaking of law we think of what according to the general consensus they ought to do. Law is a normative science, as the lawyers say. It seeks to develop rules, principles, and standards that will guide states in their behavior so as to realize such desirable goals as order and justice. Whereas, in politics the state seeks to achieve its objectives and to utilize the means that are adapted to that end in the situation.

But here again, we can't make a clear and precise distinction, because, a system of politics necessarily implies some rules, some legal limitations. The very idea of international politics implies territorial boundaries which are of importance in international politics but are defined by international law. It implies the point, which I made before, that a sovereign state has matters within its domestic jurisdiction which, different from the problems in international law, it can deal with at discretion. As I pointed out, the concept of domestic jurisdiction is defined by the absence of any obligation of a state under treaty or international law.

Thus, law as a regulative and defining agency in the state system is necessarily implied by all actions in the field of international politics. On the other hand, international law exists in a changing world; the rules of law must change as technology and values change and it is one of the functions of international politics, gradually, or even abruptly by agreement, to change the rules of law.

International law is a discipline which has been studied for a great many years; the founders of international law in the 16th and 17th centuries--Francis of Victoria, Grotius, et cetera--hoped to reduce the whole of international relations to international law. They thought we would have a peaceful world if we could only have a law-governed world. And a lot of people say that today. I notice that former President Eisenhower, in a talk he gave about the "Test Ban Agreement" said that he hoped it might lead to an amelioration of international conditions so that we could have a world of law instead of a world of rivalry. Many people hope that instead of having a world governed by international politics we will eventually have a world governed by international law. I do not think we will ever do that completely. It would mean a static unprogressive world.

In national states--such as the United States--we have Constitutional Law, but we also have plenty of national politics. And so, we will always have international politics to bring about change in the world, but we may hope to have more respect for law than we do now. There are rules and principles of international law which are, perhaps adequate to define situations and settle conflicts but we can't be sure that these rules will always be observed. We can hope for a better balance so that politics will be conducted by legal methods.

Now, in the third place we must distinguish international politics from international ethics. International ethics is a broader term than international law; it assumes that there are certain standards which should be observed, even though there is no explicit agreement or explicit rule of law. This was the thesis in the Middle Ages where the body of ethical rules said to be demonstrated by reason were often called "natural law." Medieval writers, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, defined these principles. St. Thomas, for instance, distinguished four types of law--Divine Law, Natural Law, Eternal Law, and Civil Law. When he used the term "Natural Law" he meant those principles which were not defined in any religious system, or in any system of positive law, but which all states could perceive ought to be observed in the interest of all.

Well, there has been a lot of discussion initiated by Machiavelli in the early 16th century, who said that in international relations you must forget morality; there isn't any international morality or natural law. He said the Prince who does not look after the size of his Army is not going to be a Prince very long. That was the basis on which he thought international relations depended; it was a struggle of armed forces. The Prince, he said, should appear to be behaving in a moral way, but he should realize that deception and all sorts of moral delinquencies were permissible to a Prince in practice; in fact, they were necessary. He did not go along with Benjamin Franklin who said, "Honesty is the best policy."

The difficulty in discussing international ethics is that there is such a diversity of ethical systems, of religious systems, and of ideologies in the world, that it is hard to know whose ethics you are talking about. Khrushchev said, "What we want is a world of peacefully coexisting states, of different ideologies and economic systems." He recognizes these vast differences, but he says we can have peaceful coexistence. And our statesmen have said the same thing. Apparently that is a notion that statesmen accept, although they do it in different terms. The Communists use the term "Peaceful Coexistence," whereas we like to use the term "Peaceful Cooperation." Perhaps that implies that we go a little further than mere coexistence; we cooperate.

The notion of states that have different ethical, ideological and religious systems coexisting peacefully or not is, as I said implied by the term "international relations." But you can't keep it peaceful unless you have some ethical or legal principles that limit the activities of all. And so, we come to the question of whether there

is an international ethic. Now, whether in our modern world we can find these principles of right reason which St. Thomas Aquinas called "Natural Law," which states that they ought to observe because reason shows that it would be in their self-interest to do so, is a question. I will simply note that there has been a good deal of discussion of international ethics as distinguished from international law, and also from international politics.

Now, there is a fourth distinction between international politics, and international organization. International politics as discussed by Machiavelli assumed a total disorganization of the world community--if there was a world community. He rejected the decoying Medieval order and had no conception of any overriding agency, such as we now have in the United Nations, or before that, in the League of Nations, or even before that, in the many public international unions dealing with international postal communications, telegraphic communications, et cetera.

The notion of international organization is comparatively modern. Its roots are to be found in the diplomatic system. After the 30-years War in the 17th century, the states began to send regular diplomatic representatives, each to all of the others, and this provided a very loose organization. This was somewhat added to by the occasional holding of international conferences where all the states would meet together and try to draw up treaties, as, for instance, the great Congress at Westphalia in 1648, the great Congress at Utrecht in 1713, the great Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.

So, this custom of dealing with the great political issues which affected all of the states of the Western World--I'm speaking primarily of the Western World at this stage--was a loose type of organization. But since the middle of the 19th century, the notion of permanent organizations has developed, and there is no doubt that such organizations have been exerting an increasing influence, making the state system move toward a federalistic system. Of course, the authority of the United Nations over the sovereign states of the world is not comparable to the authority of the Federal Government of the United States over the States in the Union. It is, however, a difference in degree; the authority of the international organization has been increasing. Perhaps you read Secretary General U Thant's recent report indicating a significant number of cases in the last year in which the United Nations has exercised a very important political influence.

The concept of the world as an international organization, is different from the concept of the world as a system of wholly sovereign states. The two merge into one another, but we have to recognize that as the development of international organization proceeds, there is a modification of international politics. The United Nations itself is a political influence in the world which sometimes faces the sovereign states. It does not control them, but it may influence them. If the great states act together, it can exercise a controlling influence over the smaller states.

Other disciplines have developed, to some extent on their own legs, some for professional purposes like the art of war and the art of diplomacy, some from theoretical interest like diplomatic history, political geography, political demography (the study of population) the sociology of international relations, the psychology in international relations, technology and international relations, international communications, and international education. Each of these has become a discipline with a large literature. They are all related international politics. The truth of the matter is that we have a multitude of special approaches to what may be called, in a broad sense, "International Relations." International politics is based on certain assumptions and all of these other disciplines on different assumptions. Analysis of situations in terms of these assumptions will, it is hoped, assist in predicting what is likely to happen or what actions would contribute to desired ends.

But when we speak of international politics I should repeat, the emphasis is upon the capability of what we call sovereign states, defined territorially, to act, in accordance with what they deem their national interests to overcome the opposition of other states. That is the fundamental conception. And these other developments-- international organization, international law, international ethics, et cetera--are from the point of view of international politics, influences which in different situations affect the behavior of states in varying degrees.

#### Realists and Idealists

So much for the problem of defining international politics and related disciplines. Now I want to say something about the various schools of thought in this field. First is the distinction which you find in many books, between realists and idealists. I suppose one would say that Machiavelli was a realist; my former colleague at

the University of Chicago, Hans Morgenthau, describes himself as a realist; in fact he at one time spoke of himself as a modern Machiavelli. The realists say that the states must function to meet the immediate problems of national interest as best they can, adapting means to ends, but not looking too far into the future.

I believe that Bismarck once said that a statesman couldn't calculate on more than three years ahead; that the system of international politics was so dynamic that changes which might take place 10 years, or 7 years hence could not be foreseen so if you are a realist you ask: "Well, what kind of a world are we going to have during the next three years and how can we serve our national interests in that period?" A good many people have found difficulties with this point of view. They believe you should look further ahead; that if you serve only the first three years you may find yourself in a very bad way in the fourth year.

You remember the great controversy during World War II which Winston Churchill emphasized in his memoirs. He said that Americans, especially the military, did not look far enough ahead. He objected to our policy of concentrating everything on the Normandy Front. He said we ought to invade the soft underbelly of Europe, so that there would be a situation after the War where the West would control the Central European area and not let the Communists get in. He said the policy of concentrating everything on the Normandy Front, thinking of defeating Hitler and nothing else, was going to leave the West in a bad situation after the war was over.

Well, we had a major influence and we did not move into the soft underbelly of Europe, and the result was that the Communists did move in and Central Europe came under their influence. That perhaps illustrates one of the difficulties of realism. The realist would say: "Our problem today is Hitler; we've got to do him in with the least expense. This means concentrating everything on the Normandy Front and getting Hitler. We'll let the problems that come after that, take care of themselves."

That illustrates what the idealists emphasize. They say: "You have certain fundamental standards, values, and objectives in the world; that these are your longrun interests. You can't expect to achieve them in a short time but you should think of the influence which a short-run measure, adopted to serve immediate interests, is going to have in the longrun; you should try to look a

little ahead of three years." I think our State Department realizes that. They have a Planning Commission that is supposed to take a very longrun view. Whether they succeed in doing that always, I don't know, but I think that a wise policy should be never so "realistic" as to neglect the consequences of activities deemed "necessary" to take care of an immediate situation, upon the longrun state of the world.

Richardson is a Scotsman--and I'll discuss him more later--who tried to apply mathematics to international politics. He said that the statesmen were trying to steer the ship of state to the port of peace, but the trouble with them was that they turned the rudder the wrong way: They thought you would get to that port by turning the rudder this way, whereas you ought to have turned it that way. He was particularly speaking of what he considered the counter-effective consequence of armament building. He thought that in order to get security states that they ought to build their armaments bigger so they would have a dominant position in the world and could negotiate from a position of strength but actually this meant the other fellow would build his; you would have an arms race and the result was that both would be less secure than they were before. He said this was a perfectly natural reaction, but it did not bring the ship of state into the port of peace.

He tried to calculate, mathematically, how the arms race would work under various circumstances and verified his results by statistics. He assumed that his mathematical exposition predicted what would happen if statesmen did not pause to think and concluded that they seldom did so pause. He said, "If they paused to think, they might look ahead to where they were going, abandon traditional reaction patterns, and do something different." Well, he would be characterized, I suppose, as an idealist. He said, "You've got to look as far ahead as you can."

Now, I think that one has to be both an idealist and a realist. I once wrote that statesmen ought to be "realistic-idealists" and "idealistic-realists;" that this notion of neglecting the more distant future, of regarding the immediate power situation as the only thing necessary to consider, is too "realistic." Statesmen should get a bit of a future which is, at the moment, only an ideal into the game. I might mention, incidentally, that this word "realist" is philosophically one of the most controversial terms we have ever had. For instance, Plato, who started European philosophy, said "Reality lies behind phenomena." Some of you may have read Plato's

Dialogue in which he describes a man who is so chained, that he could look only into a cave. With the real world going on behind him, he could only see the shadows in the cave. The shadows were phenomena. The reality was behind. You had to create reality from looking at things. Reality was the abstract conception or idea and not the phenomena which you saw. For instance, he would say: "The real circle is that line which is precisely equidistant from the center at every point"--a geometrical definition or idea. Every circle you see is a little inaccurate; it isn't a "real" circle.

Well, that was Plato's idea; that the most abstract conceptions are reality, whereas, the phenomena which you perceive directly and immediately are simply shadows in the cave.

Then you come to modern science. Francis Bacon, for instance, took an exactly opposite point of view. He said, "Reality is the things you see, the sounds you hear. Abstract ideas are not reality; they are simply conceptions--simply words by which we group things together for convenience." Bacon was what the medieval philosophers called a "nominalist." He considered universal ideas merely names, not reality as did the Platonic "realists." This indicates that reality is a very ambiguous term. Do we mean by reality those abstract conceptions which may be realized, which may come into existence, or do we mean those things which we immediately see? Of course, modern science has been built to a certain extent on the latter, although scientists, I think, sometimes regard their abstract conceptions as being more real than the things they see. They always say, however, we must bring the abstract conceptions to the test of observation.

### Historians and Sociologists

Well, so much for this distinction between realists and idealists; they run together. Now, the second distinction is between the historical school and the sociological school. There has probably been more writing in international politics from a historical than from any other point of view. The historians say the states did such and so, and other states did such and so; they narrate the actions and reactions of states in their relationship with each other suggesting motives and intentions. But they usually say that their exposition is good to explain what has happened in the past, but that neither they nor anyone else can make generalizations that are very much good for the future. Perhaps they are extreme realists.

They say that the future is so problematical that we had better not try to make generalizations which assume that the future is either controllable or predictable.

The sociological school--and there has been an increasing number of writers of this type--has tried to create a sociology of international relations, or, you might call it a science of international relations. The sociologists try to formulate generalizations that will assist in predicting what is going to happen, and will assist states in guiding their policy. Now, you can see there is quite a difference between these schools.

I taught international relations at the University of Chicago where we had a committee of people from the Sociology Department, the History Department, the Geography Department, the Economics Department, and the Political Science Department. In recommending theses subjects for students in International Relations most of the committee would say: "What we want in international relations is a thesis dealing with the present and the future; and with the past only insofar as it is useful for the present and the future." I found that the historians on the committee usually thought that a student couldn't write an acceptable thesis that dealt with a subject that was much less than 50 years old. He must get to the archives. But they were not open to study until years after the event. Consequently, the historians often objected to theses that dealt with the relations of states in the present or with the effort to make generalizations that would be good for the future. They said "You can't do that; that wouldn't be a satisfactory thesis," and so, they wanted students to write about Napoleonic Wars or the 30-years War, or perhaps even the international relations of the American Civil War. But when you came up to date, they would say, "This would not be of permanent nature, you would have to do it all over again when the archives become available."

Most of the people in international relations were interested in the present and the future. And, they would say, "Well, we've got to do the best we can with what is available. If we can't get into the archives, then we must do what we can with the newspapers, and contemporary comments."

That illustrates the difference between the historical and the sociological schools, as I call them; increasingly you find people who are trying to make the study of international politics of practical use, not merely an historical explanation.

Mechanics and Psychologists

Now, the third distinction I want to make is between what I would call the mechanical or balance of power school on the one hand, and the psychological school of international politics on the other. This distinction was manifested at the beginning of the 16th century in the difference between Machiavelli, whom I've referred to so often, and Erasmus.

Erasmus was a theologian and a philosopher who wrote during the early part of the 16th century, about the same time that Machiavelli was writing, but he thought that the relations of nations, or the relations of Princes, as he put it, was like the relations of human beings; that it was a psychological problem. He wrote a book called "The Plaint of Peace," in which he describes the character of man; how he liked to live; he liked to be prosperous; he liked to live in peace; and he said there is no reason why Princes should not understand each other and adjust their relations just the same as human beings do.

The mechanical or balance of power school probably had a greater influence. The term "Balance of Power," of course implies an analogy to the relation of masses or weights to each other. Masses are measurable. We have such things as balances or scales to measure weights and we have the "Law of Gravitation." "Power" implies a physical conception, and we have had international politics to a considerable extent, governed by these ideas of power, balance of power, and control of the balance. Now, if you look at the basis of this, it is assumed that states seek to develop their power by a kind of automatic action without much consideration of human interests. Perhaps they say that power is wanted because you can get other things with it; economic prosperity, security, et cetera, but sometimes it seems as though states automatically seek to augment their power. As they all do so it is possible to make certain mechanical calculations on what their relations will be.

The psychological school on the other hand, assumes that states act through governments and that governments are composed of human beings. The human beings in government are like other human beings; they are guided by numerous considerations. They sometimes act impulsively; they sometimes act rationally; they sometimes act according to custom. But it's very difficult to make any precise mechanical determination of how they are going to act. A human being is different from an atom, a neutron, or a heavenly

body, which is guided only by mechanical principles. He acts in accordance with values, and he may act, as I say, more or less rationally.

In recent discussions this contrast has developed in the studies of deterrence. We seek a policy of deterrence; we build armed forces to deter aggression. But is a deterrent a mechanical conception, or a psychological conception? Some would say that the greater is your armed power, the greater is the deterrent. On the other hand, the psychologist would say it doesn't depend upon the size of your armed power; it depends upon the credibility that it will be used; does the other fellow think you will use it in a given situation? If he thinks that you won't in a certain emergency, then it is not a deterrent at all. And so, there is always this psychological calculation on whether an armed force is really going to be a deterrent.

You remember in the southeast Asia controversy in 1954 Secretary Dulles spoke of massive retaliation. There was the implication that if the Communists advanced in southeast Asia, we would massively retaliate by sending nuclear weapons toward Moscow. The Soviets clearly thought that was absolutely incredible. The Soviets at the time had nuclear weapons and they did not think that we would start sending nuclear weapons to Moscow for the sake of Vietnam, because it would mean that the Soviets could send some to New York.

That shows that deterrence is not a question of your power to do something; it's the question of the credibility in the mind of the other fellow that you will do it; that deterrence is really a psychological problem. How is the government of one state going to interpret your probable actions in given circumstances of the future?

Now, there is another aspect from the psychological point of view. We say that governments try to act to achieve their values and goals in a situation as they perceive it. Now, this statement conforms to the concepts of certain psychologists--I have in mind Kurt Lewin, for instance, who made an interesting distinction between what he called "The life space of an individual," and "the hull." By the life space he meant the interpretation or perception of the world within the mind of the individual. At any given moment, he said, an individual has a certain perception of his own values, of the obstacles to achieving them; of the general state of the world

in which he's going to act. That's what he calls the "life space." And that explains behavior.

Now, that "life space" may not have a very close relationship to the world as perceived by an objective observer; the world as it actually is, which Lewin called "the hull." The world may be perceived entirely differently by different persons. The life spaces of individuals may not correspond with one another. That may be even more true in the case of nations. They may perceive the world very differently. This may be most significant in the perception of the characteristics of other nations. The Soviet Union, both government and people, has a conception of itself. The United States has a conception of the Soviet Union that differs very greatly. These images of the various states of the world differ--the self-image and the image that other states have are very different--and the different states may have a very different image.

President de Gaulle seems to have a very different image of the Soviet Union from that we have. This consideration leads one to suspect that international relations are not really relations between nations, but relations between distorted images of nations. That is the thought which the psychological school tries to emphasize. It was given a certain emphasis by President Kennedy in his talk at American University last June, in which he said we ought to reexamine our image of the Soviet Union and perhaps we ought to reexamine our image of ourselves. Pope John had expressed the same thought in his encyclical.

This conception implies that it is the images of other states, and the perception of the world as a whole, which is responsible for many of the problems of international politics. The sound conduct of international politics requires a continual reexamination of these images, on the basis of which we necessarily act, to see whether we can assemble evidence that will make it possible continually to revise them in the rapidly-changing world, so that our "life space" will closely resemble "the hull."

Now, in international relations these images are particularly likely to be distorted because of the influence of self-serving propaganda. States, governments, and organizations are continually trying to get other people to accept an image of the world which would be favorable to them. So, this propaganda proceeds over the radio, television, press, and all agencies, and is motivated not by the idea of creating an image which corresponds to objectivity, but

to creating an image which will serve the designs of the person who initiates the propaganda.

Then there is the phenomena of the "stereotype." An image of another state or of the state of the world may be accurate at a particular time, but because the state of the public mind moves slowly, long after this situation has changed, the stereotype which was made perhaps 10, 20, or 100 years ago, will continue.

I think there have been great changes, for instance, in the character of the Soviet Union. I think in 1917 when Lenin and Trotsky talked World Revolution it was one thing. Then when Stalin referred to communism in one state it changed a bit. And when Stalin died and Khrushchev came in and talked about "peaceful coexistence" there was another change. But I think the stereotype of the aims, purposes, and character of the Soviet Union has been pretty fixed in this country. We have not reexamined it. And no doubt the same is true the other way. I think the Soviet stereotype of the West was determined to a considerable extent by the invasions on behalf of the "Whites," by the Western countries in 1918. We had forces in Archangel and the Far East; the British and the French did also. We were supporting the White Generals. And the Reds got this stereotype of the continuing hostility, of what they called the "Western imperialistic countries." These stereotypes have continued, although the actual policy and aims of both the Communist and the Western countries have changed greatly.

To beware of stereotypes, it seems to me, is one of the important things in international relations. We live in a world more rapidly-changing than ever before in the history of mankind. The inventions in communications, in military technology, in transportation have changed the face of the world. They have changed the policies and interests of states. Consequently, this problem of false images; of stereotypes; of the influence of propaganda, is greater than it ever was before. This psychological reexamination is continually necessary.

And so, it seems to me that we ought, in foreign policy, continue to distinguish between conditions to which we have got to adjust ourselves, and conditions which may be changed by policy. There are some conditions in the world which can't very well be changed; they can't be changed in any foreseeable future, and we've got to adjust ourselves to those. There are others which a wise policy may modify so that we can make the world more according to our

hearts' desire. So, you have those two types of conditions, but we've got to think of them not in terms of what our images are-- what our images were a long time ago--but what are the actual conditions of the world.

I don't think we can rely completely on our so-called "intelligence agencies." My observation of the Central Intelligence Agency is that it's very good at giving objective advice on what the material conditions of the world are. But I think that the psychological conditions of the world are far more important. I remember that Allen Dulles was once in a Congressional Committee and some member of the committee said, "Well, you tell us about how many weapons they have of one kind or another, but what are their intentions? What are their motives?" And Dulles said, "Well, we've tried to do something with this, but this is extremely difficult to find out." Well, it is. But it is the intentions and the motives of other states which are important in framing international politics. It's a good deal more important if you see a fellow armed with a big gun to know what direction he's going to point it, than it is to know the caliber of the gun.

### Quantitative Themes

Well, so much for the psychological school; I see my time is just about up, but I want to say a few words about a very important distinction between what I call the "quality school" and the "quantitative school" in international politics. The quantitative school-- some men call it the "philosophical school"--that makes abstract distinctions; the quantitative school that tries to make measurements. It might be called the "mathematical school." I notice that we've had mathematicians in recent times, such as Lewis Richardson, who had written two books. I was one of the editors of his posthumous works. He died a few years ago and left these manuscripts with his widow and son. One of them he called "Arms and Insecurity," and the other "The Statistics of Deadly Quarrels." He went farther, I think, than anybody else in trying to apply quantitative mathematics to international politics. Others have done something in this direction.

Richardson's effort was to express an arms race in mathematical terms. He came up with this:  $\frac{dx}{dt} = ky - ax \neq g$  and  $\frac{dy}{dt} = lx - by \neq h$ .


I am sure that is very illuminating to all of you. In this formula,  $\frac{dx}{dt}$  --if you are familiar with calculus-- means the rate of arms building at a given moment, dt being an instant of time and dx the increase in armament at that instant. Now, his theory is that x's rate of arms building is equal to its perception of menace--a constant "k" multiplied by the rate at which y is building arms, minus a constant "a" multiplied by x, the cost to x which gives some consideration to how much these arms are costing, plus "g" the grievances of one kind or another which x has against y. Well, that's the way x's arms go up.

Y is the same, except that his arms go up with different constants--"lx," his perception of menace, "by," his costs and "h," his grievances against x.


I will not go into that further but perhaps you can see how he could develop those formulae and show how, under certain conditions, calculating the constants and the rates of arms building, you would get stability and under other conditions you would get war. If both would stop arms building, the race would end, but both might go on until they got into a war with each other. Now, as I said before, Richardson thought his formula indicated how the arms race would go if statesmen did not pause to think. He hoped they would pause to think because they would realize that these formulas would automatically work toward war if they did not. So, they might perhaps, reach some agreement and stop the arms race.

That is one mode of mathematical treatment. You can find it worked out in great detail in Richardson's book entitled, "Arms and Insecurity." Other mathematical treatments have tried to calculate changes of opinion--by psychologists who consider the conditions of opinion the major factor in the relations of states. Richardson was working on a mechanical theory. These are psychological theories. Professor H. D. Lasswell has worked along that line and the psychologist L. L. Thurstone. In my study of war I had some graphs illustrating this point of view. See charts on page 19. We made graphs that indicate the four dimensions of opinion; the four dimensions being (1) the direction of opinion; (2) the homogeneity of opinion; (3) the intensity; and (4) the continuity.

GERMANY --Chart A



FRANCE --Chart B



Trend of opinions in the United States toward France and Germany, 1933. Data are from the *New York Times*. The thickness of the vertical lines indicates the distribution of opinion statements each month.


You can take newspapers or other documents of that kind and extract from them attitude or opinion indicators. A paragraph in, say, the "New York Times," would indicate extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. Another one at a later time might indicate greater friendliness. Well, now, if you get people to clip a great many newspapers to find what the general opinion was in one month; suppose we say this middle line "B" is neutral (see charts on page 19) and this upper area is friendly, and this lower area is hostile. You put these together and you get the attitude or opinion of the United States toward Germany in January of 1933. It looked something like this. See chart A, page 19. And then, in February it looked more like this; each of these humps being the number of friendly neutral or hostile statements, the average indicating the degree of intensity of friendly or hostile opinion during the month. Well, as 1933, the year Hitler came in, went on, American opinion got less friendly and then more hostile toward Germany but with some ups and downs.

Then we made another graph of the American attitude toward France and it went in the opposite direction. See chart B, page 19. We became more friendly but not continuously. Well, this effort to measure the changing attitude of a nation toward another nation as indicated by these evidences of opinion might have predictive or control utility.


We found that when it got below a certain threshold, hostile opinion generally meant war; maybe it wouldn't now because war is so near suicide. But you could take such a graph and you could say we are getting more and more hostile; we should be careful. It might, of course, be that something would happen, the trend would turn, and the crisis would have been passed. Well, this mathematical school thinks you can learn a great deal through such graphing of opinion.

In addition to direction of opinion (friendly or hostile) intensity (distance from neutral), and continuity (straightness of line), the graphs indicate the homogeneity of opinion. In both graphs, in most months you had some friendly opinions and some hostile. If you have a homogeneous opinion you have a bell-shaped curve with the majority at a certain point. See chart C, page 21. But you may have something like this, a group that is quite friendly and another group that is quite unfriendly--a heterogeneous opinion. Now, of course, if you have such a split opinion it means something quite different from a homogeneous opinion. For instance,

CHART C




HOMOGENEOUS  
OPINION



HETEROGENEOUS  
OPINION

## CHART D



Probability of war between pairs of states, January, 1937. Probabilities of less than 0.3 are, with a few exceptions, omitted.

in March 1933, American opinion toward Germany was very hostile but there was a small group that was quite friendly. That, of course, means there is an internal political problem. If the minority is powerful it may bring about an accommodation, but, on the other hand it may induce the majority to take an even more belligerent attitude internationally with hope of quieting its internal opposition on the plea of unity against the foreign enemy.

Another type of mathematical exposition was developed by a student of mine, Frank Klingberg. He was trying to estimate in 1937 when he made this study, the probability of war between different pairs of states. He thought you could learn a lot by averaging expert opinions. He got this result from averaging the judgment of 82 experts from many countries. (See chart D, page 22.) He assumed the greater the probability the sooner the war. War between Denmark and the United States was judged the least probable of any of the pairs that he studied; it was put near zero, .06. On the other hand, at that time the most probable war, as these experts saw it, would be between Japan and China .94. They actually were fighting in 1937, though not a full-scale legal war. War between Japan and the U.S.S.R. was put at .89. It was 1945 quite a time after this prediction was made in 1937 before those two countries got into a war. So, that prediction was not very good, probably because of Stalin's nonaggression pact with Japan to avoid a two front war. War between Germany and France was put at .78; Germany and Great Britain, .66; the United States and Great Britain only .27, a little more possibility of war than between Denmark and the United States. War between the United States and the Soviet Union was rated .31. Nobody thought in 1937 that there was much likelihood of war there and none has occurred. France and the U.S.S.R. were put at .32; the United States and Italy, .38. The wars rated less probable than that have not occurred and nearly all above occurred in the next decade, generally in the order of the probability rating. This method of prediction therefore turned out fairly well.

These experts were asked to judge "What in your opinion is the probability of a war between states A and B in the next ten years?" They were asked to go beyond Bismarck's 3 years judge for the next 10 years. We sent this questionnaire to about two hundred experts on international politics, all over the world and got 82 answers. I might say, incidentally, that the Americans were much more willing to respond. Many of the Europeans said, "You can't do that. You're trying to reduce international politics

to statistical terms--and you can't do it." Some of them refused to answer at all, but some of them did answer. And we found a good many people in the Latin American countries would answer; and some in Asia. Well, we got these judgments from all over the world and averaged them. And that averaging of expert opinion gave results indicating the length of time before the pair of countries got into war with each other.

Another mathematical exposition was worked out in my "Study of War;" an analysis of the aspects of "distance," between states. I used the term "distance," in a very broad sense. Of course, in a purely geographical sense we could have said, before the First World War, that there was very little chance of Bolivia and Afghanistan getting into a war with each other; they were just too far apart; they couldn't reach each other. Of course, geographical distance doesn't make so much difference now. And even then, it made less difference than you might have thought because of the great alliance systems that were formed, and eventually you did find many Latin American countries, actually at war with remote countries of Europe and Asia, because they followed the United States into the war.

Geographical distance does not make so much difference as it once did, but I defined various aspects of "distance" which seemed significant such as "technological distance," (the abundance of communication) "strategic distance," (vulnerability to attack) "legal distance," (the extent to which each recognized the other as its equal in law) "intellectual distance," (the degree of similarity between their assumptions and modes of reasoning) "social distance," (the similarity of their economic and social institutions) "political distance," (the extent to which they recognized the same political institutions), "psychological distance," (the degree of friendliness or hostility), and finally, "war expectancy distance" (the extent to which each country expected war with the other).

I will put on the blackboard the formula which I worked out relating these distances to one another. It gets quite complicated.

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = K \left[ \frac{dE}{dt} + \left( 2 \frac{dPs}{dt} - \frac{dT}{dt} \right) + \left( \frac{dS}{dt} - \frac{dI}{dt} \right) \right. \\ \left. + \left( \frac{d(E_{ab} - E_{ba})}{dt} + \frac{d(S_{ba}^t - S_{ab}^t)}{dt} \right) \right. \\ \left. + \left( \frac{d(P_{ab} - P_{ba})}{dt} + \frac{d(L_{ba} - L_{ab})}{dt} \right) + c \right]$$

There you have it.  $\frac{dx}{dt}$  means the probability of war between two states at any moment. The other symbols refer to the rate of change of the various aspects of distance between the states--war expectancy distance E, psychological distance Ps, the technological distance T, intellectual distance I, et cetera. In some cases the distance, from B to A, may differ from that from A to B.

We made estimates of each of these variables, and the formula gave pretty good results. This prediction was made in 1939, and the results were a little better than the results from Klingberg's method based on the opinions of experts in 1937. There is, of course, no perfect way of predicting the likelihood of war between any particular pair of states, but these methods worked out pretty well in the calculations made before any of the wars of World War II began. With the new technologies, the greater vulnerability of states to rapid and total destruction and their increased interdependence since the atomic age began in 1945, I think they are less valid. The factors involved are now more psychological, more numerous and less predictable. We must study the images, values, processes, and accidents producing action by all the important decision makers in the world, not only the relations between pairs of states, the patterns of arms races or the fluctuations of public and expert opinion.

Now, I have gone way over my allotted time, but I will add that I still think there is some value in efforts at mathematical exposition of international politics though methods must be adapted to changing conditions. We are never going to reduce international politics to any such precise systems as those to which Newton and Einstein reduced the relations of heavenly bodies. My analysis of distances is based a little on Newtonian physics which begins with the two body problem. I attempted in my Study on International Relations (1955) to devise a system based more on Einsteinian physics. I developed an analytical field, defined by capability and value coordinates, in which all the states of the world could be located, and their movements in relation to each other at any given moment understood.

Such systems are suggestive, but international politics are so variable; the possibilities of the future are in such large degree indeterminate, that psychological understanding of decision-making is now of major importance.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN McCUSKEY: Thank you very much, Professor Wright. We will dispense with the question and answer period, except that those who would like to ask Dr. Wright some questions, please join us in the faculty lounge after which we will go along with our schedule.

Again, we are very appreciative, sir, for a fine profound lecture. Thank you.

DR. WRIGHT: I am sorry I went so far over my time. Thank you, sir.

(26 Feb 1964--7, 600)H/pd:dc