



THE NATO AND WARSAW PACTS

Honorable William R. Tyler

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 3 March 1964/

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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24 February 1964

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
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Reviewed by: Col R. W. Bergmyer, USAF Date: 3 March 1964
Reporter--Grace R. O'Toole



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ADMIRAL ROSE: Gentlemen: Today we start a new unit of our curriculum. I'm sure you are going to find it a fascinating one. I was about to say your hard work is over--has everybody finished his thesis--but to some extent this is the frosting on the cake. The work you have done up to now is essential, and that's what we are here for, really. You have now learned how to make money in a business; you know all about economics; and you know how to program a budget and control it.

This unit is an important one, and, obviously, the unit that we are starting now is related to the next unit, which covers the overseas field trips, which I assure you I very much regret that I am not going to take with you.

But, anyway, we are starting a new unit. Instead of concerning ourselves chiefly with U. S. affairs, we are going to do something else.

We are most fortunate today to have the speaker that we have. I have had the pleasure of knowing him a little bit for a long time. I certainly know his reputation to be a fine one. He is the Honorable William R. Tyler, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and he is going to speak to us on The NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

It is a great pleasure to welcome you, Mr. Tyler, to our auditorium.

SECRETARY TYLER: Admiral Rose, General Stoughton, Mr. Freers, Members of the Industrial College: I am deeply honored to be with you today

for the opening talk of the seven-week unit on the Comparative Capabilities of International Conflict. I confess that when I first saw the title I wondered a little how I could even attempt to cover so vast a subject in the 45 minutes allotted to me.

What I am going to try to do is to interpret it very broadly, not limiting myself to the NATO and Warsaw Pacts as such but I'll try to take a canter over the course of this vast field, and then I'll look forward to the question-and-answer period, when you can try to cover all the points which I am not able to cover in the time I have.

I'd like to say, first of all, obviously, as you know, the NATO and Warsaw Pacts are two different kinds of animals. They are not comparable except in language. The Warsaw Pact was only invented by the Soviet Union in 1954 after the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin, in January of that year, and it was intended to give a kind of fictitious appearance of unity and similarity of purpose to NATO. In fact it is not an organization of an alliance. It is simply the confirmation of the Soviet domination of the military, economic, and political capabilities of the Eastern bloc.

I noticed in the little paragraph on the scope of my talk that the words "in the European arena" are used. I would like to remind you that it is not a bad thing to liberate ourselves from the restrictive conventions of geography, that NATO itself has members in three of the continents of the world, and that, more important still, situations and events in

areas all over the world have an effect not only on the military fortunes of NATO but also on the attitude of the members of NATO toward the alliance as a whole and on the estimate which the individual members have for the value of the alliance to the individual interests of its members.

I might briefly remind you of some of the traditional, historical relationships which have a bearing on the attitudes and policies of individual NATO members.

Take the case of Portugal. It is not a very important member militarily in itself on the continent of Europe, and yet it is tremendously important to us in that it affords us the Azores bases which for the next few years, at least, will continue to be a vital link in the tactical deployment of our troops to any troubled spots all over the world. So that, when you think of the troubles going on in Africa, the difference of policy between ourselves and Portugal with regard to Angola and Mozambique, or recently, a couple years ago, when Goa was taken over by India, or the threat to Timor or Macao, you realize immediately that what happens in those parts of the world has a definite and direct relationship to our security interests in the European area.

there is
Take the case of France. Obviously/ tropical Africa and the former possessions of France in North Africa and Southeast Asia, where De Gaulle has now manifested a good deal of interest to our discomfort and in some quarters to our dismay.

Take the case of the United Kingdom. Obviously Cyprus and Malaysia, where the U.K. attempts to maintain the independence and the unity of

Malaysia, have a direct bearing or relationship to our policy to Indonesia and differences between the United Kingdom to some extent on the emphasis and direction of our policies in that area. Our actions in that part of the world have an effect on British public and political opinion estimates of the role of NATO and the degree of the identity of our interest with the U.K.

Take the case of Belgium, with the Congo and obviously the historical relationships with reaction on the attitude and the estimate of our allies as to what the alliance is all about, and particularly what the United States considers to be the objectives and the justification of the alliance.

I would like to talk this morning briefly under two headings, first, the alliance as a whole, and then to turn a little more to the individual members of the alliance, or our particular alliances. The first thing, which is very obvious to us all, but it is good to remember it, is that the solidarity of the alliance tends to be at its strongest when identifiable military threats exist, and, conversely, to be at its weakest or at its most difficult position to be maintained when tension relaxes.

This is a problem which is inherent in free societies and in the organization of individual, free societies. It is a problem which to a great degree the Soviet Union does not have to face. I say "to a great degree" because it is not entirely true. The Soviet Union probably does to some extent have to face and may increasingly have to face the effects of manifestations of increased national assertiveness within the Eastern bloc, but for us it is very obvious that a climate of relaxation of tension and an

acceptance that the threat of war is receding poses problems and creates appetites and different emphasis on national policies which make it harder to reconcile. The absence of the threat of war exerts a centrifugal force on the cohesiveness of NATO.

Taking the alliance as a whole, we have certain continuing problems which I would like to run down briefly. I might say the first could be described as the paradox of concurrent fears of reductions of U. S. troops in Europe with the absence of a sense of threat. I just mentioned that there is a general acceptance that we are not at this moment faced with an immediate military threat from the Soviet Union, and yet never has Europe been more sensitive to the possibility that we might substantially diminish our forces on the continent of Europe. This fear of U. S. troop reductions is most acute and, potentially, in the political sense most dangerous in the case of Germany.

I take it that one of the major objectives of our foreign policy in terms of our national security is to be sure that Germany should never feel that she had an option for a foreign policy other than one which linked her very closely indeed and kept her bound to the West. To the extent that Germany fears the possibility of reduction of U. S. forces in Germany or a thinning out, or anything like an acceptance of the so-called Rapashki proposals of a few years ago, Germany becomes nervous and there emerge certain trends of thought in Germany considering alternatives to the system of security bound to the United States. This is a subtle, often indefinable, but, I would say, automatic process of

compensation. Just as water tends to find its own level, in Germany psychologically and politically there is no doubt that in proportion as the estimate of security is weakened in one direction so an attempt is made to find security or deal in another direction. The other direction alternative to the United States, of course, would be the Soviet Union. So we have to be extremely careful in what we do, particularly in the disarmament field, in order to minimize the possibility that Germany should be looking elsewhere for its security than in the direction of the West.

Some people resent this and call it a veto which Germany has over U. S. foreign policy. I think that is oversimplifying it. It is a factor in our political considerations, and, of course, much depends on who is governing in Germany. Adenauer was kind of an element of suspicion all by himself. He liked to look on the dark side of things and he liked to be suspicious of us. We just couldn't reassure him enough. In the case of Erhard and Schroeder there is probably, I would say, a more sophisticated view of the limits in which German security and interests can be assured.

Another continuing problem within the alliance is the difficulty, which we have not resolved, of achieving a single strategic concept. It is rather strange that, 15 years after the foundation of NATO, we have not been able to agree yet among ourselves as to what/^{the}basic strategic concept common to the alliance is and what the mission of our forces ought to be. The fact remains that we are now still engaged in trying to

work on the NATO force-planning exercise which was approved only last May at the NATO meeting in Ottawa, at which we found it very difficult to move on because, principally, of French objections. In this respect I would say that what is really at heart here is the estimate which the Europeans have of the circumstances and conditions in which the United States would make use of nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet aggression.

The policy which we have proposed since 1961, involving the increase of conventional forces and the concepts of the pause on the threshold, has never really been accepted by the Europeans as meeting their basic security interests. They fear that what we mean by this strategy basically is to reserve to ourselves the decision of when to use nuclear weapons indefinitely, perhaps to the point where a conventional war might be fought on European soil and we still would not come in with nuclear weapons in order to avoid retaliation on U. S. cities with the devastation and the loss of population.

So we have not really solved this problem of the strategic concept. We are making efforts to do so. I might mention here briefly that our interest in the multilateral force is stimulated and is explained in part by our belief that the multilateral force, if it comes into being, could be **the start** of a process of reconciliation of European and U. S. nuclear strategic doctrine and interests.

I would like to enumerate for you a few points on the multilateral force which you perhaps don't see in the press put together quite clearly

but which do explain why we believe that if some of our allies are willing to join and contribute to a multilateral force it would have a considerable political as well as strategic importance for us. Our interest in the multilateral force primarily is that it provides a way for the two major European non-nuclear countries, that is, Germany and Italy, to participate in their nuclear defense without encouraging national nuclear weapons proliferation.

Again, specifically, our interest in the multilateral force is explained by the fact that we would thereby support those proponents of moderate, democratic government in Germany who want to forestall pressures for the acquisition by Germany of nuclear weapons under national control. It is true that former Defense Minister Strauss and others are pushing forward views already which portend the possible, eventual aspiration for possession of national nuclear weapons. The moderates in Germany must be able to counter with something strong and positive and plausible. Foreign Minister Schroeder and Defense Minister Von Hasle believe that the multilateral force is essential. The socialists, though they are not enthusiastic for it, recognize the fact that the multilateral force does meet a political problem which won't go away and that, in the absence of anything better, it is in their interest to support it.

I must remind you that there is no treaty or other commitment which prevents Germany from having nuclear weapons, contrary to what one often reads. The WEU Treaty of 1954 binds Germany only to promise not to manufacture them. So this is a very real issue and one which is certainly

absolutely basic to the cohesiveness of the alliance.

Thirdly, our interest in the multilateral force is that it would tend to strengthen the alliance by creating a closely knit force in which some major and some smaller members would take part and in which they would have pride. It would give confidence to the members of the alliance by closely associating the United States with them in the ownership, in the control, and in the manning of a major nuclear force. The multilateral force, if it comes into being, could be the nucleus for a growing program of U. S.-European nuclear cooperation which would perhaps, by increasing the sense of European participation and commitment in nuclear defense, reconcile the difficulties to which I have alluded.

The multilateral force would provide part of the MRBM's which SACEUR feels there is a requirement for and which many Europeans also feel are needed to offset the Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's which are targeted on Europe from Soviet soil. By having some European participation in counteracting MRBM defense at sea, we would avoid the problem, which is a very difficult one politically, of where to put MRBM's on land. Politically, the only possibility of putting MRBM's on the continent of Europe would be in Germany, and this raises many very grave political difficulties.

The MLF would provide a practical means of countering DeGaulle's proposals for creating a French-organized Europe by inducing Germany to support the force de frappe. It would create a powerful alternative to the United Kingdom and French national forces and a force into which

they might eventually be drawn. It would promote European cooperation and unity within an alliance partnership, drawing NATO European nations together in a real working force of NATO military, political, and psychological importance. And it would confront the Soviets with the harnessing of European resources to the United States, as I said.

Now, leaving the military strategic side, I'd like to turn to a continuing problem which we have, which is the question of trade with the Communist world, be it with Cuba or with the Soviet Union. I would like here to read to you a message which I received only over the weekend but which will describe to you, I think, much more graphically and much more authoritatively than I could, how some of our best friends in Europe see our policy with regard to Cuba. This telegram I am reading from reports a conversation by one of our ambassadors with one of the most experienced and friendliest European political figures.

Our Ambassador reports that this person raised the subject of Cuba with him three days ago, saying that he sympathizes greatly with the United States over the problem of Cuba and will do his best to be helpful. However, he said that the truth is that neither European leaders, parliamentarians, nor the public understand or appreciate the United States policy. In the first place, for most Europeans Latin America seems remote and far away and then most Europeans just don't appreciate what would happen in terms of European and free-world interests if Latin America were to go Communist. This politician who was speaking to our Ambassador said that when he met with the Foreign Relations Committee of

his Parliament recently, U. S. policy toward Cuba, particularly the trade embargo and pressure that we are bringing against other nations to prevent Cuban trade, came under the most savage criticism. This European pointed out to the committee that the United States was engaged in difficult situations in every part of the world, not just on behalf of U. S. interests but on behalf of free-world interests. He told the committee that it was true that things had not been going well for the United States and that we had made some mistakes, but that his country was certainly in no position to talk, because it had not really contributed in proportion to its means to the military strength of the alliance. He said that, although the committee had been silent when he made these remarks, he had not won a single vote by making them, and that he was deeply troubled because he fears that, unless we can make our position understood, a growing estrangement between the United States and Europe would result.

I mention this only because I know that we have failed, obviously, in getting across to Europe the reasons why we believe that our policy with regard to trade with Cuba is not only sound for our interests and the interests of the Western Hemisphere but for the interests of the alliance as a whole. This is the kind of problem that we are faced with continually, and it's a tough row to hoe.

We also have considerable differences with some of our allies, and I would say potentially with most of our allies, if not all of our allies, with regard to long-term credits to the Soviet Union. The British have

a fundamental and overtly expressed difference of opinion with regard to long-term credits, and you are familiar with that. I think it is fair to say that essentially, except for France--and even so, France is not going to stay out of competition of long-term credits if the line isn't held--most of Europe feels sympathetic to the British position that a fat Russian is a safe Russian, and that long-term credits and anything that increases the flow of noble trade is in the interest of relations between the free world and the Communist world.

Turning to the Europe-unification field, I really don't/^{want}to go over the history of the last two years, which I am sure is known to you. But, after the doldrums following De Gaulle's press conference of January 1963, there has been more recently, in the last few months, a certain resumption of interest, of discussion between governments in Europe, on the possibility of further moves in the field of European unity. There is, of course, a fairly basic difference between the views of De Gaulle on European unity and the views of those who were brought up politically in the forties and fifties and who think of European unity as being based on supra-national institutions. De Gaulle's emphasis on the role of the state and his emphasis on confederation rather than federation reflect really a division within Europe. It is very difficult to tell **statistically** whether the majority of Europeans are in favor of De Gaulle's view of Europe or in favor of the traditional concept of federation and supra-national institutions.

I think the best thing for the United States to do is to stay out of

this discussion. I think we involved ourselves rather deeply in it over a year ago when we were perhaps too explicit in our support of the UK application for entering the Common Market. I think that, while I'm sure we were right in backing the UK application--and I think ultimately that the United Kingdom must come into and be part of Europe--nevertheless by talking about it rather too much we tended to justify De Gaulle's charge that the United States really wants to have Europe created in such a way that it will perpetuate U. S. so-called domination over Europe, or keep Europe tame in terms of U. S. interests.

I mentioned the fact that, within the next few months, there may not be very much going on, but, under the service, in the field of European unity, there is discussion between governments, and it is possible that we should see again some organized talks picking up again where they left off in 1962 on movements toward European unity.

Turning briefly to our relations with our individual allies, we face, in the case of the United Kingdom, the fact of the declining power of the United Kingdom with regard to its ability to fulfill its worldwide responsibilities. This is giving us considerable trouble with regard to parts of the world where the United Kingdom hitherto has been able to play a role of security which now, due to shortage in manpower and economic difficulties, as well as loss in national wealth, it is finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill .

We have difficulties with the United Kingdom, as I mentioned, with regard to the philosophy and policy of trade with the Communist world,

be it Cuba or the Soviet Union, or Communist China.

With regard to France, I mentioned De Gaulle's particular outlook with regard to Europe. He has disagreed with us with regard to the tactics which we should employ in our attitude toward the Soviet Union. Since 1961 De Gaulle has felt that it was dangerous for us to talk with the Soviet Union, to probe, to try to find a basis for negotiation. He has not objected to our continuing efforts to find such a basis, but he has not approved it, and he has always felt that we might make concessions which would be damaging, and that this might lead to some kind of U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreement at the expense of Europe.

De Gaulle, of course, as you know, has more recently come even more into the limelight by his recognition of Communist China. He has also been unhelpful, to say the least, with regard to Southeast Asia, where, at a time when we are deeply involved and determined to continue to fulfill our commitments to the South Vietnamese government and people, he has talked about neutralization without being able to indicate in any way how such a happy state of equilibrium in that part of the world could be brought about.

I would like to note, however, at the same time, that since DeGaulle came into power in France, that there have been very few positive aspects of De Gaulle's policy and of France's relations with the United States. First of all, it is worth remembering that De Gaulle, while he is critical of the present organization of NATO, which he feels is too much under U. S. control and U. S. influence, has always repeated that the North Atlantic

Alliance with the United States is vital to Europe's security, and particularly France's security. He has demonstrated this belief in all the major confrontations of power and crisis since he came into power himself, first of all the Berlin crisis, starting in November 1958, the U-2 crisis in May 1960, and more recently the Cuban crisis, in October 1962. There is no doubt that, insofar as a NATO crisis or one in which there is a possibility of war is concerned, De Gaulle will throw all his political weight and psychological weight in Europe, which are immense, and his military weight, which is practically nil, in favor of a strong and unyielding stand with regard to Soviet pressure. In that respect there are very positive aspects with regard to France's role under De Gaulle.

France has also been among the leaders in giving aid and economic support to underdeveloped countries and in strengthening free-world efforts.

Now, I mentioned Germany and the problems we have with regard to the possibility of Germany feeling that the United States is either no longer committed to the defense of Europe or is willing to contemplate the possibility of war being waged in Europe with conventional weapons, and the feeling that in either event she might have to turn elsewhere and perhaps raise again the specter of a deal with the Soviet Union.

There has been one development in the last 2 or 3 years but particularly in the last 2 years which I am sure is of great interest to this group. That is the initiatives which Germany has been taking, essentially since

1961, in developing trade relations with countries in Eastern Europe. This policy is due, I think, essentially to Foreign Minister Schroeder. Before him, Foreign Minister Von Brentano was absolutely negative to any efforts by Germany to establish any kind of relations with Eastern European countries, Germany's great fear being that of establishing any kind of relations which would lead to political relations and to an enhancement, as they call it, of the role of East Germany and recognition and consecration of the division of Germany.

So that when in 1961 the Germans started negotiating with the Poles for the establishment of a trade mission and an increase of trade relations, this was a significant political development. German trade initiatives since then with Eastern Europe have multiplied. The Germans have trade agreements and trade missions established in several of the Eastern European countries. A German official told me a few weeks ago that Germany is being solicited by Eastern European countries for tourist programs and exchanges.

Where this will lead to it is difficult to tell, but there is no doubt that this of very great importance and it tends to consolidate the Germans' decision to diminish the plausibility of Communist propaganda against Germany. It suggests that Germany is a powerful economic element within the Common Market and is exercising an attractive power to the countries of Eastern Europe, which certainly has a very important political connotation for future developments.

I mentioned the difficulties we are having with Portugal. This is

painful business. If it were not for the Azores bases, I suppose that we could live with it more easily, but we are not able to get a renewal of our Azores base agreement with Portugal, because the Portuguese government insists that we ought to give them commitments with regard to our policy in the United Nations, and commit ourselves to support the Portuguese position in Africa in the United Nations. This we cannot do. The Portuguese government did not refuse to allow us to use the bases, but I think we are going to on living there and using the bases under a threat of termination.

I'd like to mention the importance of the Franco-German reconciliation in the last few years, and I thought it might be of interest to you if I told you briefly, from a telegram I received a few days ago, what Erhard and De Gaulle talked about when they met in Paris a few days ago. I do it this way because I think if you know what they talked about it is a better illustration of the problems there and the divergencies or similarities in policies than anything I could say on my own.

Erhard and De Gaulle talked together in Paris and Erhard told our Ambassador in Bonn that he had gone to the meeting with some apprehension and that he had not expected that it would be a very pleasant encounter but that it had turned out quite differently. Now, on the subject of European political unity, the Chancellor had told DeGaulle of his frustration that Europe was unable to coordinate its views and combine its efforts so as to express a common will. "If this continues," he said, "the United States might some day ask why it should continue to defend

such a Europe." There again is the manifestation of the German apprehension of the withdrawal of the United States commitment to defend Europe.

With regard to German-French friendship, De Gaulle had asked Erhard the question of the value he attached to Franco-German friendship. Erhard had replied that he valued it highly and had enumerated several reasons why he did so, and why it was therefore necessary for France and Germany to overcome the residue of past conflicts. Germany valued France as a trusted ally who would support them in Berlin and reunification matters.

With regard to the French recognition of Communist China Erhard made it clear to De Gaulle that in the case of world problems Germany and France were far apart. Erhard had told DeGaulle that he could not understand his China policy and that Germany would not follow him in this policy. De Gaulle had attempted to justify his recognition of Communist China by the theory that a dualism in world affairs--that's the United States and the Soviet Union--must be replaced by pluralism.

Erhard had asked him why he had not, if his aim was to strengthen the position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, made his start in Europe, which was closer. De Gaulle, in continuing his support of his Chinese policy, had used the argument that China was a political reality which could not be ignored. Erhard retorted that that same argument could be applied to the GDR and that he would much rather that De Gaulle

stopped using that argument when talking about Communist China.

Erhard criticized De Gaulle with regard to De Gaulle's pronouncements about Southeast Asia and expressed the fear that the consequences of De Gaulle's recognition of Communist China would be that Viet Nam and perhaps the whole area would go Communist, and all the efforts of the United States would be lost.

De Gaulle argued that recognition of Communist China might be helpful with regard to the Soviet Union--if pressure were put on the Soviet Union through China, the Soviets might be more amenable to talking to the West. Erhard didn't accept this. De Gaulle, with regard to Southeast Asia, apparently had no program of assistance in mind, either economic or military, and no plan to send troops to Southeast Asia. In other words, as I said before, what De Gaulle had to say about Southeast Asia was merely a proposal of an ideal solution of neutralization, without being able in any way to indicate by what means such an ideal solution could be achieved or maintained.

I would like in the last five minutes I have to talk a little about the obvious increasing evidence of desire on the part of the Eastern European countries to improve their relations with the United States and the West, and the evidence of an increasing sense of national interest or national assertiveness, a kind of parallel in the growth of a nationalistic feeling on the other side of the Iron Curtain to what we witness on the Western side of the Iron Curtain.

With regard to Hungary, the Hungarian government has recently signed a preliminary agreement with Hilton Hotel Corporation for the building of a Hilton Hotel in Budapest. We have been officially informed that the Hungarian government ceased the jamming of the Voice of America and the Radio Free Europe. They have indicated a willingness to talk to us on a settlement of U. S. claims, which has been a long-standing issue on which no progress has been made up to now. They have assured us that visas to U. S. citizens will guarantee the safety of those citizens, even though they might be of Hungarian origin, and that once a visa is given a U. S. citizen with a U. S. passport can travel safely in Hungary and will not be subject to police duress.

In the case of Rumania, they have told us that they are prepared to negotiate a new Consular convention. They have given recently exit documentation to a certain number of individuals on the list we have given the government in dual-nationality and divided-family cases.

The Soviet weekly, The New Times, which was formerly circulated in Bucharest, has been recently replaced by a Rumanian weekly called The World, which published the entire text of the President's State of the Union Message recently.

In Poland there is a great increase of interest in trade. The Deputy Polish Minister for Foreign Trade, Mojeski, came to the States and spent two weeks, in which he had extremely fruitful and very pragmatic and practical talks with us. There was no ideology or propaganda connected with it. I think that Poland is desperately anxious to increase trade

with the West and particularly with the United States. We recently concluded a P.L. 480 agreement with Poland. The poles have removed an objectionable commissioner on the I.C.C. Commission in Laos and have replaced him with somebody who is more amenable to reason. And there have been invitations of high U. S. officials to go to Poland.

Czechoslovakis even, the most retarded, perhaps, of the Eastern European countries traditionally, with the exception of Ulbricht, of course, has been showing some movement toward more moderate internal policies, and police, and cultural expression, and intellectual freedom. There is, as I mentioned, solicitation of tourism from the West, the opening of border-crossing points with the Federal Republic of Germany, and improved prospects for progress in settling outstanding U. S. claims.

I would like to stress that this is not an indication that June is busting out all over and that Eastern Europe is finally going to become part of the free world. This is within the strict limits of Soviet security tolerance. Nevertheless, something is moving there. Khrushchev said to Mr. Rusk when he was in Moscow this summer, when Mr. Rusk referred to the fact that there are increasing evidences of interest in contacts with the West on the part of the Eastern European countries, "Well, those countries are like children. They are getting too big to spank." While that is not to be taken literally, it is still an indication that there are areas, particularly within your field of research, which are extremely interesting. That is: What is the relationship between the economic and

trade possibilities and appeals of the West and our political and security interests?

I see now my time is up, and I look forward to exchanging some more ideas with you in the question. I might conclude with two remarks which were in yesterday's column by Scotty Reston in the New York Times, which I think have something to do with the problems we are contending with. He wrote:

"There are more centers of effective world power today, not only Washington and Moscow but Peking and Paris, among others. The points of controversy could be multiplied indefinitely. There is more international contention, not because there is actually greater danger of war in the world but because the nations now think it is safe to play politics with foreign policy."

Thank you very much.

COLONEL TILLMAN; Gentlemen, before the question period, I'd like to remind you of the privileged character of the Secretary's remarks this morning. They are not to be discussed outside the College.

Secretary Tyler is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, would you mind discussing any change in the status of our Yugoslavian policy?

SECRETARY TYLER: I think you had Ambassador Kennan talk to you a few months ago. Anything I would say would be certainly very marginal

compared with what he told you. We had trouble with Yugoslavia and Poland, as you know, over the attempt by the Congress to prevent the President from extending the most-favored-nation clause, or withdrawing the most-favored-nation clause from Yugoslavia and Poland. Looking at the thing from where I sit, and admittedly with a restricted vantage point, because I have never been to Yugoslavia, and I'm not an expert at all in this field, I get the sense that the manifestations of national consciousness, which have always been strong in the Serbo-Croatian people, that these manifestations are continuing to be asserted, that Yugoslavia is exerting an increasing influence and attractive power on other countries which are looking for a middle way between the Soviet Union and the United States, that within Yugoslavia itself economic and commercial matters are retaining, and indeed have been increasing, their priorities, that Yugoslavia is very conscious of the fact that she depends on trade with the Common Market and the West for the maintenance of an independent role.

I would say that the role of Yugoslavia on the whole, with regard to the problem of neutral countries or nonalignment, is on balance in favor of our purposes. I think that she sets up an alternative to countries to becoming dominated by the Soviet Union or Communist China, without putting those countries before the decision of having to join the West if they don't join the East. So, I, myself, am very much in favor of an active policy toward Yugoslavia and a very close policy.

We have just sent one of our most able career ambassadors there,

Mr. Elbrick, so we attach great importance to our relations with that country.

QUESTION: Sir, in the event that De Gaulle is not timeless, what forces or individuals would likely take over in France, and what would their policies be likely to be?

SECRETARY TYLER: That's a hell of a question. First of all, I am not sure that De Gaulle is not timeless. He seems to defy every other criterion of normalcy. I belong to the optimistic school, and perhaps I will have to eat my words later, but I believe that the fabric and structure of France is strong enough to withstand a transition from De Gaulle to a more orthodox kind of parliamentary democracy.

It's true that the parties in France have been atrophied because of De Gaulle's authoritarian concept of rule, which has been interpreted and, I believe, misinterpreted by many people, in the sense of being considered more dictatorial than it in fact is. I would like this not to be repeated--I was having a talk just last week with the Secretary General of the Sas Souvri^{er}, the non-Communist labor union in France. There is also the CFTT, the Confederation^{Federal}/de Travail, but this is the Sas Souvri^{er}, the largest non-Communist labor union. This was a fellow called Verjavoin, who succeeded Bartroyen, and he's a socialist and he certainly could not be suspected of any tenderness for DeGaulle's political philosophy or style of ruling.

He believes that there are growing within the French political scene elements of stability. He points to the fact that Gaston De Fer, who has

been named by the Socialist Party as the candidate against De Gaulle in 1965, certainly has no chance of being elected in 1965, but that under the surface there is building up a consolidation of the left without being dependent on the Communist Party, because there is only the lunatic right, and on the remnants there may survive the elements that went to form the LAS, but that the radical Gaullists, or rather the right-wing Gaullists of the UNR, are really the individuals who benefit from De Gaulle's authority, but they are not people who build up a structure of rightist power.

So, on balance I would be inclined to be optimistic and say that even if De Gaulle were to drop through the floor tomorrow we do not face in France the likelihood of a radical, political upheaval. But I may be wrong.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment on the problems of manning and controlling a multilateral force?

SECRETARY TYLER: As you know, the multilateral force is being studied in two groups, one of which is the military sub-group here in Washington. I think they have just reported to the major group, the working group in Paris, which will be working, presumably, on the charter of the multilateral force, if the governments are willing to continue to draft a charter.

One thing is clear. We've got to retain a veto in the control and command of the multilateral force for the indefinite future. We can't envisage the possibility of a nuclear force in which we participate and

to which we have contributed being used without our consent. This has been pointed up by critics as a fact that the multilateral force perpetuates the domination of the United States, but, in fact, on the basis that nuclear defense is indivisible, we feel that as a participant, not only because our law requires it but in fact, it is in the general interest that no force should be able to be used without our consent. We would have to have a veto which is neither more nor less than that of any of the other members of the force.

I am not an expert in this, but there is some kind of committee or council within the force in which we would be a part, maybe a committee or council of the major powers involved, according to the degree of participation of the individual powers, up to, say, a certain percentage of the costs. Perhaps it would be Germany and Italy, if she comes in, and the UK, if it were to come in, which is certainly an open question, and ourselves, or there could be another arrangement whereby you could have a majority of Europeans themselves who could really decide how they wanted to arrange it.

It wouldn't be for us to say, so long as we are participants, so long as we have an equal responsibility or a responsibility not less than that of any other country or member of the force.

If you get a politically unified Europe speaking with a single voice, we have not closed our eyes to the possibility of a European nuclear multilateral force. That is not excluded theoretically, and, indeed, in the course of years, if the multilateral force comes into being, you may get

some such solution, in which case such a European nuclear force would be by definition and by hypothesis merged with or very closely related to ours, so that you would not get the possibility of our force being triggered by the European force, which would certainly always be much weaker than ours.

It's a very difficult problem but, on the basis of my talks with some of the military personnel working on this, and with Ambassador Merchant, who has been following the matter, as you know, very closely, and Jerry Smith, the former Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the State Department, it is clear to me that the problem is not insoluble. It's difficult, but not insoluble, and the problem of command and control is one that can be worked out.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in retrospect, do you consider that the wheat arrangements we have made with Russia are offensive to our allies?

SECRETARY TYLER: I don't think so. I think the wheat arrangement with Russia is being used by our European friends to rationalize their conviction that, in a period of detant, with the prospect of war in the European Theater receding, the best thing the West can do is to increase its contacts and exchanges with the East bloc. I don't think that the arguments that we advance, which I think are true, but not legal, are likely to be convincing to the Europeans, the fact that wheat is something which is immediately absorbed by consumption and that therefore it does not serve to build up the economy, or that it is a one-shot business and doesn't represent the extension of economic support and strengthening of

the economy or the heavy industry of the Soviet Bloc. I don't think these are likely to be convincing. In fact, we can see that they are not convincing. The European press has not accepted them, and European public opinion has not accepted them.

But I think essentially that if it weren't the wheat deal it would be some other argument. I don't think it is a mistake. I think we are right to go ahead with the wheat arrangement, though we are not able to carry out our policy because of the labor union's feelings about it and the difficulties of shipment.

The wheat deal, I think, is basically a different proposition from what we are dealing with in the European desire on the whole to go out and extend long-term credits which have the effect of helping the Soviet Union unduly, in my view, to solve its problem of the allocation of resources and which would enable the Soviet Union, at much less cost, to service its military industry and security requirements.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what are your views on the relaxation of the East Zone and the allowing of West Zone Germans to visit in East Germany?

SECRETARY TYLER: Just before Christmas, around December 5, I think it was, the Vice Chancellor of Germany, Eric Mender, made a speech in Berlin, in which he advocated more imagination and more initiative in finding a way to get an exchange across the Wall between East and West Berlin. This was seized upon and developed by the Cenart in Berlin. My impression is that the Federal Government in Bonn was taken by surprise

and, if not, was at least caught short to some extent. Shroeder, the Prime Minister, was away at the time. Chancellor Erhard felt that, in view of the great emotional and human factor involved in visits across from West Berlin to East Berlin, it was not possible really to head this off, and that resistance to this and preventing it from occurring would have been unacceptable politically.

But I know very well how worried the Federal Government was that the effect of this, with the presence of certain East German officials in West Berlin for the purpose of processing the applications, would result in an increase in the degree of the prestige and the recognition of the East German regime.

Since that time there has been a certain stiffening on the part of the Federal Government, and the latest negotiations for an exchange between West Berlin and East Berlin for Easter and Whitsun passes do not seem to be going to occur. I think it is understandable that the Federal Government does not want to allow exchanges to take place which can be used as political leverage or exploited politically by the so-called GDR to increase its political acceptability or role. In fact, it is believed by the Federal Government that the recent recognition of the GDR--well, it isn't quite a recognition--or the deal between Zanzibar and the GDR, where the GDR has set up a Consul General in Zanzibar, reflects a breaking down of the deterrent effects of the Holstein doctrine, and that this breakdown of the deterrent effects of the Holstein doctrine is due particularly to the fact that people say, "Well, now, the West

Germans and the East Germans are beginning to get together, and so why shouldn't we establish relations with East Germany."

There's the same situation with Ceylon. Ceylon has recently agreed to the establishment of a GDR consulate in Colombo, so the Federal Republic has immediately cut off all economic aid to Ceylon.

There's the difficulty, really. You don't know how far you can go without setting in a train reaction of recognition of the GDR which is, of course, anathema to the West Germans, because it represents consolidation of the division of Germany.

So my own view is that you have to go gradually in this respect. You can't go too fast. There is a theory that West Germany ought to be able to exert a powerful attraction and influence on East Germany and that you ought to be able to get by osmosis a kind of absorption of the political energies of East Germany by West Germany. The thing to remember, in my view, is that East Germany isn't a German state. East Germany is a regime put in place by Stalin. It is a holdover from the Stalin period. Ulbricht is a German national, but he is an instrument of Moscow, and, when we are dealing with East Germany in terms of power and politics and military elements, we are dealing with Moscow. We are not dealing with a finite German element.

QUESTION: Both the NATO and the Warsaw Pacts seem to be in a state of disarray. First I would like to have you say which one is in the worse state of disarray. Secondly, could you speculate on the effects of the establishment of a Paris-Peiping axis which would reflect on the two pacts?

SECRETARY TYLER: I think the word "disarray" is picturesque but it is not descriptive. We have our problems and they have theirs. Which has the greater problems, I don't know. I know what Mr. Rusk says, which is that, in spite of all the headaches we have, he wouldn't exchange his problems for Khrushchev's at all. I think that's about right. I think we have assets that are not always easy to mobilize and which we can't make use of tactically. But I think that we have gained a good deal; without going through the history of the last 10 or 15 years I think at this time that the Soviet Union, what with the Sino-Soviet split and its economic problems and agricultural problems, and the fact that it has to attend to more problems than it did before, is not in such good shape.

So I would just rest on that. I'd sooner be where I am in terms of survivability and with interest politically as well as militarily, than to be in Moscow.

We know what De Gaulle thinks about policy toward China. How he thinks he is going to implement it, I don't know. He believes that up to the last two years you could know what was going on in the international Communist world by having relations with only the Soviet Union, but that since the split of last summer, with the Communist Chinese letter of June 15 and the Soviet rebuttal of that letter on July 14 the split is unhealable, and that it is necessary to have relations with the Communist Chinese as a part of the international Communist movement.

I don't think that he has anything more than a rather vague idea

that in the Western world, France, as a self-appointed leader or trail blazer of Europe, should have relations with Communist China. I don't think this suggests a rapprochement between France and China, but I think he feels that no solution in that part of the world is possible without the participation of Communist China, that is, Southeast Asia.

There are opportunities for the West in Southeast Asia, particularly for France. I think that he thinks we are debarred by our domestic, political inhibitions and restrictions from taking an initiative with regard to resumption of diplomatic relations with Communist China now. I think he sees some benefit in the assertion of initiative on the part of a European country, and particularly France. I don't think he is motivated by a conscious anti-American bias or objective, but I think he is setting the stage for a greater role by Europe, particularly France, in that part of the world.

But, as I said in my talk, there is a great difference between what he projects on the screen as an ideal solution, which is an equilibrium in Southeast Asia, agreed to by Communist China, and a means of achieving this. The record does not encourage us to think that China would fulfill any commitment she entered into in the course of negotiations.

So I am not sure that I see the developments in terms of a France-Peking axis, but I do think that De Gaulle believes that he can by relations with Communist China increase the West's role in that part of the world, and that we are not in a good position to do so because we are

involved in military operations which he thinks cannot lead to a political solution. It is possible that he feels that, as he told Erhard, by having relations with Communist China some pressure or influence can be brought to bear on the Soviet Union which would be likely to make the Soviet Union more amenable to certain negotiations or settlements in Europe.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you give us some idea of what the future might hold for Austria?

SECRETARY TYLER: Well, of course, I am not sure that I can. Austria was created or was manufactured as a neutral country. Austrian neutrality is not something that emanates from the sentiments or desires or conscious policies of the people. It's a strange business, this business of neutrality. If you look at Switzerland or Sweden, as well as Austria, neutrality is like love. Everybody knows what it is, but nobody can describe it.

Austria was made a neutral country as a price for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and of our troops. If there is implicit in your question an assumption that Austria is not viable, I don't know that I would agree with that. I think that Austria, even though it is in a quiescent state politically, so long as there is a confrontation between East and West, is likely to remain as it is. It is a kind of no-man's land with regard to Soviet-Western influences, but there is no doubt at all that the policies of the Austrian government on the whole are consistent with what we take to be our security interest in that part of the world.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment on the current state of relations

between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and the impact of these relations on NATO?

SECRETARY TYLER: It's a painful business. Ten days ago I thought we had had it, as far as Cyprus is concerned. I think that what would trigger a Greek-Turkish military confrontation would be widespread rioting and bloodshed, particularly if there was substantial bloodshed of the Turkish minority. Turkey would intervene and Greece would thereupon intervene also. This, if not disastrous, would be a terrible blow to everything that the alliance stands for and to its prestige in the world.

As you know, the British came to us, as they have done in the past, and said, "We can't provide enough manpower in Cyprus to guarantee security. This thing is getting out of hand. You've got to help us." It was a hard decision, which was taken at the highest level, after careful consideration. We first tried to get the British to go to some other European countries and get them to contribute to a peace-keeping force and to leave us out of it. This again is part of the paradox that in a moment of need everybody comes to us and they can get along without us when they are getting along--but I don't want to get into that. Anyway, they came back with, "No, no. Unless the United States came in nobody would believe in the peace keeping." So the decision was taken that we would go in on a limited basis, with logistic support, transportation, and maybe about a battalion or 1200 men. It was not a particularly pleasant thought for us. And, of course, the Soviet Union immediately exploited the issue, and it looked very bad indeed.

Then, when there was fighting on the South Coast about 10 days ago and Turks were killed, the Turkish fleet--I believe it was a political

move--started off, and that could have triggered the whole thing. But now we have gained time, and time I think is awfully important. There has been, so far as I know, no extensive rioting. There was a coincidence in that there was the visit of the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary here while Mr. Ball was in Cyprus, and we got our ducks in a row with regard to the next stage, the U.N., if we couldn't get Makarios to agree on accepting the peace-keeping force.

So now the issue is being debated in the U. N. If the U.N. can set up a peace-keeping force which is not directly under the Security Council, so that the Soviet Union can't abuse its role in the Security Council to make trouble for us, I think that we may be able to come out of it.

The British have flown in some more troops, about 1500 troops. We are not out of the woods yet, but at least there is a better chance now than seemed to be the case about 10 days ago. But I repeat, I just can't qualify this or be optimistic about it. If we do fail, and if the Greek and Turkish governments are involved in fighting against each other in Cyprus, this would be a terrible blow to the alliance. I hope it would survive it, but it would certainly be a terrible thing.

I think that the Greek and Turkish governments, given the centuries-old animosity and hysterical and passionate hatred that have existed so long, since the conquest of Constantinople in 1353, between the Greeks and the Turks, have shown a good deal of restraint and self-discipline, more than I personally had counted on.

QUESTION: In your prepared remarks you mentioned the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Are such propaganda efforts of any real, tangible help to you or are they in fact sometimes a hindrance and a nuisance?

SECRETARY TYLER: I think that any propaganda effort is at times, in certain often limited but specific respects, a hindrance or a nuisance. In other words, the synchronization of the propaganda effort could be tactical shifts within the framework of national policy that you cannot coordinate. You can try to do this only if you dispose by central control of all the instruments of communication and dissemination, as is the case, of course, in a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union. They have a great advantage. They can call their shots. They can prepare for something by conditioning opinion and then move, or they can flip-flop. They have the great advantage of centralized control, obviously.

So that there have been times in the past when the Voice of America and RFE have not always been on the same wave length politically as well as technically, and there have been some difficulties. But, maybe I'm prejudiced in this case, because I used to be with the USIS before I came into the State Department and joined the War. I was with the Office of War Information in the Psychological Warfare Branch.

I think propaganda is a much-abused word, but I think that the conditioning of foreign opinion by the use of facts and truth and an explanation of what you are doing is/absolutely necessary ^{an} corollary to the pursuit of national policy. My feeling is that on the whole we are

much more sophisticated than we used to be and that we are much better coordinated. I think that, even though, say, RFE and the Voice of America were greatly criticized at the time of the Hungarian crisis and many people felt that we had gone much too far and had raised the hopes of the Hungarians to take violent action, in the expectation that we would intervene--and I went through all that--I was appointed in 1956 to review the scripts, after all this happened--I found that the words were not inflammatory, but, as you know, people hear what they want to hear, and people interpret things in the direction that they want things to go. That's a human failing. So that, even/some of the scripts, when they were read, cold, didn't have any particular indications along the lines that they were interpreted as having, nevertheless, if you put yourselves in the minds of the people who were hoping to hear things, they thought they heard them in the implications of what was said.

But I believe that the Voice of America and RFE are together definitely an asset to us, and the fact that the broadcasts have become sufficiently sophisticated, so that it is possible for the regimes of those countries to withdraw the jamming, as the Soviet Union did on the RFE broadcasts to the Soviet Union last summer, when they suddenly ceased jamming the Voice of America, on June 19, which was coincidentally four days after the Peking blast, makes it a very interesting area. There is no question in my mind that the Voice of America and RFE are a necessary and extremely important adjunct of our national policies.

COLONEL TILLMAN: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of all of us, I thank you for coming here and getting us off to such a good start on our new unit.

SECRETARY TYLER: Thank you very much.