

## EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PROCESSES IN EMERGING NATIONS

Dr. Robert H. Johnson

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Reviewed by: Colonel J. H. M. Smith 22 November 1962

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29 August 1962

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
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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole



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MR. PALMER: So far in our examination of government and our studies of government we have looked into the political systems of the Western democracies, our American heritage, and to a limited extent into the philosophy and organization of Communist governments.

Today we turn our attention to the so-called emerging nations in Asia, in Latin America, and in Africa. Needless to say, these are of transcendent importance to us and to the future of the United States, particularly in relation to the United Nations.

We will examine the factors and forces which will make these nations develop either toward communism, toward neutralism, or toward dictatorships of the right or left.

We are very fortunate to have with us this morning Dr. Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, who will discuss with us this problem.

Welcome to the Industrial College, Dr. Johnson.

DR. JOHNSON: Mr. Palmer, Admiral Rose, Gentlemen:

I have been left with the rest of the world and it is going to be a little difficult to cover, I think you can appreciate, this vast area that has been mentioned in the 45 minutes that I have. In order to make this at least a slightly manageable task, I am going to have to do a certain amount of simplifying.

In the first place, I want to emphasize in my talk the character of the political process in the societies, rather than to focus upon the political structures. The political structure of many of these countries is changing. They are inherited structures and can be expected to change further. It is only, I think, if we focus on the way in which politics is organized that we can begin to make at least some meaningful comparisons between these three areas of the world--Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Further, in order to simplify, the first part of my talk is going to be devoted to some generalizations about the character of the political process in the developing countries, and then, in order to bring this down to earth, to make it a little more specific, I would like, in the second part of my talk, to apply some of these general concepts which I will have developed to the particular case of Viet Nam. I should perhaps make the point at the beginning that, while I am not an expert really on any of these areas, I know a bit more about Asia than I do about the rest, and you'll find that my examples will tend to be drawn more from Asia than from other parts of the world. But I will try to bring in at least some comparisons with other parts of the world.

Turning first to the business of the generalizations about the political process in the developing countries, obviously this in itself is going to have to involve heroic oversimplification. Perhaps I should anticipate one comment. Perhaps when I have gotten through with this section of my talk you will be thinking that really the political process that I have described in the developing countries is not very much different from what it is in the developed countries.

I live, as perhaps some of you do, in the State of Virginia, and I sometimes like to amuse myself with the idea that in fact the politics in Virginia is the politics of the transitional society, a society in movement, that is, from a rather traditional political order to a more modern political order. Politics in Virginia and in the South generally does have some of the characteristics of politics in a traditional society with the emphasis upon personal ties, personal connections, upon status, and so on. This analogy cannot be pushed too far, obviously. I think all of us would agree that there are some differences between, say, politics in Virginia and politics in Africa.

None the less, there are certain basic similarities, because, after all, political problems, when you deal with them, particularly at the general level, at which I will be dealing with them this morning, have certain common characteristics.

Since I'll be taking you over a rather rough obstacle course rather rapidly, I think perhaps I should give you a map before I start. The general outline of the subjects that I'll be covering is this: First I want to talk a little about the basic political problem of leadership in the emerging societies; then briefly further about the political objectives of the leaderships of these societies; then, to go on to the main content of my talk, the methods of organizing political power in these countries. In that connection I'll talk about ideologies, about interest groups, about political parties, about the character of leadership, and particularly charismatic leadership, as an answer to the problem of political organization, and about authoritarian controls. Finally, I may have a few words to say about the role of government institutions and processes. But as I say the main emphasis will be upon

the political process. Having gone over this ground in general I'll use the same concepts, attempting to apply them to the case of Viet Nam.

Turning then to the basic problem of political leadership, the in-as-most elemental form, I think it can be stated simply as the problem of the organization of political power. In this general form it is very similar to the problem of political leadership in any part of the world. But, whereas in the United States, for example, we tend to emphasize in our talk about politics the necessary limits upon power and how power can be checked and limited, in the developing societies the predominant and overwhelming problem is one of accumulating sufficient power to keep the nation together and to give it some direction.

Only if national unity can be reasonably established can the leadership go on to the organization of political power to accomplish other purposes, such as modernization and economic development. National unity is a major problem in many of the new states. They are deeply divided by racial, linguistic, religious, tribal, and status differences. There are many groups in these societies that have difficulty identifying with the nation because their primary loyalties are to tribe, to linguistics, or to another group. The nation is but dimly seen, and often when it is seen at all it is seen as a device for insuring the domination by one group over another.

Thus, for example, in Burma the Shans, the Kachins, and the Karens, the minority groups, have difficulty identifying their interests with the state, which is under control of the dominant cultural group, the Burmans. In many societies within these groups there is a basic sense of distrust. Loyalty often does not

really extend much beyond the family group. When individuals get out beyond that group there is often a sense of distrust. It's a characteristic of village life in many of these areas.

The minority problems of these countries to which I have been referring antedated the colonial period, but the colonial regimes and their administration had some influence upon them. One thing that had an impact was whether the colonial regime ruled the country directly or indirectly. Where it ruled indirectly, that is, through the existing traditional indigenous leadership, the colonial power tended to accentuate and strengthen these existing divisions in the society by recognizing their leadership and giving them important <sup>political</sup> or administrative roles to play. Thus, for example, I think, colonial rule in parts of Africa and in Indonesia, where it was indirect, tended to have the effect of accentuating the divisions within the society by making use of the leadership of these various groupings that made up the society.

The modernization process, by which I mean the assimilation of modern techniques and some modern outlook, has tended both to accentuate these traditional divisions and to create some new bases of disunity in these societies. We tend, I think, to assume rather hopefully that <sup>technically mass</sup> improved communication will increase understanding between social groups, but often it has the opposite effect, at least initially. In the traditional society various social groups can live a rather semi-autonomous existence, hardly aware of or in contact with other groups in the society. While government in the traditional society is generally authoritarian, its purposes are limited, and there is relatively little contact between whatever group it is that is

in control of the government and these other groupings in the society. With the improvement in communications and with the increase in governmental functions, however, there tends to be a heightened awareness on the part of these tribal and other groups in the society of the threats that are posed to them by groups of which they are not a part and by the ruling group, whatever that may be.

Moreover, as we shall discuss in somewhat more detail in a few moments, these various groupings--tribal, communal, caste, and so on--tend to become the foundation stones for political organization when more modern political organizations are created in these societies. Thus, these differences that already exist in the traditional society become politicized. They enter the arena of politics, that is, the arena of power. This naturally also tends to accentuate the antagonisms that already exist. Moreover, the modernization process itself creates new divisions within the society. These divisions may take a variety of forms, but basically they are generally rooted in the differences in a degree to which different parts of the society, different individuals and groups, develop a more modern outlook. The difference, in other words, is between the relatively modernized, or Westernized, elements in a society and the relatively traditional elements.

One of the most obvious examples of this kind of division is the division between the rural and the urban populations. This is not to say, of course, that all city dwellers become modern in outlook and that all country dwellers continue to live the traditional life. Many of those who are drawn into the city, attracted to it by various advantages--perhaps the opportunity for entertainment at the movies--carry with them many characteristics of the traditional society and some of the groupings

of the traditional village society from which they came. Contrariwise, many village dwellers, of course, are in contact with modern civilization and become quite modern men. One of the things that facilitate this contact is the fact that many of the people who go to the cities, the young people, maintain continuing contact with their villages, and there is a circulation of people back and forth and an awareness of city life and a more modern outlook. Improvements in communication and transportation also, of course, produce this effect.

Cities none the less are peculiarly<sup>a</sup>/manifestation of and a carrier for the modernization process. So some of this division does exist. Such modernist-traditionalist splits develop in other parts of the society. Religious groups, for example, in response to contact with modern ways, develop a traditionalist and a modernist wing. Thus, in Indonesia you have this kind of development within the Moslem religion, and to a degree this difference between the modernists and traditionalists in Indonesia has been institutionalized in political parties. There is one political Moslem party that tends to represent the traditional point of view, another the more modern reformist Moslem point of view.

The military sometimes is characterized by a division between the traditionalists and the more modern elements. The old officer class may come from a traditional aristocracy, based upon the land/<sup>and,</sup> although it may have received some elements of a modern military education, may continue to be rather traditionalist in outlook, whereas the younger officers, who receive a more modern military education, perhaps abroad, often have a more modern outlook. This, of course, is often the stuff of revolution in these countries.

There are also divisions in these societies, particularly within the elites, based upon generational differences. In many societies which have achieved independence since the war, there still exists a prerevolutionary generation of leaders who generally collaborated, many of them, with the colonial powers. Then there will be the revolutionary generation that organized and ran the nationalist movement and which is generally in power. Then there often is a postrevolutionary generation that is pushing the generation of leadership from below. This also is a source of division and conflict.

How are these divisions in these societies to be bridged? How does a political leader go about organizing his country and organizing a political base for action on the problems of the society as he sees them? Before we go to an answer to that, or to the attempts to find an answer, I should say, it may be useful to talk very briefly about the political purposes, other than the purpose of creating national unity, of the leadership of these societies?

There are, of course, as many purposes as there are leaders, and it's difficult to generalize about them. One rough kind of distinction is between the leadership that is concerned with maintaining a traditional oligarchy in power, versus a leadership whose objectives are modernization and economic development. Perhaps at one pole versus the other on this, you could cite the case of Paraguay, where the focus is on maintaining a traditional oligarchy and its privileges, and at the other extreme--or perhaps not at the other extreme but toward the other end of the spectrum--India under Nehru would be an example.

Many leaders have a different objective. It is increased status for their nation.

Nationalism continues as a powerful motive force in these societies. There may be the objective of development projects, less the welfare of the citizens of the country, and then the assertion of the status of the nation. This is an obvious thing. We are all familiar with it. Steel mills are the most obvious example and manifestation of it.

On the other hand, some national leaders seek a firm base of national power as the basis on which to build personal international leadership. Their ambitions, in other words, are broader than the boundaries of the nation. Examples of this readily come to mind--Nkrumah in Ghana and Nasser, at least in his earlier phase, up until recent days.

The objective of leadership may be to create an environment within which it is possible for business, say, to operate. This was the objective, surely, of leaderships in Western Europe at the time of modernization development there. It tends to be less the objective in these countries as a generalization, partly because there is a bias in the societies against commercial activities, partly because commercial activities are often in the hands of various minority groups like the Chinese or Indians, in the case of Southeast Asia.

The military may seize political power, with the objective of creating the political preconditions for military security, which they find, or feel, anyway, that the civilian leadership is unable or incapable of accomplishing. There is something of this element, surely, in the Ney Win takeover in Burma.

Finally, of course, the objective of political leadership may be nothing more than personal power for the leader himself or for his political group. The

outstanding example of this, I suppose, would be Sukarno in Indonesia. His main preoccupation has not been, so far anyway, with the problems of development and modernization but rather with balancing one group off against another in order to maintain his personal power. At one time it has been perhaps democratic politicians versus the Communists. At the present moment it's the Communists versus the Army that he is balancing off against each other.

Turning then to the organization of political power in these societies, given these deep divisions, given these governmental purposes and the need for national unity, how is political power organized? One way of organizing political power, of getting support for governmental programs, is through ideological appeals. Again I'll have to generalize in a very gross way, but I'll distinguish four categories of ideology that are prominent in these societies. One I have already mentioned-- the ideology of nationalism. As I said, this is still a great motive force in many of these societies. We tended, I think, for a while to think of nationalism as being a phenomenon of the national revolution and not a continuing phenomenon, but actually it has an impact in a variety of ways upon the policies of these countries.

Even in Latin America, where countries have been independent, generally speaking for about 100 years, there is a new nationalism. In this case it represents in part a reaction to an old oligarchy which is identified with foreign elements. It's a kind of class-oriented nationalism. It represents sometimes a search for identity on the part of submerged groups, like the Indians in Latin American societies.

Nationalism in these societies often provides the real content of many of the

other nominal ideologies. For example, measures that may be justified as being socialist may in fact have their primary motivation in nationalism. I have already mentioned prestige development projects. Another example of this sort of thing is the nationalization of import trade. This may appear to be a measure of socialism, but in fact it often represents an effort on the part of the leadership to gain control for the country of an important economic sector, imports, which are frequently in the hands of some foreign minority or other.

I have mentioned socialism. That is the second category, of course, of ideologies in these countries. Socialism in the developing countries often bears little resemblance to the classical socialism of Marx and Engels. Fundamentally, in its most basic aspect, it represents the desire for the redistribution of power in the society. It is this desire for the redistribution of power which gave socialism its impact and its impetus as an ideology of the national revolution. It was anti-colonial. Socialist theory called for redistribution of power not only internally, domestically, but in the sense of throwing the colonial masters out. Socialism moreover in these countries, once they have attained their independence, may take a variety of forms. Some socialism is modern in emphasis. This is the kind of socialism we think of, welfare oriented, oriented toward government enterprise, and so on. However, there are in some of these societies the kind of socialism that is more traditionalist in its orientation. It seeks to recreate the village society. It emphasizes cooperatives, and so on. You find an element of this in the thinking of one wing of the socialist party in India, the Prajah Socialist Party. You find this also in the nationalist party in Indonesia. So that socialism is not a

single, simple thing. It is rather a complex thing mixed up with nationalism and mixed up with a lot of other ideas, some of them traditional.

Another type of ideology is the idea of populace ideologies. It's characteristic of the intellectuals of the Westernized types in these societies that they feel cut off from their society. They have been Westernized to a degree, and yet they have feelings of guilt or concern that they are no longer Indians or that they are no longer Burmans. Populace ideologies often represent an effort to return to the true culture, the true life, of the country. There is an element of this in the kind of socialism that I have already mentioned in India and Indonesia. The intellectual seeks through populace philosophies to create a link between the traditional life and more modern nationalism. You find this in the U.S.S.R. in the 19th century, in some of the ideologies there. Gandhism, in its successors in India, has a strong populace element.

Finally, of course, there are the Communist ideologies. Many things could be said about these. I'll limit myself only to saying that the appeals of communism, contrary sometimes to the popular impression, are various. They are not simply an appeal based upon economic problems of these societies. They often appeal to modernist elements, elements desiring to modernize their societies. They also may appeal to traditionalist elements. The Communist parties themselves often make a pitch to the traditionalist elements and try to work through the traditional power structures. In India, for example, the Communist Party in Bombay state, until that state was divided, played the communal issue, the linguistic issue, for all it was worth as a source of political power.

Turning then to political organization, here I want to talk about interest groups and political parties. An important way in which links are created between the people and political leadership in developed countries is through associations of individuals which press demands upon the political leadership, which we familiarly and often call interest groups. These may be economic or noneconomic. They may be labor unions, business organizations, parent-teachers associations, professional organizations, and so on.

In sociologist terms these are secondary associations. In the emerging countries, as I previously noted, these are the primary associations. That is, family, clan, caste, and tribe are much stronger than groups organized around economic, occupational, or other interests. Where these interest groups do exist in these societies, they frequently have as their basic unit tribal or caste associations of one sort or another.

Another characteristic of interest groups in these societies is that they were often created by the nationalist parties either during the period of the national revolution and the struggle against the colonial power or in the period since, primarily as a means of mustering power for the party. That is, they were not organized to press demands upon the party but were a means of getting another group support for the nationalist party. They become appendages of the party and channels of communication from the party downward to the people, not upward from the people to the party. In other words, they do not serve the purpose that they do in more developed societies of pressing political demands upon the political system.

Generally speaking, interest groups in these societies are weak and do not

provide a very satisfactory base for political power. They exist mainly on paper and provide a kind of political platform for the politically ambitious. The links between the membership and the leadership in these organizations often are very weak.

Now, as a general qualification to these generalizations, I think, there are a number of cases in Latin America where such organized groups are of greater importance. Primary associations--the extended family, for example, I understand, in Latin America is much weaker than it is in Africa or Asia. Therefore, associations of land owners, labor, students, and to a lesser extent of business men are of considerable importance in these Latin American societies. And of course the Church is of great importance as a kind of interest group pressing demands on the system.

These groups in Latin America form political coalitions often of a rather odd sort, as in Argentina, where you had a coalition between the Army and labor under Peron.

Now turning then to political parties, and trying to generalize again about the characteristics of political parties in the societies--and I hope perhaps that one of the virtues of generalizing so much is that there are so many exceptions to these generalizations that as I go along they will be occurring to you and perhaps will stimulate some discussion--the dominant political parties in the new states, that is, those that have recently emerged from colonialism, tend to be parties of the national revolution. The preeminent example, perhaps, is the Congress Party in India. These parties are tending, however, to break up. This is partly

because they are made up of such a diversity of interests. They range all the way from the far right to the far left, frequently—land owners on one side to real, fire-eating socialists on the other. But it's also partly due simply to factionalism, which is characteristic of political parties, not only in these countries but particularly in these emerging countries, based upon the fact that parties are organized on a very personal basis. I'll come back to that in a moment.

These national parties are challenged often by two types of opposition-- one, parties which are based upon tribal, communal, or linguistic groups, in other words, the basic appeals in a society, the basic units to which individuals still often feel themselves attached. These tribal and communal parties often demand local autonomy or threaten secession from the state, as, for example, the Sikhs have done from time to time in India.

On the other side the national parties are challenged by new more ideological parties, sometimes organized by a postrevolutionary generation. The basic units around which political parties in these societies tend to be built are status groupings or the primary associations that we have been referring to. In the village, the head man, the large land owner, or the leader of a caste may control a large part of the vote of the village. A shift in his allegiance may shift the vote, or may shift much of the vote, of the village.

In India an understanding of the caste role in politics is often essential to an understanding of the inner character of the politics of the country. In Africa the tribe is of crucial importance. The popular image, I suppose, of Africa is that as the tribal/<sup>member</sup> moves to the city he leaves behind him his tribal associations.

Actually in Africa, as in other parts of the underdeveloped world, the individual brings his associations with him. Usually he lives initially with his caste or tribal fellows in the city, and these basic organizations, both in the city and in the countryside, become the cells around which political party organizations are built.

In many respects primary associations of this sort are not unlike the immigrant groups in an American society, in an American city, who also tended to live initially among their fellows and were organized politically on that basis.

Political organizations in these societies are built, as I have said, upon personal ties, ties at both the bottom and the top of the party. It is personal associations rather than agreement on programs or policies that are the basis that holds the party together.

It is this characteristic of politics in these societies which often makes it exceedingly difficult for an outsider to understand the politics, because the network of relationships is exceedingly complex, and the way that it works out in a particular political situation may be very difficult to trace. One of the results of this emphasis upon the personal character of politics, the personal loyalty as an element that holds political parties together, is factionalism and the splintering of parties, because these alliances, being based upon these personal connections of emotion and loyalty, are frequently broken and remade. So that one of the characteristics of politics is a constant splintering of parties of political groups and a reforming of new groups. You have some of this, for example, in the Philippines, a radical example after the recent election, where the new President, Macapagal, does not have the majority in the Congress, and yet managed somehow to form an

effective majority, utilizing dissidents from the opposition party.

The links between the party at the top, at the national or provincial level, and the party in politics at the bottom of the society, in the village, are often very weak in these countries. The political systems generally lack brokers who can serve as mediators between politics at the top and politics at the bottom, who can translate the needs of the people in the village into demands upon the political leadership, and who can translate government programs and explain them to the residents in the countryside.

Leaders at the top of these parties are often preoccupied with the struggle for power at the top, and village political life goes on largely unaffected. This lack of intermediate level of political leadership between the top and the bottom in the politics of these societies introduces great uncertainty into political calculations. It becomes very difficult for a political leader to know what kinds of programs and what kinds of policies might obtain supports. This is one of the reasons why political appeals tend to be particularly emotional and to rely less upon appeals to interests, appeals to support particular programs or policies.

The heavy reliance upon personal ties, the weakness of interest groups, and the intermediate level of political leadership which can mediate between the people and the top leadership create gaps within these societies which the Communists can exploit. In an environment first of democratic politics, the Communists may undercut the alliances between the political leaders, by creating modern bloc level or village level political organizations, which in effect steal the political support away from the alleged political leaders. For example, the Communists

in Java, it is claimed, have paid political workers in every village. They have adopted modern political organization techniques, often, although in some cases they are subject to many of the same defects. In fact one of the claims by Indian non-Communists is that you don't need to worry about the Communists in India because they are subject to all the same difficulties as all other Indians, and the party won't hang together and it won't be an instrument for suppression. But it is none the less true that the Communists have adopted modern political organization techniques and applied them in the societies and undercut the existing leadership.

Another device for getting support is through charismatic leadership. The need for national unity in the face of the deep divisions in these societies, and the need for action to tackle problems are often not satisfied by a political system in which the means for articulation of interests are weak and parties are built upon personal allegiances and ideologies are often lacking in real content. This problem of creating a <sup>political</sup> coalition may be accentuated by the withering away in large parts of the society of the deep emotional roots of respect for traditional authority. The habits of obedience to traditional authority have withered away in many cases, particularly in the society, and habits of obedience are left rather in a free-floating state, ready to attach themselves to whatever political force can attract them. In such a situation often one of two solutions is adopted:

One is a charismatic leader who can appeal in the most general way to the emotions of obedience, or an authoritarian solution which uses the political system to impose order and unity upon the society. The charismatic leader is a leader who exudes a certain authority or sense of authority which appears to have a spiritual

rather than a material source. Such leaders communicate emotions and emotional states, rather than precise points of view based upon careful reasoning. Almost all effective political leaders have some of this charismatic quality, but the pure types offer little else. This kind of appeal can bridge the gaps of interest and emotion which separate the people in these societies, but it is not a very sound basis for the implementation of government programs that conflict with the interests, particularly economic interests, in the society.

The other approach that I have mentioned is the approach of authoritarianism, the use of the instruments of state power to overcome the divisions in these societies, to create public order, and sometimes to foster economic development. As has often been pointed out, both the precolonial and colonial experience of these societies point in the direction of authoritarianism. Despite the efforts of the leadership in some of these societies to romanticize the democracy of the traditional period, in fact, the political order was generally authoritarian. Of the institutions left by the colonial powers, the bureaucracies and the armies typically are much stronger than the political structures. The executive is generally much stronger than the legislative and judicial organs.

Authoritarianism may range from the rather mild form that you have in Thailand to the very oppressive form, as in Korea under Rhee. The instruments of control may be very rudimentary and inefficient, or highly developed and very repressive.

I think I had better skip what I had to say about the governmental structures and pass now briefly to a discussion of the case of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam is not a very good case, in a way, to take. I am taking it partly because it's one I spent some time on recently, frankly. It is an interesting case. It presents the problems of an active insurgency, of course, and the extent of U. S. involvement is much greater than in most of these societies. It does exhibit many of the political problems of an underdeveloped country, and also illustrates the policy problems posed for the United States in dealing with some of these underdeveloped societies.

The usual focus in dealing with the political aspect of the problem in Viet Nam is to emphasize the lack of democracy in the central government. Surely this is the emphasis in the popular writing on the subject. But the real problem, at least the real immediate problem, in fighting the guerrilla war is the lack of identification between the rural population and the government. Cooperation of the rural population with the government is absolutely essential for the conduct of a guerrilla war, as you well know--as a source of intelligence, for one thing.

Let me talk in terms of the categories that I have been using, then, briefly about Viet Nam. I'll skip over the traditional and colonial background. If you want to go into that, perhaps we can go into it a little later. As to the divisions in the Vietnamese society, Viet Nam has been divided for years into three main regions--Tonkin, in the North, Annam, in the center, and Cochin China in the South. In present day, Viet Nam consists of the southern part of the country, that is, Cochin China. I am talking now about all of Viet Nam, when I talk about these three divisions, North and South. South Viet Nam consists of the southern part, that is, Cochin China, and part of the central section of the country.

One of the sources of division in the society is the fact that the leadership of the government of Viet Nam tends to come from the center and from the North, rather than from the South. The center and the North are highly traditional parts of the society. They were less affected by the impact of colonialism. The southern part of the country, on the other hand, was being settled in the 19th century when the French moved into Viet Nam. So this is a source of division in the society.

The fact that Diem and his group are Catholic is another source of division in a predominantly Buddhist country. There are other religious divisions in the society, particularly the sects--the Khow Dai and the Wah How. Diem, as you know, battled these when he was struggling to achieve political power, and still distrusts them. This is a division and a source of some difficulty.

Then there are the mountain tribes, the so-called Montagnards. These backward tribal peoples have been treated traditionally by the Vietnamese governments, whether under French colonial administration or otherwise, even more callously than Vietnamese administration treats the Vietnamese rural population. These Montagnards really are in the position of the Indians in the American West. They are being pushed off the land, and they have a little long-run future. Recently there has been some forward movement on the problem of the Montagnards, and if I have time we can mention that in more detail.

Then there is the division in the society between the relatively modern leadership in Saigon, which lives in a relatively affluent-society style, and the traditional population in the villages. There are also generational differences,

and this, perhaps, is the source of the opposition of the café intellectual in Saigon to the Diem regime--they come from a different generation.

What has been the approach of the government of Viet Nam to the problem of organization of political power? First, as to ideologies, the sentiments of modern nationalism in Viet Nam, as you well know, I think, attach themselves to a nationalist movement led by the Communists. Diem sat out the war between the French and the Viet Minh, and has never achieved this kind of nationalist identification in the eyes of the population, which is a very important source of support for many leaders in many parts of the underdeveloped world. This is a serious drawback for the government, not only internally but also internationally, because it raises questions in the minds of some people internationally about the support the government enjoys.

The government has attempted to create a kind of synthetic philosophy, a personalist ideology which attempted to combine modernist and traditionalist appeals. It emphasizes the development of the human personality and individual rights, but within a communal context.

Interest groups in Viet Nam--the government has created a variety of farmer, labor, youth, and civil servant organizations. These organizations have provided some services or opportunities for group activity to their members, but have generally not served as channels of protest or communication between the government and the society. When there has been some slight tendency in this direction, as, for example, a tenant farmers' union that attempted to insure the enforcement of land reform, the tendency of the government has been to suppress it, in this case

by absorbing the tenant farmers' union into the government-controlled farmers' association.

Political parties--the government again has created the political parties. There is a mass political party, the National Revolutionary Movement, and an elite party, the Khan Low. Both are designed as devices for control of the population, the Khan Low Party as a means for insuring that the leadership of the various organizations in the society, the mass organizations--the Army and the bureaucracy--remains in the hands of the government leadership. Both political party organizations and interest group organizations in Viet Nam, interestingly, are modeled somewhat on Communist patterns, deliberately.

As to charismatic leadership as a basis for organizing political power, one of Diem's weaknesses is that he does not have emotional appeal to the population. He is a mandarin. In fact, it is not easy to find this type of personality apparently in Viet Nam. It is somehow contrary to the psychology of Viet Nam. The government therefore has not been able, Diem has not been able, to rely to a considerable extent- although he has made some effort in this direction--upon a kind of personal loyalty to him based upon this sort of emotional attachment.

Government institutions and processes have been used as instruments of control. Government relations with the rural population emphasize control rather than sensitivity to local needs and participation by local people. Local administration, at least until recently, was in the hands wholly of the appointed officials. Even the village councils and the hamlet councils were appointed in character, until recently, under the Strategic Hamlet Program, where there is some effort being

made to elect hamlet councils.

Politics in Viet Nam and administration has a very personal character. The most obvious manifestation of this is the control by Diem's family at the top. As you know, I think, his brothers play a very important role in one way or another in the administration of Viet Nam. But individuals in the administration, particularly the province chiefs, are associated with Diem through personal ties. He personally appoints the province chiefs.

The administrators in Viet Nam, for reasons that we could go into, are characterized generally by a lack of empathy in their dealing with the rural population, that is, a lack of ability to appreciate the emotions, needs, and desires of the rural population. This is also characteristic to some fair degree of the relationship between the military and the civilian population, although it is said that some of the new military province chiefs and districts chiefs represent an improvement over their civilian predecessors in this regard.

The tendency of the colonial regime to place heavy demands upon the population and to do little about providing channels of upward communication of protest and to reflect needs in the countryside has been accentuated, really, under the Diem regime. In general, the system for passing commands down from the top and loading responsibilities on local officials is better organized than the means for obtaining upward the desires and needs of the society.

Now, in just one minute that I've got left to complete this picture in a partial way, anyway, of Viet Nam, I might make some reference to the kinds of programs and activities which the government of Viet Nam, or the United States Government,

or the two in collaboration, have developed to deal with this lack of identification and association between the people in the countryside and the central government.

One type of approach emphasizes improvement in the administration, both the quality of the ability of the administrator to do the technical job and also to improve his attitude toward the rural population. His attitudes, of course, are rooted in a long tradition briefly identified with the word, "mandarin," and cannot be readily rooted out. The effect of the French colonial regime was to accentuate in many respects the formalism and the lack of contact or communication of the administration with the countryside.

Another sort of device is to get some measure of participation on the part of the population. The government's approach to this, as I have said, has emphasized mass organizations which are controlled at the top, by the top leadership. There has been some effort under the Strategic Hamlet Program to elect hamlet officials and to give some opportunity for protest. For example, just last month the government published an instruction inviting the rural population of Viet Nam to submit complaints when they were having excessive demands placed upon them in connection with counterinsurgency efforts.

Another type of approach in addition to administration and participation can be characterized by the word "welfare." We are engaged in a variety of economic development welfare projects. In many societies what the countries have been trying is a device for providing a connection of better links between the countryside and the central government's community development. There is no community-development program as such in Viet Nam, but there is something that is a rough

kind of Vietnamese equivalent, or so-called civic action. One problem here, as previous discussion has suggested, is how to determine what the local needs really are, when the channels of communication and means of identifying these needs are imperfect. Both we and the Vietnamese are attempting to develop some channels of communication, improved channels of communication, into the countryside.

Finally, a way of achieving this kind of identify is through information and propaganda programs. This surely has been the main emphasis in the past of the government of Viet Nam. In fact it is one of its weaknesses, that it thought that the job could be done through information and propaganda. Obviously information and propaganda can only support a substantive effort of another sort.

To conclude the talk, let me say that I hope I have not left the impression that all of these societies are about to fall apart and that we are about to be faced by a whole group of Congos around the world. These are problems that I have been focusing on, but the leadership in these societies has made progress and is making progress in varying degrees in dealing with them. In some societies rather remarkable progress has been made. When you consider the deep divisions in India, for example, and the grave economic problems that that country has faced, the progress has really been quite remarkable. In Taiwan and in countries of Latin America like Brazil, and Nigeria, there is forward movement. Other countries seem to be in a rather drifting state--countries like Burma and Indonesia, where the main preoccupation still is with the struggle for power, establishing a power base, rather than with using a power base which doesn't exist to pursue governmental programs.

Our objective in all of this, most generally stated, of course, is to try to identify the modernizing and developing politically capable elements in these societies, to induce them to undertake the necessary changes both to create a political power base and to move their societies forward, and to facilitate the creation of a broad coalition of those interests in the society, those groups that are interested in modernization and economic development.

That, gentlemen, is a very brief, and I hope not too rapid, survey of some of the characteristics of politics in the developing societies. If there are questions, as I hope there will be, we can pursue them in a moment.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN BRYCE: Gentlemen, Dr. Johnson is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Could you comment on the effects of political stability that the presence of our military forces may have in South Viet Nam?

DR. JOHNSON: Well, I think that they do perhaps have a politically stabilizing effect in the sense that it makes it more difficult for somebody, say, to run a coup or to give them second thoughts about running a coup against Diem. On the other hand, in a way it has some politically destabilizing effects, in the sense that one of the great effects of what we are doing in Viet Nam militarily is that we are getting Americans and the Vietnamese themselves to a greater extent out into the countryside. Through the programs that we are engaged in we are vastly increasing the contact with the countryside and really stirring things up, in a way. So that it depends, I think, on your perspective, whether you are

thinking about, say, a coup at the top, or some of the consequences in the countryside.

QUESTION: Can you discuss some of the impact the Peace Corps has on these underdeveloped countries? Or is it too soon to tell?

DR. JOHNSON: I think the official ideology of the Peace Corps refuses to acknowledge that it has a political impact. So far as what its specific impacts will be, I think it perhaps is a little early to tell, and it would depend, I think, on the kind of activities in which the Peace Corps becomes involved. If they should become involved in the community-development and self-help type of activities and in stirring up an awareness in the countryside of the ability to deal with their own problems, particularly if they get some governmental support, it could have some political impact I think. As I say, it is difficult to say, and the ideology says there is nothing there.

QUESTION: Would you give us a further explanation of the political power base you mentioned--exactly what is meant by that?

DR. JOHNSON: Well, what I mean by that is creating a sufficient coalition of forces in the society, an adequate one to do whatever job it is that you are setting out to do, whether it's development or whatever, in other words, the sort of process that the Republican and Democratic Parties engage in here, appealing to various groups in the society, attempting to obtain their support so that they can carry out specific programs of action. Of course I was involved in a description of some of the great difficulties that you have in communicating with these groups and obtaining their support for programs. But that is basically what I meant.

Prior to that is the problem of creating a degree of national consensus of national unity, which is often lacking.

QUESTION: You pointed out how difficult it is to coordinate this complex basis of political organization in the underdeveloped countries. Taking South Viet Nam as an example of this problem, how has it been possible for the Communists to get what looks like a monolithic solidarity in North Viet Nam and North Korea?

DR. JOHNSON: I am not by any means an expert on the political organization of Communist societies, but they are using some of these techniques which I said that the Vietnamese in the South use. They have mass organizations. They have various devices of control, including secret police services. The Communists, operating in an authoritarian environment, have all the advantages of any authoritarian regime in creating a kind of unity in the country. They have the same problems, however, as democratic political leaders when they operate in a democratic political environment. You can see some of these problems when you examine Communist parties in a place like India which has been characterized traditionally by a tremendous amount of factionalism--personal cliques, sometimes based upon ideological differences, or rationalized by ideological differences, and sometimes not.

As I suggested briefly in my talk, one of the advantages that the Communists have in the democratic societies that they attempt to exploit is to use the modern methods of political organization, getting down to the bloc and making door-to-door campaigns, organizing the people, in effect, out from under the traditional

leadership which tends to assume that because a person is Chinese he will vote  
tells him to vote.  
the way the head of the Chinese association / The P. A. P. in Singapore, which  
is not a Communist party, although it has some Communists in it--a radical left  
party--did a very good job of subverting the alliance between the traditional  
elements.

I realize that I have gone from your question on the regimes in Communist  
countries, about which I know relatively little, to something about which I know  
a little bit more--Communist parties in democratic societies.

QUESTION: Would you care to comment on the apparent success, at least,  
of Sukarno's efforts to detain the Dutch in New Guinea?

DR. JOHNSON: Well, this gets us into things that get beyond the political  
development process, of course. The West New Guinea issue is, of course, an  
interesting case of the use of nationalism by a political leader in order to main-  
tain himself in political power. As long as Sukarno has beaten this particular  
drum it is very difficult for anybody, whether it is a Communist politician or an  
anti-Communist politician, or the Army, to oppose him politically.

One of the virtues of the West New Guinea settlement perhaps is that with this  
preeminently irredentist issue disposed of perhaps the society can be turned more  
toward the problems of development and perhaps Sukarno will see development as  
a way of strengthening his political power.

I think that to talk about the diplomatic aspects of the West New Guinea settle-  
ment and how it came about would be getting a bit off our immediate subject here,  
although I would be happy to discuss that.

QUESTION: Relating to that last discussion, it apparently seems that very often we back personnel, that is, leaders, of countries that do not have the support of the people or we continue to back personnel like Sukarno who deviate from the principles that we would like to see established, and we do so at the risk of some of our established allies. Could you please comment on our lack of flexibility?

DR. JOHNSON: In the first place I think I would dispute the implied proposition that Sukarno lacks the support of the people of Indonesia. It is precisely because they do identify Indonesia with Sukarno that he has the political power that he does, or in part because of that. So far as opting for leaders that don't represent everything that we stand for, of course the problem is often the old traditional problem of the alternatives. In Indonesia we have not only been interested in Sukarno, of course, but we have also been interested in the Army, which is the primary anti-Communist force in the country, because the political parties have declined to almost absolute zero from the Communist political party.

It really was in the interest in part of our support of the Army that there was some virtue in pressing for a settlement of the West New Guinea issue, getting this out of Indonesian politics. If we had had an armed conflict over West New Guinea, in which the military was supported, as it was being supported, by the Communist side, that surely would not have served our best interests in Indonesia. It would have made it very difficult indeed for the Army to continue as an important anti-Communist force in that country.

So far as the third part of your question is concerned, choosing the new

country as opposed to the colonial power, the choice, if there was one, was a rather subtle one, in the sense that the Dutch decided some months back that they wanted out of West New Guinea. The question from that point forward became not a question of whether they would go out or whether they would not go out. The question was, how. This is what the negotiations have been about since. It was obvious, I think, that if there was to be a solution that was not to result in a war it was one that would have to make substantial concessions to the Indonesians. The Dutch, no doubt, don't feel altogether happy about the pushing that we have done against them. I might say that we pushed against both sides in this negotiation. But a certain amount of this unhappiness is inevitable in this kind of relationship, surely.

I think our net view was that what we did had the virtue of saving what is the fourth largest country in terms of population in the world and one of the most important in Southeast Asia, at least saving it temporarily--no country is saved permanently, and surely not Indonesia--against some slight losses in our relationships with our Dutch allies.

QUESTION: What aspects of our democratic process have the most chance for appeal to these emerging nations?

DR. JOHNSON: Well, that is, I think, a very good and yet a very difficult question to answer. The effectiveness of the appeal of the democratic institutions depends in part and in considerable measure upon the colonial experience that these countries have. As you are very much aware, I think, the British, as a generalization, in their colonies, left behind much more of a structure, both

political and administrative, than some of the other colonial powers, to provide the basis, the sort of steel frames, as they are often called, within which a democratic political process could be conducted. Surely there is a broad appeal in these societies for democracies--the values of democracy have a broad appeal in the sense of individual rights and freedoms, particularly to the elite groups. To people who live still in a traditional or semi-traditional state in the villages, perhaps, this is of much less importance, but the elite groups often make the politics of these societies. So that in that very basic sense the democratic rights have this appeal.

But I think that basically what will determine the outcome is less the appeal in some abstract ideological sense of democratic ideas than in the degree to which they have institutionalized, either in the colonial period or in the period of independence. It is the process of institutionalization that we have really been discussing here--what some of the problems are and how the leadership tends to go about solving them. I think that this is a peculiar thing in the United States. We are in a way very unideological in our own approach to politics, and yet, when we approach the politics of other societies we tend to emphasize ideology and think in terms of the appeals of democracy and the appeals of communism as ideologies. In fact, the struggle often is taking place on an organizational or an institutional level between the effectiveness of the Communists in organizing a political party or in organizing a society versus the effectiveness of the democratic or non-Communist politicians--not always democratic.

QUESTION: Would you give us your views on the political organization of

Laos as it exists now and the possibility for stability in the coalition in the immediate future?

DR. JOHNSON: The trouble with Laos, of course, is that it really isn't a country, and this makes political organization a little difficult. Political organization as it has existed in Laos has been based primarily upon this kind of thing that I have been talking about, namely, family ties. There are certain families that dominate one area of the country, for example--the Sononicons in Vientiane, and certain other families like the Butjunions family in Salanakev, and so on.

Political movements in that country, even to some degree the Communist movements, have been organized on these affiliations or family ties.

The problem really in Laos at the moment is how you can make the transition, how you can begin with that kind of basic organization--because that's about all you have to operate with--and make the transition to a more modern political organization, one that gets down into the villages, as the Communists, to some fair degree, have done.

This will not be easy. I don't know that there is an easy answer or even any answer, and it's particularly difficult, of course, in the situation where you've got a coalition government, with the two non-Communist tendencies, Souvanna Phouma in the center and the Boun Oum Acumi group on the right, still suffering from the results of their recent differences. I can define the problem, but I don't know that I can tell you what the solution is. The problem is, somehow, beginning with the family groups to build the kind of political organization that can begin to reach out

into the countryside.

One kind of a beginning of an answer, perhaps, is emphasis on civic action, both military and civilian, if that can get going. Part of the trouble here is the fact that the non-Communists don't control large areas of the country. But it is some place in this some such general context as this, I think, that we have to look for a solution.

QUESTION: You spoke, Dr. Johnson, of the lack of institutionalizing many of the nations under colonial rule, except in the case of the British. You spoke also of the lack of any political orientation in the ideology of the Peace Corps. My question is: What device do we have for promoting institutionalization along our democratic lines in these emerging nations; other than applying diplomatic persuasion?

DR. JOHNSON: You have asked really the \$64 question. This is a question for which we should have an answer, but we have only, I think, approaches to an answer. One kind of formal answer is to talk in terms of the various programs. We've got AID, we've got a foreign information program, and so on. But you have to get a lot more specific, I think, before you can begin to approach a real answer.

Now, in a society like the one in Viet Nam, where we are heavily involved, the opportunities in some ways are greater and in some ways, on the other hand, are more difficult, because, if there is one thing that the Vietnamese government is sensitive to, of course, it is that it is being dominated by the Americans. But here we are getting into some degree on the ground. We tend to stimulate the government through diplomatic approaches, through the way that we use our AID program. There

is some interest in and activity in this general field of political organization.

One type of technique that I mentioned briefly in passing in my talk is the community-development technique. Community development means a variety of different things to the different people who are associated with it. Often it has a rather simple welfare orientation. The community development, at least in some societies, has been used very effectively to create political organizations.

Perhaps the outstanding example is the Philippines. The trouble with the Philippines, of course, is that it is a typical, like so many examples. The Filipinos have more of a tradition of community activity at the village local level. There is something more to build on there in the way of a political structure. None the less it did have some value, and people are interested and are concerning themselves with the question of what further use can be made of community development to help the leadership in these countries create political links between themselves in the countryside.

Well, I don't know. The basic idea, of course, behind the AID program and the emphasis upon planning is that a five-year plan itself, or a ten-year plan, or a three-year plan, or whatever it is, provides a kind of rallying point for the sort of coalition that we would like to see in some of these societies, and where the society is at a stage where this can work this also is a means of influencing the political development of the society to encourage the development of five-year plans, to support those plans through U. S. aid, and then perhaps to think in terms of the specific kind of support that we can give to the particular groups, the modernist groups,

that might make up such a coalition.

I might say that while we don't have a lot of specific answers to the problem, we are spending a lot of time studying it. One thing that the Policy Planning Council is engaged in at the moment is precisely this kind of activity. It has been started in Latin America with five so-called strategic studies. These are studies which attempt to get at the political, economic, social processes of these countries, attempt to see what kind of political grouping might further the objectives that we have of reform, modernization, economic development, and then attempt to identify the specific measures that we can take to help insure that such coalitions, where they exist, are strengthened, or to help see that the society moves in the direction of that kind of coalition. As I say, we are engaged in five studies to try to get at this.

In the case of Latin America we have in the AID program and in the Alliance for Progress this specific kind of aid philosophy that relates more directly to this than in other parts of the world, with emphasis upon reform measures and upon the fact that development consists not only of steel mills but also of basic reforms in societies.

This is a rather diffused, rambling answer, but I'm afraid that's the only kind of answer we have to the problem.

**QUESTION:** In these underdeveloped countries that we are discussing, a recent trend has been a series of military coups. In some cases they prevent political disintegration and they do give a measure of stability. Our position, of course, has been that the role of the military be controlled by the civilian authority. I

wonder how you view this development of military domination in these societies.

DR. JOHNSON: This again is, I think, a difficult subject to generalize about, because there is on the one hand a tendency to think that military rule may provide a sort of comprehensive, complete solution for the problems of these societies. I am very skeptical on that proposition, partly because I think our vision of what the military is in these societies is somewhat distorted. We think in terms, I'm afraid, of the pattern of our own military, a highly professional organization with a clear set of values and goals, and so on, whereas the military in these societies is often just an offshoot of the nationalist movement, a sort of differentiation of the nationalist movement which took place at an early stage in the struggle for independence, and the military may be subject to many of the same defects and difficulties that the civilian leadership is--preeminently factionalism, the ties within the military which may be very distinctly personal. When you get a military regime as you now have in Korea or as you now have in Burma, one of the first things that develop are factions within the group if they weren't there when they took over.

On the other hand, the military in these societies is relatively one of the most modern elements in the society. They have had, as a generalization, many of them, more modern education. Because of the nature of the military education they are familiar with modern technology. They have management skills, and so on. One of the reasons they take over is their awareness of the defects of their society, based on this more modern point of view and more modern capabilities, and a belief that because of these skills they can do a more effective job than the civilian leadership. To some degree this may be true.

I think that the military rule has obviously succeeded better on the problem of reestablishing law and order which often breaks down for a variety of reasons which I hoped to go into more fully but didn't have an opportunity to. But they are much less good when it comes to the economic development task. This is understandable, because they do have management skills. They can get the basic government services operating. But when it comes to the broad concepts of how you go about developing a society, they may lack the information, they may lack the will, and they may lack clear goals.

You can see some of this difficulty, I think, again, going on in both the Korean and the Burmese cases, where they seem to be struggling for some kind of definition of what it is that they are up to and how they should go about it.

So that military rule can rescue a country from chaos, it can provide a measure of national unity where the country is badly split up, it can reestablish law and order, and perhaps in some cases it can do the development and modernization task. Everybody thinks of the Ataturk regime in Turkey, but in some respects again that was A typical. It is subject to some of the same weaknesses that the civilian leadership is subject to.

**CAPTAIN BRYCE:** Dr. Johnson, you have made a very significant contribution toward our understanding of this important subject. On behalf of the school, thank you very much.