

THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Professor Elspeth Davies Rostow

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Reviewed by: Colonel J. H. M. Smith, 21 December 1962

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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The Economic Nature of Developing Countries

13 September 1962

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
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

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13 September 1962

COLONEL SMITH: Our Speaker this afternoon is Mrs. Walter Whitman Rostow, who is returning to the platform here for her second appearance at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Her subject is "The Economic Nature of Developing Countries."

I must say, Mrs. Rostow, that the question of economic growth has been on our lips for the past couple of weeks in our study of economics, so I assure you that the class has really been alerted for the subject. This lecture is designed to help us understand these pre-conditions for economic growth and to apply some of these economic truths that we have been learning.

It has another purpose also, and that is to provide a better feeling for those economic conditions that nurture the development of Communist-led insurgency. This will be a recurring theme this year.

Gentlemen, I'm proud to present Mrs. W. W. Rostow.

PROF. ROSTOW: Colonel Smith; Ladies and Gentlemen:

I probably regard you with different eyes than anyone who has looked at you before, because as I was leaving my house this morning carrying this black case in my hand, my six-year old daughter came out, looked at me reproachfully, and said, "You're not talking to the Peace Corps again, are you Mummy?" I had to answer and I explained to her to the best of my knowledge what you're up to, and at the end she said in a rather discouraged way, "You mean they're in favor of

war?" I finished this and then I gave her another description of what you do. And so, in the end she said, "It's all right, mummy, they sound like the Peace Corps to me."

My topic, as you gather, is an impossible one to handle even with all the time that you have at your disposal at the college, let alone in 45 minutes. So, I will begin by discussing a few definitions of underdevelopment, and hit some of the points in this situation which strike me as being the most important at least for facing up to the alternatives open to us. I don't know how you have been defining the term underdeveloped. But let me begin with a few of the definitions and see which strikes me as the most appropriate.

Obviously, one definition of a society termed underdeveloped would be that it applied less science and less technology than it could at any given period in history. By this definition the United States was an underdeveloped society down to roughly 1860. Certainly, in the period of the first half of the 19th Century we did not apply all the tricks of then-known technology, although we were beginning to apply them. Roughly after 1860, you might say, we had moved past this stage. But I would also suggest that this first definition might also describe the United States in 1962. Remember the definition, applying less/^{modern}science and technology than is theoretically possible. It's perhaps one way of saying that there is a gap still that a productivity revolution in this country might fill, that might move us even more rapidly forward than we are now.

A second definition of an underdeveloped society would be simply that it's poor; that its per capital income is less than some figure such as \$150 per head per

annum. But this, as I will suggest, is not a wholly satisfactory definition because there are some countries where, by this definition, you would assume the period of underdevelopment had passed, and yet which to me, satisfy the criteria truly of an underdeveloped society. So, this is one index, but not a wholly satisfactory one.

Then, a third possible definition would be that an underdeveloped society is one which thinks that other societies have the duty to give it money. This poor relation syndrome, in one sense, is characteristic of an underdeveloped society; a society open and waiting for handouts from more developed societies. Now, this obviously has an element of prejudice in the point of the person giving the definition, and I think, again, that although this is one characteristic, it is not a wholly satisfactory way of defining the condition of underdevelopment.

A fourth approximation of this definition would be that an underdeveloped society is one which has not yet organized itself to grow regularly. That is, to produce a regular increase in income per head. And I prefer this of the four definitions because it not only gives us a valuable yardstick, but it also suggests one of the problems which must be solved if the society is to move past the underdeveloped level.

So, the fourth definition is the one that I shall stress. We, then, are talking about societies where growth is irregular though it may exist; where the notion of regular development is still in the future. Put another way, then, development is a process simply of a nation learning how to grow; transforming itself from a relatively static agricultural society into a society where the balance is shifted in the direction, usually, of a mixed base. Therefore, as we are turning to this I

think I should begin by suggesting that, as you've already seen, my underlying assumption is that it is possible - and I gather that this has been a part of your discussion - to define the various stages through which most societies go, without rigidly concluding that each society must follow the pattern in any tight fashion.

The concept of the stages of growth which I am, in a sense, assuming in my discussion with you today derives from some lectures which my husband gave several years ago, in which I helped him, not in the way that Mary Baird was supposed to have helped her husband by putting in the adjectives after he had finished writing the book, but in providing the kind of sounding board which I assume is the wife's role in such a venture. The concept of the stages of growth, in case you have not encountered it as yet, is very simply the view that the historian, the politician and the economist can agree that there are certain levels through which nations progress toward the highest then-known level of economic, political and social organization; that these are five in number; that they range from the traditional society in which growth (virtually cannot be detected, through the second stage, the transitional society where the pre-conditions are laid for regular growth, through the third stage when the society takes off into regular economic development and when you have passed the hump, as it were, in the process of modernizing, into the fourth stage when you begin to spread your technology through your society, when your living standards go up, when urbanization is part of the picture and when you begin to see the sharing in the results of this society spreading throughout your income level; to the fifth and final stage in the analysis when you reach the age of high mass consumption and when you have learned all the tricks

there are to know and when you are then concerned, as it were, with the problems of a mature society presumably with the power status commensurate with that economic position.

This concept, then, of developmental approach to the understanding of societies would then suggest that we should concentrate on the second stage. That is, on the stage called in this hypothesis, the stage of pre-conditions, which are simply the transitional stage from a traditional society to the moment when growth becomes regular. So, my first theme, then, is that the economics of underdeveloped areas is an understanding of the problems of this second stage; an understanding of the nature of the transition. And I would also say as a corollary to this, that there are certain hallmarks of the second stage which can be detected in the spectrum of underdevelopment which I shall begin to discuss with you.

To understand underdevelopment, then, let us begin with the immediate past of the underdeveloped society; that is, with the stage when it was a traditional society, and see what its past has been. Because, I would put it to you that the legacy from the first stage, which the underdeveloped society has, is usually one of its major problems in modernizing.

According to the concept, then, of the stages of growth, in the first or traditional stage, we encounter societies which are primarily agricultural, where commerce has only begun on a small scale. This, in American terms, is a stage through which we never went. In America we were born into the second stage. Despite the fact that we were 95% agricultural at the beginning of the 19th Century, we did not have the legacy, as I shall suggest in a moment, of the traditional problems of the

first stage.

America, then, never had the problem of the transfer from the trauma of the first stage to contend with. The traditional society, then, has these as its hallmarks; primarily an agricultural base with an occasional technological breakthrough, but not a flow of new technology going into the society. For example, in a traditional society, well, gunpowder may disrupt, change and alter the nature of the political and economic context, but this will not precipitate a condition in the way of a regular technological input. You may introduce irrigation and therefore change the pattern of your agriculture. But here again the effects will not be sufficiently large scale to jockey you out of Stage I.

The first hallmark, then, is the agricultural base. The second is usually that the traditional society is one where land-owners dominate; feudal landlords, princes - a decentralized and usually highly contentious society is the traditional society; a society which is pre-national and which solves its political problems on the microcosm rather than on the macrocosm.

Politically, then, you can say that this is a society which is not organized for any joint common purpose. Beyond that the traditional society has a psychological dimension which also carries over into the second stage. This is usually a rather fatalistic assumption that this agricultural, warring world must adjust to the nature of what it is and that it cannot move very rapidly forward. You do not get a sense of optimistic on-going in a traditional society.

Another hallmark of the traditional society is that you have high birth and death rates, up to 40,000 in some cases. Population also in a traditional society tends to

vary with the harvests. Although it can leap to a new level, let's say, because of the potato or because of irrigation, it is not a regular phenomenon. I mention this much out of the first stage, to suggest that it is hard for the underdeveloped society to forget its national past. It's hard not only to forget its traditional enemies, but to forget this fatalistic, stagnant stage from which, in many cases, it has recently developed.

To turn from the traditional society, then, to a period that I would call a period of underdevelopment that interests us more today we turn to the early transitional period, the first part of Stage II. Now, here in an underdeveloped society you begin to get - this is the period when you first have contact, in many cases, with the more modern society; when you look out and begin to see the outside world. This was, in American terms - and I'll hark back from time to time to our own period of underdevelopment - this was perhaps the time in the first part of the 19th Century when the underdeveloped society of the United States began to look out toward Europe, south to Latin America, and began to develop a certain distaste for what it saw in these areas, and began, therefore, to concern itself with growth as not only an internal problem, but to be concerned about the implications of intrusion to the extent of generating something such as the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.

The results of an outside world, however, usually in the beginning of the transitional stage, result in at least the development of some kind of an elite which is habituated to dealing with people from more advanced levels of development. These are the natives who deal with the colonial rulers in one case. These are the people who met Commodore Perry at an earlier period. This is what happened during the

"Opium Wars." The contacts with the outside world are frequently hostile in the first part of the transitional stage. And they generate within the society, sometimes, a greater degree of reluctance to participate in the active growth than was at least easy to determine even in the traditional stage itself.

Now, what about the economics of the early transitional stage? An underdeveloped society, of course, remains primarily agricultural like the traditional society. But there is often the beginning of an important development which is the export of some raw materials which will begin to generate some foreign exchange.

So, one of the first problems we see that underdeveloped societies will have in common is the need for increasing agriculture in order to pay for some of the imports which are required at this stage. In American terms, in the 19th Century we did this admirably. We built the railroads; we got the western wheat out; we began to get sufficient foreign exchange to buy the products we needed from Europe to pay for our imports; and during the period when we were underdeveloped - that is, the period most importantly, from the beginning of the century down to 1843, we then needed a good deal of foreign exchange which did result from our agricultural break-through in the first part of the century.

Now, the economics, then, of an agricultural society, tends, nonetheless, to produce cities. So, you begin to see the growth of towns in the underdeveloped society as a place particularly through which your products will be channeled into the world market. You begin, therefore, to develop modern transport, commerce, industry, and some commerce begins, in the beginning of this stage, to expand into the interior, often to sell the goods which are brought in by the intruder,

whether a colonial power or not, within the society itself.

The first phase, then, of the transition, is a rather traumatic phase for the society as a whole. It's the beginning of a more rapid change than any traditional society has seen, and this disrupts old values and relationships and usually produces not only the possibilities of corruption, but the possibilities of disillusionment on the part of those outsiders "who are witnessing this. It's all too easy to generate the kind of pessimism about a developing society which is usually heard in budget hearings on the Hill. And it's valuable to realize that those looking at America in the first part of the 19th Century were equally pessimistic about this country's capacity to grow and develop; this country's capacity to avoid the pitfalls of corruption and the other problems of underdevelopment.

In terms of the social characteristics of the second stage you see the old social structure, in most cases, remaining, but new, more modern types emerging, as I suggested, to deal primarily with the intruders; whether they're an aid mission or a colonial power, you get the same response generated. They must work and learn from the intruder and they must help him in his responsibilities. Therefore, you get a group of clerks, students and traders who are professionally a new group within the society. So, here in the beginning of the second stage you see something the traditional society does not have, namely the alteration of the professional and occupational structure of the country.

Third, the political characteristic of this part of the second stage. You find that on the whole the underdeveloped world exhibits not only the spectrum from a traditional colony to a society pre-nationalistic, but still operating, in one sense,

on the same basis as a colony. You find that in the politics of the transitional stage what you're getting is the beginning of unification. This is the period when, if you get a national basis, you are beginning to move toward regular growth. Because, I would like to stress ~~very strongly,~~ the importance of the political precondition; this, in the history of the developing societies of the 19th Century and the world at the present time, is a sinequanon of economic growth, to develop a sufficiently secure political base in order to permit the society to make those investment decisions, make those international decisions crucial to the future of the society. This means de-travelization, in many cases. It means the transfer of power from the microcosm to the center of society.

We saw this in the 19th Century in Japan before the Meiji restoration in 1868. We saw it in Siam, roughly, at the time reflected in Roger's and Hammerstein's "Anna and the King of Siam." We have seen it in other societies, resulting in the same transfer away from the countryside and toward the center.

The political transfer, then, yields in the end a Stage II society where new people are in a position to make political decisions. And where these new people are those who have had the experience of dealing with the outside world. The psychological problems of the second stage suggest that the traditional values of the society have been altered in such a way as to produce considerable strain within the society. A class of modernizers begins to emerge in an underdeveloped society who wish change, sometimes for its own sake, sometimes for personal gain. These modernizers are the ones who are the movers and shakers, a class, if you will, of resenters, resenters of the traditional mores; and opportunists as

well, who see in the breakup of the traditional society, a chance for themselves to gain political power and to gain money.

For the mass of the people the old values of the traditional society remain in the second stage. And it's this tension between the old values; religious, economic, political and social, against the new modernizers, which creates a good deal of the tension which we see in many underdeveloped societies. It is often a generational problem. In an underdeveloped society you frequently find not only the distaste of the older generation for the changes which they witness, but an active hostility as between one generation and another.

The fatalism of the traditional society is giving way to a new sense of optimism and national direction, but a national direction which can best be expressed through the vocabulary and the energies of younger people. This has an impact on the society which is frequently a very difficult one in human terms, but an essential one, if you will, in terms of the transition as a whole.

On another plane you find the death rate beginning to fall at this stage of the transition. Cheap public health begins to be applied. You begin to see radical changes in the whole problem of the death rate, and this frequently generates in the first instance, more problems than it solves. The take-over generation, in short - and I did not think I would live to the day when I would be quoting from a current issue of Life Magazine - but if you look at the current issue you will see the take-over generation well-described. It is the take-over generation making its bid for power which characterizes the transitional society. These are people even younger than the fresh faces I see before me now; men in their late 20s and early 30s, who,

by that very fact, are willing to make the break with their society which their elders and perhaps their wiser colleagues find it difficult to accept.

After awhile, then, usually some city kids, in a sense, figure that they know enough to throw the rascals out. These rascals may be a colonial ruler; they may be traditional rulers; or they may be both. And it is this usually urban-based younger generation which provides the catalytic force which makes the most brusque break between the traditional and the transitional situation of underdeveloped people. Usually, then, a coalition of urban types - soldiers, professional people, politicians - least of all, by the way, what Karl Marx thought; people who depart rather radically from the Marxian prescription - these are the people who engineer the change.

In many cases the people who engineer the change are conservative politically. What they are doing is a radical act, but they are doing it in one sense to conserve certain values in their society which they regard as most significant.

Now, the take-over kids, once in power, have to decide what to do with their society; to go on waving the bloody shirt in a fashion, well, you might say there was a moment when the early Nasser did this. This, perhaps, is one way rather rudely of describing what Sukarno has been up to. Whether they shall reduce the residual traditional elements within their society and try to enforce unity at home, or whether they are just going to enjoy power for its own sake. And I would say that many Latin-American dictators, in one sense, fall into this last category. Or, whether they are to use the power now at their disposal, to modernize their society.

And within the underdeveloped spectrum you see rulers who have opted for each one of these possibilities, either for going on waving the bloody shirt or spending a great deal of time eradicating the signs of the traditional society, or modernizing. And I would suggest that one of the major objectives which the quite diverse underdeveloped peoples exhibit in common is an awareness of the implications of modernization. This seems to me a better way of describing the objectives of underdeveloped peoples than talking about industrialization, as such, and talking about going through the industrial revolution, or any of the other earlier cliches. Perhaps "modernization" is the modern cliché.

I mean by modernization the development within a society not only of the technological base which is the most up to date in whatever historical terms you're speaking of, but the possibility within a generation of spreading the results of this technology through society to generate higher living standards, a more effective use of the work-force, etc. etc.

So, the goal of modernization, then, is always before the take-over generation. But frequently they become so excited by the possibility of continuing civil disturbance, or enjoying power, or enjoying the other dimensions of power which may yield all kinds of interesting and odd possibilities for the individual, that they forget the task of modernization. One way, then, of testing the absorptive capacity of an underdeveloped society is to ask what the leaders of this society have ahead of them as their targets.

For example, I used, deliberately, the phrase "the early Nasser." I would suggest that Nasser has gone through several of these stages. He has gone through

the period when he was interested in power for its own sake. He has gone through the period when he was in this sense hyper-nationalistic without any yield within the society. And he is perhaps using not only the possibilities of development now more wisely, but he is moving in the direction of accepting modernization as a more tolerable and generally acceptable goal for his world.

The target of modernization, then, I would suggest is one that will be a clue as to not only the availability of an underdeveloped society for the use of aid funds from the outside, but also a suggestion as to the future of this area. Usually you get a mixture of these motives, as I've suggested. But you can rate the leadership on this three-way scale and see where you come out.

I would suggest that Nehru deserves reasonably good marks because he has put so much effort into modernization. It doesn't mean that the third Five-Year Plan is going to be a going concern, necessarily, but it means he has, at least by my yardstick, opted for the direction which would seem to yield the best results in terms of his own society.

Now, what about society in the transitional stage in general? All I've been saying is a round-about way of saying that the period of pre-conditions for takeoff into self-sustained economic growth are being laid during Stage II. And if you don't lay these pre-conditions adequately you will not move into the next stage. What you're developing, then, economically, is the infra-structure for a modern society. And in Stage II, if you are building toward modernization you are building not only roads, schools, power, transport, improving public health, beginning to build industrially, but your urban proportion is beginning to rise, you are applying

technology to your farms, and in general, what you're doing is, putting in the social over-head capital necessary for a modern society.

If this is your target, if this is the target which I have assigned in this fashion to Nehru, and which I've suggested has been the new target of Nassér, you begin to see the emergence of a new middle-class, which is more than just the take-over boys themselves; a new middle-class which begins to forget the glorious revolution. It's very hard to forget a revolution of which you've been an important part.

Urban life gets infected with a modern spirit in a society which is moving in this direction. You get a gradual shift toward modernization, politically, as opposed to other objectives and problems. And once you have passed the time when you must - I've used the bloody shirt image and I might stick to it for a moment - once you have passed the stage when the simple waving of the bloody shirt has a pleasant athletic yield of its own, you begin to see that there is more in the society that will respond to growth, than anyone had anticipated. In other words, the fatalism of the traditional society is not predicated on sound assumptions in many underdeveloped areas.

You see, therefore, the gradual shift toward modernization yielding both economic and political returns. You begin to see, psychologically, the notion spreading that nature can be manipulated. Now, this is a new idea for underdeveloped societies, because the traditional society regarded nature as constant and fixed. You couldn't do anything about it; the gods wouldn't permit it. The seasons wouldn't permit it! The climate wouldn't permit it. The elders of the tribe wouldn't permit it. The underdeveloped society that is moving begins to regard the environment

as subject to manipulation, and this is a vast change in human attitude. It is a change which gives the possibility for growth very real meaning and depth. Therefore, with the end, in this sense, of fatalism, you come to the assumption that the underdeveloped world is an area of great expectations; an area where, although times remain hard, there is a hope that something better is ahead. And this is in sharp contrast to the level of expectations of the traditional society.

You see, then, of course, the curve of the society is a vastly significant factor. I recall once going in Eastern Europe, in the late 1940s, from Poland to Czechoslovakia. And this was a time when both societies by Western eyes were in a reasonably deplorable state of affairs. Well, Poland had Rokossovski, which is a deplorable situation by itself. Czechoslovakia had a higher living standard and less physical damage to exhibit. Nonetheless, the general attitude in Poland which had been so poor and which had gone through so much, was that life was appreciably bettering in one sense, over time, and that although the rebuilding of Warsaw was a physical act of not only courage, but the greatest slowness in the achievement of the goal, nonetheless, each day you could see, as it were, a church rising slowly before you; whereas, in Czechoslovakia the curve was going down. And even though at a given time you were higher on the curve, the notion of direction was paramount in the minds of the people with whom we were talking. The reasonably well-dressed and well-fed Czechs were far more dismal than the reasonably under-fed and unhappy Poles whom we had seen a bit earlier.

So, the direction of the curve, I would say, is perhaps on a plateau in the traditional society; in the transitional stage the curve begins to slope upward, and it is

this factor accepted by more than the elite who engineered the revolution, which begins to generate the kind of national effort which is essential for growth. This, then, will lead to the acceptance of a situation which by outside eyes is still intolerable for a longer period, than those from a longer level of development would think possible. However, the transitional stage is, politically, dynamite - this is a nice archaic phrase; it's combustible; it's explosive. It's a dangerous time not only because struggles between classes are characteristic of this period - struggles between generations - but it's a struggle within men's minds to accept change. And this factor by itself not only takes time, but sometimes it's impossible within an individual mind to make the transition between the old and the new.

The radical decline in the death rate to which I have referred, yields an increase in population which sometimes fills the cities and deteriorates already inadequate dwelling space. Only in small segments, then, does the society begin to realize the results toward which it is striving. And it is this that makes the pre-condition period so crucial. Because, you can easily slip back from a period when you might feel that the takeoff into self-sustained growth is imminent, simply because either the group who are in political power misuse their authority, or because the tempo of change is so slow as to discourage the necessary support.

What we are moving toward, however, in all this, is the concept that the underdeveloped world exhibits every one of the characteristics to which I have referred. It is not by any means subject, then, to single definition. The characteristic of underdevelopment is a spectrum. It is a spectrum, let's say, from Yemen on the one side to a country like Chile on the other, where per capita income would suggest that

the period of underdevelopment has ended, but where it has not. And throughout this spectrum you will see, then, all the problems which are attendant upon rapid change within a society.

So, we are now looking in the world around us, at geological layers of economic growth which can be detected, and on every plane of which there are many examples. And the response of the developed society to the underdeveloped world will be, in the first place, to see where on the spectrum a given country, area, a given problem appears; where on the spectrum it exists and how great the capacity for absorbing outside assistance of this given area can be said to be.

So, the final point should be the tasks of the developed world toward the underdeveloped world, and to that I shall turn. The first task which those of us in developed societies face, then, is the one that I have just suggested; to find how close to a traditional society, how close to takeoff a given area is. Now, how can you determine this? You determine it in terms of the political index; how great is political unification, etc.; the other questions that I referred to previously. You determine it in terms of the nature of those in power. Is it a military junta? Is it a broadly-based and reasonably stable political group? And even if it's broadly-based and reasonably stable, how long will it last and how can you make such predictions without the foresight that none of us have?

You must then take a risk. Risk-taking is the essential feature, in one sense, of the development game. But they should be enlightened risks; they should not be blind risks. You should look at the various indices, then, to suggest the position on the spectrum, and once you have determined this you must see the set of

problems which this particular society exhibits. Because, I would put it to you that each society is as unique as each human being, and it will have certain weaknesses and strengths in solving these problems that only an on-the-spot approach to the country will yield for you. For example, Japan had in its own society a strong nationalist base at the time it was opened to the West. This gave it the possibility for cohesive development which was denied to China, which exhibited many of the same alternative characteristics.

The problems of the political field, then, are the first to which I would suggest attention should be turned. The second task, once you have defined the place on the spectrum, the degree to which a society is near the traditional or moving toward takeoff. The next question to ask is, what is the correct program for this particular society? And this is, of course, impossible to do either from an external theory, or from an external capital.

Take what happened to China by applying doctrinaire ideological answers to a special problem. The Chinese Communists read their Marx; even read their Russian history, and determined that the time had come for the application to China of certain tricks which they thought had worked rather well in Russia and which had certain ideological authority deriving from their particular bible. Unfortunately for them, and perhaps fortunately for world history, it worked out just on the contrary. The application of Marxist ideology to China seemed to work pretty well down to 1958. From '58 on it was quite a different story. The breakup of the communes, the destruction, in one sense, of the optimistic experiments of the Chinese Communists, is an admirable illustration of why doctrinaire economic ideology is a very

dangerous commodity to deal with.

Equally dangerous, of course, is to apply more tolerable ideological concepts without any knowledge of the given situation. So, the meaning of China, then, is that the textbook solution isn't enough. In determining the program for an underdeveloped society, then, you having determined the place on the spectrum, having avoided the textbook solution, begin to assess the possibility for sustained development on the part of the leadership in the area. Leadership is not strictly a political term; it relates to the businessmen capable of undertaking the tasks that should be assigned to them; the Civil Service capable of carrying it out. It is, in part, related to the number of people literate in the society - the number of college graduates; the number of people who have been to technical schools; the number of people who can read a bill of lading; the number of people who are capable, in short, of doing any one of the tasks that you may wish them to have.

This internal conclusion is usually productive of a good deal of pessimism, and I would say that the lesson out of this second point is simply that you can do more with a relatively small number of people than sometimes you can believe. We have heard about the number of college graduates in the Congo, as one of the explanations for the difficulties in that area since the Belgian withdrawal. I would suggest that it was not only the scarcity of university-trained people in the Congo that led to the results that we have witnessed, but also the fact that this society was rather far from being ready to act as an independent society from many other points of view as well. It was, in short, very close to being a traditional society with an over-lag of imported know-how which had no roots within the society as a whole.

So, having determined the particular weakness and strength of the underdeveloped society, having determined the nature of the leadership, and having assessed the possibility for some kind of political stability, we then come, in a sense, to the final task of asking what kind of assistance a developed world can provide for this spectrum of underdeveloped areas. And the answer here, I think, is emerging. Because from the time when Marshall gave his speech at Harvard in 1947, which marked the beginning of a new period in American external policy, down to the present, we have developed a good deal of know-how in the field of attempting to export not only American interests and American concern, but American capital outside. And out of this 15 years of experience we have now found ourselves in a world where with the development of the concept of partnership, no longer does the dollar have to bear the full brunt of assistance to underdeveloped areas, but we're working with the developed world in a sharing operation toward the underdeveloped areas. And this is much trickier, I would suggest, than just providing Marshall Plan dollars from '48 on.

The task, then, of working with other developed societies to project programs and assistance to the underdeveloped world, is, in a sense, the task with which we close. And here the problem is more complicated because you've put more variables into the equation. Bilateral dealings are, in many respects, easier than multi-lateral. But I would say frankly that we are living now in a world of multi-lateralism. We have the spectrum of the underdeveloped societies in every stage of momentum; from their traditional stagnant stage toward regular growth; and we are turning out of the developed world, turning toward them, with the necessity at

the same time, of making our initiatives mesh with the initiative of Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and so on.

This is a proper state of human affairs, but it is a difficult state. It is a challenging period, but it is a period when we no longer have the initiative on our side alone, but where we are participating in, as it were, a funding operation with others with whom we're having dialogue on a different plane existing at the same time.

The nature, then, of the problem that we as a developed society face, is to attempt out of this a set of coherent initiatives which will assist as much as is possible, those ready underdeveloped societies to move into the third stage; to move in to take off toward regular growth; and to put up with the truculence, the nationalist fervor, the rudeness and all the other schtormendrang of the second stage. We will not only have to do this, but it will happen even if we don't. And I would say that finally, the justification for an American policy toward the underdeveloped world, relating to the program which I have been talking about is this; that within the balance of this century we will see thundering into development a series of countries not only with a population problem that is staggering, but with a potential on all other planes which is commensurate with this.

If we are able to share in this active growth, with the underdeveloped world, and if out of this they can generate some sense of at least our concern with them, at the end of this century I think our position vis-a-vis the rest of the world, will be immeasurably strengthened. If, on the other hand, the distaste that we will have for the nature of the development process is such as to make us withdraw and

make us decide that our interests are really more in the developed world, then I would say that the possibility, not of a garrison America, necessarily, but of an America in a hostile world 40 or 50 years from now, is very much greater.

So, our concern, then, is only partly altruistic. Our concern with the problems of development is very much a part of our definition of the national interest, which, almost without our own enthusiastic support has widened to the point where U. S. participation in the problems of development has, over a hundred years, markedly changed. Here we were, at the time of the American Civil War, coming out of the period that I have described. Now, suddenly, we are on - not the fringe, because we are partners with a great many other societies close to us technologically, in the active attempting to understand the breakup of the traditional world and the momentum of the southern tier of the world toward the same stage of development in which we now are.

So, finally, it is again a North-South problem. It's appropriate to say this in Washington. The Northern tier of the world, by and large, is the developed part which is coalescing at this period. And the peculiar paradox with which I leave you is that at the same time as you witness in the Common Market, not to mention NATO and other manifestations, a drawing together of the North, a post-nationalist world emerging with tight ties generated out of a series of historical problems, facing a Southern tier of the world trumpeting internationalism into the destruction and fragmentation of their world. And if the Northern tier can hold together, witnessing the fragmentation and disruption of the Southern tier, it will be an act of great engineering on a political and economic plane, an act of great creative

imagination, and an act which, in the ultimate sense, will be not only in the national interest, but generally in the interest of this reasonably troubled world.

Thank you.

QUESTION: In your discussion of the tasks which developed society has toward underdeveloped areas you mentioned that the correct program must be determined for the particular underdeveloped area. But who should determine this program, the underdeveloped area, or the developed nations which are going to render this assistance?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well, I would say in answer to that that as much as possible the program has to be generated by the country. If it's superimposed and sent in from outside you get the same results that you get - well, in a farm program when Washington tries to tell the farmers what to do. This is traditional. It's a rather difficult human situation. And it's important not only in that sense, that the country receiving the aid should generate the program, but this is an important part of their growth because it tends to train a group of people to assess their own situation, to measure it, to set targets and to take a kind of, as it were, national inventory. And this is an important part of growth itself.

So, the imposition of, as it were, outside experts to find the answers really doesn't solve the problem because this is a problem, in one sense, of maturity. And a part of the act of maturation is this self-assessment. So, I would say that although, again I've tried to suggest that in dealing with underdeveloped areas it's just as difficult as trying to write - well, Dr. Spaak has written a book about

children, but every mother knows that her child doesn't exactly conform, although Dr. Gesell's book is perhaps a better illustration to the model five-year old, let's say. You can generate your theory, but in the end the specific country asking for aid should work on its program, present it, and defend it coherently, and if it's not in a position to do any one of those things, probably it's not time to think of any large-scale aid program going in its direction. But this does not mean that you don't send in technical assistance, because all of this is, in part, an act of education.

But if you send in your teams - your assistance - the temptation for them to take over the work is very great, and this is one of the problems that I think we have realized and learned from the Marshall Plan period on; that the more you get the recipients to create the atmosphere within which they can move, the better the job goes. And here I might say that the analogy of the Marshall Plan is too easy a one. We saw, under the Marshall Plan, the recipient countries organizing the OEEC. And the OEEC was a fine and sophisticated organization of literate Europeans who were able to assess their situation very well indeed.

To think that we can have anything like this in the underdeveloped areas is to jump several generations ahead. And just as to say that we need a Marshall Plan for Latin-America or for Asia, seems to me a false analogy because here we were dealing with already developed societies in a state of disrepair. Dealing with underdeveloped societies growing imposes a quite different set of tasks. So, we're not asking, as it were, for a new OEEC; we won't get it. We won't get a remarkable man like Robert Marjalain to provide the answers for us. What we will get are

approximations, guesses, enlightened hunches - but I would say they must be made primarily by the people on-the-spot with outside assistance.

QUESTION: Mrs. Rostow, in your presentation you brought out through your five points an observation which is almost directly analogous on the microscopic scale, to the development of communications, formation of the group, organization of the group for purpose, and the action that follows. I am prompted, therefore, to ask you for one further observation. Of all the "underdeveloped" nations in the world with whom we are having relations, or considering relations, how many have basically asked or expressed a desire for help, aid and assistance, versus how many have we determined needed it or it would be beneficial; and I'm not talking in terms of offering our dollars, which, of course, would be accepted; but the fundamental desire we have, a feeling that they need our help. Can you make an observation of that proportion?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well, this would not even be an informed guess; it would just be a hunch. Of course, we have tended to divide the world in terms of three parts. The Soviet area, for example, would have liked our assistance at the time of the Marshall Plan. We know from evidence that Czechoslovakia would have been charmed to take American assistance in the summer of 1947, which was part of the reason that Molotov moved out of the Paris Conference. So, we are sure that within the Soviet orbit there are lots of countries that would like nothing better than to have us come in and help.

Now, the percentage of that part of the world we just don't know, but the signs are pretty great that we could find a good many clients, as it were, if we had any

access to that part of the world. The developed part of the world which we consider as part of the Free World, receives our assistance already in one form or another. So, this leaves us, roughly, with the third of the world which is emerging. Now, American assistance by itself runs again through a spectrum, of those who would just like us to go in and build them one plant; those who would like our capital and none of our assistance; those who would like us to come in and help them set up, let's say, an MIT for them.

Virtually every developing society has a set of needs which we could help them with. The problem is whether the current political context within this society is such as to permit the act of turning to us for assistance. Of course, our policy has always been that unless a country wishes assistance, we're not trying to give it to them. And this, I think, is a correct policy; just as we were not anxious under the Marshall Plan to feed American assistance into Western Europe.

So, the answer is that there are, to my knowledge, very few emerging nations that do not have some request that they filter in our direction. The range is from small single requests which may or may not be granted, to those who turn to us and say, "Help. Come in and take over." And this is the most difficult end of the spectrum for us to handle.

Let's look very specifically, though, at an area that tried to answer it. Look at the whole question of the Alliance for Progress. Here in Latin-America we have a range of countries which almost satisfy my spectrum; a range all the way up and down the line in terms of the capacity to grow. Here, I think the American image is better - if I may use that phrase - now than it was a while back because

we had lost the - well, the banner, in one sense, to the Russians for awhile. The things these countries want in common, are land reform, education, some form of political democracy - modernization, in short - and for a long time we had allowed the Russians to say that they could do a better job of land reform; they could do a better job of modernizing an educational system or creating one from scratch; they could do a better job of bringing a society out of a traditional status, etc.

I think that the slow-starting Alliance for Progress symbolizes an alteration in the American attitude toward Latin-America, which is going to yield more requests in the future. And this, in a sense, will be a test as to whether it's working. Because the notion of countries coming to us for assistance suggests that they think we are a problem-solving device. The underdeveloped world, I think, is looking toward Russia on the one hand and the United States on the other, as two alternative methods of solving problems. And if we get many requests for assistance this suggests that they regard us as a problem-solving device that will work for them.

So, for my money I'm glad when they turn to us, because it seems to symbolize the fact that they feel in these areas we can provide some of the answers. I don't think, ideologically, they are often terribly interested in whether we have one man, one vote, whether we maximize the values which to us are so meaningful. They simply regard us in a hard-nosed way as one way of solving their terrible problems and keeping them in order. So, finally I'll just say that the number of requests we get seems to me an index as to whether or not this kind of image is being projected.

QUESTION: Isn't the population problem in the majority of the underdeveloped countries so large that they are, in fact, destined to remain underdeveloped

countries?

PROF. ROSTOW: Population isn't always a net loss. You need your working force, clearly, and the fact that one of the results of modern public health techniques is to create this burgeoning population problem, is a good thing for Time Magazine to make as a lead story. But, the pressure of population generates, clearly for us in this country, a set of problems that I'm sure you have in mind; the question of whether or not the society takes an attitude toward population control; whether, politically, it's feasible for us to even discuss the question of birth control is, of course, one of the dimensions of the American problem in looking at the underdeveloped world. But the question you raise is much more serious than what will happen when a given measure goes up on the Hill.

It's a question of whether or not we have reached a stage where, in a way, Malthus was right; where the notion of Malthusian pressure is going to be such that we are all going to be standing up, elbowing one another on a planet which has become uninhabitable. I don't think so.

Of course, the question of whether an increase in population dooms an underdeveloped area to this stage can be answered historically. We've seen comparable population bulges in the past. What has happened in societies where, for example, the United States in the first part of the 19th Century had a population pattern which was absolutely out of phase with the countries of origin of the American population. In other words, when people came to America they began a pattern of family formation which was quite atypical in terms of their countries of origin. And they did it because you get this rise in population during the second stage regularly.

And what happens to countries that satisfactorily solve it, is that you get a sufficient amount of momentum in your economy to begin to absorb this working force. You're taking people off the land in the second stage, and of course, this is a problem, because in one sense, if you keep them on the farm they're easier to handle than if they're in Paris. But there is Paris by the second stage, and you have to deal with them there.

I'll leave up to you the question of the ultimate implication of the introduction of automation to all this. But short of that dimension of the problem the question is whether or not you can get a series of economic tasks which can in any way productively use this new burgeoning population. Now, every underdeveloped society has these tasks with bells on. The whole question of social overhead capital requires not only building schools and roads, etc., it requires an active and vigorous working force, but it builds in a whole set of secondary effects which will utilize them for awhile.

So, the question is not, I'd say, what you do with the population as much as what you do with your whole economy to begin to absorb your working force. Now, I'm not trying to evade the question of whether you don't introduce some kind of population control. But again, as a historian I would say that in those areas where there is something to be gained by family limitation, historically we've witnessed this limitation occur. Take, for example - this is a very touchy illustration - Massachusetts. In Boston you will find in areas where you have a predominantly Catholic population, that the size of the family is a function of income level, more than anything else. You would not know that you were dealing with a predominantly

Catholic population. You'd say you were dealing with a predominantly lower middle-class, middle middle-class, upper middle-class, in terms of income, and the conclusion you would draw, as it were, would be that it was income-tied rather than religion-tied.

So, I'm suggesting that people know how, in one sense, to limit their families, in many cases, if they wish to; to produce the incentive in terms of higher living standards; to produce the employment. And in one sense your population problem tapers off, but it still remains in the terms of the dealings of developed countries toward underdeveloped, as clearly one of the touchiest tasks which lies ahead of us. But it's not insoluble, and I'd say, ultimately my answer to your question is no; the population problem per se does not doom a society to remain at Stage II. What it does with other dimensions of its economic and political context may doom it to remain there, but it isn't just babies.

QUESTION: Mrs. Rostow, in your opening remarks you mentioned that the United States at about the time of the Civil War was an emerging nation; I believe you said until 1860 or something like that. In consideration of the history behind us at that time, and that we had some of the greatest men in history almost a hundred years before, writing and providing documents, and providing a philosophy for us to grow on, do you think that in the present emerging nations they still have a hundred years to look ahead, let's say, before they have some possibility of getting a kind of stability and emerging up into a higher order?

PROF. ROSTOW: I think that we were the most remarkable developing nation and the luckiest that I can think of off-hand. I put Stage II and Stage III together as

the time before we were really developed. The transitional stage in America, by this analysis, would have - the pre-condition stage - lasted, really, down to 1843. From 1843 to '60 we were in takeoff. By '60 we were really a going concern. So, the question is how we got started so rapidly. We got started and fed off the British Constitution, the British Common Law; a whole set of institutions which gave us not only a literate middle-class, but it gave us exposure to the then most advanced technology in the world. And out of this we were born free, in Louis Hartz's phrase; we were also born pretty far ahead of the game.

So, we were, in a way, older than our chronological age suggested. But nonetheless, in the first half of the 19th Century we certainly did fill the Senate and the country with some remarkably articulate and impressive figures. It's hard to see - it's not so hard to see a Daniel Webster in some of these countries - but it's hard to see some of our early 19th Century figures emerging, simply because we are dealing quantitatively with a wholly different unit size. Scale is important here. And here we're dealing not with a continent freeing itself, but dealing with a tiny, scarcely viable area in a larger context.

The phrase "viability" had great currency in the early Marshall Plan period. We used to talk about whether country X was viable. Somebody helped me in my thinking by saying that he was very glad within the American terms - I shan't mention his state - that if anybody asked whether his state was viable, the answer was obviously no. But we don't have to think about this in America. What we're seeing now is, as it were, an American state projected into the dimension of the nation and trying to act as a nation. And the fact that we don't get the range of public

figures nor the level of literacy, I think, is not at all surprising. Whether it will come, who can tell. We certainly have seen leadership - quite interesting leadership, emerging in different areas. I feel personally sad over the death of one man. I never met him but he wrote to my husband from Wehlo Prison in Nyasaland a couple of years ago where he had been reading "The Stages of Economic Growth," in the London Economist.

The British, his jailers, were apparently very benign and they gave their prisoners the Economist. Or maybe they weren't benign; maybe they were being cruel. But in any case, they gave the Economist to this fellow in prison and he began to promote a series of letters with my husband, on the issues of economic development, from his position in a jail. He just happened to be killed recently in an automobile accident. But he was the kind of African from whom, if you extrapolated, you would conclude a great many interesting and literate and thoughtful people would be emerging in the next generation. And I think this is a fair assumption.

But they won't look like our 19th Century figures, and it's no wonder that they won't, because the tradition is so sharply differentiated and they are coming straight out of the traditional society. We were coming out of a fairly advanced part of Stage II. But it was still a bit of a human trick to have produced our early 19th Century figures in such abundance as we did, or even have the men who met at the Philadelphia Convention in 1786 who were quite a distinguished collection of fellows just to be engineering the Revolution.

But no one will be quite as lucky as we. And no one, therefore, I think, should

look to the American model for easy imitation. It's much better to look at some country like Sweden which had many strikes against it and see what they did, than to look at the United States which had so many acts of good fortune and extrapolate from that model.

So, the answer is, I think there is no reason for pessimism on this, but they won't look just like Abraham Lincoln.

QUESTION: Do you think the Peace Corps will help this country determine the future aid to these underdeveloped countries, or the tasks for the tasks for the specific things which will help them?

PROF. ROSTOW: I think the Peace Corps will. The Aid Agency itself, of course, at the moment has, as I understand it, something like 13,000 people overseas, so they should be able to help in creating programs themselves. I think the Peace Corps can be a useful source of information, and simply because they have access to levels of society often denied to people who come in on a different technical level. I think that they should be a very valuable filter for us. But I wouldn't discount the amount of information on different programs that we're getting through more normal channels. The Peace Corps groups that I've spoken to before they've gone out have ranged from a 4-H Club group out here on Connecticut Avenue, who were going to Brazil, through groups going to Togo and Cyprus and Ethiopia. And the level of information that they already had about the country to which they were destined, and the level with which they discussed the problems in this area and others, I confess struck me favorably.

I don't know what I had anticipated, but I think that if we have worked out a way

of absorbing the information which they're capable of giving back to us, that it should be a very useful channel. But I would regard it as only one of many tentacles that we have out, as it were, into parts of the underdeveloped world. But it's certainly not one to be minimized. And again, the test on the Peace Corps is simply to me is simply that where they've been they want more. Where they haven't been, sometimes the attitude is negative. But the mere fact that they seem to breed a desire for more of their services strikes me as being a healthful sign about them.

QUESTION: Most of the countries throughout the world being in an underdeveloped stage of modernization, do the Western powers have an obligation of taking on that whole task, or should we channelize our efforts towards a few?

PROF. ROSTOW: Every now and then Walter Lippman rises up and says that we should only use models - Nigeria, he likes, for example; choose an African nation and really send it. I don't think so. I don't think that this is a useful way of taking American assistance out into the world, for this reason; suppose, for example, that we did decide that the only viable bit of Africa was Nigeria. Suppose we should put all our eggs in that basket? Well, would this either be the best solution for Africa, or what would it do to our attitude toward the rest of the underdeveloped areas? I think it would breed a sense not only of America's intrusion which would have rather bad secondary effects, but I think that the chances - not that I have any pessimism about Nigeria per se, or Brazil I think was his other illustration in Latin-America - and I think, India - that we choose these three and push them along as fast as we could.

Well, the simple problem of dealing with Brazil, I think, has been amply illustrated since the/^{last} time he wrote this column, which he writes about annually, the danger of this placing of all eggs in one basket. It isn't only that we might make the wrong gamble and that our horse might come in near the back of the pack instead of first, but that this is not a proper use of American resources. Yes, it would have a nice effect as if you went into a Settlement House to tried to help only the kid who looked the most likely to succeed. But I think there are a lot of other kids in the block. And the American position should be to give such assistance as can productively be absorbed by the countries that are growing.

And this means that there will be, as the President recently said, instances when I think we should just weigh out and say, "All right, you can't use any more aid," and stop. But this is a very difficult thing to do. But at that end of the spectrum I think we should certainly be willing and at all times ready to withdraw. But this doesn't mean that we should withdraw so far that we only concentrate on, as it were, a model in each part of the world. I think this would be an improper use of our resources, a dangerous and risky business, and I just don't think it conforms to the general nature of American policy at the present time.

So, my answer is no, I don't think that would be a sound solution.

QUESTION: Cuba would seem to fit somewhere in your spectrum as you have described it. I wonder if you would place it more accurately for us and comment particularly on the take-over class as you describe it for us?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well, on the last point, these particular take-over kids have clearly not opted for modernization. It's really quite impressive what has happened

to the Cuban economy since the take-over - in a negative way, that is. Here you had a society that was moving along, really, very far; that was not only a going concern, but one where, because of its proximity to the United States, had very beneficial effects. You see what happens when you decide not to modernize, when you opt entirely for the power option rather than the option for modernization. And the degree to which the Russians are using Cuba as a kind of model is obvious from reading even the most casual headlines.

So, in one sense I might say that the Russians have a kind of Lippman approach to Cuba and they may be making the sort of error that I believe is inherent in the Lippman approach with respect to the Cuban situation. Here, of course, the entire problem of Cuba has been, if I may say so, rather clouded in the last 18 months, by various other things that have occurred on the part of American initiative. But quite aside from whether or not our ill-fated approach to Cuba had any justification to it at the time, I think that our current attitude is one of the greatest importance because the distance from Miami is something we're aware of. But I think that we should be equally aware of the danger of falling into a Soviet trap, because it strikes me that the Soviet initiative with respect to Cuba is to try to push us just as far in the direction of repeating past mistakes, as they can.

And in this area more than anything else, I think we should maximize our caution in scaring. That is, I think we should scare hard, not easy, with respect to Cuba. So, I say that the Cuban situation is a society which has been a good illustration of a developing society which has slipped backward because of a failure in the political area; a society in takeoff which has gone back I don't know how far, as

societies can; not toward the traditional society, but toward this peculiar mix of what happens in the pre-condition period.

To me it illustrates the dangers of a failure in the political area, dangers for a developed society, of just this kind of slippage, and also, the need - which we certainly have - of what Mayor LaGuardia refer to as "patience and fortitude" in dealing with perhaps the most awkward of the underdeveloped situations which has spewed up towards us; awkward not only in the sense that it's close, but the Alliance for Progress, as a whole, is looking at our attitude toward Cuba as a test of our good will, a test of attitude, a test, generally, of American initiative. So, on this I hope we're playing it cool, because it seems to me that this is something that is being used as a goad to us, and will continue so to be used, for the measurable future. So, to me it's a good illustration of economic slippage in Stage II; back into Stage II from Stage III.

QUESTION: Mrs. Rostow, in answer to a couple of questions you discounted, it seems to me, completely, this question of viability. Do you believe that countries like Yemen and Ruanda Urundi have the same possibility of getting to your Phase III, as, let's say, Venezuela has?

PROF. ROSTOW: I'm sorry. What I was suggesting, I did it too elliptically, was that viability, in terms of many of the new nations, I think will come when they go from the stage that I described at the end of my remarks, which is the stage of nationalist fervor by which they have rapidly taken on the trappings of a nation before they're emotionally, economically, politically, or any other way fit to be called a nation by our old political science standards. We used to know what

a nation was; we don't anymore. We have things that are calling themselves nations now, which don't satisfy the criteria of political unification, economic, etc. etc. So, what we have are kind of quasi-nations. But nonetheless, they're in the U. N. They exist, at least for the time being, like a Disney character that has gone beyond the cliff and hasn't yet looked down.

If they're going to be viable in the end I think it will be as part of, let's say, a West African federation; as part of some larger unit. Because many of them have nothing to sell to one another, they have no justification, certainly, as an economic unit, for separate status. And it strikes me that what we will have to see - and this is why patience and fortitude seems to be the theme - is the development in what I call the Southern tier, of the same degree of mutual inter-dependence which we see long after the nationalist period in the North. I'm not suggesting that we're going to see an African Common Market in the near future, but viability will only come when we get past the time when the symbols of nationalism are so important that they must be preserved at all cost, in the direction of a context of interdependence.

Note, it's only the advanced nations which are talking about inter-dependence. But post-colonial status breeds, understandably, a need for this feeling of independence, a sort of late adolescent desire to tell daddy off. And they'll have to get into their 20s in this unhappy analogy before they'll have an acceptance, as it were, before they'll have an acceptance of the fact that a modern nation, even the strongest, has ties to other nations and can't exist in a solitary way.

So, if I suggested that the new nations are viable by being nations, I'm sorry.

I didn't mean to do that. As to the next phase and how far ahead it is, depends upon the area that you're talking about. The next phase will have to be recognition on the part, let's say of Togo, of the fact that Quai Togo may exist in the books, but it doesn't exist, certainly, as an economic entity. And this stage will be one toward which we should be working.

COLONEL BERGAMYER: Mrs. Rostow, I'm sure I speak for all when I say that we enjoyed your lecture and your observations, very much. On behalf of the Commandant, the faculty and the student body, thank you very much.