



AN ADDRESS

Mr. Leo Cherne

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Reviewed by: Dr. Reichley Date: 7 Feb 63

**INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

1962 - 1963

An Address

27 November 1962

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Reviewed by: Mr. Reilly Date: 7 Feb 63

Reporter: Albert C. Helder

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Publication No. L63-78

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington 25, D. C.

AN ADDRESS

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ADMIRAL ROSE: Ladies and Gentlemen; Fellow Students of International Affairs:

Welcome; particularly to the wives. The lecture tonight is one of the regularly scheduled lectures of this school, but it's held in the evening because twice a year - sometimes three times - we do include the wives, and I think this one will be particularly interesting to both the students and their wives.

Our speaker has been a student of international affairs for many years. As Executive Director of the Research Institute of America he is in a position to critically observe and study world events as they occur. He has appeared on many nationally televised panels of distinguished experts to discuss national and international problems, and I'm sure a number of you have seen or heard him. He is well-known for his writing and lectures, and he is particularly well-qualified to speak to us on the subject that he has chosen for this evening which is, "An Appraisal of the Policy of Containment."

He has also been a friend of the school for many years and has made many talks here to the student body. It is a great pleasure to present to you Mr. Leo Cherne.

Mr. Cherne.

MR. CHERNE: Admiral Rose; Ladies and Gentlemen:

I must confess a little anxiety this evening; anxiety for two reasons. First, I've denied myself the opportunity to speak in public for a number of months, and I've

relearned a little more, what it means to be nervous. Secondly, I don't customarily speak with extensive notes, but I've chosen to do so this evening. My reasons are simple. I have a great deal to say in a limited time and the subject I want to discuss, and my respect for you, makes it doubly important that I be reasonably precise in what it is I am about to say, especially since some of my comments will tend to be critical.

Just a month ago this country was deep in the midst of what may well turn out to be the most significant of all the crises we've gone through since the end of World War II. For, it was then for the first time that this country pointed its guns and missiles directly at the center of Communist power - at the U.S.S.R. itself - and made it unmistakably clear that it would pull the trigger if deeds already done were not undone.

At the moment that President Kennedy took the rostrum on October 22d, 17 years of indirection and euphemism were swept away. This was no longer a contest of airlift versus blockade, a war against communist proxies, or a safe argument on secondary issues; nor was it a warning to "stop where you are; go no further." There are many lessons in the Cuban crisis, and I'm aware even as I try to extract some of them that the crisis is by no means concluded, nor the lessons to any extent altogether visible. They will be a long time in being fully absorbed. But, two already stand out clearly.

First, this was an assertion of power; an acceptance of the theorem that policy is real and valid only to the extent that within it inheres the element of will. However reluctantly and with painful soul-searching, we did recognize that this was the

imperative that could not be evaded any longer. Second, therefore, was the crisis within ourselves; what we had long assured ourselves we would do "if they pushed us far enough," but which we really doubted we might do, now was done. There might be a turning back from these deeds. The voices of pacifism and the fear of war might yet cause our leadership to retreat from the rim of the abyss. We might yet become so terrified with how close we were to Armageddon that we would undo it. But at that historic moment and until the white heat was drawn from the immediate crisis, there could be no doubt of the enormous step we had taken.

Now, in the aftermath of the crisis comes the inevitable long review of how we got there and whether the policies with which we rode are adequate for what lies ahead. Before we take too much comfort from the Cuban experience let us not forget that after all, we had waited until the reach of the enemy was dangerously close. If things had to come to that desperate a pass, the policies which previously dictated the waiting surely cannot be complacently deemed satisfactory. And, as Savayana once reminded us, if we don't want to be doomed to repeat history we had better understand it.

Now is the time, consequently, to go back for a searching examination of those policy guidelines and postures which have become known by the generic name of containment. I believe the best starting point to be the very cogent description of that policy by its - at least - literary author, George Kennan; an article of his which appeared in "Foreign Affairs" Magazine in July 1947. Since Mr. Kennan was at that time a responsible policy-making official of the State Department, and since it was well understood that this was the Truman Administration's way of putting the

containment formulations before the American public, I think that article - in which Mr. Kennan disguised his authorship under the pseudonym "Mr. X" - is worth some re quoting. The heart of the containment formula is expressed by him in this sentence, and I quote: "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States' policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

This policy, Mr. X goes on to say, should be "designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." Now, these are only two excerpts from a 17-page essay, but they are the two which alone have been picked up and acted upon in the 15 years that followed. Before going into the consequences of this development I would like to call attention to what is also in that same essay, but which in the interval of these 15 years has dropped into the abyss of non-memory.

To begin with, there is the little three-word phrase modifying the excerpt I read, "in these circumstances." By this, Kennan was referring back to his previous discussion of Soviet power dynamics. While noting the great degrees of rigidity in the outward face of that Soviet power and in the enormous structure of internal suppression and control, Kennan made it clear that there lurk nonetheless, great weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the same structure; the "limits of the physical and nervous strength of the peoples themselves." These limits, he said, are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship because beyond them people cannot be driven.

The key to Kennan's speech, however, lies not in a comfortable expectation of Soviet disintegration from within, a concept which, incidentally, in that article Kennan explicitly warned against, but rather in the organic link between Western policy and communist vulnerability. "Let us," and I quote, "suppose," he said, "that the Western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of 10 to 15 years. What does that spell for Russia itself? Who can say," he goes on to ask, "whether in those circumstances the eventual rejuvenation of the higher spheres of authority can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims. If this were ever to happen, strange consequences would flow for the Communist Party."

It is, he concluded very outwardly, the possibility that Russia - still by far the weaker party - "may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. That would, of course, warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment." Now, that's the most profound passage of the article of those with which he concludes these final quotations.

But in actuality, the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. "It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments both within Russia and throughout the international communist movement by which Russian policy is largely determined. The United States has it within its power to enormously increase the

strains under which Soviet policy must operate; to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."

Now, these insights into Soviet vulnerabilities and how they must be exploited by Western actions, have, I submit, been either ignored or misunderstood during the last two decades. Yet, what they imply, I submit further, cannot be evaded forever. We failed to reckon with the fact that containment is not a single, but a dual policy; that it called not alone for military counter-force, but for action beyond the imposition of counter-force and the frustration of the outward Soviet expansive thrust. We failed to do that in Central Europe; we failed to do it in Eastern Asia; therefore we faced the need to do it in Cuba under conditions infinitely more difficult than they would have been 15 years ago.

Now, the criticisms of containment that must now be made are not that it did not work, but precisely the opposite; it worked well - all too well - but when the time for next steps arrived - as Mr. X said it would - Western and American responsiveness was missing. Let us recapitulate for a moment, just how accurately Kennan's predictions came to pass. In Greece, as his article went to Press, the communist power was probing southward. The Truman Doctrine halted that thrust and within the sanctuary whence the probers came - Yugoslavia - the process of ferment began to set in almost within days of the application of effective containment.

In Western Europe the westward-reaching finger of communist aggression was

confronted a year later by the Berlin Airlift, and then by the barricades of the newly-formed NATO Alliance. In Korea as the Red Army turned eastward it ran into similar armed resistance and was stopped. By 1953 the first arm of containment had done its job and the military threat was under firm control. But by 1953 the corrosive forces inside the communist structure were also coming to the surface. Stalin's death acted like a trigger and the struggle at the top Kennan had talked of was an actuality. Less than two months after Stalin was gone the results burst upon the world. In Czechoslovakia, the most docile of all the Red captives, riots swept Prague and Pilsen in May 1953. They were followed a few weeks later by the June uprisings in East Germany. Then came Hungary preceded in the spring and summer of 1956, by Posnan which had become the symbol of threatening Polish independence.

The gathering storm then followed in Hungary where the irresistible pressures drove the leadership into reversing the collectivization program, and peasants by the thousands began seceding from communism's most vital sector, its collective farms. Repercussions spread to Bulgaria's tobacco farms, and even inside Russia's own slave labor camps far off inside the Arctic Circle. It was obvious that the entire Red Empire was cracking apart and communism as a system was on its way to extinction. At that point the West ran out of policy. Confronted by the subjugated communist peoples, pushed beyond Kennan's limits, and the communist high command in clear disorder, the West did nothing. In fact, it did less than nothing. It ordered the various radio sources which penetrated the Iron Curtain to pull back on their reporting, and to be absolutely certain that no call for revolution was either

sounded, suggested, or in any way implied.

Our response to Budapest was to explicitly assure the Kremlin that we would not violate her colonial territory. And, lest this appear to be a criticism which has any aspect of partisanship let me quickly add that both candidates for the Presidency in October 1956 rushed to be equally emphatic in the assurances they were conveying, that we would not be involved in Hungary. For America's allies this course was at least understandable. Just getting back on their economic feet after the war, the last thing they wanted was even the most tenuous risk of another war, this one to free 250 million communist captives.

For the United States there never was any question. We did have commitments. For example, on the same day - October 9, 1952 - both the President of the United States, and the President-to-be, expressed the nation's refusal to acquiesce in the Red takeovers in Eastern Europe. Speaking in Buffalo that day, President Truman declared that "Our whole foreign policy is designed to strengthen these countries where they are still free and to work toward the day of freedom for those that are enslaved."

At the same time, General Eisenhower speaking in Los Angeles said, "We must, in addition, employ all peaceful means to keep alive the hope of freedom in the hearts of people the Kremlin has enslaved." America, more than its allies, therefore, had a commitment. Exiled leaders of those captive countries had been given not only sanctuary, but broadcasting facilities as well, and had for three years been telling their people at home that the American people stood with them in their resistance.

President Kennedy, as recently as this year, reiterated these same commitments when he told a Buffalo audience only six weeks ago, on October 14th, it is not enough to make speeches about liberation; our government must pursue an active policy which holds out the promise of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. Now, that commitment had a very deep and wide base among most Americans. There has been a fashion since 1953 to wave away liberation as a Republican campaign trick to get Polish, Hungarian, and other minority group votes. But this doesn't disservice both to the men who identify themselves with that policy, and to the policy itself.

Men like General Clay and Ambassador Grew, who had established the core of the liberation movement in 1950, with the Crusade for Freedom, cannot be thought of as trickstering politicians, and the response of millions of Americans to the "Freedom Bell" symbol and their contributions in money and support, make it clear that the commitments leaders of both parties were making came from the heart of the American people. This was more than a commitment; it was a policy objective with the soundest strategic and security motives. Liberation was the missing piece, the companion to containment; that initiative to influence change inside the Red Orbit; the change that came exactly as Kennan said it would.

It was neither political chicanery nor mere coincidence that containment and liberation were born side by side and walked together for several years. They belong together; and when we made the fatal mistake of separating them, both died and we were left without policy. It is clear now, looking back, that a truncated containment based on the Maginot Line of arms didn't have a prayer. The communists

are never embarrassed for long by military obstacles. These can be out-flanked, especially by the para-military and non-military instruments in their spectrum of weapons. And when they have built their own armaments levels up to something like ours or greater they are right back with military-political blackmail. But their real vulnerability - in fact, their only vulnerability - is their people. Containment without liberation left those people to their masters - to work for them, to fight for them, to help make credible communism's claim that it has a bunch of keys that will unlock the doors to the future for everyone. The chickens of our abandonment of communism's peoples are now coming home to roost with a vengeance.

Our neighbor, Fidel Castro, is the latest and most dangerous, but by no means the only beneficiary of our policies in Europe. He has ten-year agreements with every one of the communist satellites under which they are supplying him with everything from arms to machetes. Indeed, it's highly doubtful that the Soviet Union itself without the resources of its captive nations would be in any position to stake its bearded ally to the trouble he has caused and will continue to cause, and this is to say nothing of the supplies and materials that have flowed liberally from the satellites to all the other flashpoints in the world where they are threatened by communist power.

Now, captive populations can only go in two directions. They must either wrench themselves free from their captors or they will begin the long and dismal process of accommodation to their fate. When we had failed to liberate them it didn't mean that the situation would then be frozen in glass awaiting some future change of mind on our part. It meant that they would make the best peace they

could with the forces they could not destroy. It makes very little practical difference to us now if these people are not communists by conviction, if they really despise the system, or if they retain an affection for the West or believe in its ideals, so long as we do nothing about it. In place of the lost initiatives what do we have? We have programs of cultural exchange, endless negotiations with the communists, and the will-o-the-wisp hope that through increasing dialogue, contacts and trade, we can somehow attain the tranquility which we could not grasp by more direct means.

Now, the answer to all these hopes is now, in my opinion, self-revealed; not peace, but Cuba with its nuclear eggs ready to break over us; not peace, but Berlin, Vietnam, India, Venezuela, and all other points beyond, wherever Khrushchev's or Mao's targets of opportunity may seem to beckon them. And on our own soil there are new unhealthy growths of pacifism, cults of docility and self-immolation; women pushing baby carriages and carrying placards in the belief that lord Russell offers them peace on earth, unaware that he has very candidly accepted the prospect of a new Middle Ages of enslavement as the alternative to making a fight for freedom.

I would like to single out one area of hope which I think illustrates very sharply the pandemonium into which our vision of containment has already led us; East-West trade. Just before the Cuban emergency broke, State Department officials told 500 news media people in Washington of the political benefits that would accrue from trade. Not the least of these benefits were those anticipated from trade with communist nations like Poland and Yugoslavia, and perhaps others that would display signs of independence from Muscovite domination. But in these same series of

briefings they also emphasized that our policy on Cuba was to make it as expensive as possible for the Soviets to go on supplying the island through pressing for shipping boycotts and the like. The aggregate result of all these briefings on trade was the picture of the United States supplying Poland; Poland supplying Cuba; but the United States trying to increase the burden on Poland by helping to do so. Now, if this makes sense, then everything else we believe in is nonsense.

To be sure, the trade exponents distinguish between strategic and non-strategic materials. I maintain that anything we give a communist that enables him to turn around and give something of his own to Fidel Castro is a clear case of assininity. And if we live that long, history will convict us for it. I might add that it won't spare our allies either.

Now, what is wrong with our trade and cultural dialogues with the communists is not that trade and discussion are wrong in themselves, but that we are trying to carry them on half in the spirit of Anglo-Saxon noblesse oblige and half as though they were the only front on which the cold war is being fought, won or lost. More often than not it is as though we had already won that conflict, as though nothing really remained but to reestablish East-West relations on the precepts of normal international conduct. Now, this is the very disturbing self-deception we have been practicing part of the time - the writing off of the cold war.

There has been an increasingly large stream of books and articles over the past few years, urging upon us the theme that the cold war does not have to be fought; that it can and should be waited out. These authors say communism is changing; it is altering course; and besides, it's running into substantial difficulties; it cannot

grow food; it cannot run its factories; its ideology is being splintered under the hammers of internal dissent; and anyway, neutralist eyes are being opened throughout the world; with time and forbearance on our part the threat will be rendered harmless. Now, the people who say these things aren't Red agents; they're not even pacifists or nuclear disarmers; they're simply believers in the narrow version of containment. Move in with arms and weapons when and where communist aggression actually looms, but depend on their troubles and our own example of democratic progress and improvement, to do the job of winning the cold war.

Now, such attitudes, I contend, are eminently reasonable. And if the world spun on our particular brand of rationality they would no doubt be effective. But the world doesn't run that way and we cannot allow ourselves the fiction that it does. To wait for the communists to wither away or to become tame is to run the enormous and, in my judgment, impermissible risk of disaster. Whatever fond notions we cherish about the course of history, the communists see it as one long, wide spectrum-protracted struggle. Their whole political dynamic is built on struggle. Inside their councils the pressures to expand and conquer are irresistible. Contain them in one place and they can be counted on to come back at you in another. Remember that their working motto is the old Russian expression "kivo kito" - who destroys whom? Who destroys whom?

Men committed to the belief in destruction cannot act but to make that belief come true. Each pause in the conflict, therefore, is for them only the prelude to the next thrust forward. That is why the more they try to practice containment the more we are driven to something like liberation. We can live with a Communist Russia

or a Communist China, but we cannot live with the persistent efforts to engulf other nations. Nor, as we are finding out, can we live with some captures; some take-overs. We have tried even going to the extent of assuring the communist leaders that we have no designs on their legitimate interests in Eastern Europe.

On July 25, 1961, President Kennedy co-signed the assurance given previously by the Eisenhower Administration to this effect, and in the famous public weekend correspondence between the President and Khrushchev there were, of course, the references to detente between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact powers. Yes, we have tried to reassure them. We have tried to settle. But it was they that would not settle. When control had been reestablished inside the bloc after the '53 to '56 shattering upheavals, the leaders were right back with the Berlin ultimatum, the Congo, Laos, Cuba, and a whole philosophy of just wars and wars of liberation under which Mr. Khrushchev has said he is helping the Vietnamese people find their freedom. Under the circumstances it may well be that we will be compelled to take them at their word; that it is either they or we; destroy or be destroyed - kivo kito - who destroys whom?

If that is the case, the rational thing is to go back to the original premises of containment and have a new look at what might still be done to bring it to the fulfillment it promised. Obviously, the options of 15 years ago don't exist any longer. What we could have done to force a recession of the Polish or Hungarian takeovers when we had the A-Bomb monopoly almost certainly cannot be done today. No one, including the captive peoples themselves, wants liberation at the expense of a general nuclear holocaust. What is needed are alternatives to liberation enacted by

allied military threats, but they must be genuine alternatives, not just the substitutes of platitudes for action. They must be effective equivalents.

Interestingly, I believe that while the assumptions for liberation have altered drastically, those of containment have not. In 1962 as in 1947 it is still the valid, working assumption that the Soviets are playing from weakness, not from strength. While their military power has developed enormously their economic and political problems have also deepened. The very plant they have invested in so heavily in order to provide new military muscle has brought them all kinds of new tensions, as George Kennan said that it would; between party and managers, managers and workers, capital investment and consumer award.

Let's take a moment to spell out just a bit further what those exploitable tensions are. These tensions have had the most substantial political effect upon the structure of Red rule. These tensions have, at different times and in different ways, produced policy indecisions and inhibitions for the Soviet Union, most recently on Cuba and India. The Soviet Union has been curiously indecisive and ineffectual in both black and Mediterranean Africa. The results have been happier for the West than might have been anticipated, in the Congo, Guinea and Egypt.

Similarly, the existence of tension has produced both confusion and inhibition in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. We have seen evidences of this in the manifold problems of farm and factory management, in the backing and filling on the educational policies and programs of the nation, and in the constant debate involving the so-called "freedom of the writer," in which a first-page story in the New York Times, yesterday indicated that the liberal wing of Soviet writers has just made a

historic breakthrough toward new freedoms. Then, further down in the article it indicated, of course, that this had nothing to do with political questions or loyalty to the party, since, on those two, writers must of necessity adhere to the line. In other words, they have freedom on anything but freedom.

Now, we must understand that the tensions which exist are real; that they do complicate and confuse the application of power and control within Soviet society; but that they do not result, even for a moment, in the weakening of that control. Understanding this, as we should, it does follow that those weaknesses and tensions should be exploited if for no other reason than that they are enormously time and energy consuming for the Soviet apparatus; enormously preoccupying and frequently debilitating for the Soviet hierarchy; and seriously distracting from their ability to initiate external adventures.

Now, first there are the tensions between peoples and regime. While political accommodations are followed in the wake of the failure to overthrow the communist rulers, economic and social conflicts have grown. At the bottom is the hostility between the imperatives of party supremacy and the imperatives of modern technology. The party, it may be generalized, exists on theology, ideology, persuasion and coercion, all founded on the assumption of its corporate infallibility. Industrialization, however, runs on incentives ranging all the way from on-the-job satisfactions and/or autonomy to consumer awards. Try^{ing} to run a mechanical civilization from a Marxist-Leninist front office has been an enormously difficult task, although, with enough time and no interference from us, even this could be accomplished by the Soviet Union. But if I may presume, as a student of management, let me say that

this is the hardest way to accomplish the task of management. I'm not saying it can't be done, but it is the hardest way to do it, and the way which is filled with the greatest of all tensions.

Then, second there are the tensions among the party elite. In the balancing act between party and industry there are factions that would loosen the political reins carefully in order to get greater output, and other factions that would put the party ahead of production. Caught in the middle is the vast bureaucracy - the apparatus - which must transmit party orders and come back with the goods. It would be fine if they just had to transmit party orders; they also have to come back with the goods. And if the party orders are too tight or too unrealistic, the work force from superintendent to line employee is driven into silent revolt, dropping productivity, absenteeism, accidents, etc., etc. If the line is loosened, the party bosses take alarm that the system will run away from them. This is the kind of tension that isn't easily brought under permanent control.

Because of the tension between agriculture and industry, neither having been altogether satisfactory - and one being close to abysmal - the Soviet is now involved in an altogether new way of managing the tensions. It is creating two separate societies segmented down the middle; two nations living vacuum-packed within one border; one called industry; one called agriculture. Is this being done because there is a genuine expectation that this will work? No. It's being done because the last thing didn't, and something else must be done. But interestingly, that something else must always involve control. And in that control there is tension, as George Kennan said there would be. This we can observe; we can smile; we can take

comfort from it - as we're doing this evening - or, we can do something about it.

There's the other area, the whole complex of tensions flitting around the Moscow-Peiping axis. The so-called question of war versus peaceful coexistence; I want to repeat - the so-called question of war versus peaceful coexistence - is only the most dramatic aspect of those tensions. But at the root is this fundamental split over how socialism ought to be run in the 1960s. In fact, I would suggest strongly that the two giants aren't nearly as far apart on how to fight the cold war as they are on issues like communes and collectives, worker freedoms, investment policies, and the like; especially on who ought to be helping whom, and how much.

Now, put these stresses in the light of decision-making and I think it becomes clear why the picture is one of vulnerability and not one of monolithic strength. The question is how to exploit these vulnerabilities. In trying to propose answers I would emphasize that our goal is neither merely to expose the weaknesses, nor to persuade ourselves or others that they automatically serve the cause of freedom by their very existence. Our objective must be complete - nothing less than the most serious injury to communism itself and the restoration as extensively as possible, of political choice.

To these ends, therefore, I offer these four courses of action, all of which must run together, and I must also run them together if I am to all but impose impossibly on your patience. In compressing and over-simplifying, therefore, let me say the four courses of action first involve overload. Every action we take should be subjected to the test does it increase or ease the burden on the communist system? We had the outline of such a policy in our actions on Cuba prior to the crisis, to make

it as expensive as possible for the communists to supply their outposts by imposing the maximum burden on non-communist ship-bottoms making the run. Now, that policy should be extended to other situations. Some of the assistance that we are giving nations that give nothing in return because of their threat to turn to Moscow or Peiping should be cancelled. As President De Gaulle proved with Guinea, that isn't necessarily disastrous. And even if the communists do come through, it adds to the strain on their already over-worked economy. Furthermore, the more material that Poland or Czechoslovakia has to send to Moscow's overseas clients, the greater the resentment of the Czech and the Polish peoples for Moscow, and for their own puppet regimes which assist others while exploiting their own people.

Secondly, there is the complicated question of the quid pro quo, companion to overload. I do not want to suggest that every American action requires its quid; let me be clear that in the current circumstances in India I would earnestly urge maximum U. S. assistance with absolutely not the slightest suggestion of any quid, not because we don't want any; the circumstances are providing it. It would be damaging to ourselves to request this. History, with a good stiff push from Peiping is providing the quid all of the American generosity for the last ten years has not been able to cure. Therefore, I repeat, that I would urge in the case of India, maximum American assistance without the slightest whisper of anything we would ever want or expect back in return. But other situations are not necessarily that clear, controlling or useful.

Instead of donating help in the hope it will willy-nilly soften the recipients, as on occasion it has done, we should tie big strings to what we give and pull on them

hard. Relaxation of communist controls over church, people, intellectuals, restraints on Muscovite belligerency. Something should be said about Milavan Jilloff. If his name were Tom Mooney - most of you are too young to recall the meaning of that historic episode of social injustice. But his name was Tom Mooney. Or, Sacco-Vanzetti; you'd never hear the end of it. But we can't ever seem to learn to be repetitive. And Jilloff - well, we said it twice, and above all we don't want to bore ourselves.

And so, of course, we extend aid without referring to the unattractive aspects of life, like Milavan Jilloff. And in doing so we tend to forget some very important things. We tend to forget, for example, that the maximum disaffection between Gomulka and the Kremlin on the one hand; between Tito and the Kremlin on the other; came after an interval of minimal aid from the United States. And that the recent hardening of both of those regimes toward their own people and growing coordination with the Kremlin has occurred after a period of enlarged American aid. I think they're going to gravitate back to the Red power center. Our assistance won't stop them. We can afford to demand payment for what we give and let them wrestle with the choice.

Let me urge, finally, on this business of aid, that the most important thing is not whether we give that aid, but whether we wisely expect certain consequences which we readily assume flow from the help we give. We tend to romantically assume that American generosity will pry a Polish Communist Government from its Russian communist moorings. Now, if instead, the purpose of our aid was simply to provide the Polish people with food, without a companion expectation of political

dividends from their communist masters, a far better case could be made for our generosity. And more often than not, I would be eager to support it.

The third of the four principles which must be increasingly involved is the powerful leverage of the word and principle of freedom. Because it is here that the tensions are at their most abrasive, particularly within the captive nations, the achilles heel of the Soviet Empire. I had hoped, for example, to devote some time to certain of the crudest kinds of imperialist practices applied by the Soviet Union on its satellites today.

The Soviet Union, for example, is able to dump vast supplies of certain commodities upon the Free World market. The Soviet Union has been able to seriously affect the oil industry throughout the world by its trade in oil. And on the commercial market the Soviet Union is frequently a desirable customer. Its prices are low. And its oil is good. But are we aware at the same time, that we are making it possible for the Soviet Union to do something else, to exploit its own people? Do we know, for example, that the Soviet Union charges Hungary 91% more for every barrel of crude oil than it charges any nation in the West? Do we know that on the 25 leading commodities - and I'm taking Hungary just as an illustration - that on the 25 commodities which Hungary must import from the Soviet Union, it pays higher prices on 21 of them than the Soviet Union charges capitalist customers in Western Europe.

This is colonial exploitation of the crudest kind. The old pre-World War I empires hesitated to do it this boldly. The Soviet Union goes a step further; it not only charges more from its captive customers, but what it buys from them it pays less

for than those captive nations can sell those identical goods - and in fact do - sell those identical goods on the world market. Now, we wouldn't participate in anything like this. It so happens that internationally the honest trading nations of the world have joined in GATT for the specific purpose of making impossible, such cartel exploitation. Dumping is prohibited among us, but not prohibited to the Soviet Union. And after all, world trade means world peace, especially to the Soviet Union. In our own domestic life we have statutes, the most important one of which, the Robinson-Patman Act, makes it illegal for a supplier to give two different prices to two competitors because of the logical principle that it will weaken one of them. And in our interest in maintaining the health of competition we do not permit that privilege to either supplier or buyer.

Well, what would happen if the United States insisted not that it would not trade with the Soviet Union; I don't even have the courage to urge that - or the satellite nations - but that since trade we must, since there are some mystic things that are derived from it in addition to profits - since we must; that we will do so only where the Soviet Union inheres to the same commercial customs which we require of each other in the nations of the West and require of ourselves in our internal economic discourse. The tensions would be considerable. The Hungarian people would find that their one ally is the United States. In other words, we would be on the side of the Hungarian people being paid honestly for a day's work, and not being overcharged for a Russian day's work.

Finally, negotiation. In the end if we're to get real concessions out of the communists without trying to obliterate them we're going to have to negotiate them out

of what we want. Now, this is a strange thought to many of us who are accustomed to thinking of negotiation as the device with which they get us to concede. But there is every reason why we must turn it into a taking as well as a giving technique. Fundamentally our bargaining position should be absolutely clear; the withdrawal of Soviet military power from every nation it has illegally occupied outside the borders of the U.S.S.R. and the reestablishment of political practices that will permit the peoples themselves to make their own political choice. There is nothing new in this principle for us. What would be new is the transformation of a vague expression of sentiment into a hard, trading basis.

Now, we should not be naive enough to assume or suppose that Moscow is going to begin with a long withdrawal everywhere simply because we demand it. But a start is distinctly possible in the more marginal areas of commitment. We've found that we could negotiate their missiles out of Cuba. And with enough determination we can force them to get the rest of their arms out as well. In fact, if Castro were himself suddenly to disappear and the communist structure in Cuba to suddenly collapse with him, there is good reason to suppose that Khrushchev would not be much more unhappy to see this happen than we would today - today.

Our next target of opportunity must be Germany. Because, after Cuba, Germany is communism's greatest liability. Stalin at one point in 1952 was evidently playing with the idea of cutting his losses and getting out. And the idea must have occurred to Khrushchev more than once. As Khrushchev today, dealing with the problem of tension - of which Kennan spoke - within his own backyard, the one thing of which we can be sure is that there are two people within his own camp with whom

he is least likely to sign any peace treaty - not most likely. Those two are Ulbricht in Germany and Novotny in Czechoslovakia. Novotny doesn't have to sign any peace treaty; he'll be lucky to remain around for another six months. Khrushchev's close friend Barek is in jail and may well be the successor to Novotny.

To return to Germany - and to conclude with it; if we change our policy from one of merely remaining in West Berlin to one of freedom for all of Eastern Germany we have, in my judgment, the possibilities of the beginning of a process of roll-back there. Now, that doesn't mean that Germany will be free or reunited soon, but it does mean that the pressure should be on the communists at least as much as on ourselves. And every inch we move toward a free Germany is at least a foot forward to a free Eastern Europe, since the situation in the other captive countries is only a lesser reproduction of the one in Germany.

Should Eastern Europe recover its independence or really begin its move toward it, the remainder of the Soviet threat in the world will have been reduced to the point of harmlessness. Now, will Khrushchev, it will be asked; stand for this? Won't the prospect of roll-back of his empire throw him into greater adventures abroad and cause him to create greater dangers of war? I recall in the days when Senator Keating was seeing visions of missiles in Cuba, that it was suggested if we did anything about Cuba - which we wanted to do - that it would just drive the Soviet Union all the more intensely to act on Berlin. And it was seriously advanced by very thoughtful analysts that any American action on Cuba would hasten Soviet action on Berlin.

Do we ever compel an accounting of analysts whose scores come out wrong? I

recognize I am in a doubtful position to urge ~~this~~ form of justice. But if I were you I would.

Now, obviously I've been talking about more than a change in plans. I'm suggesting a whole shift in attitudes and reasoning. First I'm saying we stop trying to talk, hope, and dream the cold war away as we are doing at this moment. We are now in a nice atmosphere of detente. Russian writers are getting their freedom. The Soviet Union has now seen that the door is closed. It has recognized the terrible danger of nuclear holocaust. Khrushchev had no idea that he would be running such a horrible risk of plunging the world into devastation. And having seen how awful the mistake might have been, well, what we had hoped for all along has happened; he's now ready to talk decently and quietly without his shoes.

This is a process of hoping and dreaming the cold war away. We must stop pinning our actions to our own hopes and aspirations. Because we want spring let us not imagine each new whistle from the Kremlin is a harbinger of a new political spring.

Third, we ought to give up the kind of fascinating Kremlinology which says that if we're too tough we may topple Khrushchev and get someone worse. As a matter of fact, I've been surprised that that one hasn't met with more resistance, because the fact is we would do better - we would do better with someone worse. We can deal with Stalinism exactly because it's tough. And we know how to be tough. It's infinitely harder to deal with Khrushchev because he's soft and he's slippery, and we always do much worse with that kind because every once in awhile we see a smile on his face and he looks just like that nice uncle.

Now, finally, we must give up the notion that winning can be cheap, safe, or even civilized. Power, as Cuba has taught us, is brought to bear only at a price, not only in money, but in wear and tear on one's humanity. I suggest that if we understand the price we can mitigate its bite. I also suggest that if we survive our softer instincts will survive also, to flourish again. And if we don't survive, what will it benefit us that we died nobly?

I suggest, in conclusion, a radical policy; that we adopt the policy of containment as enunciated and unread in 1947.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Cherne, I wonder why you feel so strongly about supporting India?

MR. CHERNE: Well, on several counts. First of all because it's acutely embarrassing and tension-making within the communist world. Secondly, because it's my belief that Asia has potentially two polar points of potential political attraction, the essentially democratic efforts of India, and the totalitarian efforts and directions of Red China. It has been galling, as an American, to listen to the pomposity, naivete and hypocrisy that has for years emerged from New Delhi, and I can understand impatience with the democracy which has produced these qualities. But at the moment history has suddenly subdued some of these less attractive qualities and some of the less attractive people who have given voice to them.

Under the circumstances it would not be my wish to see Americans involved as we are in Vietnam. But I would like to see our substance genuinely provided in as

much measure as the Indians can use, so that India can learn, and much of the neutral world - through India - can learn what it means to have communist friends. If you have communist friends you don't need any enemies. And this lesson India may teach the world better than anything we ever conceivably could design to do.

QUESTION: Have you an opinion about the Chinese cease fire?

MR. CHERNE: Well, I don't claim any particular knowledge of China, or the Chinese mentality. But I think I can, with some confidence, speak of communist mentality, communist tactics and philosophy. It is as standard and as repetitive as the fact that day follows night, that any communist action always involves offering to terminate the action in exchange for keeping what you've got. This is neither a termination nor does it mean that you're content with what you've got. It merely means you have moved from where you were to here. Your adversary has said you didn't belong anywhere beyond the point at where you were. Now you've moved from where you were to here. You now offer for the sake of peace to go no further than here in exchange for a cease fire, agreement, treaty - any other arrangement.

Once that has been established you are now here. Now you go from here to here, whenever you're ready to; whenever it suits your purposes to. Incidentally, it's not altogether clear to me why China did what she did. To answer the question more intelligently I'd have to have a more intelligent or deeper understanding of exactly why China did what she did. I don't think she did it for the piece of territory she has thus far swallowed. I think her purposes are significantly more extensive. Therefore, I would also have to say that the cease fire must be understood in the light of China's understanding that this helps her get what it is she wanted when she did

what she did. And that, in my judgment, is quite a bit more than just the piece of territory that was involved.

QUESTION: If the facts at least were known, what would you have done in 1947?

MR. CHERNE: Well, as you will recall, I indicated that I thought we had reacted especially well in the years 1947, '48 and '49. The Truman Doctrine was one of the most clear-cut expressions of containment. Now, to be sure, it was one of the true aspects of containment. But the aspect which it conveyed was absolutely clear-cut and it worked. It did the trick in Greece and the odds were not very good in Greece. It terminated the threat in Turkey, and it has kept it terminated to this moment.

Our action on the Berlin blockade, I think is debatable whether the course we took was the course to be taken, or whether we should, on that occasion, have pushed our way through on the ground. Without too much emphasis I would say that my choice would have been to push through to Berlin on the ground; not because it would have meant supplying Berlin more easily, but because it would have sustained certain political notions which were achievable only on the ground; and in my opinion it could have been done at no more, no greater risk than was involved in doing it by air.

The first point at which I find myself in some significant difference with what was done is in Korea. This is a very sensitive subject. I think we both understood and didn't understand containment, but we did not at all; by the time we got to Korea we had begun to lose sight of that second aspect of the Kennan containment thesis. And that is, the tension that is created by your action on the other side of the line.

In Korea I regret many things. I regret our great anxiety not to excite the Chinese and therefore to keep inviolate their territory.

Let me say this. I think it has been a historic mistake that we have even more rigidly than the Soviet Union, regarded as inviolate what they call the "peace zone." We just never do anything to injure the peace zone. Now, from 1953 on this is where the problem came to a head. In Berlin in June 1953 there is no question in my mind whatsoever that I at least would have advocated the use of American military power in West Berlin, going into East Berlin, to be of help to our Soviet ally, to help them restore order. We had a four-power agreement jointly carrying responsibility for the city. Half of the city was in turmoil. We had a responsibility toward the four sectors of the city. We had rights in the four sectors of the city. We have failed to act on them. The first of those great opportunities was on June 17th and in the two days that followed 1953.

The next opportunity occurred in Budapest. It is the judgment of many that American action in Budapest, American participation, would have involved the certainty of war. Let me say that it is my judgment - and was then, in Budapest, which is where I was - that this would not have been the case; that the Soviet Union was powerless even to handle the Hungarians, let alone handle us; that Soviet force had to pull out of Budapest and pull out of much of Hungary because it couldn't manage Hungarian power. And for ten days - and they were ten of the most awful days for the Kremlin - there was real Soviet indecision and inability before they moved back.

But, there's a mid-point. I've been described on occasion, as a "hot-head." Assuming that the risk of war was there, and that this should therefore have deter-

red our action, let me say that there was another course of action available to us which we have been sufficiently inventive enough to use on other occasions. Large shipments of planes bearing red crosses, carrying food and medical supplies, filling up the airfields, particularly outside of Budapest. We could have hustled off Dag Hammarskjold and his group of U.N. people to go to Budapest for on-site exploration of ways of settling this problem. The importance of those two is, a returning Soviet force would have to return in the face of peaceful planes cluttering up the airfields, official personnel of the U.N. and elsewhere in Hungary - not with arms - and in my opinion the situation was so nip and tuck as to whether Russia would move back at all, that a U.N. presence in Hungary in October 1956, in my judgment, would have made all the difference in the world.

But we until recently, only learned how to use the U.N. where the shoe pinches us. And it's a shame, because it is our mechanism. We ought to have been a little more inventive than we have been, in using it where it pinches somebody else. Now, that's a long answer for an important question, and I hope that it has not been as confusing as it has been long.

QUESTION: Do you feel it would be advantageous to the Free World to have an outward antagonism between China and Russia, and if so, what would be the best way to promote this antagonism?

MR. CHERNE: First let me say that I think by and large it would be of benefit to the Free World to have the Soviet Union and China break with each other; a real deep, full break. I think that's desirable. The second part of the question; what can we do to promote it? I don't think we can. I just don't think we can at all. I

think, therefore, we ought not to try. I think we ought to limit our activities to things we can do. I think the prospects of that kind of break between the Soviet Union and Red China are very dim, and by and large, very distant. They need each other a great deal more than they hate each other. And they do hate each other. There are points of very real difference and tension among them. But let's not make a typical American mistake of assuming that the communist world is ruled by love.

Not even one Communist Party cell functions without the most vigorous, sometimes vicious, kind of tension. This is not unusual in communist life, this is endemic to it. And this too shall pass. In what way and in which direction, I don't think any of us can foresee now. I think what we ought to do is take advantage of the areas of the split where they do exist. As a perfect illustration, I'll return to India. It's very clear that what China has done in India has been very costly to the Soviet Union. And I must applaud the vigor and the speed - the speed with which we moved. Because, had we not moved as rapidly as we did, it may well be the Soviet Union would have recaptured its own equilibrium on India within a matter of days.

But the very speed with which we moved resulted in the Soviets' reconsideration of its refusal to ship its MIGs to India, making it look hollow, false, and responsive to us, which meant even we would get the credit if they resumed the shipment of their MIGs. Now that's fine. And this is what I mean by taking advantage of the places in which they are at odds with each other.

Similarly, for example, since ^{North} Vietnam is an area of Soviet interest rather than Chinese, and since the Soviet Union is in disarray at the moment - for the moment -

I have to say both - at the moment; for the moment - and since the Soviet Union and Red China are not in the same bed altogether at the moment, I don't think it would be altogether unhappy if certain insurrectionary activities were conducted in North Vietnam above the 17th Parallel by free Vietnamese at this time. I think it would have some rather remarkable effects on the Soviet Union, on the Civil War in Vietnam, on the relationship between Red China and the Soviet Union, and on Laos where we signed an agreement that the other party doesn't seem to recall having signed.

This is the kind of way I think we might be a little more inventive where there are points of difference between the Soviet Union and Red China.

QUESTION: Mr. Cherne, you indicated in your talk that the Soviet educational program was backing and filling, giving me the impression that perhaps we should not worry so much about their accomplishments in that field. I've been under the impression that they have a very solid program and is going to be a threat, if it is not a threat in the production of their technicians, scientists and engineers in the future, and that the only thing that's holding them up right now is perhaps the loss of personnel to feed into the system as a result of World War II casualties.

Can you comment, please?

MR. CHERNE: Yes. I must first say that I would very much have welcomed this question not having been asked, but since it was, I'll try to comment. First of all, if there was any suggestion that we ought to relax in the race of particularly the production of scientists and technologically trained personnel in relation to the Soviet Union, no difficulties, no changes, no backing and filling that have or may

in the future take place in the Soviet Union are going to give us a moment's breathing space. Because, the sheer numbers as well as the competence of education particularly in the sciences and technology leave us very inadequate in comparison; at least, numerically that's true without the necessity of making the qualitative judgment.

* What I was commenting on is the fact that the Soviet Union has three times within the last ten years radically changed its concept of its educational program; the emphasis it has given to education; the emphasis it has given to the need to work as well as to be educated. The Soviet Union is ambivalent and is apologetic, even with its great emphasis on education. It's apologetic about slighting the needs of industry and agriculture, and has not solved that constant problem of industry, agriculture, and the educated man, including the educated man for industry.

It's the kind of struggle, incidentally, which goes on in the United States - or has, not as frequently - in the contests or the differences of view about progressive and non-progressive education, and the philosophies of education. Well, the philosophies of education have troubled the Soviet Union and in recent years there has been tension. There are other areas of tension, incidentally. The Soviet Union has bitten off ^avery substantial, and initially a very dangerous for us, program, of offering education to Africans and other underdeveloped nations' students. This too, happily, has kicked back rather seriously. Substantial numbers of these students have been seriously disaffected by the treatment they received in the Soviet Union.

6 This, interestingly enough, has provided an altogether new kind of refugee - if I may comment in passing - in West Berlin. Some 240 African students who were

in East Germany - most of them in East Berlin - being educated in communist universities, have fled and have taken sanctuary in West Berlin and West Germany, and are trying to complete their education in West Germany because they've been unable to stand the education and the discriminatory treatment to which they've been exposed.

There are other manifestations of the tensions of which I spoke, and I included that one because, addressing myself as I did, to the exploitations of tension this is an area in which it is not difficult for us to exploit the tensions, especially as they involve students from underdeveloped countries going to Soviet areas and being dissatisfied with what they've received or seen.

But, to return to the thrust of your question, not for a moment would I suggest that they're having difficulty grinding out the extremely well-educated and trained people, particularly in the sciences and technology.

QUESTION: Mr. Cherne, Senator Goldwater has been quite outspoken in the last several months on what he would do. His thesis would indicate that he agrees with all your four points. Would this allow us to conclude that he understands containments, believes in them, and is a political leader of containment policy?

MR. CHERNE: Well, your question was just as clear - as crisp - as it could be. I'll try to make my response almost as clear. If Senator Goldwater agrees with my four points, I must say that I do not agree with his four points. Now, I don't just want to make a joke about this. There are certain aspects of the continuous struggle or protracted conflict that, in my judgment, Senator Goldwater sees clearly, effectively, and has stated courageously. I think he has done those views a disser-

period of Senator McCarthy; his tendency to polarize an American community. That is where the communist does his best work. And I'm a little hesitant to see the quick smear - that's the wrong word; I meant the brush stroke - the quick brush stroke of no win, no will, no guts, applied to a group; applied to a party. Because I don't think it does apply to a group or to a party; I think it applies to the American people. Whatever criticisms can be made are really not criticisms as much as they are a reflection of the very decencies of American life. It's because we are generous that we expect generosity. It's because we keep our word. And we think agreements will result in that word being kept by others.

It's because we have certain codes of political conduct that we can't get used to the notion that the enemy doesn't have the same codes of political conduct. These are the decencies of American life. I don't like to see them distorted into something that is neither attractive nor desirable.

In my judgment, Senator Goldwater tends too easily to do this, and in doing this, even as he advances things with which I completely agree, I am concerned about the effect he has on a community that must be involved and kept together if the policies are to have any possibility of being applied.

DR. REICHLEY: Mr. Cherne, Ladies and Gentlemen:

While listening to the answers to the various questions a few thoughts flashed through my mind which had nothing to do with this evening's program. One was that throughout the academic year here a number of cliches are always built up, and one, I think, that is given more reference than any others is, the apathetic American public. The second was, in Sunday's paper I read an article by Art Buchwald

about how welcome he was in intellectual circles in New York City because he represented the inside dope from Washington.

Now, to get back to this evening, I think we have an example here of an answer to our cliché, that the American citizen is not apathetic. And secondly, we have a New Yorker who has come to Washington and analyzed, dissected, and given us good, sound advice on international problems which will be of great benefit to us.

Leo, again, thank you very much from all of us.