


THE ENVIRONMENT OF INSURGENCY

Dr. Kenneth P. Landon

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Reviewed by Col R. W. Bergamy, USAF on 20 November 1963.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1963 - 1964

The Environment of Insurgency

12 November 1963

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
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Reporter: Albert C. Helder



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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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MR. FREERS: Mao Tse Tung has favored us with many graphic figures of speech describing the concepts involved in guerrilla warfare. Today we're concerned with the picture he gives of the fish in the water.

Our speaker is well qualified to talk about the water in which the guerrilla fish swims. He is an experienced, well-trained scholar who has spent many years in Southeast Asia. Dr. Landon is at present the Associate Dean of Area Studies at the School of Languages and Area Studies, of the Foreign Service Institute. This is his second appearance at the Industrial College.

Dr. Kenneth P. Landon.

DR. LANDON: As I sat in that chair I wondered whether it was wired. That is a lonesome-looking chair.

Gentlemen of the Industrial College:

It is a pleasure to be with you. I was preparing myself psychologically for this event. I think one has to create the right mental attitude or atmosphere for insurgency. I spent my weekend - three days of it - raking leaves, and I am ready to revolt. Needless to say, my wife was away.

I have a quote that I would like to quote from a book by Sol Cohen, "Geography and Politics in a World Divided." I don't know whether you have encountered this volume or not. It's very controversial, at least in some of the comments. And having in mind what has just recently happened in South Viet Nam, to Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh

Nhu, it is interesting to read that, "We can lose the battle for South Viet Nam without losing the war for Southeast Asia." In fact, he said the loss of Thailand and South Viet Nam would not make the retention of off-shore Asia strategically impossible. This is very controversial because a lot of us have the idea that it is essential to stay in South Viet Nam. And when we are thinking of staying in South Viet Nam or Thailand, or in any other of the developing nations that are in war called by the geopoliticians "The shatter-belts between the two major powers," we realize that the essential factor is the people.

What kind of people are the 12 to 15,000 Americans working with in South Viet Nam? What kind of people do we encounter as allies and to whom we look for strength and support in our contest with the communists? Are they sophisticated? Are they ambitious? Are they trained? Are they content like us who rake leaves on weekends? I don't know how many of you have ever lived in a traditional society or in a traditional village way of life; probably few of you. Probably many of you have gone through villages or have traveled along a highway through developing areas, or underdeveloped areas. But have you ever lived among them? Do you know what they think? Do you know what they think? Do you believe they do think? Do you believe they are capable of thinking?

We often hear them referred to as people who are still up in the trees and haven't quite gotten down to the ground where we are. I would like to try very briefly to describe a typical family; the sort that I have encountered off and on for many years. I lived for ten years with my wife in the Malayan Peninsula part of Siam. And there is a way of

life and a traditional family that is being profoundly affected by the kind of revolutionary world in which we are living; a traditional family. And this is one kind of traditional family. There are many kinds of traditional patterns, but this is typical of Southeast Asia and South Asia - the form of family that was perfected in South China.

The household is part of a larger group. Kinfolk? They have lots of kinfolk. They have lots of special terms to describe all their aunts, uncles and grandparents - and their grandparents' relatives. They have "kissin cousins" to depths unknown in the South in our country; and goodness knows we have a lot of "kissin cousins" and relatives in our own society. But, a typical household will have a few trees about it; coconut, betelnut, banana and various other kinds of fruit trees. And the lady of the household is the one in the household who has a commercial instinct. She is not really hungry for money but for the things she doesn't have and they don't grow.

She'll take some of the fruit off to market and barter them. Maybe she'll barter them for some kind of money, but generally she'll barter them off for other things or petty change in order to buy the things she wants that she can't barter for directly. She'll feed her family with some of the fruit. What is left over from the family she'll feed to the pigs. And what the pigs leave she'll throw into the pond.

She has a truck garden. Some of the truck materials - the vegetables - she'll take to market to barter for things they don't have. So, she'll feed to her family what's left over. What's left over from the family she'll give to the pigs. What the pigs don't eat she'll throw

into the pond.

There will be a few chickens and eggs. She'll take the chickens and eggs off to market to barter. What's left over from that she'll feed to the family. What the family doesn't eat she'll feed to the pigs. And what the pigs don't eat she'll throw into the pond.

Now and then they have a big funeral or a wedding. A funeral is a very gay time in most traditional societies. After the funeral they may slaughter a pig because it takes a lot of people to eat a pig. They have no refrigeration facilities. The only way they can keep it is to either eat it or to cure it. And what they don't eat they'll take to market to barter. What's left over from their eating they'll give to the other pigs. What the other pigs don't eat they'll throw into the pond. In the pond there are fish - three levels of fish, bottom feeders, middle feeders and surface feeders. And periodically the whole village will turn out with a family. The families will get together for a fishing party. They'll use nets and baskets, and they may fish with a hook and line. They'll catch the fish and dry them. They'll take some off to market to barter and to feed the family. What's left over from the family they'll feed to the pigs. And what's left over from the pigs they'll throw into the pond.

They're growing lovely garbage down there all this time, and as you know, this is one way of developing manure. And on the pond there are ducks; the same treatment. Then, according to the part of the country in which they live, the power is either in the Buffalo or in the Bullock. The kind of staple that they grow is wet rice.

Now, this is the typical family which has been tampered with by religions, revised and modified by Buddhism and by Islam. Think what the Moslems can do to an efficient economy like this when they eliminate the pig. What do you do with all that stuff? They have quite a problem. Here is a traditional society kinship, a society that is closely akin to nature; that is dependent upon the natural fertility of the soil, the rain. The soil is not very fertile, generally speaking. A family which realizes that it has to live on terms with nature; it cannot effect it; it cannot modify it; it cannot control it; and so, it must come to terms with it by the spirit world.

Every family knows there are spirits. They worship the spirits. They're on close terms with the spirits and they have various techniques and devices for coping with the spirits - appeasing them; satisfying them, when they are ill. If you ask a typical traditional villager how he is feeling today he may say he doesn't feel so good; "It's the wind. I have the wind element in me." He knows his body is made up of earth, air, fire and water. The wind element has gone out of kilter and he has to appease the spirits that control the wind. He goes to the witch doctor or the wizard - every village has them - and they can take care of this with herbs, with unguents, with roots - the barks they boil up or treat.

If you read Dr. Dooley's tales of his adventures in Laos, about his fee-splitting with the witch and wizard doctors, why, you'll know what I mean. He didn't have a very high regard for them. And yet, in their materia medica they've had some effective materials which did

have an effect on indigestion, dysentery, and things of that sort. They had to come to terms with the spirit world.

Into this kind of traditional society the West has moved and has shaken it deeper than any previous cultural invader in the two milleniums since beginning of the Christian Era.

I began touring South and Southeast Asia after World War II. I went out to the British-Siamese negotiations and also for the opening of our consulate and our legation at Bangkok. I went in with Glenn Abbey to Rangoon, to open up our Consulate General. I had the privilege of spending the evenings sitting around on the porch, drinking with General Oung Sahn who was at that time negotiating with the British, trying to secure the independence of Burma. I went in ahead of Charlie Yost of the British-Siamese negotiations, opening up our legation in Bangkok. I went over to Saigon before we had a Consulate General; we still had an OSS Mission. I hitch-hiked up to Hanoi and was the house-guest of Ho Chi Minh for ten days, during the time that General Liu Hahn was in occupation. I went on down to Singapore and discovered Pat Moun and our Consulate General down there already opened up. I went on down and met our Consul General Uncle Billy Foote, one of our old-style foreign service types who had gone in with the Dutch, in old Batavia. I had the opportunity to tour Southeast Asia.

I came back with the feeling that it wasn't the way that it used to be when I was a young man. I went out in 1927 and became very familiar with all the parts of Southeast Asia during the ten years that I was there as a Presbyterian Missionary. I had studied the cultures,

and the peoples, and the religions of the peoples of Southeast Asia; the Hinduization process; the Islamization process; the impact of Chinese culture on the peoples of Southeast Asia. And it was all very superficial. The people had not been affected - more than 8% or 9% of the population. The great mass of the people were unscathed by the cultural invaders which preceded World War II. But since World War II the changes have been profound. The underdeveloped world has entered into a state of revolution that has shaken the peoples right down to the village and the family levels. And we see the cultural catastrophes occurring in these developing nations more profoundly than ever occurred in previous decades or centuries. They are analogous to the kinds of development that occurred in England during the Dickens Period, during the rise of capitalism and industrialization that Dickens wrote about - child labor and things of that sort; slavery for the landless, who were forced off the land when the British fenced the fields.

The exotic peoples of today are encountering the same predicament that the Western World went through decades ago. I'll give you a short formula. That is, for cultural catastrophe. When a market economy is foisted upon a people, or is brought upon a people who are not socially prepared for it; when land and labor and money become commodities among the people for whom land has never been a commodity - it has been owned by the Crown or the state - has been available for settling freely, for a people whose labor has always been freely shared, and among families at house-raisings, harvesting or sewing periods, and now labor becomes a commodity and a man finds that he has a price put upon him that is the

equivalent of the price, perhaps not as good as that of a bullock or a water buffalo, or a pig, and when he discovers that money has become a commodity and it's a very mysterious kind of commodity which he doesn't understand, it's a situation that gets out of hand and he goes into debt. Think what happens to a people when the land becomes a commodity as it was made a commodity by the colonial powers. It took a long time even under the colonial pressures and temperatures, in developing commercial crops. The rice crop is a commercial crop. Burma, before the war, exported three million tons of rice. This wasn't done to feed the Burmese people. 80% of the Burmese who worked the land before World War II did not own the land they worked.

They were dispossessed. Imagine what this did to them psychologically. They were disturbed; they were unhappy. I used to tour the hospitals in Burma and I was astounded to discover the high percentage of knife cases in the hospitals. This was the Burmese reaction as he struck back at a life situation that had dispossessed him from the land. Because, land had become something in the hands of the money-changers and absentee landlords. And if a man worked a piece of land he became a virtual slave to the landlord for money to buy the seed. And after he got his crop it wasn't his; he had to share it with the landlord. He was dispossessed and he was psychologically disturbed. This was upsetting to the family and to his personal psyche, and to the hopes that he might have had for his sons and daughters; also to their hopes for a future of security. Because, everyone likes a sense of security, even though security is a bad thing for us. I don't believe in it myself.

This today is still one of the pressing problems in the Philippines, absentee landlords of large estates. Land becomes a commodity in a society that is not adjusted to it, that doesn't understand it, that isn't organized to cope with it. And concomitant with this situation, is the rise of the entrepreneur, the class that handles the commercial crops - the copra, the metal crops; the tin, the tungsten, the lead, the silver, the zinc, the coal - all these products. And they have to have labor.

Now, how do you hire a people who are not used to being hired, and what incentive do you use to hire somebody who isn't used to being hired. In the first place, he has to be motivated; he has to want it. And the motivation, of course, is for the young fellows especially. They want to get things in order to give them to the girls in order to get the girls. We men all know that the straightest way to a girl's heart is by a gift of something that she wants. If the girl wants a Singer sewing machine of the type that you sit on the floor with and wind by hand, and if you want the girl, you know how to get her. You get her a Singer sewing machine. The girl gets the Singer sewing machine, you get the girl, and she has you.

But how do you get a Singer sewing machine if you haven't any money? Even on their terms how do you get it? You have to go to work. And here are the commercial crop men, the entrepreneurs, the colonial powers, the absentee owners of property, who need labor or are working through managers to hire the people to grow the crops, to dig the ditches and do the various chores. And some people just won't do it. They revolt.

The British, for instance, wanted labor to go into the Bawdwin Mine - underground. They tried to lure the Burmese people to go underground. They would look down into the hole and say, "There is no sun down there. So, they had to get Chinese; they had to get Indians; they had to bring in outsiders - outside labor. This led to a minorities problem. The young man goes off to the city where the things are and where the money is, in order to be able to buy things that the girl wants. This begins to break up the family. He gets out from under his father's and mother's authority. He is away from his friends, or perhaps he goes along with his friends to the city. And what does he do? He is unskilled and untrained. And so, he perhaps gets a job in a rice mill or a weaving factory as a laborer. Or, perhaps he pedals a bicycle taxi - they are ubiquitous in most of those countries - anything to get money. And land, and labor, and money become a commodity. And there you have the short formula for the breakup of the traditional home.

This is a situation that is developing just as it developed in Western Europe at the rise of industrialization, at a time when there is no socialization; there are no governmental controls over the exploitation of the helpless, the young and the dispossessed. You have a situation like that of Burma where the people are ready to pick up the knife and strike out in any direction. You have the converse of the way the Dutch treated the Indonesians; where, instead of shaking them up and dispossessing them, they screwed them down to the land and made the land an anchor that they would like to shake loose from. Because, they said, "You stick to the land. We'll lay a quota on you and you will

have to produce so much in order to get this money." They found their own land becoming something that turned into something to hate rather than something to love. Now, these new things come in.

We're called gadgeteers - people with things. You can't have things without ideas. And it is astonishing. The idea of money begins to catch on. Now, in the traditional countries, when people have gotten money they haven't had banks and so they bury it. This is still the curse of the Middle East. Money is a static thing. You get your hands on it; you hold it. People go around as beggars and yet they may have lots of cash. They don't know what to do with it because they don't understand money for investment purposes. This comes very hard. And as they begin to get the idea it shakes them up; out of their traditional patterns.

I'll never forget one of my little nextdoor neighbors in a village in one of the countries. She came to me one morning and said she had been robbed. She said, "Mr. Landon, they have taken everything I own." She looked very poor to me. She had a little rubber estate and sold her crop commercially. She didn't have many things, obviously, and couldn't have had much money. And then she said to me, "They didn't get it all. May I put the remnants of what I have saved from the robbers in your safe? I had it hidden up under the roof." Everybody around that part of the Peninsula knew that I had a safe. What they didn't know was that the bottom was made of mud; it wasn't a very good safe. I had forgotten the combination at one time and had to cut out the bottom, after which I just plastered it up. Because, who could

tell?

So, I took her bundle of money and I was astounded; it was a big fat wad. We counted it out and she knew exactly what she had. We wrapped it back up in her handkerchief; wrapped that in paper; tied it with string; put sealing wax on it; she put her thumbprint on it - she was illiterate; she could read the figures but no writing - and I put it in the safe. Well, that was all right for about a year or two. She would come in about every month or two and look at her money. She didn't want to open it, she just wanted to see it. That was her idea of money; it was something you kept; you had it.

Then I had to return to this country and I called her in and said, "Auntie, I'm sorry about your money; I have to give it back to you because I'm returning to the United States and will be leaving the country." Well, she said, "I don't dare take it back; everybody knows my money is with you." And I said to her, "Well, I know there are no banks, but we can take it down and put it in the Post Office in postal savings." What's that? Well, I explained to her about postal savings in the Post Office, but she was very dubious. Finally I persuaded her because she was desperate. We went down to the Post Office and she was scared to death, with all those young men standing around there. She was sure they were going to knock her on the head and take her money; or, as soon as she left, rob the Post Office. So, I reassured her. I told her they had a big safe in there.

Finally we got the money out and began to count it. The postmaster took a little black book, wrote the sum in it, put her name on it, and

handed it to her. He said, "Now, auntie, in three months you bring this little book in and I will write in there how much more money your money has earned." "I don't get it," she said. You mean in three months I will come in and you will write in there how much I have to pay you for keeping my money?" She didn't understand money. The Postmaster said, "No. You bring the book in and we'll write in there how much more money you have after three months. She turned to me and she said, "The man's a fool. I have never heard of such a thing."

Well, I was still around at the end of the three months. She went in with the little black book and the man wrote in it how much more money she had. And she was absolutely stunned. She went back home and in the next week there was an epidemic of little old ladies with tin cans of money, going down to the Post Office. They had learned something new about money.

Take a train; an ordinary thing like a train. It does something to people. It's a gadget. It does something in terms of transportation. But it does something more than that; it makes them mobile. It makes it easier to get to the city. It improves social mobility because it tends to break up the families. It gets the young people out from under parental authority and village authority. And it does something even more remarkable than that.

A family came down to the railroad station; they were going to visit Auntie Dang up the tracks about 16 miles. They asked to buy tickets on the train; they had earned some money. The Station Master said, "I'm sorry, the train left at 8:00 a.m." What is 8:00 a.m.?- never heard of it. They measure time by the watches of the day and the night. He poin-

ted to a coconut tree and said, "When the sun is in such and such a position by that coconut tree, that is 8:00 a.m. They went back home and ate their sandwiches. They made new ones, went to bed, woke up in the morning, and went down to get the train. They had missed it again. And then they did the thing that so many people did when they really wanted to catch trains in that part of the world; they slept on the tracks. That is one of the reasons why the trains didn't run at night for many decades after they were first built; they never knew who was sleeping on the tracks waiting for the train. Also, they were afraid of running into elephants, buffalo and things of that sort.

The train came in at 8:00 a.m. in the morning; they took a sound-
ing on the tree; they got on board; and they have a new sense of time. Then along comes a Swiss watch salesman. He follows along after the train. He has a little gadget that he sells very cheaply. And have you ever seen a Southeast Asian? On his skinny little wrist he has the biggest, the heaviest, the gaudiest-looking wristwatch that he can buy or barter for. He has a sense of time. He knows what 8:00 a.m. is. He begins to move into a new kind of society and world. And some of them really learn a sense of time.

I remember we gave a dinner party after the war, for the Thai Cabinet and the Regent. The time announced was 7:30. About 7:10 I said to the Charge, Charlie Yost, "You'd better get your trousers on and get dressed." It was a hot night and he was putting it off until the last possible moment. He said, "Oh, these orientals; if they get here by 8:00 o'clock we'll be lucky." And at 7:15 the whole Cabinet drove up.

I never heard such scrambling in a dressing room in all my life. Something happens to their thinking. Something happens to their kinship relations. Something happens to their sense of values.

Now, their sense of values doesn't change dramatically. It doesn't change suddenly. But they begin to change as they learn that money is a commodity; that land is a commodity; that people can be bought and sold. They learn that they have to have new kinds of legislation. They learn that the government plays a new and a different kind of role in their lives. This has been part of the problem between Ngo Dinh Diem and the villagers of South Viet Nam. Now, don't imagine that just by changing the government from Ngo Dinh Diem to the present government that the situation is going to become stable. It would be revolutionary whether or not the Viet Cong and the communists were in South Viet Nam. Because, these people have been shaken and disturbed by the new ways they have encountered.

We have gone in with our message; the communists have gone in with theirs. They offered them a new way of life. They have come in with a ward politics kind of message. They have offered them the new things that they want. They have offered them ways of getting rid of their landlords. They have offered them ways of getting free from their taxes; from corvez labor. They have offered them ways of getting schools; maternity home treatment for wives and mothers. The communists come in with a message of hope. They don't just come in to kill, to threaten and to intimidate - and to torture. They do that, of course, but they also win the population. They don't merely come in with brutality;

they come in with a message; a message to people in a traditional society, who are encountering new things; who are developing new appetites, new desires; desire drives right down to the grass roots. These people are disturbed and the communists have a message for them. They offer them a certain way of life; a certain set of solutions; certain kinds of procedures. And they promise anything. They study the individual. They study the family. They study the village. And they offer them what they want.

This is good politics. They don't just go in and preach Marxism, Leninism or Mao Tse Tungism, or something of the sort - although they do that with the intellectuals and develop their intellectual cadres for leadership. They do it for the masses of people. They offer them hope, and solutions. This is a large part of the problem. Because, the conflict is for men's minds; for men's hopes; for men's aspirations. It isn't just a security problem, although it's that too. It isn't just a military problem, although it's that too. I daresay that never before in the history of the world have international relations and problems involved so much of life. Because, the total life process is involved. It's as wide as life and as profound as man's aspirations.

Who would have thought that the Buddhists, those peace-loving gentle Buddhists - so advertised - would become an essential ingredient in rioting; in self-barbecuing - to use the Madam Nhu phrase. And this was done in the traditional pattern. Why do you think they burn themselves? It's in the traditional pattern of creating a malevolent spirit to obsess and to get at an enemy. You create a malevolent spirit. This

has been an abnormal death.

When one of our villagers wanted to get back at Dr. Buckley, one of my colleagues, he went around and hanged himself on the doctor's front porch. That was a dirty trick. I mean, it wasn't just that the doc had to cut him down and bury him - although, that was embarrassing enough - but everybody in town knew that now the doc's front steps were haunted by a malevolent spirit. This was a traditional gesture of creating a malevolent opposition to your enemy. Buddhism.

Now, in our embassy, every embassy has to make a country plan - a country study. But particularly a country plan. The ambassador is DCM; the Chief of MAAG; the Chief of the AID Mission - USOM - and what is known euphemistically as the "Station Chief," that other man. They have to get together. They have to put down on a piece of paper, something that is called a "country plan," a unified and realistic concept of the forces at work in that country. They have to put it on paper. And they have to line out what their targets of opportunity are; to utilize U. S. resources. They have to figure out ways in which these forces can be influenced by our operations, recognizing that we don't solve all their problems for them. But can we influence them? Can we move them?

Well, we all watched with bated breath as Cabot Lodge went out to Saigon. I don't suppose he sat around with a piece of paper trying to figure out what the forces at work were, and yet everybody on his staff was doing it and handing in reports about what to do about this, that and the other thing. And we saw how Washington and Lodge reciprocated

back and forth in terms of the evaluations which the ambassador and his staff made. Every one of our agencies has its missions; its operations. You know them all. Are these means effective in accomplishing U. S. policy objectives in countries where the villagers are as profoundly disturbed and in revolution as they are - social revolution and cultural revolution? They'll never be the same again.

I don't believe that we can, anymore, write about the simple, naive country folk who wish only to be left alone. They aren't simple, in the first place. They aren't naive. They may be illiterate, but their appetites have been whetted. And you're not going to satisfy people by giving them a little bit; that only disturbs them. You know that. When you get a little bit you want more. If you haven't had any, you don't know what you have missed. But when you begin to get a little bit from one side, and then the other side offers you a little bit more, you begin to get very smart. This is the way society moves, profoundly its wonders to perform.

Now, we have to figure out what we can do to move them or influence them. We are good with gadgets and things. Practically all our operations involve things. We can examine the Northeast Thailanders along the borders of Laos and figure out what things they need. But can we figure out what they are thinking, hoping for, and what they expect from the Marshal Srit Government in Bangkok, and what will satisfy them and make them continue to be loyal to that government? The new government in Saigon is certainly preoccupied, among other things, with the problems of what to do about binding the villagers to them and to

turn their loyalties away from the allurements of the Viet Cong and their message.

What have we got to work with? Well, to put it comparatively, take a look at a state in our own country, with which we are more familiar; take Alabama. Supposing we set up an embassy down in Alabama, and the ambassador and his country team have to put up a country plan on what to do about the forces at work in the social sector in Alabama. Now, I don't care which side you're on at the moment; it doesn't matter. You're preoccupied with the problem of how to motivate these forces forward, to move them in the direction you would like to see them go.

Now, what are you going to do? Are you going to give them a book-mobile? Are you going to establish a library or an information service? You're going to have a leader grant program and bring them up to the North for cultural exchange? Are you going to give them a police-training program? Or, how about a Freedom Highway? I mean, these are the things we do in other countries. And I am saying this because it just makes you stop and think. In your own country how are you going to motivate other human beings who are just like us? It's not easy. Do we do it with programs like this? And how effective are these programs?

If you turn from one of our dear states where we have problems, to a state like South Viet Nam, you have the same things to work with that I have just been mentioning. Now, how are you going to use them and just how effective are they going to be? These are things we really need done. And there are a lot of people thinking about them. What

is it that can move a country that is underdeveloped, with all these targets of opportunity and these little families that are disturbed, whose kinship relationships are being broken down, whose traditional confidence in the spirit world is being shattered by the injection syringe and by the Western medical hospitals. This is a violent issue.

Over in Salan you may remember that this issue was so violent that a Buddhist monk sat down with a group and agreed to assassinate the Prime Minister, Bandaranaike, because he was promoting Western medicine at the expense of what they call Iarbatic medicine, which is the kind of medicine used by the wizards and witches, with or without incantations, to suit yourself. And who drew the short straw? A peace-loving Buddhist monk. He was the real McCoy - head shaven, robes, well-educated as far as monks want in Buddhism. And he said, rather plaintively, "I don't have a gun." The Police Chief who was on the assassination committee - it's always nice to have one - said, "Well, here, you can have mine." And then the monk said, "Well, gee, I've never shot a gun." And the police chief said, very cheerily, because he had the long straw, "That's all right. Come on out in the meadow and I'll show you how to shoot it." And he did.

And then the monk, according to monkish practice, came in the next morning, and the Prime Minister, as a good Buddhist, got down on his knees in front of the monk. Out from his little begging bowl he drew his gun and shot the Prime Minister who was kneeling before him. What was the issue? These new, strange invaders who are upsetting society, making these people targets of opportunity for ourselves and for the

communists, are at the roots of it. And we're really in search of a Free World strategy of what to do about societal situations like these that are peculiarly representative of the two great shatterbelts, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, that lie between us and the major communist powers.

Our scholars and our government officials I don't distinguish between, because many are both. They have been thinking for a good many years about the factors involved, the forces at work, what to do, etc. They say, "Well, to move a ^{developing} nation forward you must have capital formation." This is the economists' approach. This is how Walt Rostow made his name and fame - with lectures; "Stages of Economic Growth." You must have capital formation.

Growth and takeoff? You know you have growth. And takeoff; now you've got takeoff if you read Rostow; takeoff is directly dependent upon capital formation. This means that a people as a nation - as a government - have to agree on values that involve investment capital. This is a new concept for a traditional society to acquire. And many people around this town five or six years ago were so hipped on capital formation that it was brooded about that with a billion dollars a year India who was on the launching pad could go off into orbit on a billion a year, and in five years would be off of everybody's back; they would have moved into the modern industrial age and the villages would automatically be taken care of as their living standard went up.

Massive external aid then was proposed as a substitute for the capital formation in nations which weren't prepared to form it. Then

some mean person asked, "Yes, but even if you gave them all this massive external aid in place of their capital formation and helped them out in this fashion, could they absorb it." Absorptive capacity is another one of the considerations that any embassy has to consider when they put down what to do about the forces at work in a society. Inevitably there are political scientists on every embassy staff, and the embassy political scientist says the most important consideration here is political environment. We have heard a great deal about this. We do with every country that is developing a political environment.

What happens if the military constantly take over and develop military-controlled governments, little autocracies, hither and yon? Will this satisfy the people's political environment. And then, of course, the military must always remind us of the problem of insurgency - counterinsurgency. This is one of the key words around this town. There must be internal security. And it is often argued there is no use trying to repair the house while the house is on fire; put the fire out first and then deal with these other things. And, of course, this is the magic word right now - counterinsurgency.

Others say, "Well, it takes planning - national planning. You have to develop national plans involving the whole spectrum of life - the economics, the politics, the societal changes and developments and all the rest, and get them all in the picture - national planning. And, of course, lots of companies saw a good thing in this, and national plans broke out on the faces of the underdeveloped world like pimples on the faces of adolescent boys. We had national plans all over the place.

Everybody who was respectable; every nation that was respectable or coming along had a national plan - a five-year plan, an eight-year plan, or a second five-year plan.

And then, of course, the psychologists always get into the picture. It's astounding who you will find on an embassy staff nowadays. The psychologist comes forward and says, "Yes, but fellows you have got to have motivation." Leave it to the psychologists to think about motivation; you've got to have motivation. At this point the businessman who has just come to town with a couple of Congressmen says, "Aha! Motivation? We'll give them motivation; the profit motive. That is the motivation; trade, not aid." And maybe Mr. Rooney is on the commission that goes touring; and trade not aid is one of the big things up on the Hill right now, as we know from our morning papers - trade, not aid; the profit motive - goods and services.

And so, we go around in the embassy as we consider the forces at work in that society. And do you know? I think we're even going to establish religious advisers at a good many of our embassies; and goodness knows we need them. We really were caught off-base on Buddhism. We like to believe that religion and politics should be separated and religion should be kept out of government affairs. But they can't be anymore. The good old days when international affairs were reflected in the title of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy are gone. We are not in that kind of world anymore. We have to deal with the total way of life of the people in any country with which we are concerned.

Now, these forces at work reflect the disturbed societal situa-

tions which are developing. You look at South Viet Nam. I continually refer to it because we're all reading about it. There are two new forces which have come up in the last couple of months, prominently in the situation there, that may very well prove to be most fascinating objects of study for the embassy. One is the organization of the Buddhists. The other is the university students group; two new societal groupings which are effective. Never before have these two elements had this much influence. It's curious to watch the Buddhists develop because they've never had a hierarchy; they've never been organized. But they seem to be effectively organizing now. These are the things that we have to cope with.

And we have to examine our programs and our own operations to determine how effective they can be used in influencing or motivating these forces in society in these developing nations, in the direction of U. S. objectives.

Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Doctor, you told us what the communist message is. You told us what the problem is. What should our message be?

DR. LANDON: Well, I think our message is not to offer them security. I don't think we have that to offer. I think what we have to offer is opportunity; it's much more frightening. But also, I think that most people react favorably to opportunity. And I think this is what we have to offer. It means that our greatest appeal is with people who recognize an opportunity. I think Rheinhold Niebuhr has made this point in his writings. He's a very fine thinker on the subject. I believe he's as good a political scientist as he is a theologian. He has commented

on the fact that what we have to offer is something that has more long-range, long-run appeal, than short-range. Because, Utopias have a way of playing out.

What the communists can offer and get spontaneous and immediate support for, after it's tried and found wanting, then if people find that we can offer and come through with the longer-range development and with more provision for human dignity, the dignity of the individual, they will prefer our method. And in all of these developing societies the movement is in the direction of the breakup of the big families into the smaller. With the rising independence of the individual he can break out of the traditional pattern and traditional societal controls. I think that this is our message. I think it has to be represented in terms of our philosophy of human nature. In contrast to the communists I think this is fundamental and it has to be reflected. And I am sure it is being reflected in everything that we do.

We are convinced that people want to improve. We are convinced that if people are given a chance, an opportunity, that they will improve. We believe in progress. We even advertise that progress is our business. All of you who have served on committees, have you ever heard a committee report that wasn't a progress report even when it was in the red? This is our philosophy; give the boy a helping hand; send the girl to college; give them a loan; see your banker next Tuesday. This is fundamental in all of our aid programs. It's the helping hand concept of AID, USIA, or the MAAG Missions; wherever our operations go, whether it be for irrigation, seed selection, highway development, or

anything of the sort. It's the marginal helping hand to get them started on their way, in the belief that they want to improve and progress.

Now, whether they do or not depends on the individual. The communists have a different philosophy of human nature. They believe that people don't really want to improve; they won't change unless they are forced to and organized. Consequently they have a closed society tightly controlled, and they'll keep their eye on you. Big brother is watching you to see to it that you do make improvements in the direction that they direct after they have you convinced that what they have to offer is what you need. They feel that if they are not watching you, perhaps you will slip back into your old ways. It's a different approach, a different philosophy of human nature.

I think we have a great deal to offer. I think it's the long-run. I think it has to be reflected in our foreign programs. And it's certainly reflected in the kinds of aid programs that we provide.

QUESTION: Doctor, you touched rather lightly on the Buddhist situation in South Viet Nam. Would you care to comment on what is the underlying problem here? I don't think we are getting this in the press. And whether they are in any way being influenced by communist elements.

DR. LANDON: The question has to do with the real problem of the Buddhists. I think we need to realize one or two things about the Buddhists in South Viet Nam. They are not the same brand of Buddhists, the kind of Buddhists that you will find in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Burma or Ceylon. They have the kind of Buddhism that is derived from China, in a rather weak form. Essentially they are spirit worshipers. Most

of them, if they do get to a Buddhist Temple once a year for some kind of ritual, that is about par for the course. It's almost like us Presbyterians getting to Easter ceremonies. I don't know how you evaluate Presbyterians who go to church on Easter only and the rest of the time can get along without the church.

They have never been highly organized. On the other hand, they periodically have formed in recent decades, particularly since World War II, organizations for their own private armies. I would like for you to recall that the Roman Catholics, while they were still in the North, before the Geneva Agreements of 1954, had their own private army and they were very much sought after by Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, for their support, not because they were Roman Catholics, but because they were organized with an army.

In the South there were two other religious sects, one allegedly Buddhist, called the "Ho How;" it had a private army. And another one, an eclectic religious sect, the "Bao Dais." By eclectic I mean they really have had everything in the pot. They had Mohammed, Christ, Moses, Victor Hugo, and anyone else who was worth paying any attention to. And they had a Pope; they were set up like the Roman Catholic Church. They too had an army and their significance isn't religious so much as political and in terms of a coagulation of power.

You may recall that when Ngo Dinh Diem cracked down on the Hoh How and the Bao Dai in 1954 and '55 there was no great outcry of religious persecution; he was just settling an internal political problem. The thing that made it different on this occasion - on the recent occa-

sion - is that the Buddhists were able to stir the population more profoundly. They were able to develop a wider organization than they ever had before, apparently, and they were able to give some inspiration - I guess we gave some inspiration too - to the Generals who overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem. It was quite a phenomenon to see the Buddhists able to call on the people in the countryside to come into Saigon to demonstrate. This hadn't happened before. So, it wasn't just a religious issue.

I was called in on this problem when it first broke, simply to be asked what I thought about it. And my observation then was, and still is, that if it were religious - purely religious - Ngo Dinh Diem could come to terms with it, ungraciously, because he was not a gracious man; but that if it were political he would suppress it ruthlessly, which he did. I think that out of this situation we see the Buddhists coming into newly-organized strength. And whether they have a private army or not seems aside from the point right now because the Generals who are heading up the government are very sympathetic to the Buddhists' cause. I wouldn't be surprised to see the stirrings of a movement to make Buddhism the national religion of South Viet Nam, and the persecution begin by the Buddhists, of the Roman Catholics. This could easily happen.

We saw something like this developing over in Burma when U Nu was moving hard to establish Buddhism as the national religion of Burma. Those peace-loving Buddhists of Burma suddenly began clobbering the Moslems. That was when General Nei Win took over, because he saw that things were getting out of hand. So, I think these religious organizations have

to be viewed not just as religious manifestations, but as political.

QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss the role of the white race and the yellow race, the ratio problem that we have in Southeast Asia over the long-run?

DR. LANDON: Well, there is no doubt that color plays a part and race plays a part in our relations. We shouldn't try to kid ourselves that it doesn't, if we do. A great deal is made of racial discrimination in our own country and its implications for international relations, the implications being that if we can't solve our own racial problem at home, then we will endanger our relations with the brown-skinned peoples of the rest of the world.

But I think we need to recall that we are probably the only people on the face of the earth who are doing anything about the colored problem. That is one of the reasons it has so much advertising; because, most of the other peoples in the world seem to take it for granted that everybody dislikes everybody. The caste system isn't very much discussed in India. It's based on color. The Indians and the Paks loathe each other. This is racial; not color. The Cambodians can't get along with the Thais and hate the South Viet Nameese and distrust them. This isn't color; it's race. People just don't like each other. And then, if you add a little color to it in addition, it just is an added incentive, perhaps.

I can recall living in a town in South Viet Nam. I used to play tennis every day at the government club. My wife and I are bilingual in Siamese. I did all my lectures, teaching, preaching, writing and

everything else, in Siamese. I also used Chinese. I hardly ever spoke English. My friends were all Thai or Chinese. We ate in their house; they ate in our house. I played tennis with them. Then we came up to the annual tournament and I was runner-up for the tennis championship. It seems improbable that this could happen to me because I'm no athlete. But I remember I was runner-up. And I suddenly realized that there was a wave of animosity toward me, because up to that point I didn't realize that I was white, anymore.

My wife went for 18 months and didn't see another white woman; only one other white man. That is why I was able to hold her. We didn't feel white. My kids went to the Siamese school. They sang, danced, played, and did their reading, writing and arithmetic, in Siamese. We didn't know we were white until I was in this tennis tournament and was runner-up. I realized suddenly that I was going to do myself no good in that community if I beat their champion, and so I was a lousy sport and threw the game. It was good for my career but it was bad for my tennis.

Yes, there is a problem; there always will be I guess. But it isn't just color; it's just people. How are you ever going to get the Irish and the English together? This is the way of deciding they are all bounders, I guess. What we do have to do is to learn how to accommodate and work together. This we can do; we can accommodate. And I don't think we should delude ourselves into thinking that we can make these differences disappear. As a matter of fact, I like all those differences. It will be a sad time when we are all the same.

QUESTION: Doctor, our foreign aid program is in deep trouble, the

deepest in about 15 years - since about 1947. The trend apparently will continue because of the feeling throughout the country, the Congress and the House of Representatives. Do you think this is bad? Would you comment, please?

DR. LANDON: Well, whether it's bad or good, I don't know; it's an ethical judgment. I think a very careful scrutiny of the effectiveness of our operations is very important. I think lots of people question the effectiveness of some of the things that we are doing that cost a lot of money. Do you really win friends and influence people, or move them, or motivate them as social forces, by some of the things, by many of the things, by all of the things that we do? I think this is what we are trying to find out.

I think that by having these programs brought under fire we have to begin to make determinations as to just how effective these things are in accomplishing our policy objectives. Now, lots of things we are going to do for political reasons. What does that mean? It means that you don't give a hang. You hope, kind of, that it will work well intrinsically, substantially, but what your eye is on is the person whom you are trying to influence in the government - the Prime Minister, the government itself, or some public gesture. Or, you're just trying to keep your foot in the door regardless of whether the program is intrinsically effective or not.

So, you really have two questions that you're asking: One, are the programs intrinsically effective? Do they really accomplish their stated objectives? And secondly, do you have to do them whether or not

they are intrinsically effective, in order to stay in because it's absolutely essential to stay in the situation in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East? We can't forfeit our positions. If we withdrew our programs and withdrew our influence from the Middle East and Southeast Asia the whole Indian Ocean area would go.

I don't know whether you gentlemen have ever studied the Indian Ocean area. I'm sure the Navy has. It's a power vacuum. It used to be a British lake, but right now it's a power vacuum. And he who controls the two ends of the Indian Ocean area - which is like a big bay - he who controls it at the Middle East end - at Suez, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the other end - Malaya, South Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Thailand in particular - controlling the Straits of Malacca and Sunda - controls everything that lies in between.

You say you can go around South Africa and Australia. Take a look at your map and what that would do for your logistics problem. So, we have a couple of considerations, I think, with our programs; one, their intrinsic effectiveness, and two, their effectiveness in keeping us in the areas. A show of U. S. power and influence is a personal view. I think it's essential to stay in.

But it does mean that a great many studies are being made, and should be made. I don't mind kidding other people, but we shouldn't kid ourselves. And we ought to find out just how effective we really can be with the things that we really want to accomplish.

DR. SANDERS: Dr. Landon, I want to thank you on behalf of the Industrial College for not only giving us a clear insight into the social

environment of insurgency, but also for giving us a real feeling of the grass roots that we encounter. Thank you very much.