

# CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of submittal .....	III
Executive summary .....	1
1. Chapter 1—Introduction .....	13
A. Background .....	13
B. Key considerations .....	14
C. Reasons for the study .....	14
D. Organization of the study .....	16
E. The National Security Interagency process .....	17
F. The Department of Defense organizational structure .....	21
2. Chapter 2—Civilian control of the military .....	25
A. Introduction .....	25
B. Current framework for civilian control .....	26
C. Historical context of U.S. civil-military relations .....	27
D. Analysis of U.S. civil-military relations .....	40
E. Conclusions .....	45
Appendix A—Trends in civil-military relations .....	46
3. Chapter 3—Office of the Secretary of Defense .....	49
A. Evolution of the Office of the Secretary of Defense .....	49
B. Key organizational trends .....	53
C. Current organization of OSD and subordinate offices .....	65
D. Problem areas and causes .....	76
E. Description of solutions to problem areas .....	98
F. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	119
G. Conclusions and recommendations .....	134
4. Chapter 4—Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .....	139
A. Evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .....	139
B. Key organizational trends .....	143
C. Current organization and staffing procedures of OJCS .....	147
D. Problem areas and causes .....	157
E. Description of solutions to problem areas .....	187
F. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	207
G. Conclusions and recommendations .....	240
Appendix A—The evolution of congressional attitudes toward a general staff in the 20th century .....	244
5. Chapter 5—Unified and specified commands .....	275
A. Introduction .....	275
B. Evolution of the operational commands .....	275
C. Key trends .....	278
D. The current operational command structure .....	288
E. Problem areas and causes .....	302
F. Description of solutions to problem areas .....	324
G. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	334
H. Conclusions and recommendations .....	350

VIII

	Page
Appendix A—Historical examples of DOD organizational problems .....	354
Appendix B—The military chain of command .....	371
6. Chapter 6—Military departments.....	379
A. Evolution of the military departments .....	379
B. Key organizational trends.....	383
C. Current organization of the military departments .....	394
D. Problem areas and causes.....	414
E. Description of solutions to problem areas.....	450
F. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	466
G. Conclusions and recommendations .....	479
7. Chapter 7—Planning, programming, and budgeting system.....	483
A. Introduction.....	483
B. Historical development of the PPB system .....	484
C. Key trends in the PPB system .....	486
D. Current PPBS procedures.....	487
E. Problem areas and causes .....	493
F. Description of solutions to problem areas.....	508
G. Evaluation of alternative solutions.....	517
H. Conclusions and recommendations .....	526
8. Chapter 8—The acquisition process.....	529
A. Introduction.....	529
B. Evolution of the acquisition process.....	529
C. Current organization and procedures for acquisition ...	533
D. Problem areas and causes.....	536
E. Description of solutions to problem areas.....	542
F. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	546
G. Conclusions and recommendations .....	551
Appendix A—Acquisition management issues.....	553
9. Chapter 9—Congressional review and oversight.....	569
A. Introduction.....	569
B. Evolution of congressional review and oversight .....	569
C. Key trends.....	573
D. Problem areas and causes.....	580
E. Description of solutions to problem areas.....	594
F. Evaluation of alternative solutions .....	602
G. Conclusions and recommendations .....	611
10. Chapter 10—Overview analysis.....	613
A. Introduction.....	613
B. Major problem themes in DOD organization and procedures .....	613
C. Historical context.....	632
D. Conclusions and recommendations .....	636
Appendix A—Aggregation of problem areas into major problem themes.....	639
Appendix B—Summary of the views of outside experts on the staff study.....	642

## CHAPTER 4

### ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

#### A. EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

##### 1. The JCS in World War II

Before World War II, a Joint Board of the Army and Navy prepared joint war plans and worked on other issues that required interservice coordination. However, it was not designed to direct the Army and Navy in wartime operations and served only in an advisory capacity.

Shortly after the United States entered World War II, President Roosevelt informally created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to work with the British Chiefs of Staff in a new supreme military body, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The latter body had been set up by the United States and Great Britain to direct their mutual war effort against Nazi Germany. As originally established, the JCS was an informal body that was organized simply by identifying the U.S. officers whose responsibilities most closely matched those of the members of the British Chiefs of Staff.

Nonetheless, the JCS played an important leadership role during the war, particularly in the European theater. Working closely with the President (the only civilian in the chain of command), the Joint Chiefs exercised a great deal of flexibility in carrying out their duties. From its position in the chain of command immediately below the President, the JCS planned and directed U.S. military operations.

Initially the JCS consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Later, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was added to serve as an intermediary between the President and the Service Chiefs.

##### 2. The National Security Act of 1947

Virtually all plans for the postwar unification of the Services into one national military establishment took for granted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be continued. Two years after the end of the war, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80-253), which has remained, with amendments, the foundation for the U.S. national security establishment. This Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a permanent body with a Joint Staff limited to 100 officers drawn in approximately equal numbers from each of the Military Departments. The Act restricted membership of the JCS to four individuals: the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, "if there be one." In practice, the latter position was never filled. The Act also created

the position of Director of the Joint Staff, to be appointed by the JCS.

The National Security Act of 1947 defined the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

In comparison with the Nation's other defense institutions, the JCS has changed remarkably little over the years. The basic concept underlying the institution has survived intact for over 37 years. However, amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 passed by Congress in 1949, 1953, 1958, 1967 and 1978 did make some changes in the statutory organization of the JCS and beyond those statutory changes, the organization has experienced some evolution in its nature.

### 3. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949

In 1949, under the impetus of recommendations made by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and by the Hoover Commission, President Truman sent a message to Congress recommending the unification of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in a new Executive Department to be known as the Department of Defense. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 81-216) responded to Secretary Forrestal's conviction that there should be a "responsible head" for the JCS by creating the position of Chairman. The former billet on the JCS for "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one," was abolished. The President was to appoint a Chairman, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve for a term of two years, with one reappointment possible. He was to serve as presiding officer of the JCS, but was to have no formal vote in its deliberations. The 1949

Amendments also enlarged the Joint Staff to a maximum of 210 officers.

#### 4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In 1953, President Eisenhower submitted a reorganization plan to Congress that set forth certain proposed changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. In a message to Congress accompanying this reorganization plan, the President also described a number of changes he intended to make by executive action. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, as it was called, required no positive legislative action, but was subject only to possible Congressional disapproval. As neither the House nor the Senate took unfavorable action within 60 days, the plan became effective on June 30, 1953.

This reorganization plan, together with the executive actions undertaken by the President, affected the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a number of ways. It made the selection of the Director of the Joint Staff by the JCS, and his tenure, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The selection and tenure of members of the Joint Staff was made subject to the approval of the Chairman of the JCS. Finally, the responsibility of the JCS for managing the Joint Staff and its Director was transferred to the Chairman. The net effect of these changes was to strengthen the authority of the Chairman. However, while the Chairman was to manage the Joint Staff, the JCS as a corporate body continued to possess control and authority over it and to assign tasks to it, in accordance with the administrative regulations worked out for implementing the reorganization plan.

The President's 1953 message to Congress also called for a major change in the chain of command. To implement this change, the Secretary of Defense issued a revision of the 1948 memorandum known as the Key West Agreement. (Attachment to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff"; January 13, 1954). That memorandum had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to designate one of its members as its executive agent for a unified command. However, it had created a widespread perception that the JCS was in the chain of command, and in practice, it had functioned as though that were the case. The revision of 1953 sought to restore the original intent of the National Security Act of 1947 that the JCS would serve as advisors and planners, but not directly as commanders. The new directive specified that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the JCS, would designate in each case a Military Department to serve as the executive agent for a unified command. This change to the chain of command clarified the status of the JCS and ensured that they did not exercise operational command, but played only an advisory and planning role. In practice, however, it led to the cumbersome arrangement of a chain of command that ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of whichever Military Department was the executive agent for a unified command to the Service Chief of that particular Service to the unified commander. By 1958, President Eisenhower had determined that this arrangement was too unwieldy and again sought to change it by executive action.

### 5. The 1958 Defense Department Reorganization Act

In his State of the Union address to Congress in January 1958, President Eisenhower listed the reorganization of the national defense as the first of eight priority tasks. In April he submitted to Congress his recommendations for changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. Congress made a few amendments to the President's proposal before passing the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), the last major reorganization of the Department.

This Act amended the National Security Act of 1947 in several important ways. With regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Act made the Chairman a voting member of that body and made the Commandant of the Marine Corps a member of the JCS whenever matters directly concerning the Marine Corps were under consideration. The Act also added several provisions dealing with the Joint Staff. The Act raised the statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff to 400 officers, but it restricted the terms of Joint Staff members (including the Director) to three years in peacetime, with further restrictions on reassignment. The Act expressly prohibited the Joint Staff from functioning as an overall General Staff and from exercising any executive authority. The Act also made a number of changes in the wording of the National Security Act of 1947 with respect to the responsibilities of the JCS and the Chairman. The Chairman of the JCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was now to select the Director of the Joint Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman was to manage the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", and the Joint Staff could be given assignments by the JCS or the Chairman.

In his message to Congress in connection with the 1958 legislation, President Eisenhower indicated his dissatisfaction with the chain of command. On December 31, 1958, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy issued a directive establishing two command lines: one for the operational direction of the armed forces and the second for the direction of support activities through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. (Revision to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components"; December 31, 1958). The operational chain of command was to run "from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands." It was generally understood that the word "through" implied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be transmitters, and not originators, of command orders.

### 6. Developments Since 1958

In 1967, Congress initiated and passed legislation establishing four-year terms for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and for the Chief of Naval Operations, paralleling already existing law setting the term of the Marine Corps Commandant. (Public Law 90-22) The Defense Authorization Act of 1979 (Public Law 95-485) included a provision making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a full participating member of the JCS, no longer formally restricted to voting only on matters directly concerning the Marine Corps.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff has proven to be one of the most stable and enduring institutions within the Department of Defense. The basic concept underlying the institution has remained intact since 1947, and its organization and structure have changed but little since the Reorganization Act of 1958. The JCS has evolved, of course, but only modestly, and principally as the result of changes undertaken internally over the years, rather than as the result of legislation.

## **B. KEY ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS**

The preceding section briefly reviewed the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This section describes several important organizational trends that have emerged during the evolution of the JCS.

### **1. Size of the OJCS Staff**

The number of personnel working under the Joint Chiefs of Staff has grown considerably since its creation. In fact, this growth has outstripped the increases in the statutory limitation on the number of military officers who may serve on the Joint Staff. This has been made possible by distinguishing between military officers who are members of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and several other categories of personnel, on the other hand: enlisted military personnel on the Joint Staff, civilian personnel on the Joint Staff, and military and civilian personnel who are not on the Joint Staff but who work for the larger, umbrella Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

Table 4-1 sets forth the military and civilian personnel strengths of the OJCS for each year since 1948. The OJCS staff grew at a fairly steady rate for the first 20 years of its existence, reaching a peak of about 2,000 personnel in 1968-1969 at the height of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. During the subsequent decade (1969-1978), the OJCS gradually contracted to about 1,250 personnel—a reduction of roughly 37 percent. Since 1978, the staff of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has experienced modest growth.

TABLE 4-1  
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN OJCS

1948-1983

<u>Year</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Military Personnel</u>	<u>Military Officers</u> <sup>2</sup>	<u>Civilian Personnel</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>
1948	214	164	151	365
1949	257	191	184	441
1950	272	172	177	449
1951	308	184	192	500
1952	325	207	190	515
1953	323	202	188	511
1954	338	211	183	521
1955	310	243	187	497
1956	312	252	173	485
1957	322	251	175	497
1958	328	257	199	527
1959	594	449	303	897
1960	635	480	311	946
1961	654	468	317	971
1962	645	453	385	1,030
1963	773	544	403	1,176
1964	1,173	719	417	1,590
1965	1,201	733	426	1,627
1966	1,238	750	453	1,691
1967	1,338	805	470	1,808
1968	1,438	862	486	1,924
1969	1,571	877	441	2,012
1970	1,325	782	383	1,708
1971	1,272	754	370	1,642
1972	1,305	765	379	1,684
1973	1,308	778	356	1,664
1974	1,234	729	342	1,576
1975	1,141	706	344	1,485
1976	1,049	641	303	1,352
1977	999	619	278	1,277
1978	976	612	270	1,246
1979	996	632	257	1,253
1980	1,017	633	261	1,278
1981	1,039	676	271	1,310
1982	1,077	719	274	1,351
1983	1,122	752	283	1,405

<sup>1</sup> Dates for the years 1948-1976 are as of June 30 each year; dates for the years 1977-1982 are as of September 30; and the date for 1983 is as of December 31.

<sup>2</sup> Subset of Military Personnel category

Table 4-1 also makes it clear that most of the growth in the OJCS staff has occurred through the addition of military personnel rather than civil servants. In the early years of the OJCS, the number of civilian personnel assigned to it lagged behind the number of military personnel by a relatively small amount. However, by 1960, there were more than twice as many military as civilians in the OJCS; by the end of 1963, this disparity had grown to nearly four to one. In other words, the growth in the size of the OJCS staff cannot be attributed to increasing civilian involvement in its work. Instead, Table 4-1 would suggest that, if anything, civilian influence in the OJCS has declined since its early history.

## 2. Increasing Organizational Complexity of the OJCS

As it has grown in size, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also developed a complicated structure of units and functions. Just as the size of the OJCS reached a peak around 1968, so also did its complexity. Since then, however, the structure has been somewhat streamlined; nonetheless, it still includes many units and performs many functions that were not necessarily envisioned in its early history.

A staff organization to support the new Joint Chiefs of Staff took shape piece by piece during 1942. Reflecting the informal nature of the JCS itself, the staff consisted of inter-Service committees composed of Service staff officers on part-time assignment to the JCS. Only a relatively small number of officers served full-time on the JCS staff.

After World War II, the system of part-time inter-Service committees continued without fundamental change until 1958. That year, President Eisenhower redirected the chain of operational command to run from the Secretary of Defense directly to the unified commands rather than through the Military Departments. To implement this change, the President informed the Congress that "the Joint Staff must be further unified and strengthened in order to provide the operational and planning assistance heretofore largely furnished by the staffs of the military departments." (*A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1979*; JCS Historical Division, page 47)

Because he found the existing JCS staff system "laborious", President Eisenhower directed Secretary of Defense McElroy to discontinue the JCS committee system and to add "an integrated operations division". (*Concise History of the OJCS*, page 47) The Joint Staff that emerged from this reorganization consisted of the numbered J-Directorates of a conventional military staff: J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 (Operations), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans and Policy), and J-6 (Communications—Electronics). This structure was designed to make it easier for the Joint Staff to work with the similar staff structure of the unified and specified commands. During the year following the 1958 reorganization, the growth in the size of the OJCS staff accelerated as the institution assumed its enhanced operational responsibilities.

During the 1960's, agencies and groups proliferated within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, the Joint War Games Agency, and Special Assistants for Disarmament Affairs, for Counterinsurgency

and Special Activities, for Strategic Mobility, and for Environmental Services were among the new offices created in the 1960's — often in response to the pressures of the Vietnam War.

So many new staff units had been established by the late 1960's that there was an effort to streamline the OJCS staff by consolidating groups and agencies under the J-Directorates. This counter-trend continued during the 1970's in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and budget pressures for reduced defense spending.

Despite the consolidation that took place during the 1970's, the JCS staff remains a much more elaborate and complicated organization than the one that operated during World War II and in the immediate post-war era. Like other elements of the Defense Department, the evolving structure of the OJCS has reflected the dramatic growth in the complexity of warfare since World War II.

### 3. Consolidation of the Position of the JCS

Since its creation in early 1942, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has consolidated its position in both the law and in the national security policymaking apparatus. By 1961, this process of consolidation had progressed to the point that Paul Hammond could describe the JCS as “the kingpin of the unification structure” in his book, *Organizing for Defense* (page 159).

The previous section described the highly informal way in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created shortly after the United States entered World War II. To facilitate cooperation with the British Chiefs of Staff, the JCS “simply sprang into being as a group of American opposite numbers composed, coincidentally, of the three senior members of the old Joint Board”. (Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., *Unification of the Armed Forces*, page 259) Even after its spontaneous formation, the JCS continued to function without a formal charter and without the specific approval of Congress. Legere concludes about the JCS that “it would be difficult to imagine anything less the result of considered study of organizational problems”. (pages 259–260)

Although it lacked a formal charter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enjoyed a great deal of authority and prestige in the strategic direction of the American war effort. The stature of the Chiefs themselves (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold) and their close working relationship with President Roosevelt enabled the JCS to become “next to the President, the single most important force in the overall conduct of the war...” (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, page 318)

After World War II, the extraordinary status achieved by the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff inevitably suffered. In the absence of wartime pressures, the JCS institution was forced to consolidate its position within a national security establishment that was taking on a shape very different from the one that existed during World War II. Although the 1947 National Security Act finally provided the JCS with a statutory charter, it also subjected it for the first time to the loose control of a newly created Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Service Secretaries reasserted their statutory authority over the individual Chiefs.

Within these new limitations on its authority, the JCS gradually developed a distinctive role for itself in the emerging Department of Defense. During their first 2 years under the 1947 Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff negotiated with Secretary of Defense Forrestal the so-called "Key West Agreement" on the Services' roles and missions. Then, in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the new position of JCS Chairman was created and the statutory ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff was raised from 100 to 210 officers.

This process of consolidation was interrupted in 1953 when President Eisenhower removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the "executive agent" system of command and re-routed the chain of command through the Military Departments. However, as was explained earlier in this section, he discarded this cumbersome system 5 years later. Again, the JCS assumed a corporate role in the operational chain of command that has continued to the present.

Once the 1958 reorganization was implemented, the JCS institution had essentially completed the consolidation of its position within the Defense Department. During the 16 years that had elapsed since its highly informal emergence in 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had firmly established itself both in law and in practice as a distinct and somewhat exclusive organization with a broad range of responsibilities.

### C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING PROCEDURES OF OJCS

The first section of this chapter noted that the statutory responsibilities of the JCS have not changed significantly since they were initially established by the National Security Act of 1947. They can be distilled into two basic functions: (1) to provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; and (2) to plan for the employment of U.S. forces in contingencies. A third basic function —to support and oversee the execution of contingency plans and other military operations by the combatant commands —has evolved from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The DoD Directive issued to implement that legislation specified that "the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and *through the Joint Chiefs of Staff* to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Orders to such commanders will be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense, or *by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.*" (emphasis added) (Revision to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components", December 31, 1958)

The first two JCS responsibilities, to advise and to plan, are relatively well known and understood. However, the third function has often been misinterpreted to mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are actually *in* the chain of command for military operations. Instead, the role of the JCS is to *transmit* orders from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands. The JCS itself cannot initiate operational orders; it can only communicate them. In the "execution of the Single Integrated Oper-


ational Plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations", however, the Chairman is authorized by another DoD Directive to represent the JCS in transmitting orders to the unified and specified commands. (Department of Defense Directive 5100.3, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)", December 2, 1971) The confused role of the JCS in the chain of command is addressed in detail in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands.

The military advice and plans of the JCS are requested most often by three organizations: the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the unified and specified commands. These "customers" constantly ask the JCS for its views on a variety of specific national security issues. At the same time, they receive a stream of plans and studies which the JCS generates on a regular cycle.


The JCS actually constitutes only one element in the larger Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the JCS itself, the OJCS consists of the Office of the JCS Chairman, the Joint Staff, and certain supporting agencies and special offices. Charts 4-1 and 4-2 provide a graphic depiction of the OJCS. At the end of 1983, about 1,400 people worked in the OJCS (of which 400 officers serve on the Joint Staff). Slightly more than one-half of these 1,400 people were officers; the remainder were enlisted personnel and civilians. Officer billets are equally divided among the three Military Departments with the Marine Corps assigned about 20 percent of the spaces allocated to the Department of the Navy.

CHART 4-1

### ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



**ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING TO THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**



- 1 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations
- 2 Law of the Sea treaty negotiations
- 3 Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations

The central organizational characteristic of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since its inception in 1942 has been the membership of the Chiefs of the military Services. The four Service Chiefs function both as the military leaders of their individual Services and as members of the JCS. The only JCS member without formal concurrent duties in his parent Service is the Chairman.

To guide the Service Chiefs in the performance of their dual responsibilities, Secretary of Defense Wilson promulgated a DoD Directive in 1954 which specified that "The Joint Staff work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take precedence over all other duties." (Department of Defense Directive 5158.1, "Method of Operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Relationship With Other Staff Agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense," July 26, 1954) As a result, the Service Chiefs are supposed to free themselves for their JCS responsibilities by delegating much of the daily management of their Services to their Vice Chiefs.

The same 1954 Directive "broadened and strengthened" the functions of the Deputies to the Service Chiefs charged with responsibility for operations (the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations; the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations; and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations). These 3-star Operations Deputies play a crucial role in representing their Service Chiefs during the consideration and resolution of joint issues. For example, the Director of the Joint Staff chairs meetings of the Operations Deputies to consider less important issues or to screen major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs themselves. The Operations Deputies also supervise the large Service Staffs which work closely with the Joint Staff to refine proposals for the JCS.

The following elements form the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

#### 1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Presiding over the JCS is the Chairman, the highest-ranking military officer in the armed forces. Despite his senior rank, he exercises little statutory authority independently of the other JCS members. Instead, he is specifically authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to only preside over the JCS, to provide agendas for JCS meetings, to assist the JCS in conducting its business as promptly as practicable, to determine when issues under consideration shall be decided, and to inform the Secretary of Defense and the President of those issues upon which the JCS have not agreed.

The Chairman performs two of his most important duties on behalf of the JCS corporate body. First, Presidents have invited JCS Chairmen to participate as military advisors in meetings of the National Security Council. Second, the Chairman manages the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." In carrying out both of these duties, the Chairman is supposed to represent the corporate views of the JCS.

Within the Joint Staff is a small cell of officers which works directly for the JCS Chairman. A three-star flag or general officer serves as Assistant to the JCS Chairman. In that position, he usu-

ally functions as the Chairman's "outside man" or as his representative to the organizations with which the JCS must work closely (i.e., the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State.) Serving below the Assistant to the Chairman are five to seven officers who are designated as the Chairman's Staff Group. This small staff element is distinguished from the much larger Joint Staff in that it directly assists the Chairman in his participation in JCS deliberations.

## 2. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff itself is organized along traditional military staff lines for the purpose of preparing plans and reports for consideration by the JCS. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, limits the size of the Joint Staff to no more than 400 officers. Its major elements are briefly described below:

a. The *Director of the Joint Staff* (a three-star flag or general officer) serves as the "inside man" for the JCS and the JCS Chairman. He is responsible for supervising the Joint Staff and providing guidance to certain specialized activities of the OJCS.

b. The *Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1)* performs the following major functions:

- (1) develops JCS positions on personnel issues;
- (2) develops policies on joint and inter-service professional military education;
- (3) provides policy guidance and staff supervision to the National Defense University;
- (4) monitors U.S. manpower authorizations in joint and international activities that report to or through the JCS; and
- (5) plans and manages the selection and assignment of military personnel, except flag and general officers, for duty in the OJCS.

c. The *Defense Intelligence Agency* functions as the Intelligence Directorate (J-2).

d. The *Operations Directorate (J-3)* assists the JCS in carrying out its operational responsibilities as the military staff in the chain of command. J-3 performs the following major functions:

- (1) reviews operations plans submitted by unified and specified commands and international treaty organizations to determine their feasibility;
- (2) maintains information on the readiness status of forces assigned to unified and specified commands;
- (3) manages the JCS military exercise program and coordinates for the OJCS all matters relating to exercises conducted by the unified and specified commands and the Services; and
- (4) supervises the National Military Command System.

e. The *Logistics Directorate (J-4)* performs the following major functions:

- (1) reviews the logistic elements of joint operations plans;
- (2) monitors and evaluates mobility assets and programs;
- (3) coordinates with the Joint Deployment Agency and the transportation operating agencies (the Army's Military Traffic Management Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Air Force's Military Airlift Command); and

(4) coordinates base development and pre-positioning programs for Southwest Asia.

f. The *Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)* performs the following major functions:

- (1) prepares strategic plans and studies;
- (2) provides politico-military advice;
- (3) monitors and supports JCS participation in international negotiations; and
- (4) assists the JCS and the Chairman in addressing programmatic and budgetary matters.

g. The *Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (C<sup>3</sup>S)* develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure adequate C<sup>3</sup> support to unified and specified commands for joint military operations.

### 3. OJCS Elements Outside the Joint Staff

Outside the Joint Staff but still within the umbrella Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are several staff elements that are considered to support the JCS less directly than the J-Directorates. This arbitrary distinction is primarily designed to circumvent the statutory ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff. An example of its artificial nature is the assignment of the Office of the JCS Chairman (which was described earlier) *outside* the Joint Staff.

In addition to a few offices that perform mostly administrative tasks, the OJCS beyond the Joint Staff includes the following significant staff elements:

a. The *National Military Command System* continuously monitors the worldwide military, political, and economic situation and assists the JCS in exercising operational direction over the combatant commands.

b. The *Joint Analysis Directorate* (formerly the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency) prepares studies of military forces and plans, conducts joint war games and interagency politico-military simulations, and attempts to improve tools of analysis.

c. The *Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency*, established in 1984, carries out the following functions:

- (1) analyzes the warfighting requirements and resources of the unified and specified commands;
- (2) assesses inputs to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); and
- (3) assists the JCS Chairman in his role as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).


### 4. OJCS Staffing Procedures

Although there is no statutory or administrative requirement for unanimity, the JCS and the Joint Staff rarely resolve issues without first reaching a consensus among the Services. Before most plans, studies, or recommendations for the Secretary of Defense or the President can represent the corporate position of the JCS, they must be refined and approved at several levels of the OJCS and the Services. This iterative system ensures that decisions on complex national security issues are not made without full consideration of

the different experiences, expertise, and points of view of the four Services.

The staffing process for developing JCS positions, presented in Chart 4-3, generally unfolds in the following manner. (This description of the JCS staffing process is paraphrased and, in some passages, copied from an answer for the record provided to the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee by General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired).) Upon receiving a request for the views of the JCS, the Director of the Joint Staff forwards it to the appropriate directorate. An officer (a Major/Lieutenant Commander or a Lieutenant Colonel/Commander) within that directorate is assigned responsibility for preparing a draft paper that explains the issue and proposes a solution. At the same time, each of the Services is informed of the request and designates an action officer to work with the Joint Staff action officer.

# PROCESSING JOINT ACTIONS



\* OPTIONAL

<sup>1</sup>Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 132: required staffing process if major JCS policy is to be determined, if requested by any JCS member, or if likely to result in rejection of a CINC's request.

<sup>2</sup>Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 133: expedited staffing process that can be used if it is likely to result in approval of a CINC's request and if it is consistent with already-established JCS views.

At this point, the course that the staffing process takes depends upon the amount of time available to answer the request, the magnitude of the task, and the relationship of the current assignment to other recent or ongoing JCS efforts. If necessary, the staffing process can be shortened to yield a rapid response. For example, if the JCS had recently completed a relevant assessment as part of the Joint Strategic Planning System —the formal administrative mechanism for inserting JCS views into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System —the Chiefs might simply forward this product in response to the request. In addition, the Joint Staff and Service action officers may be directed to work closely with their immediate superiors, the Joint Staff and Service planners (Colonels/Captains), in order to compress the lower levels of the normal iterative process.

Assuming that ample time is allowed and that no recent or ongoing JCS effort is applicable, the staffing process continues with a meeting between the Joint Staff and the Service staff action officers. At the initial meeting, they establish a schedule for preparing the response and discuss the issue to be addressed. The Joint Staff action officer has general guidance from his Director on the content of the paper. Similarly, the Service action officers have received guidance from their Service Operations Deputies. If time allowed, the Joint Staff might request the views of the appropriate unified and specified commands. Otherwise, the Joint Staff attempts to represent their views.

After this first meeting, the Joint Staff action officer must prepare the initial draft of the response (formerly called the Flimsy). In creating this initial draft, the staff of each Service or a combatant command might write a portion of the paper or the Joint Staff might undertake the entire task. Generally, because the Service staffs are larger and have data and analysis not available to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer must rely a great deal on Service staff contributions.

Once the initial draft is prepared, the Joint Staff and Service action officers meet to discuss each Service's position on the content of the paper. Suggestions to change it are considered. For a substantive paper of some length, each Service may offer as many as 100 changes. The Joint Staff action officer then reflects the consensus of the meeting in a second iteration of the paper (formerly called the Buff). Minority views which are not incorporated into this second draft can be argued again in the next step of the process.

The same review process is now repeated by the Service and Joint Staff planners (unless they had already participated in the first review with the action officers). These officers, who work directly for the Service Operations Deputies, normally have previous experience in JCS matters and have demonstrated an ability to articulate the various perspectives of the Services. Their full-time responsibility is to represent their Services in the JCS staffing process.

At this level of review, as many as 20 issues may be left to be resolved. The planners generally are able to settle all but two or three of them. The Joint Staff planner then changes the second

draft to reflect the consensus of the planners and publishes another iteration (formerly called the Green).

The Service action officers and planners present this third draft to their Operations Deputies (on some occasions, an additional layer of review at the level of the Assistant Operations Deputy is added). The Operations Deputies then meet with the Director of the Joint Staff to discuss the paper. On many topics of lesser importance, the Operations Deputies, if in full agreement, will approve or "red-stripe" the Green paper, enabling the Director to sign and transmit it on behalf of the JCS.

The differences which cannot be settled by the Operations Deputies and the Director are highlighted for the Joint Chiefs themselves to consider. In those cases in which disagreements persist among the Chiefs, the dissenting Chief or Chiefs may add divergent views to the paper finally transmitted. However, this has been a rare practice as the JCS has been able to almost always reach full agreement on responses to requests for its views.

#### D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

During February 1982, General David C. Jones, USAF, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in an article, entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change" (*Directors & Boards*, Winter 1982), that structural problems diminish the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His remarks were soon followed by similar criticism of the JCS system by General Edward C. Meyer, USA, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The public expression of these views by two incumbent members of the JCS renewed serious consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of their disparate views on needed changes, many observers agree that the JCS system suffers from organizational and procedural problems that hamper it from fully carrying out its responsibilities. Others argue, however, that the current JCS structure is effective because it draws upon the varied experiences of the most senior military officer from each of the four Services.

The institution does not seem able to provide the quality of professional military advice that the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense should have when they are resolving complex defense issues. Testimony from former Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, Secretaries of Defense, and JCS members indicates that the institutional views of the JCS corporate body often take too long to complete; are not in the concise form required by extremely busy senior officials; and, most importantly, do not offer clear, meaningful recommendations on issues affecting more than one Service. Deficiencies in JCS advice have encouraged senior civilian officials to rely on civilian staffs for counsel that should be provided by professional military officers. Some assert that the failure of the JCS to offer more useful military advice results from organizational problems while others believe that it results from shortcomings in the leadership qualities of JCS Chairmen. The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* supports the former view: "The difficulty is caused by the system, not the people." (page 34) The Chairman's Special Study Group reached a similar conclusion:

. . . One must infer that the fault lies not with any particular group of military and civilian executives, but rather with the implementation of the JCS concept itself. (page 27)

At least some of the Service Chiefs serving in 1982 also held this view as noted in the following comment which they made to the Chairman's Special Study Group:

The JCS cannot carry out their statutory responsibilities. It is wrong to say that there is nothing wrong with the JCS organization. The basic organization concept is flawed. (page 28)

In criticizing the JCS system, Generals Jones and Meyer do not recommend that the responsibilities of the Joint Chief of Staff, as prescribed by section 141, title 10, United States Code, be changed. Instead, their concern is that the JCS system is not organized and operated to effectively perform its functions. In testimony before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee during June 1983, the then-serving members of the JCS also concluded that "those are the correct duties and responsibilities for the JCS." (HASC No. 98-8, page 63) This study accepts the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that are directed by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and, therefore, assesses the effectiveness of the JCS system largely by how well the institution carries out these duties.

This section discusses three problem areas that have been identified within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and presents analyses of the contributing causes. These problem areas are: (1) inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice; (2) inadequate quality of the OJCS staff; and (3) insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans. There is a fourth problem area concerning the JCS: the confused chain of command. This problem area is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands.

#### 1. INABILITY OF THE JCS TO PROVIDE USEFUL AND TIMELY UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

Section 141(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Since the responsibility of being "the principal military advisers" was assigned in 1947, the JCS have consistently been unable to provide useful and timely advice. As General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) has noted:

. . . the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful or very influential. And that advice is often watered down and issues are papered over in the interest of achieving unanimity, even though many have contended that the resulting lack of credibility has caused the national leadership to look elsewhere for recommendations that properly should come from the JCS. (HASC No. 97-47, page 54)

Similarly, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger criticized JCS advice in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat...The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure. (Part 5, page 187)

The inadequacies of JCS advice have been observed for more than three decades. The following quotes from various studies of DoD organization substantiate this fact. The 1949 Eberstadt Committee found that,

. . . it has proved difficult to expedite decision on the part of the Joint Chiefs, or to secure from them soundly unified and integrated plans and programs and clear, prompt advice. (page 53)

In 1960, the Symington Report stated:

Action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes place, if at all, only after prolonged debate, coordination and negotiation... (page 6)

The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found that:

The increase in frequency of unanimity in the recommendations and advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by no means conclusive proof of subjugation of particular Service views. Such frequency of unanimity can just as cogently support a conclusion that the basis of such recommendations and advice is mutual accommodation of all Service views, known in some forums as 'log rolling,' and a submergence and avoidance of significant issues or facets of issues on which accommodations of conflicting Service views are not possible. (page 33)

In 1978, the Steadman Report

. . . found a generally high degree of satisfaction with the military advice which the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally provide the Secretary...[but] the formal position papers of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uniformly given low marks by their consumers —the policy-makers in OSD, State, and the NSC staff —and by many senior military officers as well. (page 52)

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group stated:

...The JCS generally have been seen by civilian leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice on many issues. Joint Staff work often comes across as superficial and predictable, and of little help in resolving issues. (page 11)

And finally, in 1985, the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Toward a More Effective Defense*, stated:

...Although civilian leaders consistently praise the advice they receive from the individual chiefs of the services, they almost uniformly criticize the institutional products of the JCS as ponderous in presentation, predictably wedded to the status quo, and reactive rather than innovative. As a consequence, civilians have filled this void, serving as the major source of advice to the secretary on matters for which concise, independent military inputs would have been preferred. (page 12)

#### a. Symptoms of Inadequate Unified Military Advice

Symptoms of inadequate unified military advice are found in many aspects of organizational activity within DoD including strategic planning, programming, operational planning, force employment, roles and missions of the Services, revision of the Unified Command Plan, organization of the unified commands, and development of joint doctrine. The JCS are viewed as the key military advisors on a substantial range of important strategy, resource, operation, and organization issues. Shortcomings in their ability to meaningfully address these issues has had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare for and to conduct military operations in times of crisis. Moreover, the JCS have failed to provide adequate staff support to the Secretary of Defense in his mission integrator role. The Steadman Report summarizes the impact of these shortcomings and failures as follows:

...many of the issues on which effective joint advice is not being provided by the JCS are of fundamental importance to the ability of the United States to deter war and to fight one successfully, if necessary. The development of force structures and weapons systems within feasible budgets and the resolution of contentious joint military issues are the very decisions most difficult for the Secretary, the President, and the Congress to make. Thus, the joint military voice does not carry the weight it could in the decision process, especially in areas where it could be most useful and influential. (page 58)

The major symptoms of inadequate unified advice are briefly described below.

#### (1) inability to formulate military strategy

Section 141(c) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces." The JCS system does participate in the strategic planning process through the preparation of the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). Nei-

ther of these documents can be considered to provide "military strategy" because they are not constrained by fiscal realities. The military strategy that is formulated as part of the resource allocation process is developed by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as part of the Defense Guidance. By their refusal or failure, as the case may be, to consider fiscal constraints in strategy formulation, the JCS have abandoned one of the important tasks of their responsibility as principal military advisers. Some observers believe that the JCS have not formulated a fiscally constrained strategy because the Service Chiefs do not want the JCS system to provide a more structured framework for evaluating Service force structures and programs. In the absence of such a framework, the Services can be much more independent in pursuit of their parochial interests.

## **(2) inability to provide meaningful programmatic advice**

Section 141(c) of title 10 specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans." As leaders of their individual Services, the Service Chiefs are deeply involved in DoD's resource allocation process. However, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerts very little influence in determining the composition of the DoD budget. The joint military perspective on warfare and operational requirements that the JCS is uniquely qualified to offer is not seriously considered in the programming and budgeting phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The 1978 Steadman Report found that:

The nature of the [JCS] organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the Services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems —except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints....The joint system plays virtually no role in this [resource] allocation process. (pages 52 and 53)

The Chairman's Special Study Group shared this assessment:

...the JCS and the Joint Staff do not have a significant role in setting objectives or in resource allocation. (pages 12 and 13)

PPBS presents a formal opportunity for the JCS to provide programmatic advice through the submission of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). In effect, the JPAM represents the Joint Chiefs' response to the Services' programming plans as presented in their Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM has never been a useful document. It has never provided an independent assessment of the Service Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM merely accommodates the disparate desires of the individual Services because as General Jones stated:

...each service usually wants the Joint Staff merely to echo its views. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20)

The limited utility of the JPAM is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

The members of the JCS attend meetings of the Defense Resources Board during the Program Review Process. However, the Service Chiefs' role during these sessions is to defend the programs contained in their Services' POM's. While the JCS Chairman also attends the DRB meetings, he cannot provide, due to his inadequate staff support, the quality of joint military programmatic advice that is needed. General Jones commented as follows on this situation:

...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only military member of the Defense Resources Board and can offer independent opinions, but the chairman has only five people working directly for him to sift through the various issues. (The Joint Staff belongs to the Joint Chiefs' corporate body, not to the chairman.) Consequently, chairmen traditionally focus on a few critical items. In my case, they were readiness, command and control, and mobility. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20)

General George S. Brown, USAF, also commented on the absence of staff support available to him as JCS Chairman when offering advice on programmatic issues:

I had to discuss these very important programmatic and weapons systems problems and draw on things I knew before I got the job, with no help from a staff. (*The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy*, American Enterprise Institute, 1978, page 9)

**(3) inability to effectively represent the operational commanders on resource allocation issues**

Section 141(c) of title 10 directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, to "establish unified commands in strategic areas". In addition, DoD Directive 5100.1 assigns the JCS the responsibility for transmitting orders from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. These two statutory and administrative authorities, as well as historical practice, have contributed to the role of the JCS as spokesman for the unified and specified commands within DoD.

Thus, one of the principal tasks of the JCS is to represent the operational commanders on the full range of issues affecting their commands. The JCS have failed to provide this representation because of the dominance of single Service perspectives in JCS deliberations. The Steadman Report comments on the poor representation of the operational commanders:

...most CINC's have limited power to influence the capability of the forces assigned to them....The Services (and the components) thus have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible. (page 33)

The Chairman's Special Study Group also found:

...The CINCs are in a particularly good position to advise on operational problems such as shortages of space parts, muni-

tions, and manpower, but they have been remote from, and poorly represented in, the programming and budgeting process. (page 13)

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses in detail the failure of the JCS to adequately represent the operational commanders in the context of the imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions. The absence of representation of the operational commanders in the resource allocation process is a serious deficiency because in the words of DoD Directive 7045.14:

The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. (page 1)

**(4) undue Service parochialism in operational matters**

In providing advice to the Secretary of Defense during crises or wars, the JCS have traditionally given undue emphasis to Service interests. Each Service wants to be involved in responding to the crisis or war whether or not its forces are suited to the mission. The resulting JCS recommendations are designed more to balance Service interests than provide the most effective fighting force. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated:

...At the present time, each of the services wants a piece of the action and, therefore, those crises responses are coupled together in an atmosphere in which each service is demanding that it have a piece of the action and is demanding usually that it control its own forces. (Part 5, page 201)

Similarly, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the following lesson could be learned from the Iranian hostage rescue mission:

One basic lesson is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. (SASC Hearings, Part 11, page 503)

**(5) inability to provide for effective organization and command arrangements within the unified commands**

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses the organizational deficiencies of the unified commands, especially regarding the absence of unification at subordinate levels of the commands. There are two basic causes of the problem of insufficient unification within the unified commands: (1) the refusal of the Services to accept substantial unification within the unified commands; and (2) absence of agreement on appropriate command relationships, especially concerning the principle of unity of command. The JCS must be held responsible for these deficiencies because they result primarily from organizational and procedural arrangements specified in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.

**(6) absence of an objective review of the Unified Command Plan**

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands also discusses the inability of the JCS to objectively review the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Decisions regarding the UCP affect important Service interests; therefore, the JCS have been incapable of effectively addressing these difficult, multi-Service issues. The Steadman Report comments on the controversial nature of the UCP within the JCS system:

...changes to the UCP are usually controversial, producing split opinions among the JCS. There are many reasons for this, such as pride of Service and allocation of four-star billets. (page 7)

**(7) inability to settle role and mission disputes**

In his book, *The 25-Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) discusses the inability of the JCS to settle role and mission disputes:

There are other areas in which the JCS could do a better job than they have done in the past. They should be able to sort out issues arising out of role and mission conflicts, especially when brought on by advancing technology. Technological change is inevitable and no service or its chief can prevent it. Examples of the issues involved are the roles and mission implications of missiles versus aircraft, coordinating air defense and air operations, and coordinating electronic warfare operations. A good example occurred during the Vietnam War. In chapter one I described how the secretary of defense had to decide on an interservice controversy over the helicopter, a controversy that extended from Washington to Vietnam. The JCS should have settled this role and mission issue among themselves. (page 199)

The Steadman Report also noted the inability of the JCS to resolve roles and mission issues. In discussing contentious issues in which important Service interests or prerogatives are at stake, the Steadman Report states:

...addressal in the system of such contentious issues as control of close air support of ground forces is initiated only when the pace of technological change or Secretarial directives force it. Changes in these contentious areas are approached reluctantly and deferred to the extent possible. This difficulty is basically systemic, although it is also related to inherent military conservatism. There is a natural tendency to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvement. This tendency (pejoratively labeled by some "fighting the last war over again") needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are difficult within the existing system which provides many avenues for delay. (pages 55 and 56)

In their paper, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin are highly critical of the Key West Agreement of 1948 which remains the basis for the current assignment of Service roles and missions:

...while Key West and the subsequent agreements have clarified service responsibilities and missions, they have contributed to some of the most glaring failures and shortcomings of American military policy in the postwar era. (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983-1984, page 114)

As the most senior body of joint advisors, the JCS must bear the major responsibility for the failure to more adequately address roles and missions issues.

#### (8) poorly developed joint doctrine

JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the term "doctrine" as follows:

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (page 113)

The joint operational effectiveness of military forces is dependent upon the development of joint doctrine and sufficient joint training to be able to efficiently employ it. JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, specifies one of the functions of the JCS as: "To establish doctrines for (1) Unified operations and training." (page 12) The JCS have given limited attention to the development of joint doctrine.

In *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, General John H. Cushman, USA (Retired) discusses the absence of joint doctrine:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have themselves published no doctrine to harmonize the operations of tactical air and land forces. Indeed, they have published no 'how to fight' doctrine at all. UNAAF [Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Publication 2]...is not 'how to fight' guidance but rather guidance on organization and command relationships.

Instead, the JCS, in UNAAF and in their interpretation of the statute, hold the Services responsible for the development of essentially all operational doctrine, with provisions for coordination between the Services and for referring disputes to the JCS for resolution. (pages 4-1 and 4-2)

The absence of JCS emphasis on joint doctrine means that Service doctrine dominates operational thinking. This becomes a problem because the Services are diverse and have different approaches to military operations. When U.S. military forces are jointly employed, Service doctrines clash.

General Cushman summarizes the situation as follows:

What some describe as rather incoherent United States military doctrine stems from this lack of homogeneity [of the Services] perhaps as much as it does from the absence of joint institutions which have the mission of thinking about military doctrine, or having the mission do not fulfill it. (page 4-8)

#### b. Causes of Inadequate Unified Military Advice

Eight causes of the problem of inadequate unified military advice have been identified.

### **(1) dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs**

The dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs, often referred to as "dual-hatting", to their individual Services and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to be the central feature of the JCS system. On balance, "dual-hatting" appears to both enhance and discourage the development of useful and timely unified advice.

#### **a) conflict of interest**

On the one hand, the principle that authority and responsibility should remain inseparable is cited in support of retaining the Service Chiefs as JCS members. Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Retired), a former Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized this principle in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

There is another reason why the service chiefs should not be removed even partially from the function of military advisers. To do so would separate authority and responsibility. The service chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training their forces; the Chairman is not. Because they are responsible for the readiness and performance of those units, the chiefs must therefore be involved in the chain of command to the authority that directs the employment of those forces. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 37)

Admiral Holloway and the many military officers who join him in making this argument go on to explain that establishing authority and responsibility in a Service Chief means that he is accountable for his Service's actions. Removing him from the joint arena in which operational recommendations are made would free him of responsibility for the way in which his forces are used. In this way, accountability would be diffused and, therefore, weakened.

On the other hand, recommendations to modify or eliminate "dual-hatting" are based on the assertion that Service Chiefs are unable to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the larger interests of national defense. Those that make this argument describe "dual-hatting" as a "conflict-of-interest". As General Jones has stated:

...Chiefs are judged by their peers and services on their success in obtaining funding for their own major systems and on protecting service interests in the three afternoons a week they spend in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, a service chief, who is a service advocate in one hat and supposedly an impartial judge of competing requirements in his other hat as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has a fundamental conflict of interest. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 21)

Critics of the current JCS structure believe that Service Chiefs cannot continue to successfully lead their Services if they subsume their Service needs and goals to larger joint needs and goals. Chiefs who fail to preserve and even advance their Services' interests in JCS deliberations lose the respect and dedication of their subordinates. Critics argue that this possibility discourages the Service

Chiefs from putting aside their Service interests when that is required to reach a joint position.

Therefore, "dual-hatting" yields weak JCS advice that simply reflects whatever level of compromise is necessary to achieve the four Services' unanimous agreement. Rather than rely on such advice, senior defense officials have turned to civilian sources for more useful analysis.

The conflict of interest in the dual responsibilities of Service Chiefs has long been identified as a problem. According to the Steadman Report, "problems inherent in the dual roles...have been recognized by every major study of DoD organization as well as in the Congressional debates on the various amendments since the 1947 law." (pages 48 and 49) For example, Secretary of Defense Lovett concluded in 1952:

It is extremely difficult for a group composed of the Chiefs of the three Military Departments and charged, with the exception of the Chairman, with heavy responsibilities placed upon them by law with respect to each individual Service to decide matters involving the splitting of manpower, supplies, equipment, facilities, dollars, and similar matters. (*The Department of Defense 1944 —1978*, page 120)

President Eisenhower found that the problem persisted in 1958:

I know well, from years of military life, the constant concern of service leaders for the adequacy of their respective programs, each of which is intended to strengthen the Nation's defense....But service responsibilities and activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security tree. The present organization fails to apply this truth.

The Symington Report in 1960 declared:

No different results can be expected as long as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retain their two-hatted character, with their positions preconditioned by the Service environment to which they must return after each session of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (page 6)

The Steadman Report in 1978 agreed:

A Chief's responsibility to manage and lead his Service conflicts directly with his agreement in the joint forum to recommendations which are inconsistent with programs desired by his own Service. A Chief cannot, for example, be expected to argue for additional carriers, divisions, or air wings when constructing a Service budget and then agree in a joint forum that they should be deleted in favor of programs of other Services. In doing so he would not only be unreasonably inconsistent, but would risk losing leadership of his Service as well. (page 53)

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group stated:

What the current system demands of the Chiefs is often unrealistic. They have one job that requires them to be effective advocates for their own Service; they have another that re-

quires them to subordinate Service interests to broader considerations; and they are faced with issues where the two positions may well be antithetical. It is very difficult for a Chief to argue in favor of something while wearing one of his 'hats', and against it while wearing the other. Yet that is what the current system often asks of the Service Chiefs. (page 26)

The 1985 CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, confirmed that the conflict of interest problem still exists:

...Each member of the JCS, except the chairman, faces an inherent conflict between his joint role on the one hand and his responsibility to represent the interests of his service on the other....Although the 1947 National Security Act mandates that a service chief's joint role should take precedence over his duties as leader of a service, this does not occur in practice — and for good reason. If a chief did not defend service positions in the joint forum, he would lose the support and loyalty of his service, thus destroying his effectiveness. (page 12)

Theoretically, the current JCS system is the organizational optimum. It brings together the administrative and operational lines of DoD. Substantial benefits should flow from this arrangement. The Service Chiefs bring their superior expertise on Service force capabilities and programs to the joint arena, and they take from the JCS deliberations the broader perspective on national defense to be used in their individual Service responsibilities.

In theory, this arrangement looks good. In practice, it has been a failure. The Service Chiefs were expected to balance their responsibilities in the administrative and operational lines. Throughout the history of the JCS, the Service Chiefs have failed to provide this balance. As General Jones has noted:

To provide a balance, the services must share some of their authority, but they have proved to be consistently unwilling to do so. A service chief has a constituency which, if convinced that he is not fighting hard enough for what the service sees as its fair share of defense missions and resources, can destroy the chief's effectiveness. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 23)

The risks to a Service Chief of attempting to provide a balance between his Service and joint responsibilities was most dramatically demonstrated by the "revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. In this instance, Secretary of Defense Johnson arranged to have the JCS vote on the continued construction of a super, flush-deck carrier for the Navy. With the support of a split vote (Admiral Louis A. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in lone dissent), Secretary Johnson cancelled further construction. This decision and Secretary Johnson's instructions to reduce defense expenditures placed Admiral Denfeld in a difficult position. Paul Hammond discusses the subsequent events in *Organizing for Defense*:

...Admiral Louis A. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations, had tried to preserve his status as the major spokesman for Navy interests at once within the Navy Department and within the Defense Department through the JCS. He failed no-

tably to bridge the gap between Johnson's office and the naval high command. The Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, stepped forward to be the spokesman of Navy interests while Denfeld maintained his relations with Johnson and Matthews [Secretary of the Navy]. When, in the drama of a Congressional hearing, Denfeld sided with the rest of the Navy, he was fired as CNO.

The intricate development of events which thus ended his naval career is not our concern here, but its significance is. Denfeld had found it impossible as Chief of Naval Operations to play simultaneously the two roles thrust upon him: chief spokesman for the professional Navy and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the two diverged, he favored the second role, only to find that he had been virtually deprived of the first. When the House Armed Services Committee hearings on "Unification and Strategy" finally opened in October, 1949, he found himself in growing isolation from his service, and Admiral Radford was at the tiller. When Denfeld finally sided with the rest of the Navy high command, it was only to acknowledge that the playing of his second role, as a member of the JCS, depended upon the performance of his first, as spokesman for the Navy. His firing was therefore a true administrative tragedy, for the seeds of his destruction were inherent in the office which he held. (page 246)

Hammond reaches the following conclusion from these events:

...As Admiral Denfeld's experience as Chief of Naval Operations suggests, a service Chief remains in effective control of his service only so long as he maintains its confidence; and nothing can cause the loss of that confidence faster than his abandonment of the role of service spokesman in the JCS. (page 349)

In sum, the Service Chiefs cannot effectively fulfill both roles assigned to them. They cannot balance Service and joint interests. As the previously quoted statement from the Chairman's Special Study Group notes: "What the current system demands of the Chiefs is often unrealistic." More than 40 years of experience with the JCS system has shown the theoretical model to be invalid. The JCS have consistently failed to provide the quality of joint military advice that the Secretary of Defense and other senior decision-makers vitally need.

#### **b) insufficient time to perform both roles**

It is also claimed that "dual-hatting" overburdens Service Chiefs by requiring them to shoulder more responsibilities than one person can handle. Simply performing all the duties entailed in leading a military Service is enough to fully consume the time and energy of a single individual. As serious as this problem might be in peacetime, it, of course, would be exacerbated during a prolonged crisis or war.

In 1958, an effort was made to correct this problem by authorizing the Service Chiefs to delegate duties to the Service Vice Chiefs.

In his message to the Congress on the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, President Eisenhower explained this change:

I therefore propose that present law be changed to make it clear that each chief of a military service may delegate major portions of his service responsibilities to his vice chief. Once this change is made, the Secretary of Defense will require the chiefs to use their power of delegation to enable them to make their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their principal duties. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 181)

The effort to shift burdens from the Service Chief to the Vice Chief has not been successful. The Service Chiefs continue to be substantially involved in Service matters. The Chairman's Special Study Group noted this outcome:

..Legislation was passed to permit the Service Chief to delegate his Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief, and thus free himself for Joint matters. But, in practice, no Service Chief can or will do that. The Chief is still the Chief, by tradition, inclination, and expectation. Furthermore, just managing their Service can keep both the Chief and his Vice Chief fully occupied. (page 55)

The reluctance of a Service Chief to delegate responsibilities to his Vice Chief is an important point. Basically, a Service Chief wants to remain involved in Service matters because that is where his real interests lie. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb in his book, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, addresses this fact:

The problem of the service chief is not that he cannot divest himself of his service duties. The real problem is he does not want to. The man who spends nearly forty years as a follower in his service sees his appointment to the JCS as the opportunity to remake his service in his own image. He does not view it as an opportunity to serve as a principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense. (page 20)

Similarly, the Chairman's Special Study Group concludes:

It should be expected that the Service Chiefs would have mixed feelings about the time they spend on Joint matters. Their Joint advice is not in demand. Their main interest and their constituencies lie with their Services. They cannot deal with many major Joint issues to their satisfaction because they cannot reach agreement without compromising their Service positions or waffling their advice. Many of the Joint issues they deal with they consider unnecessarily time-consuming. (page 24)

The fact that the Service Chiefs do not have sufficient time to perform their two roles has been recognized for a long time as the following quotes from previous studies show. The 1949 Eberstadt Report stated that:

A further source of the deficiencies of the Joint Chiefs lies in the fact that they are, as individuals, too busy with their service duties to give to Joint Chiefs of Staff matters the attention their great importance demands. (page 69)

President Eisenhower emphasized in his 1958 Message to Congress that:

...the Joint Chiefs' burdens are so heavy that they find it very difficult to spend adequate time on their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This situation is produced by their having the dual responsibilities of chiefs of the military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem is not new but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it.

And the problem persisted, as found by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970:

The numerous functions now assigned to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff impose an excessive workload and a difficult mix of functions and loyalties. Some of these functions must consequently suffer, and the evidence indicates both the strain on individuals who have served in such capacity and a less than desirable level of performance of the numerous functions assigned. This result has occurred despite the outstanding individual ability and dedication of those who have served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and despite attempts to shift a portion of the load from the Chiefs of Service to their Vice Chiefs. (page 34)

The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 highlighted another aspect of the problem of excessive time demands:

...the Chiefs must travel extensively to meet their own Service leadership obligations...Their travel schedules make it hard for the JCS to maintain continuity as a working group; ...only one-quarter of the time [over the past five years] were all five principals present [at JCS meetings] and 40 percent of the time two or more were gone. (page 25)

## **(2) limited independent authority of the JCS Chairman**

Though having the title of chairman, the JCS Chairman is by law one of five equals. His limited independent authority was discussed by the Chairman's Special Study Group:

...his potential effectiveness is, by law and by practice, curtailed. As one of five equals, he cannot speak authoritatively for the other members of the JCS as a corporate body unless they all agree or he states the positions of the individual Service Chiefs; he is not the "chairman of the board." Unlike the Service Chiefs, he manages few resources, and resources are an important source of influence. With regard to personnel, he controls no promotions and few assignments, so has little sway over the officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint organizations, including the Unified Commands. (page 18)

The inability of the JCS Chairman, the only JCS member with no Service responsibilities, to exercise more than limited authority independently of the Service Chiefs makes it difficult for him to advance his unique joint perspective on issues affecting more than one Service.

However, it should be noted that some argue that the JCS Chairman should only have limited independent authority if civilian con-

trol of the military is to be ensured. Those that make this argument believe that the full consideration of the four Services' experiences and expertise ensures that senior civilian decision-makers have the benefit of competitive points of view. This argument is, however, inconsistent with the pattern of JCS advice. Senior civilian decision-makers do not receive the benefit of competitive points of view; the JCS pre-negotiate issues and normally provide only one alternative for consideration by higher authority. General Jones has commented as follows on this argument:

...It is ironic that the services have, with considerable help from outside constituencies, been able to defeat attempts to bring order out of chaos by arguing that a source of alternative military advice [the JCS Chairman] for the President and Secretary of Defense runs the risk of undermining civilian control. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 21)

A convincing argument can be made that a more independent JCS Chairman would lead to a greater diversity of views and better defined choices and, as a result, provide for more effective civilian control.

The JCS consists of a presiding officer with more influence but less control than the other four members. In such a collegial organization, the personality and leadership style of the Chairman are crucial to its effective operation. Of course, JCS Chairmen have differed in these personal qualities and, hence, in their effectiveness. However the JCS is organized, the leadership skills of its Chairman will determine to a great extent its success. Indeed, some assert that the JCS has been an ineffective institution principally because of the personality and leadership shortcomings of its Chairmen rather than because of deficiencies in the organizational structure.

The determination of the JCS to reach a consensus on issues (instead of distinct alternatives) minimizes the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. Rather than developing and pressing his own views, he must be concerned with harmonizing the competing views of the Services. In doing so, however, the Chairman cannot rely on any executive authority over the Service Chiefs; instead, he must simply hope to persuade them to accept his suggestions. General Jones discusses the JCS Chairman's difficult position in the following terms:

Only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unconstrained by a service constituency, but he is in a particularly difficult position. His influence stems from his ability to persuade all his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on a course of action and any disagreement requires by law a report to the Secretary of Defense. A Chairman jeopardizes his effectiveness if, early in his tour, he creates dissension within the corporate body by trying to force the services to share some of their authority. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 23)

Despite their lack of statutory freedom to volunteer military advice in their own right, former JCS Chairmen have provided their personal views on an *ad hoc* basis to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Apparently, these personal views have often dif-

ferred from the institutional views of the JCS. Former Secretaries of Defense have testified that this informal guidance was very helpful—usually more useful than the written advice generated by the JCS staff process. Again, however, it appears that JCS Chairmen have been able to offer their own military advice only to Secretaries of Defense and Presidents with whom they enjoyed personal relations of trust and confidence. In any organization, the willingness of a superior to accept the advice of a subordinate is seldom a function of formal organizational relationships, particularly in cases where the superior has no control over the selection of his subordinates. Rather, relationships of trust and confidence, like those that should exist between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, largely depend upon personalities and perceived confidence. Such relationships cannot be legislated.

If the Chairman's informal practice of providing his own advice is to be expressly authorized and encouraged by law, he would be constrained by the current legal requirement that he manage the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff". (Section 141(d), title 10) That mandate would hinder the Chairman from drawing upon the Joint Staff for the kind of support which he would require to develop his own views.

### (3) desire for unanimity

Section 142(b) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following as one of the duties of the JCS Chairman:(3) inform the Secretary of Defense, and, when the President or the Secretary of Defense considers it appropriate, the President, of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed.

The elaborate staffing procedures established by the Joint Chiefs to develop their corporate views reflect their strong interest in achieving unanimity. Although there is no statutory or administrative requirement, successive groups of Joint Chiefs have labored to develop unanimous positions on all but a small number of matters. Apparently, the JCS has believed that its recommendations carry more weight if they reflect the agreement of all of the Chiefs. Rather than offer policy alternatives to the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs have considered it their responsibility to debate and refine the options into a single recommendation. The effective result is that the Services can frustrate an agreement on most Joint Staff actions.

In his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD," Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), comments on the negative impact of the JCS desire for unanimity:

*Because of the way it operates, the JCS system is the prisoner of the services which comprise it. The rule of unanimity which the JCS deliberately impose on themselves in order to achieve a unified view vis-a-vis the civilians permits in effect a single service veto. This means in turn that JCS advice on any controversial issue almost invariably reflects the lowest common denominator of what the Services can agree on. In effect, while this JCS system deprives the nation's military of an adequate voice in defense decisionmaking, this must be regarded as mostly a self-inflicted wound. (page 13)*

In discussing formal JCS advice, the Steadman Report also noted:

In formal papers argumentation and recommendations usually have had such extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the lowest common level of assent. (page 52)

The desire for unanimity not only forces JCS advice to the lowest common denominator, but also greatly limits the range of alternatives that a Secretary of Defense can consider. As General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) has written:

It is dangerous to submerge divergent views on important issues, and a disservice to civilian authority to infer JCS agreement when, in fact, the chiefs disagree. (*The 25-Year War*, pages 198-199)

Much has been written about the problems of inter-Service rivalry. Within the JCS system, however, the opposite appears to be the dominant case. There is limited competitive and objective examination of issues, but rather a search for compromises, often useless or ineffective, to which all Services can agree. In the work of the JCS, collusion and collegiality are the dominant features. General Jones has commented on the imbalance of Service and joint interests and the desire for unanimity:

It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties" which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a "truce" has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. What is lacking is a counterbalancing system, involving officers not so beholden to their services, who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, weapons systems, war planning and other contentious issues to offset the influence of the individual services. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22)

#### (4) closed staff character of JCS system

Despite its critical position in DoD as the source of unified military advice, the JCS has placed strict limits on its interactions with others. This has been termed a "closed staff." Paul Hammond addresses the closed staff character of the JCS in his book, *Organizing for Defense*:

...By closed we mean that the JCS as a corporate body, as distinct from its individual members carrying out their responsibilities as military Chiefs in their respective services, kept the deliberations by which it finally reached its corporate will relatively unfettered and unobserved. (page 171)

Hammond discusses the closed staff character of the JCS during World War II and indicates that its procedures "suggest an analogy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the U.S. Supreme Court." (page 173) Hammond notes the problems that this caused because military and judicial councils are so different.

Hammond discusses the reasons for the closed staff character of the JCS as follows:

This insuperability of service interests in the JCS is probably the major explanation for the closed military staff characteristics of the JCS: the refusal to delegate authority (to let, that is to say, anyone representing the JCS commit it in any way), the insistence upon taking exclusive jurisdiction over questions, the requirement (less successfully enforced) that agency viewpoints, even those of the State Department, be final before the JCS will review them, the refusal of the JCS to alter its military character by including nonmilitary experts in the Joint Staff or as advisors to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the difficulties in communication between the JCS and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, or with anyone else as a matter of regular procedure, the slowness of JCS action on many important matters, and the inadequacy of their action, as viewed from the requirements of responsible administrators. Since its establishment the JCS has maintained a barrier against anyone and everyone, including the service Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and all the defense reorganization studies. Its tactics have undoubtedly been successful. It has not had to "negotiate" in the open, where inter-service conflicts could be exacerbated (although on occasion inter-service disputes have brought its deliberations into the open)...

Without the tactics of closed diplomacy it is doubtful that the JCS could have survived World War II as a viable agency, for what held it together was not its own cohesion, but its shield against division....Even though most of the evidence presented above on the operation of the JCS was drawn from its early postwar history, the continuity in its external facade, supplemented by the data which is available concerning its behavior in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, make it fairly evident that these characteristics have not changed. (pages 349-351)

Since these words were written by Paul Hammond in 1961, the JCS system has become somewhat more open. The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* in 1970 noted this trend:

There is an increasing "openness" to the JCS, quite in contrast to the closed nature of the organization in the past. The Joint Staff has become considerably more open to informal channels and something like a normal relationship has grown under which discussions can take place prior to rather than after JCS positions are officially and formally reached. It is generally felt that considerable progress has been made in coordinative activity and flow of information and opinion among the Joint Staff, OSD, and the State Department. This cooperative atmosphere should allow the Secretary of Defense to provide more useable policy guidance to the JCS and, in return, enable them to provide him increasingly with more useful broad gauged military advice. This movement toward flexibility and openness, it should be added, is generally approved by the military. (Appendix N, page 9)

There are logical reasons, given its current composition, for the JCS to retain a closed staff. Yet, this approach does limit the quality and timeliness of JCS advice and inhibit the important interactions between the Joint Staff and OSD.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Retired), a former Chief of Naval Operations, noted in his book, *On Watch*, a negative impact of the JCS closed staff on its own work:

...the Joint Staff was almost totally useless as an instrument to monitor what other parts of the government were doing or thinking. Working, as it had to, strictly through the prescribed channels of communication and command, it was generally the last to know what was happening in Washington's bureaucratic labyrinth. (page 285)

#### **(5) limited joint experience of JCS members**

In his book, *U.S. Defense Planning, A Critique*, John M. Collins evaluates the credentials of the 48 military officers who have served as JCS Chairmen or Service Chiefs between World War II and 1982. He concludes:

Neither education nor experience equipped a majority of the Joint Chiefs to perform well in the joint arena....A lifetime of uniservice employment suited them perfectly to deal with Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps matters, but not in combination....Nearly a third lacked any kind of joint assignment in their entire careers. (pages 49-50)

Collins explains the absence of joint experience as follows:

A practical reason perpetuates that pattern. Joint assignments have not been, and are not now, considered stepping stones to success. They divert officers from the main stream of their respective Military Services into channels where duties may even conflict with narrow Service interests. (page 50)

General Jones has also noted this deficiency:

...The services control most of the money and the personnel assignments and promotions of their people wherever assigned, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Unified Command Staffs. Officers who perform duty outside their own services generally do less well than those assigned to duty in their service, especially when it comes to promotion to general or admiral. The Chiefs of Staff of the services almost always have had duty on service staffs in Washington but almost never on the Joint Staff. Few incentives exist for an officer assigned to joint duty to do more than punch his or her ticket, and then get back into a service assignment. I cannot stress this point too strongly: He who controls dollars, promotions and assignments controls the organization —and the services so control, especially with regard to personnel actions. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22)

Whatever the reason, JCS members have traditionally not had a strong background of joint service. This situation has contributed

to the inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified advice.

#### **(6) cumbersome staffing procedures**

The OJCS staffing procedures are described in detail in Section C of this chapter. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel characterized this staffing system as follows:

*The system used to process JCS actions and decisions reflects the nature and intent of the JCS structure. It is a system which is based not only on coordination with the Services but on their concurrence. It is a mechanism which maximizes the opportunities for compromise and resolution of disagreement at every step from the inception of the paper to consideration by the Joint Chiefs. It is a process of negotiation and unabashedly so. (Appendix N, page 14)*

The extensive negotiation that results from OJCS staffing procedures and the Service veto at each step of the process produces staff recommendations that have been "watered down" to the lowest common level of assent. The negative impact of OJCS staffing procedures on the quality of unified military advice has long been identified. For example, the 1960 Symington Report found:

*...Nor can the Joint Staff become fully effective in developing the basis for clear military judgments unless the present degree of influence exercised by separate Service thinking is sharply reduced. (page 6)*

The 1978 Steadman Report concluded:

*...the present system makes it difficult for the Joint Staff to produce persuasively argued joint papers which transcend Service positions and difficult for the JCS to arrive at joint decisions in many important areas. These limitations are related in part to JCS/Joint Staff procedures and style of presentation as well as to inherent tension between Service interests and a joint perspective. (page 57)*

The Chairman's Special Study Group was highly critical of OJCS staffing procedures:

*...Service staff executives actually have effective veto power on most Joint Staff actions....the JCS and the Joint Staff do not reach decisions by executive staff process; they seek unanimous consensus among the Services...(pages 8 and 9)..it is possible, and indeed likely, for a JCS paper to go through four levels of staffing, each with multiple iterations of drafting, commenting, and revising. This admittedly thorough but prolonged process of trying to reach some mutually satisfactory compromise among the Services tends not to sharpen and hone the issues, but rather to bury them. The more iterations this process involves, the longer the process takes, and the less substantive the paper becomes. The objective becomes one of agreement, at the expense of content. (pages 47 and 48)*

And finally, in 1985, the CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, found:

...the JCS have constructed an array of Joint Staff procedures for drafting and coordinating documents which ensure that all services pass on every item at several levels. In effect, each service has a veto over every joint recommendation, forcing joint advice toward the level of common assent. (page 12)

Although the JCS have recently attempted to expedite their work by compressing the levels of staff review, the staffing procedures remain lengthy, cumbersome, and, most importantly, open to the Service veto at each step of the process.

#### **(7) unfavorable incentives for OJCS officers**

Like the Service Chiefs, military officers who serve in OJCS have a conflict of interest. While they are suppose to provide a joint perspective on issues, there are tremendous incentives for them to pursue the point of view of their parent Services. The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, comments on this situation with respect to Joint Staff officers, but it applies to all military officers in OJCS:

...the officers who serve on the Joint Staff have strong incentives to protect the interests of their services in the joint arena. Joint Staff officers usually serve only a single tour there, and must look to their parent service for promotions and future assignments. Their performance is judged in large part by how effectively they have represented service interests. (page 12)

Given this situation, Service interests play the dominant role in OJCS staff work. Thus, even before the JCS focus on an issue, the joint perspective has been relegated to a secondary role.

#### **(8) absence of mission orientations**

The Joint Staff is organized along the traditional military functional lines (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, etcetera). Secretary Weinberger views this functional arrangement to be appropriate:

The Unified Commands, as the headquarters of our fighting forces in the field, are mission-oriented in purpose and outlook. These headquarters staffs, as well as the staffs of the Service Component Commands, are organized functionally in a manner which is designed to most effectively accomplish their assigned military missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are responsible for providing strategic direction to the Unified and Specified Commands, and for serving as the military staff of the Secretary of Defense and the National Command Authorities, have organized the Joint Staff along parallel functional lines. Accordingly, organizational arrangements for command, control, and employment of U.S. military forces are compatible across all operating elements and activities. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

Despite Secretary Weinberger's view, it does appear that the absence of a multi-functional, mission orientation in the Joint Staff inhibits the ability of the JCS to articulate mission requirements. In fact, given that the JCS system is expected to balance Service

and joint interests, the functional structure which mirrors the Services' organizational arrangements tilts the balance toward the Services. If the Joint Staff were focused on missions, as the unified commands are, it might be more supportive of the operational requirements of the combatant commands.

## 2. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

The second problem area is the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff. In this context, quality has three dimensions: (1) the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers; (2) the necessary education and experience; and (3) a sufficiently long tour to become effective and to provide continuity.

As Table 4-2 shows, there are about 9,000 active duty military officers assigned to "joint duty" in the Department of Defense. Joint, or non-Service, duty in the broader context includes service in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including the Joint Staff), unified command headquarters, Joint Deployment Agency, NATO headquarters, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense Agencies. The number of active duty officers so assigned represents 5 percent of all officers, 19 percent of all flag rank officers, and 11 percent of all colonels and Navy captains. (Chairman's Special Study Group, page 2)

**TABLE 4-2**  
**OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO JOINT DUTY<sup>a</sup>**

Activity	Grade					TOTAL
	O-3	O-4	O-5	O-6	General/Flag	
OSD	19	68	176	156	19	438
OJCS	2	70	368	211	31	682
JDA	5	26	30	9	4	74
Unified Commands	236	730	850	291	47	2,154
NATO Commands	162	405	478	209	45	1,299
Subtotal	424	1,299	1,902	876	146	4,647
Percent of Total Grade	<1%	3%	6%	6%	13%	3%
Defense Agencies	545	986	882	380	35	2,828
Other Activities <sup>b</sup>	159	440	501	347	29	1,476
Total	1,128	2,725	3,285	1,603	210	8,951
Percent of Total Grade	1%	5%	10%	11%	19%	5%
Army						(3,317)
Navy/Marine Corps						(2,400)
Air Force						(3,234)

<sup>a</sup> As of 28 September 1981. Source is the report of the Chairman's Special Study Group. Excludes officers assigned to the Service staffs whose principal or part-time responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in joint activities.

<sup>b</sup> Aerospace Defense Command; National Defense University; Armed Forces Staff College; Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; Joint Electronic Warfare Center; Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff; Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center; Inter-American Defense Board; Defense Attache System; and Security Assistance Activities.

In this subsection, the focus will be on the roughly 750 military officers assigned to OJCS which includes the 400 officers on the Joint Staff. While previous discussions of staff quality have focused on the Joint Staff, addressing the larger and all-encompassing OJCS staff is more useful for the purposes of this study. While the focus here is on the OJCS staff, the range of identified problems frequently apply to other joint duty assignments, especially on the joint staffs serving the unified commanders.

In this regard, the Chairman's Special Study Group noted:

. . . They [the CINC's] have practically nothing to say about the officers assigned to them; just as the Joint Staff has difficulty getting officers qualified in Joint duty, so too do the CINCs. (page 32)

The problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff also contributes to the first problem of inadequate unified military advice. The absence of a high quality OJCS staff would obviously diminish the work product of the JCS system. Despite this relationship, the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff is of sufficient concern that it merits discussion as a distinct problem area.

However the OJCS staff is organized, the officers assigned to it should be among the best of their Services and fully prepared for joint duty. Unfortunately, the quality of these officers has been uneven and disappointing. As General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) notes: "...Like it or not, the image of the Joint Staff is not a good one..." ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", pages 28 and 29) This is not to say that OJCS officers are not on the whole very capable. They are, but they do not include an appropriate portion of the most talented officers. Despite the capable nature of the OJCS staff, the constraints under which they operate greatly diminish the quality of their work. For the most part, officers do not want OJCS assignments; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their Services while serving in OJCS; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs. In his book, *A Genius for War*, Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) states that the objective of the Prussian General Staff was to institutionalize excellence. (page 24) Whatever the real or imagined deficiencies of the General Staff concept, it is clear that the OJCS staff is at the other end of the spectrum; at best it can be described as the institutionalization of mediocrity. The discussion of the causes of this problem area will further explain why this is the case.

It should also be noted that the Services have no interest in improving the quality of OJCS staff work. An ineffective OJCS staff permits Service perspectives to dominate. John Kester reaches this conclusion in his paper, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff":

. . . It is no accident that the joint staff has gone on for this long with little improvement, even though the deficiencies have been recognized for decades. The difficulties have their roots not in lack of management skill, but in the JCS itself and the power balance struck between the forces of jointness on the

one hand and the services on the other. Except for the chairman, the chiefs themselves—institutionally, though not necessarily personally—by virtue of their service roles have an interest in *not* having an effective joint staff. (*AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Volume Two, Number One, February 1980, page 17)

There are six causes of the problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff: (1) an unfavorable historical pattern of promotions and assignments; (2) negative attitudes of parent Services; (3) limited OJCS staff influence; (4) complex staffing procedures; (5) limited joint experience or education; and (6) rapid turnover rates. The first four causes contribute to the first dimension of inadequate quality: the assignment to OJCS of military officers who are not among the most skilled and talented. The fifth and sixth causes directly relate to the two other dimensions: insufficient education and experience and brief joint tours.

a. Unfavorable Historical Pattern of Promotions and Assignments

The historical pattern of promotions and assignments of military officers subsequent to tours of duty on the OJCS staff is a major disincentive. Overall, officers in OJCS staff assignments have not been as successful as their peers in competing for promotions and command positions. As the Chairman Special Study Group notes, this negative pattern has had an impact on attitudes toward joint assignments within the professional officer corps:

The general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within one Service it is flatly believed to be the "kiss of death" as far as a continued military career is concerned. In contrast, Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk a Joint-duty assignment. (page 44)

Recently, however, the Services have attempted to enhance advancement opportunities for their officers on the OJCS staff.

b. Negative Attitude of Parent Services

The Services do not generally believe that it is vital to their interests to be represented by their best officers on the OJCS staff. Rather, the Services seek to retain their best officers for more important "in-house" or joint positions (e.g., in the Office of the Secretary of Defense). The Steadman Report cites this approach by the Services:

. . . The problem [of Joint Staff performance] has been compounded by the historic unwillingness of the Services to heed the pleas of various Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the JCS to assign their most highly qualified officers to the Joint Staff. The Services have not perceived such duty as being of the highest priority and have made their personnel assignments accordingly. Many of the best officers have noted this fact and thus avoid a Joint Staff assignment if at all possible. In consequence, while the Joint Staff officers are generally ca-

pable, the very top officers of the Services more frequently are on the Service staffs. (page 51)

Of course, the attitude of their parent Services strongly discourages excellent officers from volunteering for duty on the OJCS staff.

#### c. Limited OJCS Staff Influence

The widely held perception is that the OJCS staff exercises little influence in resolving significant defense questions. As a result, many military officers foresee limited opportunities to make meaningful contributions as a member of OJCS.

#### d. Cumbersome Staffing Procedures

Another disincentive is the cumbersome staffing process followed by the OJCS staff to integrate the views of the Services into a JCS position. These procedures were identified previously in this section as a cause of inadequate unified military advice; they also have a negative effect on the quality of the OJCS staff. The perception among OJCS action officers that this cumbersome staffing process is unproductive inhibits outstanding officers from seeking Joint Staff duty. The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 concluded that the JCS staffing process:

. . . tends to water down or 'waffle' both the exposition of the issue and the recommended position as the constraints imposed by the protection of Service interests are applied at each echelon. The process is viewed as unproductive by most action officers, one of the reasons many fine officers do not seek Joint Staff assignments. It is also perceived as unproductive by its civilian consumers, one of the reasons that JCS formal advice is frequently not requested or heeded. (page 9)

#### e. Limited Joint Experience or Education

Most OJCS staff officers lack previous joint experience or education. The Chairman's Special Study Group determined that in 1982 only 2 percent of the officers serving in OJCS had any previous Joint Staff experience and only 36 percent had ever worked on a Service staff and noted:

. . . Most [Joint Staff officers] have come directly to Washington from specialized field operations where they have had little contact with the complex issues with which the Joint Staff must deal. (page 7)

Moreover, only 13 percent had attended the 5-month resident course at the Armed Forces Staff College, the school specifically designed to train young officers for joint duty. (Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chairman's Special Study Group, *The Organization and Functions of the JCS*, April 1982, page 41.) The obvious effect of this lack of prior experience or training is to require new OJCS staff officers to learn "on the job" how to analyze major political-military issues, develop national security objectives, and oversee the preparation of joint military plans. The result of this situation was summarized by the Chairman's Special Study Group:

The combination of lack of staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation

through the Joint school system, all coupled with short tours, makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable (and many are very capable), to deal effectively with these major staff responsibilities. The result is that the Chairman lacks the support he needs to carry out his responsibilities, and the Secretary of Defense is not provided the kind of military staff support he needs, has a right to expect, and could be provided if the Services gave greater weight to Joint-duty positions in their management of officer personnel. (page 43)

#### f. Rapid Turnover Rates

Compounding limited experience and education is the departure of officers from the OJCS soon after they develop some expertise in their joint assignments. The average tour lengths of officers serving in the OJCS is less than 30 months. Even worse, the Joint Staff leadership positions occupied by general and flag officers normally change every 24 months. (Chairman's Special Study Group, page 42) The rapid turnover of officers who already lacked previous joint experience or education makes it extremely difficult for the OJCS staff to perform its important staff responsibilities. Moreover, as the Chairman's Special Study Group notes, because of these short tours: "there is virtually no corporate memory." (page 42)

### 3. INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

In Chapter 3 (OSD), the absence of effective civilian review of non-nuclear contingency plans was identified as a problem area. Contributing to this problem was the JCS view that the Secretary of Defense, and possibly his Deputy, were the only civilians (because of the Secretary's command function) who had a need to have access to contingency plans. While the JCS have full and free access to contingency plans prepared by the operational commands, they have given limited attention to reviewing these plans. Inattention to this important duty has been identified as the third problem area in OJCS.

Military contingency plans present only one set of options that should be available to the President during a crisis. There should be diplomatic and economic options developed by agencies other than DoD to provide the full range of alternative courses of action. This comprehensive array of options —military, diplomatic, and economic —should be coordinated in the interagency planning process under the direction of the staff of the National Security Council. Evaluation of interagency planning is beyond the scope of this study. The focus will be exclusively on military contingency planning conducted within DoD.

Global and regional military contingency plans are developed through a JCS system, entitled the Joint Operation Planning Systems (JOPS). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), prepared annually by the JCS, is the document that initiates contingency planning. JSCP lists the planning tasks for commanders of combatant commands and allocates combat forces for planning purposes. Contingency plans are prepared by the combatant command-

ers in response to JSCP tasking and are submitted to the JCS for review and approval. The *Joint Staff Officers Guide*, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, makes an interesting observation about JOPS:

There is no formal relationship between the PPBS and JOPS, but each system obviously exerts a strong influence on the other. It is the military Services that provide a real link, if not a formal one, between the PPBS and JOPS. (pages 5-13)

The combined failure of senior civilian officials and the JCS to give adequate attention to contingency plans and to connect them to the resource allocation process is one of the gravest shortcomings of DoD. Two deficiencies result from this failure: (1) the plans for military action in a crisis or war may not be adequate or realistic, especially from a political perspective; and (2) the useful feedback that contingency plans could provide to future resource allocations is lost. In his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD", Ambassador Robert W. Komer is highly critical of the current contingency planning process:

. . . the non-nuclear war planning process has become routinized, without much imaginative consideration at CINC or JCS level of strategic alternatives. All too few war plans over the last 15 years have called for changing operational strategy in any significant respect. By and large the strategy they call for remains the same, and the whole focus is on getting more resources to execute them. (page 19)

John Kester has also criticized the quality of work in the JCS system on operational plans:

The plans prepared by the joint staff often have dismayed outsiders who had occasion to read them. No "canned" plan, of course, will perfectly fit a real-world situation. But too often it has been discovered when a crisis was at hand that the relevant JCS plans assumed away the hardest problems —by focusing, for example, only on a single contingency involving full-scale enemy invasion; or by assuming that military forces elsewhere would be unaffected and available; or by scheduling reinforcements either too rapidly for available transport or too slowly to arrive before the war was over. Sometimes plans have offered presidents few options between "do nothing" or "shoot the works" by all-out commitment of forces. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 12)

In his report, *National Security Policy Integration*, Philip Odeen cited one instance in which a Secretary of Defense found available contingency plans inadequate. According to Mr. Odeen, after the 1969 shoot down of a U.S. EC-121 aircraft by North Korea:

. . . Secretary Laird directed the OSD staff to assess selected JCS contingency plans because of his dissatisfaction with the contingency options available when the crisis occurred. (page 38)

Many of the professional military officers who provided comments to the Chairman's Special Study Group were critical of the

limited OJCS emphasis on contingency plans and the planning process itself. For example, some Service Chiefs believe that:

Organizational changes within the Joint Staff to improve responsiveness and effectiveness are needed, with particular emphasis on improved war planning. (page 29)

Some operational commanders held a similar view:

There needs to be more emphasis on war planning in the Joint Staff. Moreover, the process used to develop military operation plans takes too long. (page 33)

There are three basic causes of insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans: (1) contingency plans are not central concerns of the Services and the Service Chiefs; (2) inadequate guidance from the civilian leadership to set the framework for contingency plans; and (3) inadequate quality of the OJCS staff. As the previous quotations suggest, the contingency planning process may also be deficient. It was not possible within the scope of this study to validate problems within this process.

a. Absence of Service Interest

The Chairman's Special Study Group summarizes JCS tasks as follows:

The basic tasks of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are these: (1) to develop and present Joint military advice to the Secretary and the President on a wide variety of issues involving military strategy, objectives, plans, and programs; (2) to guide the development, by the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands (the CINCs), of military operation plans for U.S. forces operating jointly and in combination with allied forces; and (3) to support and oversee the execution of those plans by the CINCs, as the agent of the Commander in Chief. (page 2)

By far, the greatest Service interest is in the first task because of its impact on the allocation of resources. Given the mission of the Services to equip, man, train, and supply combat forces, their attention is focused almost exclusively on resources. Naturally, this becomes the greatest interest of the Service Chief. As was previously noted, this is one of the reasons that Service Chiefs do not delegate Service responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs. Given the limited time that a Service Chief can devote to his JCS duties, it is understandable why contingency plans do not receive adequate attention.

The third JCS task —execution of contingency plans —receives considerable attention during a crisis. Each Service Chief wants to ensure that his Service gets "a piece of the action" and appropriate recognition of its capabilities and contributions.

The second task —the actual development of contingency plans —is very low on Service priorities. It, therefore, receives limited attention.

b. Inadequate Civilian Guidance

Given that only the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have access to contingency plans, there is no mechanism for providing civilian guidance to be used in developing contingency plans. Regarding contingency plans, the Steadman Report states:

...present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas. (page 43)

Only once has the civilian leadership attempted to provide formal guidance for contingency plans. In 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown issued a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning (PGCP). According to Ambassador Komer, this document was:

...designed to provide broad policy guidelines and assumptions consonant with national policy and SecDef's own defense guidance. ("Strategymaking in DoD", page 18)

The absence of civilian guidance has forced military officers to develop their own assumptions and guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans. John Kester notes this situation:

...the drafting of plans is done by officers in the joint staff who often can find little specific direction in the department's general policy and program documents. They have in the past received little guidance from senior military officers, and usually none from the civilians in the Department of Defense. (page 16)

The Commanders in Chief (CINC's) of the operational commands also reflected this fact in their comments to the Chairman's Special Study Group:

The CINCs sometimes get fuzzy guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCs recognize that JCS guidance must be based on OSD guidance that may itself tend to lack certain specifics; but it is virtually impossible for a military commander to deal with a military mission that depends on guidance objectives such as 'deter', or 'dissuade'. (page 34)

The absence of civilian guidance clearly undermines the entire contingency planning process and may encourage senior military officials, including the Service Chiefs, to devote limited time to it.

#### c. Inadequate Quality of the OJCS Staff

The inadequate quality of the OJCS staff has been previously discussed. This deficiency is mentioned here because OJCS staff officers seldom have the credentials to be effective joint planners.

### E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Throughout the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —a period spanning over 40 years —there have been at least 20 major studies and proposals on the organization of the U.S. military establishment, all of which have recommended some changes in the JCS. In addition, a host of individual studies and proposals for reform have originated from scholars and retired military officers. Few of these countless proposals and recommendations have been taken seriously, and an even smaller number have actually been adopted. The JCS remains substantially the same institution that was first established formally in 1947. The few changes that have occurred —such as those instituted in 1958 and 1984 —did not alter the fundamental nature of the institution.

In this section, possible solutions to problem areas of the JCS system are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

#### 1. PROBLEM AREA #1—INADEQUATE UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

Proposals to correct this problem area can be grouped into three categories: (1) remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice; (2) enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman; and (3) make other changes to enhance the prospects for useful and timely unified military advice. Within these three categories, a total of 12 options have been developed.

a. remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

The dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs have proven to be a major impediment to the formulation of useful and timely unified military advice. Accordingly, options to eliminate the inherent conflict of interest of these dual responsibilities are worthy of careful consideration. Should a proposal to remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice be adopted, it may be necessary to ensure that Service representation on the Defense Resources Board be made a permanent feature of that decision-making council.

◦ Option 1A —establish a Joint Military Advisory Council

This option proposes the replacement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Joint Military Advisory Council. This council would have the same responsibilities as are now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in section 141 of title 10, United States Code. Under this option, however, the Service Chiefs would no longer have responsibilities for providing unified military advice. Instead, they would dedicate all their time to serving as the military leaders of their Services.

The JCS Chairman would become the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council. In addition to the Chairman, the council would consist of a 4-star military officer from each Service. These officers should have had substantial joint experience, preferably having served a tour as a commander of a unified or specified command. Service on the Joint Military Advisory Council would be the final tour of duty for all members. To provide the necessary continuity, one of the members of the council would be designated as the Deputy Chairman. The Chairman and his Deputy would be from different Service pairs: one would be from the Army or Air Force and the other from the Navy or Marine Corps.

Proposals to create a military advisory council are not new. General Omar N. Bradley, USA, then JCS Chairman, recommended in 1952 the creation of a National Military Council consisting of military elder statesmen from each of the Services. In his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, published in 1959, General Maxwell D. Taylor,

USA (Retired) recommended the establishment of a Supreme Military Council, consisting of a 4-star officer from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (page 176) In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services during December 1982, General Taylor reiterated this recommendation, calling for the formation of a National Military Council. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 33) The 1960 Symington Report recommended the establishment of "a group of senior officers from all Services to be known as the Military Advisory Council." (page 13) More recently, the Steadman Report carefully examined the option of establishing a body of National Military Advisers. In 1982, General Meyer, USA, recommended the formation of a National Military Advisory Council.

◦ Option 1B —establish a Chief of the Joint Staff

This option envisions the disestablishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the redesignation of the JCS Chairman as the Chief of the Joint Staff. The Chief of the Joint Staff would serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. He would be assisted in these duties by the Joint Staff which would be responsible to him alone. In addition, a 4-star military officer from a different pair of Services than the Chief of the Joint Staff would serve as a Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.

Proposals to create such a position have been put forth under a number of different titles: (1) Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Collins Plan in 1945); (2) Chief of Staff, National Command Authority (General Taylor); and (3) Chief of Combined Military Staff (Secretary Brown). Despite these different titles, all of these proposals would make a single officer the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

b. enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman

The second category of options to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice is actions to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 has already made a number of changes to title 10, United States Code, that will serve to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. These changes were:

- the JCS Chairman is to act as the spokesman of the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements;
- the JCS Chairman is to determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided; and
- the JCS Chairman is to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff.

While these changes do provide some increase in the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, they are insufficient, by themselves, to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice. Accordingly, additional options to strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman are presented in this subsection.

Beyond options presented in this subsection to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, there are options presented in other portions of this study that would potentially have this effect. These include: (1) the JCS Chairman's role in the chain of command which is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified

and specified commands; and (2) the JCS Chairman's influence over officer promotions and assignments which are addressed in the following subsection dealing with the problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff.

- Option 1C —designate the JCS Chairman as a statutory member of the National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) has four statutory members: the President, Vice President, and Secretaries of State and Defense. Like the Director of Central Intelligence, the JCS Chairman serves as an advisor to the NSC. In that capacity, he attends NSC meetings at the invitation of the President. Appointing the JCS Chairman to full statutory NSC membership would be designed to (1) enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman; and (2) ensure that military advice is directly provided to the NSC.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983 (H.R. 3718), passed by the House of Representatives during the 98th Congress, included a provision that would make the JCS Chairman a statutory NSC member. The rationale for this provision in the report accompanying H.R. 3718 is:

This measure is intended to ensure that joint military advice, the corporate advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the individual advice of the chairman, receives a full hearing before national security issues are decided. (page 8)

- Option 1D —authorize the JCS Chairman to provide the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense with military advice in his own right

At present, the JCS Chairman lacks statutory authority to formally present his own views on military issues. He can speak for the JCS when they agree; however, in the case of disagreement, he must present the various views of the Service Chiefs. The JCS Chairman does privately convey his own views when requested by higher authority. By formally recognizing what is now informally done, this option seeks to encourage the JCS Chairman to spend less time accommodating the views of the individual Services and more time developing his own views.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman would be able to state his own views independent of the JCS corporate position or the views of the Service Chiefs. If the JCS Chairman is to enjoy more influence, it is important that he be specifically authorized to develop and advance his own views.

- Option 1E —authorize the JCS Chairman to independently manage the Joint Staff

Section 143(c) of title 10 provides:

...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and its Director, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under this provision, the Joint Staff reports to the corporate JCS and not to the JCS Chairman.

This option would alter this reporting relationship. The Chairman would be given authority to bypass the Service Chiefs and

direct the Joint Staff to prepare position papers independent of any Service perspective. The Joint Staff would work only for the Chairman and would be responsible only to him in preparing papers in support of the joint perspective presumably embodied in his person.

- Option 1F —establish the position of Deputy JCS Chairman

Currently, the JCS Chairman is the only senior civilian or military official in DoD without a deputy. This option would create a four-star billet for a Deputy or Vice JCS Chairman who would assume the authority of the Chairman whenever he was out of Washington (which is quite often). This would give the Chairman an additional ally within the JCS who was independent of any Service, and it would enable him to sustain greater continuity and control in integrating Service policies. Most proposals for a Deputy JCS Chairman assume that he would be sixth in order of protocol behind the JCS Chairman and the Service Chiefs, though an even more forceful arrangement would be to make him the second-ranking U.S. military officer.

Under this option, the JCS Chairman and the Deputy JCS Chairman would be military officers from different Service pairs. For example, if the JCS Chairman were an Army or Air Force officer, the Deputy Chairman would be from the Navy or Marine Corps.

- Option 1G —authorize a 5-star grade for the position of JCS Chairman

Section 142(c) of title 10, United States Code, provides in part:

While holding office, the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] outranks all other officers of the armed forces.

There is no confusion about this statutory provision.

Despite clarity concerning his order of rank, the JCS Chairman has limited authority, power, and influence. This option would seek to enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman by making him the only 5-star officer in the U.S. Armed Forces during peacetime.

- c. make other changes to enhance the prospects for useful and timely unified military advice

While the most forceful options to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice involve (1) removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified advice or (2) enhancing the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, there are a number of other changes that could be made to improve the performance of the JCS system. One of these options (Option 1I) would be relevant only if the Service Chiefs remained part of the JCS system. The other four options would be appropriate regardless of whatever fundamental changes are made to the JCS system.

- Option 1H —lessen the pressures for unanimity in JCS advice

The JCS labor to produce a unanimous position on issues that they address. This may result from the requirement that the JCS Chairman inform the Secretary of Defense "of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed." (section 142(b) of title 10) Alternatively, the JCS may be responding to internal pressures based upon their view that a unanimous position will carry more weight with higher authority. Whatever the case, the JCS do

a disservice to senior civilian decision-makers when they fail to present the full range of relevant, alternative courses of action.

The pressures for unanimity could be lessened by amending title 10, United States Code, to specify that one of the responsibilities of the JCS is to inform higher authority of all legitimate alternatives. The JCS system is an advisory, not a decision-making system. When the JCS offer only one recommendation to higher authority, they, in essence, become the decision-makers. This option would amend title 10 to ensure that the JCS remains an advisory body.

- Option 1I —remove barriers to effective interactions with the JCS system, especially for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

DoD Directive 5100.1 "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," specifies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense." (page 4) In implementing this function, DoD Directive 5158.1, "Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense", assigns the following responsibilities:

C. To insure that planning and operations will be of the highest order:

1. All elements of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall cooperate fully and effectively with appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In all stages of important staff studies, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall avail itself of the views and special skills in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As a normal procedure, specialized data necessary for the preparation of such studies will be obtained from or through the appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2. The Directors of the various Directorates of the Joint Staff shall maintain active liaison with appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This shall include, but not be limited to, the exchange of information, interchange of technical advice, and guidance for mutual benefit. The heads of offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall maintain similar liaison and make representatives available to meet formally or informally with appropriate members of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\* \* \* \* \*

F. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall have the authority and responsibility for:

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Arranging for the provision of military advice to all offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (pages 2-4)

DoD Directive 5158.1 envisions a close, cooperative relationship between OJCS and OSD. This relationship has failed to develop. OJCS has, for the most part, traditionally viewed OSD as an adversary, and has held the Secretary's civilian staff at arms' length. This is due, at least in part, to the closed staff characteristics of the JCS system. However, the major cause of these poor relations is the JCS view of their independence from OSD. The *Report of the*

*Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* comments on this different JCS perception of their role:

...A fundamental problem in an earlier period, no longer as severe but still quite apparent, pertains to the view that the JCS hold of themselves vis-a-vis OSD. They have tended to conceive of their role to the Secretary of Defense quite differently from the rest of OSD charged with advising the Secretary of Defense on other aspects of defense policy. The JCS still seem to assume an autonomy and to view the relationship to the Secretary of Defense as one of separateness compared with other OSD agencies. They have always made a point of setting themselves apart from the rest of OSD. They stress their legal obligation to be independent military advisors, and imply that this stance is not compatible with total subordination to OSD. They feel, in short, more of an independent agency than the rest of OSD. It took many years for the JCS to begin to accept the obligation that they should basically serve the Secretary of Defense, are responsive to his interests and concerns, and should provide him with advice and analysis that is specifically relevant to his needs and his wishes. The advice they have offered has often been designed primarily to serve their interests rather than his. (Appendix N, page 8)

In his paper, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," John G. Kester notes the same attitude in the JCS system:

...Many in the joint staff probably still see the JCS as a semi-autonomous fiefdom rather than an integral part of the defense bureaucracy. Agencies outside the Department of Defense often seem to view the JCS the same way. (page 7)

To preserve this autonomy, the JCS have continually fought to maintain a status independent of OSD. Paul Hammond's discussion of this effort is noted in Chapter 3. Kester also notes this JCS objective:

...In 1958 the JCS successfully averted a plan to include language in a DoD directive which would have described the JCS as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," footnote, page 7)

As previously noted in this report, the JCS system is much more open now than during World War II and the immediate post-war period. However, the JCS system has retained too much of a "closed staff" character to effectively fulfill its role as the Secretary of Defense's "military staff". As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted in 1982:

...In short, the JCS and the Joint Staff could be much more the 'military staff' of the Secretary than they are now. (page 12)

The concern is not focused on the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS system. The Secretary can through perseverance break down barriers between himself and the JCS system. The real problem arises from the relatively limited interaction between OJCS and OSD. The dialogue between the Secretary's

military and civilian staffs is insufficient to be able to effectively serve the Secretary of Defense.

This option proposes that barriers to effective OJCS —OSD interactions be removed. Actions to achieve this objective could include:

- specifying in statute the desired relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and between OJCS and OSD;
- making OJCS part of OSD;
- requiring a greater degree of cooperation and coordination between various Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Directors of Joint Staff functional areas;
- increasing the use of OJCS —OSD working groups;
- removing physical barriers, such as the restricted access to OJCS work areas, that impede OJCS —OSD staff interactions; the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* criticized restricted access to JCS areas in the following terms:

The JCS, by restricting access to all their space, have tended to inhibit the interchange that should take place between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (pages 178 and 179)

- providing for increased OSD oversight and review of the output of the Joint Operation Planning System; and
- increasing the flow of information between OJCS and OSD.
- Option 1J —strengthen the requirement for joint experience for promotion to Service Chief of Staff

As previously noted, the Service Chiefs have dual responsibilities: military leaders of their Services and JCS members. In selecting Service Chiefs, too much emphasis has been placed on their credentials for the former role and too little for the latter role. The Service Chiefs have been prepared by their careers to lead their Services. Their level of experience on joint matters is too limited to justify their assumption of responsibilities as JCS members.

This option proposes that a specified level of joint experience be established as an absolute requirement for promotion to Service Chief of Staff.

- Option 1K —authorize the JCS Chairman to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff

Many studies of DoD organization have concluded that changes to OJCS staffing procedures would improve the effectiveness of the JCS system. Suggested changes include:

- require that joint papers be authored by Joint Staff action officers (Chairman's Special Study Group);
- provide more guidance from senior OJCS levels prior to formal staffing (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);
- require that joint papers be organized to present alternatives (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);
- require the Joint Staff to merely include differing Service views in joint papers rather than requiring coordination (Steadman Report); and

- reduce Service staff involvement in joint papers to providing information and advice and then only at the request of the Joint Staff (Chairman's Special Study Group).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman be given authority to specify the OJCS staff procedures. He would be able to implement any of the above suggestions or alternative approaches that would enhance the quality, utility, and objectivity of OJCS staff work.

This option would be a logical extension of Option 1E which proposes that the JCS Chairman be authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff.

- Option 1L —substantially reduce the Service staffs who work on joint matters

The Chairman's Special Study Group indicates that there are at least 675 officers assigned to Service staffs whose principal or part-time responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in joint activities. (page 45) This is nearly equal to the number of military officers serving in OJCS. The Chairman's Special Study Group comments on this situation:

...Counting the Service staffs, there are really five staffs engaged in Joint activities in support of the Chiefs, not one. Much of the work they do is redundant, with the several staffs analyzing the same issues in parallel....The Service Chiefs depend on their own Service staffs to prepare them for JCS meetings. They are seldom briefed by officers on the Joint Staff, and have relatively little interaction with them. (page 58)

Elsewhere in the same report, Joint Staff members made the following statement:

...The Chiefs get most of their preparation on Joint issues from their own Service staffs, which hardly grants them a Joint orientation. (page 35)

This option proposes that the Service staff who may work full or part time on joint matters would be limited to not more than 25 military officers for each Service. This option has three objectives: (1) free the OJCS staff from the substantial Service constraints that currently inhibit consideration of the joint perspective; (2) eliminate the redundancy in OJCS and Service staff work; and (3) force the Service Chiefs to rely primarily on the OJCS staff on joint matters. The last objective is in line with one of the recommendations of the Chairman's Special Study Group:

Require the Joint Staff to brief, interact with, and prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings, and to support the Chiefs generally in the resolution of the Joint issues they address. (page 68)

If either Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council) or Option 1B (Chief of the Joint Staff) were implemented, substantially reducing the Service staffs who work on joint matters would be an automatic extension of these options.

## 2. PROBLEM AREA #2—INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 made a number of changes to title 10, United States Code, which were designed to help improve the quality of the Joint Staff:

- the JCS Chairman is to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff;
- the restrictions on the tenure of the Director of the Joint Staff and his reassignment to the Joint Staff in peacetime were removed;
- the Secretary of Defense was required to ensure that military promotion, retention, and assignment policies give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff;
- the 3-year limitation on service on the Joint Staff was increased to 4 years; and
- officers may be reassigned to the Joint Staff after 2 years instead of 3 years, and the Secretary of Defense is authorized to approve exceptions to this limitation.

While these changes do provide the potential to improve the quality of the Joint Staff, they are insufficient, by themselves, to provide the desired quality of Joint Staff officers. Accordingly, additional options to attain this objective are presented in this subsection. Moreover, these additional options have been broadened, where appropriate, to address the entire OJCS staff in some cases and the entire joint duty community in others.

Options to improve the quality of the OJCS staff and other joint duty staffs can be grouped into three categories: (1) change promotion policies to increase interest in OJCS and other joint assignments; (2) improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments; and (3) provide for improved personnel management of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments. Within these categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

a. change promotion policies to increase interest in joint assignments

Three options involving promotion policies have been developed. The first option is designed to protect officers assigned to OJCS duty in future promotions and assignments. The other two options are designed to provide promotion incentives for joint assignments and, thereby, raise the quality of officers assigned to joint duties.

- Option 2A —give the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotion and assignment of officers who are serving or have served in OJCS

As long as the Services retain absolute control over the promotions and assignments of those officers who are serving or have served in OJCS, such officers will have strong incentives to comply with their parent Services' positions in their joint work.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman have a representative on all promotion boards that would review candidates with prior or current OJCS service. In addition, the OJCS would establish procedures for monitoring assignments of officers with OJCS

experience. Should the JCS Chairman find that an officer's assignments have been negatively influenced by his joint duty, he should seek to have this situation corrected by the Service Chief. Failing in such an effort, the Chairman should be authorized to bring the issue to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 2B —strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank

DoD Directive 1320.5, "Assignment to Duty with Joint, Combined, Allied and Office of the Secretary of Defense Staffs", provides:

...a requirement is established that all officers... will serve a normal tour of duty with a Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD Staff before being considered qualified for promotion to general or flag officer rank. (page 1)

This directive does provide for a waiver of this requirement, subject to approval of the appropriate Service Secretary.

The current Directive is widely circumvented by liberal waivers and by the broadest possible interpretation of what constitutes joint service. This loophole could be closed either by legislation or by directive of the Secretary of Defense (the latter clearly being preferable).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman specify the assignments that will meet the requirement for Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD staff duty. Furthermore, this option would grant authority only to the Secretary of Defense to waive this requirement upon the recommendation of a Service Secretary.

- Option 2C —require the JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions on the basis of their performance in joint duty assignments

H.R. 3718, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983, included this option as one of its provisions. H.R. 3718 would require the JCS Chairman to submit such evaluations to the President. The rationale for such a requirement is presented in the report (H.R. Report No. 98-382) accompanying H.R. 3718:

Because the demands and complexity of Joint Staff work require talented and dedicated officers, the committee is convinced that performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards. (page 8)

b. improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments

The House Committee on Armed Services Report 98-691 accompanying the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1985 requested a DoD report (with supporting studies by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on alternatives to improve the capabilities of joint duty officers. This reporting requirement and the report of the Chairman's Special Study Group in April 1982 have increased attention on the issue of the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments.

In his December 24, 1984 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense forwarding the JCS supporting study to fulfill the congressional reporting requirement, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, states that considerable progress has been made since April 1982 in improving the capabilities of joint-duty officers. He cites the following:

An annual 8-week CAPSTONE course for newly selected general/flag officers was implemented in 1983. [The CAPSTONE curriculum is designed to enhance understanding of key factors and issues influencing the planning for and employment of U.S. military forces in joint and combined operations.]. A joint policy document on PME [Professional Military Education] recently developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff focuses on objectives and policies for NDU [National Defense University] and the Service schools. The document provides guidance and objectives for all officer education programs at the primary, intermediate, senior, and general and flag officer level. Goals for the use of Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) graduates have been established effective CY [Calendar Year] 1985. Assignment of AFSC graduates to joint-duty billets has increased steadily from 36 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1984. A Joint Staff Officers Training System currently under development will provide computer-based instruction in 25 topic areas for officers assigned to the Joint Staff. This course will be exportable to the unified commands and other joint activities. Inter-Service education and exchange programs have experienced modest growth in recent years. During the coming year, the Services will explore the feasibility of establishing a joint skill identifier for officers with joint-duty education and training or experience, of expanding their inter-Service education programs, and of adding a second general and flag officer CAPSTONE course each year.

These developments will help to improve the preparation and experience levels of joint duty officers. By themselves, these developments will provide only modest improvements. Accordingly, five options for expanding this trend are presented. The first involves increased cross-Service assignments for military officers. The second proposes the development of a personnel management system to ensure that the graduates of joint colleges actually serve in joint duty assignments. The third option would authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation. The fourth and fifth options involve the creation of a joint duty career path.

- o Option 2D —increase the number of cross-Service assignments of military officers

The Chairman's Special Study Group recommended this option:

In another step designed to reflect greater awareness of Joint needs, a program should be established for increasing the frequency of cross-Service assignments aimed at improving the awareness within each Service of the characteristics, traditions, capabilities, and problems of the other Services. (page 70)

This option would be designed to give military officers a broader vision than just that of their own Service. This would clearly be of value in preparing officers for joint duty. At the same time, cross-Service experience would also be useful in Service assignments.

The following table shows the current number of cross-Service assignments of military officers.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF INTER-SERVICE EXCHANGES <sup>a</sup>

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Army .....		11	6	1	18
Navy .....	11		35	5	51
Air Force.....	6	34		6	46
Marine Corps .....	1	5	6		12
Total .....	18	50	47	12	127

<sup>a</sup> Source is a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated December 24, 1984, subject: "Study on Improving the Capabilities of Joint-Duty Officers", page F-2.

- Option 2E —establish a personnel management system to ensure that joint college graduates actually serve in joint duty assignments

Currently, there is no personnel management system that ensures that graduates of the three joint colleges of the National Defense University (NDU) —the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), National War College (NWC), and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) —actually serve in joint duty assignments. As these colleges are to be the source of education for joint duty, their utility is diminished if graduates do not enter joint assignments.

Data on assignments of AFSC graduates show the following percentages of officers initially assigned joint duty positions:

1982 .....	36 percent
1983 .....	40 percent
1984 .....	63 percent

This substantial increase is attributed to the attention placed on this issue by the Chairman's Special Study Group. On May 11, 1984, the JCS established a goal of 50 percent of AFSC graduates to receive first assignments in joint duty positions. This goal is to be applied to graduating classes beginning in 1985. In addition, the JCS have encouraged the Services to achieve a goal by 1990 of assigning 75 percent of AFSC graduates to joint duty.

The increase of AFSC graduates assigned to joint duty is not as the above figures indicate. In making these calculations, the definition of joint duty includes in-Service positions that have a "joint interface." For example, in 1984, the Navy met the goal of assigning 50 percent of AFSC graduates to joint duty; however, half of these assignments were joint interface billets within the Department of the Navy. (Letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 14) As the following table shows, only 37 percent of AFSC graduates in 1984 received non-Service, joint assignments.

While progress has been made with respect to AFSC graduates, the issue of assignments of graduates of the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) have not been addressed. For 1984, only 17 percent of NWC and 15 percent of ICAF graduates were assigned to joint duty immediately following completion of their education. The following table shows the percentage of NDU graduates in 1984 who received various joint and Service assignments.

### ASSIGNMENTS OF NDU GRADUATES IN 1984 <sup>a, b</sup>

[In percent]

	OJCS	Unified or combined command	Defense activity	Outside DoD	Service
NWC .....	6	3	6	2	83
ICAF .....	1	3	6	4	85
AFSC .....	5	18	14	( <sup>c</sup> )	63

<sup>a</sup> Does not include civilians, Reserve establishment officers, or Regular officers without an assignment at the time the data were prepared.

<sup>b</sup> Source is letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 15.

<sup>c</sup> Less than one percent.

Based upon this situation, Secretary Weinberger has directed that the following actions be taken:

1. Strengthen their policy on assignment of NDU graduates;
2. The basic policy will:
  - a. Cover all NDU schools;
  - b. Encourage the Services to plan the selection of students based on the best estimate of joint requirements;
  - c. Include the idea that the first assignment consideration for a graduate should be joint duty;
  - d. Not count in-Service assignments as equivalent to a joint tour for reporting purposes;
  - e. Recognize that it is important to assign NDU graduates to key billets within their own Military Service;
  - f. Eliminate the percentage goal and substitute a goal of increasing the number of officers going to joint and inter-governmental activities;
  - g. Require the Services to emphasize the assignment of former NDU graduates to joint activities regardless of whether the officers were previously assigned to a joint activity;
  - h. Include an adequate system to report information on the first assignment of officers graduating from NDU. (Letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 16)

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman would establish a personnel management system to implement Secretary Weinberger's policy decisions which are designed to ensure that the full benefit of education at all three joint colleges is realized. While this

management system would focus on initial assignments, it should also provide a formal procedure for monitoring subsequent assignments of NDU graduates.

- Option 2F —authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation

In the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, the length of possible tours of service on the Joint Staff by military officers was increased from 3 years to 4 years. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense be authorized to extend the tours of Joint Staff officers beyond 4 years. The objectives of this option would be to retain military officers who have substantial joint duty experience and improve continuity within the Joint Staff.

- Option 2G —establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group recommended the establishment in each Service of a joint duty career specialty open to selected officers in the grade of O-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) and above. Such officers would be nominated by the Service Chiefs and approved by the Chairman, both for selection in the specialty and for later assignments to joint duty positions. (page 69) This recommendation was endorsed in the CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*. (page 15)

Appendix E of the Chairman's Special Study Group describes this option in detail. Appropriate portions of that appendix are presented here:

...Service officers at the O-4, O-5, or even higher level, evidencing a talent and desire for Joint Staff work, would apply for assignment to the Joint-duty specialty. Upon acceptance, their assignments, education, and career patterns would be steered by their Service personnel management systems toward Joint duty, though from time to time they would be assigned to field positions in their parent Services to maintain currency.

Not all Joint positions would be filled by such officers. Officers not in the career specialty would continue to serve on the Joint Staff and in the Unified Command headquarters as they do now. The mix would be decided by the Chairman and the Chiefs. If 50% of the officer positions in Joint headquarters eventually were filled by officers in the new specialty, about 2,300 positions would be involved at any given time. If, in turn, officers in the specialty spent about half of their time in Joint assignments, a group of about 5,000 officers in the specialty would be needed in a steady-state situation.

...While this initiative can properly be viewed by the Services as incremental in an organization sense since it would be phased over a period of years, it would be a fundamental change for officers actually selected. The personnel management implications would be far-reaching. Grade structure, career patterns, promotion opportunities, and a host of other issues would have to be planned with care. A personnel management office in the Joint Staff (a true "J-1") would be

needed to work with the Services in handling position management and personnel support. The Chairman would need to have a role in selecting the officers and in helping to assure that officers in the Joint-duty specialty (including those of flag rank) received their fair share of promotions and key assignments. An important step in this regard would be to appoint a senior officer from a Joint headquarters to sit on each Service promotion board involving the selection of officers to the rank of 0-5 or above, and to furnish each such promotion board with clear guidance concerning the need for fair treatment of officers in the Joint-duty specialty. Officers would have to have evidence that if they excelled in the Joint-duty specialty they would have at least as good an opportunity to be promoted as their contemporaries, and indeed could aspire to four-star rank.

Training for the Joint-duty specialty would begin at the Armed Forces Staff College. Its curriculum is designed to provide such training for officers at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels. There is now no systematic means for assuring that AFSC graduates ever get to Joint duty assignments. That would be changed to be consistent with the development of the career field.<sup>1</sup>

Formal training would continue for selected officers at the 0-5 and Junior 0-6 level at either the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As with the AFSC, priority would be placed on making sure that NWC and ICAF graduates actually serve in Joint duty, and that officers destined for Joint duty, if selected for senior service college, are sent to NWC or ICAF.

The schools themselves would give greater emphasis to preparing officers for Joint duty. The NWC would emphasize preparation for Joint and combined planning and operations. Likewise, the ICAF would emphasize Joint planning and management of mobilization and deployment. Both schools would limit their emphasis on generalized studies of the politico-military environment and instead concentrate on preparing officers for near-term Joint assignments. Because so few officers have professional familiarity with their sister Services, assuring that officers on the Joint Staff and in other Joint headquarters have a broader comprehension of the nation's Armed Services would be an important objective for NDU.

A high percentage of the graduates of the Joint schools would be assigned to Joint duties, either immediately upon graduation or in an early subsequent tour. While the Services would find personnel management difficulties in meeting such goals, there are two important facts to bear in mind: First, effective Joint duty is vital to the nation's security interests, and so the preparation of officers so assigned should be taken as seriously as, say, pilot training; second, because it costs from \$25,000 to \$75,000 or more to send an officer through AFSC (5-month course) or NDU (10-month course), these schools should

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<sup>1</sup> Consideration might be given to revision of the AFSC curriculum to aim it at slightly more senior officers in order to make it possible for an officer in the Joint-duty specialty to attend *both* the command and general staff college (or equivalent) of his parent Service and the AFSC.

not be treated simply as alternatives to their Service “equivalent” schools. These are Joint schools; they are costly, and they have little justification if not so used. This is not to say that some graduates should not be assigned to Service staff positions, only that a plan should be developed that explicitly responds to the needs of the Joint community. (pages E-2 through E-5)

- Option 2H —establish a General Staff in place of the current Joint Staff

Section 143(d) of title 10, United States Code, provides in part:

The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.

A longstanding American aversion to the concept of a General Staff led to the enactment of the above prohibition as part of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. While American hostility to the General Staff concept pre-dated World War II, it intensified considerably during the war and the immediate postwar period. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. Army employed a General Staff concept beginning in 1903. The Army’s General Staff was authorized by the Congress in the General Staff Act of 1903.

Despite this hostility, a number of former DoD officials have recently spoken out either in favor of a General Staff or in efforts to clarify misconceptions about this staff concept. Among them are two former Secretaries of Defense, Dr. Harold Brown and Dr. James R. Schlesinger. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary Schlesinger sought to counter the American antipathy to the General Staff concept:

...At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff —reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime propaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler’s regime. Moreover, the issue was quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled only Germany’s ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era. (Part 5, pages 186 and 187)

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) defines a General Staff as follows in his book, *A Genius for War*:

A General Staff is a highly trained, carefully selected group of military generalists whose function in peace or war is to assist the nation’s military leadership —or a general commanding a field force of combined arms elements —in planning, controlling, directing, coordinating, and supervising the activities of all military subordinate elements in the most effective possible, mutually supporting efforts to achieve an assigned goal or objective, or in maximum readiness to under-

take such efforts. The leader or leadership makes decisions and gives commands; the General Staff's responsibility is to provide all possible support to assure that the decisions and commands are timely, sound, and effective. (page 48)

This option proposes a General Staff concept with the following elements:

- a General Staff would be created in place of the current Joint Staff and would perform the same duties;
- the General Staff would be drawn from all of the Services with selection to be made at the 0-3 (Captain or Navy Lieutenant) or 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) level;
- candidates for the General Staff would be nominated by the Service Chiefs, but would be selected by the JCS Chairman after a rigorous screening process;
- once selected, an officer would remain a member of the General Staff for the remainder of his or her career;
- the General Staff would be responsible to the JCS Chairman alone;
- the JCS Chairman, under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, would have responsibility for promotions of General Staff officers;
- General Staff officers would rotate between General Staff positions and assignments with field forces of their parent Services to maintain currency;
- the National Defense University would revise the curricula of its three joint colleges to better meet the educational needs of the General Staff; and
- General Staff officers would be eligible for selection for major joint commands such as commander of a unified or specified command.

Individual supporters of a General Staff system would undoubtedly disagree with some of these elements. Some would go further, advocating a far-reaching overhaul of the military academies and other training programs, as well as earlier selection of General Staff officers. Others might not go as far. The common thread of unity in all General Staff proposals is that an elite group of officers whose career path is divorced from any one Service should be established so that it can execute critical staff functions with greater objectivity and independence.

It would be useful to briefly compare Option 2G (Joint Duty Specialty) and Option 2H (General Staff), both of which involve the creation of a joint duty career path. There are only two fundamental differences: (1) promotion authority over officers in the joint duty career path; and (2) the extent to which the Joint Staff or General Staff would be comprised of joint duty careerists. Option 2G would retain promotion authority in the parent Services while providing the JCS Chairman with some input on promotions. In contrast, Option 2H would place promotion authority in the hands of JCS Chairman.

On the second difference, Option 2G proposes that only 50 percent of Joint Staff officers would be joint duty careerists. Under

Option 2H, all officers serving on the General Staff would be dedicated to joint duty careers.

c. provide for improved personnel management of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments

Two options have been developed in this category. The first deals only with OJCS. It proposes that the distinction between the Joint Staff and other military officers serving in OJCS be eliminated in order to provide for improved personnel management. The second option would authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.

- Option 2I —remove the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers and eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff

The distinction between the 400 military officers serving on the Joint Staff and the 350 military officers serving elsewhere in OJCS inhibits effective personnel management. It would be more useful to eliminate this artificial distinction and manage all OJCS military officers under the same policies.

Section 143(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, specifies:

There is under the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Staff consisting of not more than 400 officers selected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff is a part of the larger office, entitled Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), that works for the JCS. There is no statutory restriction on the size of OJCS which had an authorized strength of 1,444 military and civilian personnel at the end of 1983.

The adjustable personnel framework provided by OJCS alleviates the management problems caused by the limit of 400 officers on the size of the Joint Staff. Nonetheless, removing the artificial constraint on the Joint Staff would provide the JCS greater flexibility in organizing and tasking the entire staff which works for them.

This option proposes that the statutory restrictions on the size of the Joint Staff be eliminated. Removing this limit was one of the provisions of the legislative proposal submitted by DoD. The forwarding letter for this proposal dated April 18, 1983 provides the following rationale:

...In the context of a continuously increasing workload, greater demands for sophisticated military planning, and the organization of our combatant forces into unified and specified commands, arbitrary numerical limitations are no longer appropriate. In the case of the Joint Staff, as well as other assignments to duty, the goal should be the wisest use of military manpower among competing requirements, with due recognition to the increasingly joint utilization of personnel in the combatant commands.

Should this option be enacted, there would be no reason to retain the distinction between the Joint Staff and OJCS. Accordingly, all personnel working for the JCS would comprise the Joint Staff. As such, all provisions enacted as part of the DoD Authorization Act,

1985 referring to the Joint Staff would apply to what has been previously termed the OJCS staff.

- Option 2J —authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty

The problems for military officers caused by joint duty assignments are similar regardless of the specific joint organization in which they serve. Previous discussions of these problems as well as proposed solutions have focused on the Joint Staff which is clearly the most visible of all joint duty assignments. The Joint Staff, however, represents less than 5 percent of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman be authorized to manage all military officers assigned to joint duty. This would cover the roughly 9,000 officers who are serving in non-Service positions. Most of these assignments are in joint military organizations (OJCS, unified command headquarters, NATO commands). However, positions in various civilian organizations —OSD and the Defense Agencies —would also be involved. In this latter case, the JCS Chairman would act as executive agent for the Secretary of Defense.

In administering this personnel management system, the JCS Chairman would have the major influence on (1) selection of officers; (2) promotions and assignments; (3) education and training; (4) tour lengths; and (5) reassignment to joint duty. He would be expected to maintain close liaison with the unified commanders to ensure that their personnel requirements were being met. In addition, it would be logical for the JCS Chairman to play a more forceful role in managing the three joint colleges of the National Defense University.

### 3. PROBLEM AREA #3—INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

Many of the options proposed to solve the first two OJCS problem areas may indirectly ameliorate this third problem area. If Service dominance of the JCS system were lessened, important joint tasks, such as review and oversight of contingency plans, may receive more attention. Likewise, improving the quality of the OJCS staff would increase the likelihood that officers with strong joint planning credentials would be assigned to work on contingency plans.

Two specific options for correcting the problem of insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans have been developed. The first option proposes the annual preparation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning. The second option suggests the development of a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans.

- Option 3A —require that the Secretary of Defense annually promulgate a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning

This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense annually provide guidance to the JCS and operational commanders to be used as the basis for contingency planning. This guidance should in-

clude: (1) crisis situations for which plans must be prepared; (2) domestic and international political constraints; (3) other planning assumptions; (4) broad policy guidance including a clear statement of U.S. interests; and (5) an indication of the range of options that should be developed. This document could be modeled on the Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning issued by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in 1980.

- Option 3B —develop a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans

In the Fall of 1978, DoD conducted an exercise of a major war plan for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This exercise, entitled *Nifty Nugget*, was highly beneficial. The *National Security Policy Integration* study discusses the benefits of *Nifty Nugget*:

...The exercise brought to light a number of flaws in the plans and planning process as well as weaknesses in our capability to carry out the plans. The result has been beneficial for both planning and program/budgeting. (page 35)

This option proposes that a continuing series of these major exercises be conducted. The objectives of this option would be to: (1) evaluate the quality of various contingency plans; (2) identify deficiencies in the plans; and (3) increase the level of interest in the contingency planning process.

## F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

Prior to evaluating specific options, it may be useful to put the institution of the JCS into context. The report of the Chairman's Special Study Group begins with the following quote from the introduction to *Common Sense* written by Thomas Paine:

A long habit of not thinking a thing *wrong* gives it a superficial appearance of being *right*, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom.

As the Chairman's Special Study Group implied, this situation clearly applies to the JCS. As John Kester has noted: "The JCS are a product of history, not of logic." ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 23) Despite this fact, there has been great reluctance and strong opposition to questioning the logic of the JCS institution.

The performance of the JCS in both war and peace clearly support a careful analysis of the institution. For example, in *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond, writing in 1961, concludes:

...From the vantage point of a decade and a half after the end of World War II the question can be a considerably more limited one: does its record in that war justify the confidence