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CHAPTER 5

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the unified and specified commands which were established to control operations whenever military forces are employed. Commanders of the unified and specified commands report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. These commands and their Service components represent one of the two distinct organizational levels of the Department of Defense: the operational level. The other is the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations.

Unified and specified commands are, by definition, those with a broad and continuing mission. Unified commands have forces assigned from two or more Services; specified commands consist of forces from a single Service. Today, there are six unified commands and three specified commands in existence:

Unified Commands:

- U.S. Atlantic Command (Norfolk, Virginia)
- U.S. Central Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida)
- U.S. European Command (Stuttgart, Germany)
- U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)
- U.S. Readiness Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida)
- U.S. Southern Command (Quarry Heights, Panama)

Specified Commands:

- Aerospace Defense Command (Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado)
- Military Airlift Command (Scott Air Force Base, Illinois)
- Strategic Air Command (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska)

In addition, on November 20, 1984, President Reagan approved the establishment of a seventh unified command: the U.S. Space Command. This new command is to be formally established on September 23, 1985.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the unified and specified command system as it has evolved since World War II and to see, in the context of the overall DoD organization, if this system best serves U.S. national security interests. For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this chapter the unified and specified commands will be referred to as "operational commands". Likewise, the unified and specified commanders will be referred to as "operational commanders." In certain quotes, however, the operational commanders will be referred to as "CINC's", an abbreviation for Commanders in Chief.

B. EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

1. Prior to World War II

Prior to World War II, the War Department and the Navy Department existed as essentially independent entities and rarely did Army and Navy units operate together. When they did so, command arrangements were *ad hoc*. Concerns about the lack of interservice relations first arose during the Spanish-American War when the Army and Navy failed to cooperate fully during the Cuban campaign. In fact, the interservice disputes were so great that the Army Commander refused to allow the Navy representative to sign the formal surrender document. As a result of these problems, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed a common order which created the Joint Army and Navy Board, whose charge was to address "all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services." The Joint Army and Navy Board continued to handle interservice matters until the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1942.

In due time, one product of the work of the Joint Army and Navy Board became the agreements documented in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" (JAAN). The version of JAAN in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 described "mutual cooperation," not unified command, as the favored method in joint operations.

2. World War II

World War II, with its numerous theaters, multiple-Service operations, and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, proved that "mutual cooperation" between the Services was no longer adequate. General George C. Marshall, USA realized early in World War II that the complexity of modern warfare demanded unified command:

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater —air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this. (Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, 1948, page 455)

The disastrous failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941 dictated that in each theater the operational forces of two or more Services be placed under the command of a single individual. Thus, during World War II, the first continuing multi-service commands were created. The newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff designated from among their members an "executive agent" for each of these operational commands.

3. The National Security Act of 1947

While the JCS had decided during World War II that unified command would continue to be employed in peacetime, public and congressional opinion, influenced by the findings of the Pearl Harbor investigation that laid blame for that disaster in large part on divided command, would accept no other arrangement. The

Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, released in 1946, stated:

It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster that the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed. (page 245)

By World War II's end, the concept of unified command was accepted as sound in theory and practice. As a result, the National Security Act of 1947 provided for unified command and assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, for establishing "unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security."

There was, however, no change in the executive agent arrangement in 1947. Thus, in the years after World War II, the pre-World War II idea that the Military Department that raised and supported the forces also employed the forces was perpetuated. This is an important aspect of the organizational history of the operational commands, because this approach still finds expression in the attitudes and actions of many Service personnel.

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In 1953, President Eisenhower by Executive Order revised the executive agent concept to provide that the Military Department rather than a Service Chief would serve as executive agent for each unified command. In his April 30, 1953 message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, President Eisenhower explained and justified this change as follows:

. . . Under this new arrangement the channel of responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a military department. This arrangement will fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 152)

5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

In 1958, as part of the Reorganization Act, a fundamental change in the operational commands took place. President Eisenhower, in proposing the legislative revisions to the National Security Act of 1947, stated:

. . . separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. (Message to the Con-

gress, April 3, 1958, *The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 175)

To implement this thesis, President Eisenhower proposed that the operational commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Military Departments and the Service Chiefs were eliminated from the chain of command, and the executive agent arrangement was ended. This was accomplished in the 1958 Reorganization Act and remains in force today.

Specifically, Section 2 of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 declared that it was national policy "...to provide for the establishment of unified and specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands..." Later in the same Act (Section 202(j)), the authority for the President to establish operational commands is set forth with some specificity:

(j) With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. Such combat commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. Forces assigned to such unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands shall be under the full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command or the commander of the specified combatant command. All forces not so assigned remain for all purposes in their respective departments. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense. Forces assigned to such unified or specified combatant commands shall be transferred therefrom only by authority of and under procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President.

Essentially, this same provision has been codified as section 124 of title 10, United States Code, and remains the basis for the current operational command structure.

C. KEY TRENDS

1. Changes in the Operational Command Structure

a. Original Operational Commands

The original operational commands were essentially those in place at the end of World War II. The first peacetime "unified com-

mand" to be established, U.S. Forces, European Theater was created when General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was dissolved on July 14, 1945. The basic charter of the original seven unified commands and two specified commands was the Unified Command Plan prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President Truman on December 14, 1946.

Under this plan, the following commands were to be established; the date that each command was actually established is shown.

Unified Commands

- Far East Command (U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas Islands, and the Bonins) —January 1, 1947
- Pacific Command —January 1, 1947
- Alaskan Command —January 1, 1947
- European Command (In effect, the European Command (EUCOM) was only a new title for U.S. Forces, European Theater which had existed since July 1945. While nominally a unified command, EUCOM was almost wholly of Army composition.) —March 15, 1947
- Atlantic Fleet (The Atlantic Fleet was made a command on November 1, 1947, but one month later the Atlantic Command was established.)
- Caribbean Command —November 1, 1947
- Northeast Command (forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland) —October 1, 1950

Specified Commands

- Strategic Air Command —December 14, 1946
- U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) —November 1, 1947

The Strategic Air Command became the first example of what was later designated a specified command, though the term did not come into use until 1951.

b. Changes in the 1950's and 1960's

There was relatively little change in the operational command structure in the two decades following the creation of the original peacetime commands. There were only two major changes: establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command and U.S. Strike Command as unified commands. The changes during this 20-year period were:

- in 1951, U.S. Air Forces, Europe was established as a specified command;
- in 1952, the U.S. European Command became a full-fledged unified command;
- in 1954, the Continental Air Defense Command was established as a joint command and made a unified command in 1958;
- in 1956, U.S. Air Forces, Europe was disestablished as a specified command;
- in 1956, the Northeast Command was disestablished;

- in 1957, the Far East Command was disestablished and its forces were placed under the Pacific Command;
- in 1961, the U.S. Strike Command was established as a unified command;
- in 1963, the Caribbean Command was redesignated the U.S. Southern Command; and
- in 1963, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean was disestablished as a specified command and served only as U.S. Naval Forces, Europe under the European Command.

c. Changes in the 1970's and 1980's

There have been only six changes to the operational commands since 1970:

- in 1971, the U.S. Strike Command was renamed the U.S. Readiness Command;
- in 1975, the Alaskan Command was disestablished;
- in 1975, the U.S. Continental Air Defense Command was designated a specified command and renamed the Aerospace Defense Command;
- in 1977, the Military Airlift Command was given the status of a specified command;
- in 1983, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was designated a unified command and renamed the U.S. Central Command; and
- in 1984, President Reagan approved the establishment of the U.S. Space Command.

d. Summary


Since 1945, there have been 11 different unified commands (including the U.S. Space Command) and five different specified commands. Between 1947 and 1950, the original seven unified commands were created. Four of these —European Command, Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and the Caribbean Command now entitled the Southern Command —remain in existence today. The other three initial commands (Far East Command, Northeast Command, and Alaskan Command) were incorporated respectively into the Pacific, Atlantic, and Readiness Commands. (The Alaskan Air Command also reports to the Aerospace Defense Command in connection with its air defense mission.) The Continental Air Defense Command was a unified command for 17 years beginning in 1958. Two new unified commands have been created and remain in existence today: the Readiness Command/Strike Command in 1961 and the Central Command in 1983. Presidential approval of the U.S. Space Command was given in 1984 and that command was formally established in September 1985.

Of the two initial specified commands, only the Strategic Air Command remains. The other, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was incorporated into the European Command as was U.S. Air Forces, Europe which was a specified command for 5 years. Two new specified commands have been created and remain in existence today: the Aerospace Defense Command in 1975 (after its predecessor organization, Continental Air Defense Command, served as a unified command for 17 years) and the Military Airlift Command in 1977.

In general, the current operational command structure remains basically the one that emerged from World War II with some consolidation taking place and with new commands added to meet emerging requirements. Chart 5-1 shows the history of these changes.

Chart 5-1

CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE



2. Broadening of the Missions of the Operational Commands

The operational commands were formed at a time when security threats to the United States were clear and few in number. The international security environment has become much more complex since 1947 due to the buildup and growing reach of Soviet military power, a proliferation of threats to Western interests, and a diffusion of power and influence in the world. These trends have made today's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests—which in themselves have grown considerably—exceedingly more complex and demanding than in the immediate postwar period. As a result, the operational commands have experienced a substantial broadening of their missions. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier summarize this trend in their paper, "Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System":

Today, however, neither the objectives nor the threat can be so clear and so direct; therefore, a unified commander must maintain both the flexibility and the capability to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum. (page 5)

In today's world, the missions of the operational command encompass a wide spectrum, from emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals to the launching of nuclear weapons. This broadening of missions is a trend of considerable significance in the examination of (1) the adequacy of the operational command structure and (2) the organization and command arrangements of the operational commands. Changes in the international security environment that have led to a broadening of operational command missions are briefly described below.

a. Widening Geographic Extent of the U.S.-Soviet Military Competition

The growth of Soviet military power is the most ominous trend in the international security environment that faces the United States. During the past two decades, the military dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power have shifted adversely for the United States.

The geographic scope of challenges to U.S. and Western security interests has expanded substantially over the past decade, due in part to the growing reach of Soviet military power. The competition for power and influence between the United States and the Soviet Union has become truly global in nature. A new boldness and adventurism in Soviet policy toward the Third World has resulted in the proliferation of threats to U.S. interests in distant world areas which are outside the traditional system of Western alliances. In addition, while the improved ability of Soviet forces to operate in non-contiguous areas heightens the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations, more immediate threats to U.S. interests have risen from the aggressive behavior of Soviet clients such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya.

b. Proliferation of Threats to Western Interests

The proliferation of relatively inexpensive, highly destructive, and effective weapons to Third World countries has increased the likelihood and intensity of regional conflicts. Given modern tech-

nologies, states involved in regional rivalries and terrorist groups may find it easier to use force. Such relatively low intensity conflicts as the war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war may be the most likely future challenge to U.S. military forces.

For a variety of reasons, the Third World is increasing its purchases of sophisticated military equipment and, in the process, is becoming more heavily and lethally armed. This spread of military technology means that the United States may face increasingly effective military threats from a variety of Third World sources.

Economic issues have always played an important role in a nation's security policy. The trend over the past decade toward increased economic interdependence leaves national economies more vulnerable to the workings of the international economy. Short of costly neo-mercantilist strategies, this increasing economic interdependence will continue to make the free flow of raw materials and trade of significant importance to the Western World.

c. Diffusion of Power and Influence in the World

Against a backdrop of rising militarism, increasing instability, and economic interdependence, the past 20 years have witnessed a significant diffusion of political, military, and economic power and influence in the world. This diffusion has contributed to an overall weakening of the international order.

The gradual weakening of the political cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance is one example of this process; another very different example is the growing signs of serious political strains and popular discontent in the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In the past 20 years, the world's economic order has also changed. Most notable in this regard has been the new economic strength of oil-rich nations and the influence that they have over the world's economy.

Adding to the diffusion of power has been the rise in the political influence and military strength of a growing number of regional powers including India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. Within their immediate areas, these regional powers can exert considerable influence on regional policies and actions at the expense of the superpowers and other leading nations.

An increase in nationalism in Third World countries has also served to lessen traditional influences. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, which tragically found expression in the revolution in Iran, has produced another force which often conflicts with Western interests.

In general terms, given this diffusion of power and influence, the traditional instruments of power, force, and economic inducements have become more costly and difficult for great powers, particularly democratic ones, to apply. The increased complexity of world politics has reduced the potential of any one country to exercise control over the whole system.

3. Effect of Improved Communications Capabilities on Command and Control Centralization

The original postwar concept for the unified commands envisioned decentralized execution of joint military operations. However, improvements in communications capabilities have, in recent

years, enabled the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense) to effectively control forward deployed military forces.

Improved communications have led to operational centralization that was not anticipated at the time that the unified command concept was developed. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier comment on this trend:

. . . the unified command has become the conduit for centralized ad hoc control from Washington over even the most minute aspect of tactical execution. ("Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System", page 6)

They cite the experience of various crises in the mid-1970's — Arab-Israeli War (1973), Mayaguez incident (1975), Korean tree cutting incident (1976), Lebanon evacuation (1977), and the Ethiopian evacuation (1977) —as corroboration of this conclusion. The most well-known instance of centralized control from Washington occurred after Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier had written their paper: the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980. The disastrous failure of this operation focused attention on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations.

Another aspect of centralized control has been the occasional circumvention of portions of the military chain of command in the field. In certain crises, the National Command Authority has not made use of the intermediate echelons which are part of institutional command arrangements. The Steadman Report noted this occurrence:

. . . communications capabilities have improved to a point where it now is possible for a remote decisionmaker to talk directly to an on-scene commander. Thus, it is relatively easy to by-pass the military chain of command. (page 28)

Judgments on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations and on the circumvention of portions of the military chain of command will not be made here. It is sufficient to note that improved communications capabilities have shifted much of the initiative from the operational commands to Washington and has, therefore, often altered the role of the most senior elements of the operational commands.

4. Crisis Management Requirements

Of the key trends affecting the operational commands, perhaps the most significant is the emergence of a genuine requirement for increased presidential control in efforts to manage certain crises, primarily those with the potential for superpower confrontation. In today's international security environment, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union possess substantial nuclear arsenals and in which the two superpowers are locked in competition either directly or indirectly in numerous world areas, the need to manage and terminate confrontations before they escalate to war has become increasingly important. As a result, the tension between competing military and political—diplomatic considerations during crises has been considerably heightened in the last 30 years.

In his paper, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Alexander L. George discusses the requirement for presidential control during crises:

That an in-built tension exists between political—diplomatic and military considerations in efforts to manage crises and, similarly, in efforts to keep limited conflicts from escalating has long been recognized. This problem was forced upon the consciousness of American leaders and strategic analysts during the course of the Korean War and quickly led to recognition of the necessity for maintaining presidential control and asserting political constraints on both the strategy and, often, the tactical operations of a theatre commander. The Korean War taught not only President Truman but all succeeding administrations as well that the president's responsibility does not stop with establishing the political objectives to be pursued in a conflict; he must also maintain firm control over the level of costs and risks that are acceptable in pursuing those objectives. To this end the president must be willing to intervene on a timely basis in the determination of operational military plans and in aspects of their implementation. This, in turn, raises the danger of 'micro-management' of crises and adds to the dilemmas of crisis management. (*Survival*, Volume 26, September/October 1984, page 224)

George also argues that one of the major lessons of the Cuban missile crisis was that

. . . the requirements for prudent crisis management may indeed seriously conflict with and, in the interest of avoiding war, may have to be given priority over some of the standard requirements of conventional military strategy. (page 223)

Essentially, the United States must seek to manage certain crises with a political-military strategy which differs in important respects from conventional military strategy.

Conventional military strategy focuses upon making the most efficient use of available military forces to achieve assigned military objectives. In contrast, a political-military, or coercive diplomatic, strategy seeks to achieve political objectives and uses some mix and sequencing of persuasion, coercive threats or actions, accommodative offers, and concessions. In his paper, George describes a coercive diplomatic strategy as follows:

. . . Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent to do something instead of bludgeoning him into doing so. Coercive diplomatic strategy focuses upon the task of affecting the opponent's *will* and his *utility calculations* rather than negating his military capabilities....Relying upon a combination of persuasion, accommodation, and coercion, diplomatic strategy offers the possibility of achieving one's objectives economically, with little bloodshed, fewer psychological and political costs, and often with much less risk of escalation. (page 225)

While the need for a coercive diplomatic strategy and presidential control of its formulation and implementation is undeniable especially in crises involving, either directly or indirectly, the United

States and the Soviet Union, this requirement is little understood and often criticized when employed by the President. The criticisms focus upon the constraints that a coercive diplomatic strategy places upon execution of a conventional military strategy. In addition, there is also criticism—which is sometimes valid—of micro-management of tactical operations by the National Command Authority. While these criticisms may have some validity, the overwhelming evidence supports the need for increased presidential control in managing crises that involve the superpowers.

Criticisms of increased presidential control during the nuclear era—whether associated with conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere need to be placed in a historical context. Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, first published in 1832, clearly indicates that "harmful political influence on the management of war" has been a contentious issue throughout modern history. Clausewitz found little logic in these criticisms of political influence.

Clausewitz's view of war as an instrument of policy are reflected in the following:

...war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.

...war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.

...The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. (*On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, page 605)

...If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. (page 606)

Complementing these fundamental concepts, Clausewitz presents his views on political considerations in the conduct of war:

Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle. (page 606)

...We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for *purely military* opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for *purely military advice*. But it makes even less sense for theoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely military plans for a war or a campaign. It is in any case a matter of common experience that despite the great variety and development of modern war its major lines are still laid down by governments; in other words, if we are to be technical about it, by a purely political and not a military body.

This is as it should be. No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence

on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong. (pages 607–608)

Clausewitz's views —written more than 150 years ago —appear to be focused on refuting criticisms of political influences on war that have been frequently and strongly voiced in the last 30 years. *On War* gives an important historical context to the current debate.

Although many of the issues associated with the effective exercise of this control by the President are beyond the scope of this study, the extent to which the unified commands are structured and prepared to effectively respond to current crisis management requirements is not. The major question which emerges is: has the unified command system, developed primarily in the late 1940's, adapted effectively to meet today's crisis management requirements? Subsequent portions of this chapter attempt to answer this question.

D. THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

As mentioned previously, there are ten U.S.-only operational commands in existence today. Due to its brief existence, the U.S. Space Command is not included in this discussion. Figure 5-1 is an unclassified representation of the current geographic boundaries of the nine U.S. commands. (The precise geographic boundaries found in the Unified Command Plan are classified.) In addition, the United States participates in four multinational operational commands.

1. Unified Commands

a. U.S. European Command

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is commanded by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (USCINCEUR). General Rogers also commands the multinational command, Allied Command, Europe, with headquarters in Mons, Belgium. If a war were fought in Europe, the forces of all allied nations would be commanded by General Rogers as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); the U.S. force contribution would come from USEUCOM. As USCINCEUR, General Rogers has three Service component commands that report to him: U.S. Naval Forces, Europe; U.S. Army, Europe; and U.S. Air Forces, Europe. Chart 5-2 shows the command relationships for the U.S. European Command and the NATO responsibilities of these commands.

FIGURE 5-1

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP)



Chart 5-2

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US EUROPEAN COMMAND




Chart 5-3

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US SOUTHERN COMMAND





Chart 5-4

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US READINESS COMMAND



b. U.S. Southern Command

General John R. Galvin, USA (USCINCSOUTH) commands the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) which is responsible for all of Central and South America except for Mexico which is not assigned to any of the operational commands. Responsibility for the water areas adjacent to USSOUTHCOM is assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command. Among USSOUTHCOM's missions is defense of the Panama Canal. USSOUTHCOM, headquartered at Quarry Heights, Republic of Panama, has three subordinate Service component commands as shown in Chart 5-3.

c. U.S. Readiness Command

The U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) has no specific area of the world as its responsibility. USREDCOM today is responsible for managing mobilization and deployment of reinforcements to overseas commands, developing joint doctrine, and conducting joint exercises. USCINCRED, General Fred K. Mahaffey, USA, is "double hatted" as the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). USREDCOM and JDA are headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. USREDCOM has Army and Air Force component commands as shown in Chart 5-4.

d. U.S. Central Command

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was formally established in January 1983. This command is a direct response to President Carter's Southwest Asia doctrine, enunciated in his State of the Union Address in January 1980:


Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

With headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, USCENTCOM, commanded by General Robert C. Kingston, USA (USCINCCENT), has responsibility for Southwest Asia and those African nations bordering on the Red Sea and comprising generally the Horn of Africa. USCENTCOM grew out of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) established by President Carter in reaction to the policy put forth in his State of the Union address. The RDJTF was originally subordinate to USREDCOM. The former USCINCRED, General Volney Warner, USA, took exception to the decision to establish the new Central Command arguing that if USCENTCOM were established, USREDCOM should be disestablished. General Warner elected to retire to express his disagreement with the decision.

The command relationships of USCINCCENT and his three Service component commands are shown in Chart 5-5.

Chart 5-5

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US CENTRAL COMMAND



• USCINCENT MAY BE FROM ANY SERVICE

e. U.S. Atlantic Command

The U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) is predominately a naval command that exercises operational command of the Atlantic Ocean and contiguous land areas. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN (USCINCLANT) has three sub-unified commands reporting to him: U.S. Forces, Caribbean; Icelandic Defense Forces; and U.S. Forces, Azores. In addition to serving as USCINCLANT, Admiral McDonald also serves as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO command. Previously, USCINCLANT had also occupied a third position: commander of his Navy component command. However, during October 1985, another 4-star admiral will be assigned to perform the duties of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT).

In addition to his Navy component command, USCINCLANT has Army and Air Force component commands. The current command relationships of the U.S. Atlantic Command are shown in Chart 5-6.

The U.S. military action in Grenada in October 1983 was undertaken through the unified command structure with USCINCLANT exercising control of the operation.

f. U.S. Pacific Command

Similar to the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is predominately a naval command that exercises operational command of the Pacific Ocean and contiguous land areas. Admiral Ronald J. Hays, USN (USCINCPAC) has two sub-unified commands: U.S. Forces, Japan and U.S. Forces, Korea. During the Vietnam War, USPACOM had a third sub-unified command: the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

In addition to his sub-unified commands, USCINCPAC has three Service component commands reporting to him. These command relationships are shown in Chart 5-7.

Chart 5-7

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US PACIFIC COMMAND




Chart 5-8

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND




Chart 5-9





Chart 5-10



2. Specified Commands

a. Strategic Air Command

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is the oldest specified command. General Larry D. Welch, USAF (CINCSAC) commands the Air Force's strategic missile and bomber forces and exercises control over the targeting of the Navy's strategic submarine forces from his headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. As Chart 5-8 shows, SAC has three major subordinate Air Force organizations.

b. Aerospace Defense Command

The Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), established as the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954, is responsible for air defense of the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. Headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado with sensitive command and control equipment housed in nearby Cheyenne Mountain, ADCOM is commanded by General Robert T. Herres, USAF (CINCADCOM). CONAD was a joint command from 1954 until 1958 and a true unified command from 1958 until 1975 with Army and Navy components contributing to the air defense mission. CINCADCOM also doubles as CINC NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), an allied air defense command which combines the air defense capabilities of the United States and Canada.

The command relationships of ADCOM are shown in Chart 5-9.

c. Military Airlift Command

The remaining specified command is the Military Airlift Command (MAC) with headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and commanded by General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (CINCMAC). This command has operational control of all of the Air Force's airlift aircraft. As Chart 5-10 shows, MAC has five subordinate Air Force organizations.

3. Multinational Commands

The United States also participates in four multinational operational commands. Each of these four commands is commanded by a U.S. officer. In two cases, the U.S. officer also commands a U.S. unified command. In another, the U.S. officer also commands a U.S. specified command. In the last case, the U.S. officer also commands a sub-unified command. Each of these multinational operational commands has their own multinational chain of command as shown on Charts 5-2, 5-6, 5-7, and 5-9.

a. Allied Command, Europe

Allied Command, Europe (ACE) is commanded by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, whose title is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). General Rogers also commands the U.S. European Command.

b. Allied Command, Atlantic

Allied Command, Atlantic is commanded by Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN, whose title is Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Admiral McDonald also commands the U.S. Atlantic Command.

c. North American Aerospace Defense Command

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) consists of U.S. and Canadian air forces. It is commanded by General Robert T. Herres, USAF, whose title is Commander in Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD). General Herres also commands the U.S. Aerospace Defense Command, a U.S. specified command.

d. ROK/US Combined Forces Command

The ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea is commanded by General William J. Livsey, USA, whose title is Commander in Chief, CFC (CINC, CFC). General Livsey is also Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, a sub-unified command of the U.S. Pacific Command. He also commands the United Nations Command and the U.S. Army component, Eighth U.S. Army, of his sub-unified command.

E. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

This examination of the unified and specified commands identified six broad problem areas, all of which apply to the unified commands, but only two of which apply to the specified commands. First, the chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the operational commanders is confused, which is a deficiency of major proportions. Second, the authority of the unified commanders over their Service components is weak. Third, there is an imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their ability to obtain the mix of resources that they need to fulfill their missions. The fourth problem area is the absence of unification below the level of the unified commander and his staff. Fifth, the Unified Command Plan does not receive an objective review. Last, there has been unnecessary micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the National Command Authority (President and Secretary of Defense) during crises.

When the second, third, and fourth problem areas listed above are considered in combination, the authority of the unified commanders can be seen to be extremely limited. They have weak authority over their components, limited influence over resources, and an inability to promote greater unification within their commands. These deficiencies are inherent in the organizational arrangements, established in 1948, for the unified commands. President Eisenhower noted these deficiencies in his message to the Congress on the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. He stated:

Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each Unified Commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command....Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency....I recommend, therefore, that present law, including certain restrictions relating to combatant functions, be so amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full unity of our commands and the full command over them by unified

commanders. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, pages 179-180)

The arrangements that President Eisenhower sought have never been implemented and the deficiencies persist. As the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* notes:

Despite the establishment of the unified command concept in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as requested by President Eisenhower, the relationship and relative authority between the Unified Commander and the component commander, and between the component commander and his Military Department, remain substantially unchanged.

The net result is an organizational structure in which "unification" of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive. (page 50)

1. CONFUSED CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS

There is considerable confusion over the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational chain of command. As a result, the appropriate relationships between the operational commanders and those above them in the chain of command are very uncertain. There are two basic causes of this confusion: unclear statutes relating to the role of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command and an ambiguous DoD directive relating to the role of the JCS. The chain of command is further confused by the *de facto* influence that individual Service Chiefs retain over the operational commands. This influence is not the result of formal responsibilities assigned by statute or DoD directive, but is derived from the substantial dependence of the operational commanders on the Service Chiefs for resources and for subsequent career assignments. In many aspects, because of the continuing influence of the Service Chiefs, the executive agent arrangement for operational commands persists despite its termination in 1958. This *de facto* influence of the Service Chiefs has been identified as a third cause of the confused chain of command.

a. Lack of Statutory Clarity on the Role of the Secretary of Defense.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the operational military chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands who are "responsible to the President and the Secretary [of Defense] for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary [of Defense] with the approval of the President." (Section 124(c)(1) of title 10)

While the statutes have been consistently interpreted as placing the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command, the statutes are not clear. For example, nowhere in the statutes is the Secretary of Defense given the authority "to command". In addition, the statutes are silent on the question of who actually commands the operational commanders.

In his study on *Military Command Authority: Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory Bases*, Peter P. Wallace discusses the

statutory ambiguity of the Secretary of Defense's command authority:

One could construct several reasonable arguments that the Secretary has this authority by implication. For example one might argue that the command authority is included within the "authority, direction and control" of the Defense Department. Or that since all residuary powers were vested in the Secretary by the 1949 amendments, and the 1958 amendments specifically took the service secretaries out of the operational chain, the command authority now resides in the Secretary of Defense. Or lastly one might rely on the legislative history of the 1958 amendments which rather clearly indicates that the Congressional intent was to give the Secretary of Defense all the power to run that department that statute could confer, and hence an element so important as command must have been included therein. Yet, it is this very point that makes any attempt to derive command authority by implication so unper-
suasive. Command is so critically important that one really has difficulty believing that Congress or the nation could rest very comfortably leaving the command authority open to argument. But this seems to be precisely what has happened. (Pages 27-28)

b. Ambiguity of DoD Directive 5100.1

On December 31, 1958, Secretary of Defense McElroy created the greatest ambiguity in the chain of command by amending Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. This directive, entitled "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," was changed to provide: "The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and *through the Joint Chiefs of Staff* to the commanders of unified and specified commands." (emphasis added) This provision departed significantly from the precise statutory scheme concerning the combatant commands which did not include the JCS. The only elaboration that this ambiguous formula receives is in the directive's description of one of the functions of the JCS:

1. To serve as advisers and as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to unified and specified commands, to provide a channel of communications from the President and Secretary of Defense to unified and specified commands, and to coordinate all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the commanders of the unified or specified commands by other authority. (page 4)

The language of the directive could imply any of three roles for the JCS. First, they could merely be the instrumentality through which command is exercised, making no input of their own. This role, implied by the "channel of communications" language, would portray the JCS as merely the command voice of higher authority.

A second possibility is that the JCS would function more as a traditional military staff with the Secretary of Defense as the commander. This interpretation finds some support in the "advisers and military staff" language of the directive. This interpretation would seem to imply that the JCS would generate options and over-

see implementation of the Secretary's decisions, but the business of command would be conducted primarily between the Secretary and the operational commanders.

The third possibility is that the JCS would function as a full-fledged link in the chain of command. This role finds explicit support in the description of the chain of command. Under this interpretation, the JCS would not only generate but also choose and implement options; be the principal, if not exclusive, contact at the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders; and only involve the Secretary with problems that were beyond their capability to solve. The closed staff nature of the JCS system offers evidence that supports this third interpretation. If either the first or second interpretations reflected reality, it would be necessary for extensive interaction between the JCS system and the Secretary of Defense and his staff. This interaction is not possible due to the obstacles to communication resulting from the closed staff characteristics of the JCS system.

While all three possibilities seem plausible under the directive, the third interpretation seems to most closely describe reality. For example, Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN, then Chief of Naval Operations and later Chairman of the JCS, described the chain of command of the *Pueblo* during her seizure by North Korea on January 23, 1968 as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which the Chief of Naval Operations is the Navy member, *exercise command of all operating forces*. Thus in the case of *Pueblo*, the command chain ran up from CTF 96; to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who in turn report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces through the Secretary of Defense. (emphasis added)

Despite the tenuous basis for command authority provided by DoD Directive 5100.1, the JCS certainly seem to exercise it, at least on occasion.

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Retired), shares Admiral Moorer's view of the chain of command. In his book, *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect*, Admiral Sharp refers to the JCS as "military commanders" (page 33); indicates that while serving as CINCPAC, he was "under the direct authority of the JCS" (page 35); and presents a chart showing the JCS in the chain of command (page 38).

Further evidence of command authority being exercised by JCS members is presented in Graham T. Allison's book, *Essence of Decision — Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, concerning the naval blockade of Cuba:

Nevertheless, the President expressed concern that the Navy —already frustrated because of the leashing of its designed blockade —might blunder into an incident. Sensing the President's fears, McNamara decided to explore the organization's procedures and routines for making the first interception. Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy's inner sanctum, the Navy Flag Plot, McNamara put his questions

harshly. Precisely what would the Navy do when the first interception occurred? Anderson replied that he had outlined the procedures in the National Security Council meeting and that there was no need to discuss it further. Angered but still calm, McNamara began to lecture the admiral. According to Elie Abel's reconstruction of that lecture, McNamara firmly explained that:

The object of the operation was not to shoot Russians but to communicate a political message from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. The President wanted to avoid pushing Khrushchev to extremes. The blockade must be so conducted as to avoid humiliating the Russians; otherwise Khrushchev might react in a nuclear spasm. By the conventional rules, blockade was an act of war and the first Soviet ship that refused to submit to boarding and search risked being sent to the bottom. But this was a military action with a political objective. Khrushchev must somehow be persuaded to pull back, rather than be goaded into retaliation.

Sensing that Anderson was not moved by this logic, McNamara returned to the line of detailed questioning. Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. At that point the Navy man picked up the Manual of Naval Regulations and, waving it in McNamara's face, shouted, "It's all in there." To which McNamara replied, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done. I want to know what you are going to do now." The encounter ended on Anderson's remark: "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade." (pages 131-132)

A footnote to this portion of the book also proves interesting:

According to Abel, some witnesses say that Anderson "accused McNamara of 'undue interference in naval matters.'" The Admiral, thereafter Ambassador to Portugal, said that this was not his recollection, adding that he was brought up never to say such a thing even if he felt it. (page 309)

Not only does the confused chain of command hamper the ability of the Department of Defense to manage crises, it also poses a dilemma for the operational commanders in peacetime. The operational commanders may believe that the only forum available to them to raise joint Service issues is the JCS, which is often not a hospitable forum for doing so as noted in Chapter 4. Should they choose to exercise their statutory right to go to the Secretary of Defense, thus circumventing the JCS, they may feel that they would be undermining their own positions and jeopardizing their careers.

c. De Facto Influence of the Service Chiefs

Clearly, by law and regulation, the Service Chiefs are in the chain of command only as members of the JCS. As individual Serv-

ice Chiefs, they are accorded no role in the chain of command. In reality, however, they have substantial influence over the operational commanders. The forces of each operational command are dominated, or nearly so, by units of one of the Services. In each case, the operational commander is normally appointed from the Service with the dominant forces. The only exception to this rule is the U.S. Central Command where command alternates between the Army and Marine Corps. Given his substantial dependence on one Service for resources necessary to execute his missions, an operational commander can be greatly influenced by the Chief of Staff of that Service.

For example, it is highly unlikely that the Commanders of the U.S. Atlantic Command or the U.S. Pacific Command would take a potentially controversial action in peacetime without conferring with the Chief of Naval Operations. Likewise, the Commander of the U.S. European Command would probably seek, at least, the Army Chief of Staff's informal approval before taking any action affecting Army divisions forward deployed in Europe. Therefore, while the Chiefs of the respective Services are not formally in the chain of command as individuals, by virtue of the fact that they control the resources, they certainly are key participants in operational command matters.

2. WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

Within the unified commands, the chains of command vary. In four of the six commands, the unified commander deals only with Service component commands. In USLANTCOM and USPACOM, however, the unified commander deals not only with Service component commanders, but also with commanders of subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands. However, for the most part, all units below the unified commanders, including the sub-unified commands, are essentially single Service commands.

The authority of unified commanders over their Service component commands is weak. There are two basic causes of this problem: (1) restrictions placed upon the authority of unified commanders in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and (2) dependence of the Service component commands on their Services for resources.

a. Restrictions of UNAAF

The origins of today's UNAAF lie in the Key West Agreement of 1948. At that time, the abiding interest of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was to protect the integrity of their Service operations in the multi-Service operational commands. The particular device adopted to protect Service integrity was the "Service component command." The authorities of the Service component commander versus those of the unified commander, as spelled out in 1948, have survived essentially unchanged in today's UNAAF.

The language of limitation on the authority of the unified commander is pervasive in UNAAF. Key among examples of limitation is the following:

...Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commanders...or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service component commanders...Commanders of Service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of Service on matters which are the responsibilities of the Military Department and Services. (page 46)

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Retired) in his book, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, comments on the impact of the UNAAF's limitations on the unified commanders:

Service component commanders, supported by the Service staffs who largely retain the abiding concerns of the 1940s for protecting their Service's integrity and, supported by UNAAF, become powers with whom the multiservice commander conducts negotiations as equals more than as subordinates. (page 3-58)

The Conference Committee Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1985 (Report No. 98-1080) posed a number of questions to be answered by the six unified commanders. Answers were forwarded to the Senate Committee on Armed Services by Secretary Weinberger on March 5, 1985. Given the substantial evidence of UNAAF restrictions on the authority of the unified commands, one of the questions was:

Does UNAAF overly-restrict your authority over your Service component commanders?

Four of the unified commanders (Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCENT), Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH)) answered this question in the negative. In contrast, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) responded as follows:

JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), establishes the organization for unified commands. Although this organization is intended to optimize wartime employment of combat forces furnished by the Services, it does go to some length to protect the integrity of individual Service operations within multi-Service operational commands. In doing so, it places certain limits on the authority of the unified commander that could affect efficient operations (combat or otherwise).

Similarly, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCREC) stated:

UNAAF philosophically emphasizes Service vice joint matters and therefore, results in optimization of Service roles and missions. The results of Service organization, training, and equipping of their forces may not meet operational requirements of the CINC, a situation which is exacerbated by our strategic planning arrangements.

b. Dependence of the Service Component Commanders on Their Services for Resources

Concerning the logistical chain of command, UNAAF provides as follows:

The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of unified and specified commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. This chain embraces the preparation of military forces and their administration and support. (page 7)

The fact that the logistical chain of command runs around the unified commander greatly weakens his authority over his Service component commands. More specifically, Service component commanders have divided loyalties: while they must fight the battle for the unified commander, they must work through their Services to provide, train, and equip the forces in their component commands. Dependence of a component commander on resource allocations from his Service produces close ties to that Service and strong loyalties to the Service and its Chief of Staff. In addition, future promotions and assignments of component commanders are determined by the Service Chiefs and not by the unified commanders. Therefore, a unified commander must depend on subordinate commanders who in reality have more than one superior.

Moreover, Service component commanders have one great advantage over their unified commander, who is nominally their superior: they control Service resources in personnel and money. By comparison, the unified commander's resources are few. This makes it difficult for the unified commander to influence the development of the capabilities of the forces of his command.

Thus, while the unified commanders are the only military commanders who devote full time to "joint" command, they are sandwiched between powerful structures above and below that encourage single-Service perspectives over a multi-Service approach. As a result, unified commanders have no authority to override any strongly held, single-Service positions even if such is necessary in the interests of the multi-Service, unified command mission.

3. **IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCE DECISIONS**

The unified commanders have limited ability to influence the allocation of resources either to their commands or within their commands. From the perspective of the unified commanders, the resource allocation process is essentially executed by the Services. The unified commander must plan to accomplish his mission with resources provided by the Services through a process defended and

executed by the Services. In *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, General Cushman succinctly states this problem:

Responsible senior officers who are in the operational chain of command below the President and the Secretary of Defense, and who will be held accountable in the event of command and control failure, have not been given the means necessary to meet their responsibility and accountability. (page 1-21)

While General Cushman refers only to resources for the command and control function, the absence of influence by the unified commanders applies to all resources allocated to their commands.

The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 noted the limited influence of the unified commanders in the resource allocation process:

Today, the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands. They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process. In addition, they are not strongly supported by either the Services or the Joint Staff. (page 32)

The limited input of unified commanders in policy and resource allocation decisions is also addressed in the chapter dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that context, this limited input from the mission-oriented unified commanders reduces the integrating staff support readily available to the Secretary of Defense.

In the answers submitted to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the majority of the unified commanders held that there was an imbalance between their responsibilities and accountability and their influence over resource decisions. Only the Commander of the Central Command stated that such an imbalance did not exist while the Commanders of the Atlantic and Southern Commands state that Secretary Taft's new initiatives in the Defense Resources Board program review and Program Objective Memoranda (POM) development process should help redress previous imbalances. These initiatives are discussed in a subsequent portion of this section.

The three other unified commanders state:

Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command: Yes, there is an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander and my influence on resource decisions....The degree of effectiveness we have in readiness, sustainability, and transition to war is in substantial part, a matter of resources.

Commander in Chief of the European Command: On occasion the results of major Service decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. In some instances I have learned about Service initiatives, which ultimately impacted on PACOM's war fighting capabilities, after the fact during POM deliberations....In essence, some Service POM decisions altered or affected my strategy without adequate concern for PACOM's overall theater requirements.

Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command: There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource decision. . . . USCINRED has limited influence on resource allocations and limited control over operations funds, particularly crucial in the area of training.

Influence over resource decisions is not a problem for the specified commanders because their requirements are directly incorporated into the Air Force POM where they have direct influence. This fact was confirmed by the answers provided by the Commanders in Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Strategic Air Command to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985.

There are essentially four causes of the problem of the imbalance between the responsibilities and influence of the unified commanders.

a. Difficulty of the Unified Commanders to Influence the Policy-making Level of DoD

In order to influence the allocation of resources to his command and policies affecting his command, a unified commander must work through the Military Departments, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The geographic separation of the unified commanders from the policymaking level of DoD makes them dependent upon other officials to represent their views. They have had little success in obtaining adequate representation. As General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, expressed in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on November 3, 1983:

The cross-service or joint views have a smaller constituency and limited formality of expression in the current system. (Part 7, page 278)

The current Administration, recognizing the inadequacy of unified command representation in the Pentagon, has improved the situation by giving the operational commanders a direct voice in the policy and resource allocation processes. The operational commanders now formally participate in the PPBS process by appearing twice a year before the Defense Resources Board. While this bi-annual input from the operational commanders is a new dimension in the policy and resource allocation processes, it falls far short of providing the unified commanders with a substantial and continuing influence in the allocation of resources to their commands.

Recognizing this fact, Secretary Taft issued on November 14, 1984 a memorandum on "Enhancement of the CINCs' Role in the PPBS". Secretary Taft's memorandum directs the following actions:

- preparation by the operational commanders of their high priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints;
- direct communications between the operational commanders and the Military Departments to resolve problems and concerns during the development of Program Objective Memoranda (POM's);

- preparation of a separate annex for each POM which clearly identifies the requirements of the operational commanders as submitted, whether they were met in the POM with supporting rationale where such needs were not met; and
- permission for the operational commanders to independently raise issues during the Program Review Process of the Defense Resources Board.

These new procedures appear to be a promising step in providing the unified commanders with increased influence on resource decisions.

b. Inability of the JCS to Make Meaningful Programmatic Inputs

The unified commanders view the JCS as their principal contact in the policymaking level of DoD. However, at present, the JCS is an ineffective vehicle for representing the resource allocation needs of the unified commanders. The inability of the JCS to make meaningful programmatic inputs is discussed at length in Chapters 3 (OSD), 4 (OJCS), and 7 (PPBS) of this report.

c. Functional Organization of OSD

Circumventing the JCS through direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense poses substantial risks to unified commanders who are so dependent upon the Services for resources. Moreover, OSD, because of its functional organization, does not have an office that would be a natural ally of a unified commander on the full spectrum of his resource needs. Unified commanders would have to work closely with many functional offices in OSD to gain support for necessary resource allocations. In addition, OSD functional offices may not be attuned to the mission-oriented needs of the unified commanders.

d. Inability of Unified Commanders to Reallocate Resources

It is just as difficult for a unified commander to reallocate resources within his command. He cannot "trade off" between Services without going back through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. While a unified commander might prefer to acquire more ammunition for naval aviation forces and less for his ground forces because of a change in the tactical situation, he is not free to institute such an action within his command. So, most unified commands simply "make do" with the resources provided to them by the Services and plan to fight the next war with the resources that they have been given.

4. ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

In 1958, President Eisenhower stated the following rationale for unification in the operational commands:

If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. *Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.* (emphasis added)

Despite this rationale, peacetime preparatory activity and organizational arrangements within the unified commands have failed to conform to this fact.

Appendix A to this chapter presents six historical examples of organizational problems affecting U.S. military operations. The appendix presents two examples —the Spanish-American War and Pearl Harbor —from the period before the application of the concept of unified command. Four examples from the post-unified command period are presented: the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the *Pueblo*, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and the Grenada operation. Across this 85-year period, the deficiencies have remained remarkably consistent: inadequate inter-Service cooperation, lack of unity of command, and lack of unification at levels subordinate to the unified commander. Various points from the historical analyses of Appendix A are referred to in the main text of this chapter. The reader should refer to the appendix for a fuller presentation.

Unification in the unified commands stops at a very high level. Nearly all units below the unified commander are single Service because units of one Service are seldom subordinated to commanders of another Service. Accordingly, when forces from two Services are required to respond to an unanticipated situation, command by mutual cooperation —the basic U.S. military doctrine prior to World War II —remains the order of the day. It can be convincingly argued that the concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate post-war period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been implemented.

It should be noted that the degree of unification varies among the six unified commands. The existence of sub-unified commands within two of the unified commands has an impact on the relative degree of unification as do certain multinational command arrangements. The Commander in Chief of the European Command noted this fact in his answers to the questions in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985:

In my view there is sufficient unification of command in USEUCOM, especially as a result of the US/NATO dual command relations necessitated by the CINCEUR relationship to Allied Command Europe.

The absence of unification at levels below the unified commander and his staff is a problem because it substantially impedes efforts to prepare for and conduct effective, joint military operations in times of war. In other words, the absence of unification has resulted in limited mission integration at the operational level of DoD. More specifically, the single-Service status of organizations subordinate to the unified commanders results in the following deficiencies: it does not (1) provide for unity of command during crises; (2) promote joint thinking, planning, and coordination; and (3) facilitate efforts to improve the interoperability of forces from different Services.

Within the operational commands, there have been efforts, in the absence of greater unification, to improve the ability to take unified action during crises. Numerous mechanisms have been created for improving cooperation between forces of different Services. Moreover, there is a greater appreciation of the need for improved interservice cooperation.

The various operating mechanisms work well in exercises which are planned many months in advance and in resolving issues in which time permits a deliberate decision pattern. These operating mechanisms may even permit the effective execution of major operational plans that have been approved in advance by higher authority. However, these operating mechanisms have failed to be effective in unforeseen crises.

Local forces assigned to a unified commander have never been unified to the extent that they could effectively respond on a joint basis to an unexpected threat. The uncoordinated and slow reactions of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific during the seizure of the *Pueblo* may be the best example of this organizational failure. The poorly executed, although successful, incursion into Grenada is another example. Even more troubling is the inability of forces from separate Services to take effective unified action even when time permits joint planning and coordination. The disastrous Iranian hostage rescue mission is a key example of such inability.

In sum, the United States does not have major combatant commands that can provide effective unified action across the spectrum of military missions. The absence of unification at subordinate levels of the unified commands is a much more troubling problem now than in the immediate postwar period for two basic reasons.

First, during World War II, the military objectives were clear, and the unified commands were oriented to offensive, theater-wide warfighting. Since that time, the strategic environment has become increasingly more complex, as discussed in Section C of this chapter, which has greatly broadened the military missions assigned to unified commanders. Moreover, today, U.S. commanders are defending the *status quo*. While unified commands may be organized to conduct theater campaigns similar to those of World War II, it is evident that they are not organized to respond to lesser threats like the *Pueblo* seizure or the *Mayaguez* incident.

Second, two trends discussed in Section C—effect of improved communications capabilities on command and control centralization and crisis management requirements—have made unification at the subordinate levels of the unified commands of increased importance. The original rationale for unification at lower levels was to enable “a single commander to react tactically to a threat without awaiting guidance or decisions from Washington.” (*Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 1948) The need for and desirability of such a capability have diminished since this rationale was stated in 1948. However, the current arrangement of having effective unification only at the level of the unified commander and his staff poses another serious problem: in today’s environment, the unified commander and his staff are often not key players in military operations within their command. Improved communications have permitted and crisis management requirements have often caused the unified commander and his staff to be circumvented in crises. The chain of command has been shortened by having the National Command Authority deal directly with lower level commanders. In these instances, the absence of unification at lower levels can be a major shortcoming. In discussing crisis management requirements in Section C of this chapter, the following major question was posed: has the unified command system, developed primarily in the

late 1940's, adapted effectively to meet today's crisis management requirements? The answer appears to be no.

Despite substantial contrary evidence, many unified commanders believe that there is sufficient unification within their commands. In their answers to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, three of the unified commanders (USCINCLANT, USCINCENT, and USCINCEUR) clearly state that their commands are sufficiently unified. USCINCSOUTH's views on this issue are not precisely stated in his response. While noting some problems with the degree of unification, USCINCPAC states:

From my perspective the crucial question is not whether there is sufficient unification down to subordinate levels, but whether the unified commander has the requisite authority to ensure the readiness of his forces and, in times of crisis (or hostilities), to bring his subordinate commands together without undue disruption to conduct timely, imaginative and efficient operations.

Only USCINCREC fully agreed that there was a problem of insufficient unification:

Routinely, there is no unification below the unified command echelon. USREDCOM's components in "peacetime" are, in effect, independent entities in regard to unified action.... In this circumstance, the degree of operational unification in USREDCOM and between its components is decidedly insufficient.

There are two basic causes of the problem of insufficient unification within the unified commands: (1) the refusal of the Services to accept substantial unification within the unified commands, and (2) absence of agreement on appropriate command relationships, especially concerning the principle of unity of command.

a. Refusal of Services to Accept Substantial Unification within the Unified Commands

Despite the fact that the concept of placing the operational forces of two or more Services under a single commander was dictated by the disastrous failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. military establishment has seldom implemented that concept, even during wartime.

While the unified command concept worked well in the European theater during World War II, the Pacific theater was never unified under a single commander. Even the planned amphibious invasion of Japan could not bring the Army or Navy to accept a unified command arrangement: General MacArthur was to lead the land campaign, Admiral Nimitz was to be responsible for the sea battle, and General Arnold was to be responsible for the 20th Air Force with its very long-range B-29 bombers. In his recent book on the war in the Pacific, *Eagle Against the Sun*, Ronald H. Spector comments on the failure to unify the theater under a single commander:

Against all common sense, against the dictates of military doctrine, against the essence of Roosevelt's message to Churchill, the Pacific was divided into two theaters. (page 144)

Even when unified command was established, interservice cooperation was lacking. For example, in 1945, with World War II not yet ended, a JCS Special Committee observed that:

...even in areas where unity of command has been established, complete integration of effort has not yet been achieved because we are still struggling with inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies and duplications which exist in all theaters of operations.

Similarly, in Vietnam, a complex and fragmented structure was created to control U.S. forces in and around Vietnam. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was a sub-unified commander who commanded forces within South Vietnam, but his authority ended at the borders of South Vietnam. Other forces participating in the conflict reported to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), or to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC). This arrangement hardly provided for unified direction of the conflict. Again, Service considerations played the major role in the formulation of this ineffective command arrangement.

In his book, *The 25-Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) is highly critical of U.S. command arrangements in Vietnam:

The final major principle I will mention is *unity of command* (vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to obtain unity of effort toward a common goal). It did not exist with respect to U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. (page 193)

Calling Vietnam perhaps the worst example of unclear responsibilities, General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) stated in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself. For example, each fought its own air war, agreeing only to limited measures for a coordinated effort. "Body count" and "tons dropped" became the measures of merit. Lack of integration persisted right through the 1975 evacuation of Saigon —when responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea; each of these set a different "H-hour," which caused confusion and delays. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 19)

JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is a major obstacle to greater unification of the unified commands. UNAAF places great emphasis on maintaining uni-Service integrity:

Maintenance of Uni-Service Integrity. The command organization should integrate components of two or more Services into efficient teams while, at the same time, preserving to each Service its uni-Service responsibilities. The commander of any force must give due consideration to these responsibilities. *Furthermore, organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities.* (emphasis added) (page 43)

UNAAF's requirement that "within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through Service component commanders" (page 37) with certain exceptions is another inhibition on unification. By insisting on single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands, UNAAF ensures that the unified commands will remain a loose confederation of single-Service forces.

In the questions in the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the unified commanders were asked:

Does UNAAF create obstacles to greater and necessary unification in your command?

Despite substantial evidence that UNAAF is an obstacle to unification, four of the unified commanders answered no. In contrast, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command stated:

In essence, UNAAF provisions for single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands require the unified command to remain a rather loose confederation of single-Service forces.

Similarly, the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command argues:

As derived from the law and presently constituted, UNAAF inhibits the unification of command demanded by modern ways and means of warfighting....UNAAF today is less relevant in that it contemplates:

- a. A clear "peace/war" distinction (with limited CINC authority in "peacetime");
- b. Conventional war only (the least prevalent form of conflict since World War II); and
- c. The Service structures fighting the war with unification only at the top.

While the Services have agreed to the concept of unified command, they have placed strict limits on how much unification could be achieved. Command by mutual cooperation among the Services continues to be the dominant arrangement in U.S. operational commands, just as it was prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

b. Absence of Agreement on Appropriate Command Relationships, Especially Concerning the Principle of Unity of Command

In his *Maxims of War*, Napoleon in 1831 stated: "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command". The literature of warfare is filled with similar references to the importance of unity of command. Despite substantial historical evidence, the Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command.

The lack of unity of command was a fundamental ingredient of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In response, the *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* listed as its first recommendation:

That immediate action be taken to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts. (page 252)

The word "outposts" conveys the sense that the Congress meant unity at the level where an attack is possible. The Congress did not seem to mean unity only at some distant unified command headquarters.

Unity of command has been a principle of war in the U.S. Army since the early 1920's. While unity of command has often been identified as a fundamental principle for the joint employment of U.S. military forces, it remains a vague concept. For example, JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not define the term "unity of command." The JCS do, along with the Air Force, employ the term "unity of effort" while the Navy and Marine Corps do not refer to the concepts of unity of command or unity of effort in their doctrinal writings. Referring to the absence of explicit discussion of the concept of unity of command in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, has stated:

...Whereas unity of command is not explicitly treated in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, it is an underlying foundation. (Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, June 4, 1985)

Given the importance of the concept of unity of command, explicit and continuous reference to it in all doctrinal writings would appear to be highly desirable. The limited attention that unity of command receives in JCS and Service writings suggests that (1) it is not a fundamental principle for joint employment of U.S. forces or (2) there is disagreement on the meaning of this concept.

The Army defines unity of command as follows:

For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander....This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the strategic level, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow there from. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.

In the tactical dimension, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal. (Field Manual 100-1, August 1981, page 16)

In their paper, *Unity of Command—Does It Exist in the Field?*, Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff examine the extent to which the concept of unity of command is being implemented in the field. Based upon inputs from 112 military officers within all six unified commands, the paper, published in April 1983, concluded that “unity of command does not exist in the field today.” (page IV-2)

This conclusion was supported by two findings: (1) unity of command is still seen as an essential concept in the field; and (2) despite its importance, most professionals feel that unity of command (UOC) is not widespread in their organizations. Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff add the following comments to these findings:

At least four major studies since 1974 have lamented the lack of UOC. Despite attention, the problem persists. During the field interviews, we heard considerable concern expressed about complicated command relationships, especially those deriving from “dual-hatted” sub-unified commands, and a lack of control over “in-support-of” forces. Recently, one CINC bluntly asserted UOC does not exist. “Without it,” he continued, “the probability of effective wartime action is diminished.” (page III-7)

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger reached a similar conclusion:

...In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of “unity of command” is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command. (page 187)

The concept of “in-support-of” forces deserves special attention because it appears to undermine the concept of unity of command. JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines “in support of” as follows:

Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control. (page 176)

While “in-support-of” forces could be those of any Service, only U.S. naval forces have traditionally used this concept. Naval forces have not been placed under the operational control of the commander of the joint operation, but rather have been “in-support-of” the joint operation. This concept essentially means divided command.

In sum, the doctrinal writings of the U.S. military do not clarify or emphasize the concept of unity of command. Furthermore, by embracing the concept of “in-support-of” forces, doctrinal writings undermine unity of command. Reflecting these conceptual disagreements, there is evidence that unity of command does not exist within the six unified commands. In this regard, it is absolutely clear that the congressional recommendation “that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts” has not been implemented.

5. ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The fifth problem area is the current operational command configuration. As mentioned previously, the President has the statutory authority to establish unified and specified commands—"combatant" commands in the words of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. The current operational command arrangement is essentially an evolutionary one, building on the base that existed at the end of World War II. As U.S. worldwide national security interests have waxed and waned, old commands have been eliminated and new commands created. If one were to ignore the current Unified Command Plan and start from scratch to design a new plan, it might well differ significantly from the one that exists today. Clearly, today's worldwide strategic environment is drastically different from the one that existed at the end of World War II.

Many factors must be taken into consideration when contemplating what the operational command structure might look like. Management principles such as a clear chain of command, span of control, organizational layering, grade structure, and combat to support ratio must be considered. The political dimension—international treaty arrangements, the perceptions of foreign governments, world opinion, and the inevitable interservice rivalries—must inevitably receive great weight.

Many issues have been raised throughout the literature as various authors have analyzed the current Unified Command Plan:

- Should USEUCOM's responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa be assigned to other commands?
- Does USREDCOM have a valid mission?
- Should USREDCOM be assigned responsibility for large land areas (e.g., Africa and South America)?
- Should USLANTCOM and USPACOM be eliminated?
- Should Alaska be assigned to USPACOM?
- Should the geographical boundaries between USPACOM and USCENTCOM be adjusted to give USCENTCOM responsibility for the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean?
- Should the geographical boundaries between USLANTCOM and USSOUTHCOM be adjusted to give USSOUTHCOM responsibility for the Caribbean?
- Should the Navy's strategic submarine forces and the Army's ballistic missile defense effort be combined with SAC to create a unified Strategic Command?
- Should a Military Transportation Command be created as a unified command?

While these issues may be important, it is not the intent of this study to analyze or reach any conclusions on them. There are more appropriate fora in the Executive Branch for such efforts.

The problem with the Unified Command Plan (UCP) arises because UCP issues are not receiving an objective review in the Executive Branch. There are two causes of this problem: institutional deficiencies of the JCS system and limited review of the UCP by OSD and the National Security Council (NSC).

- a. Institutional Deficiencies of the JCS System

The only forum which actively reviews the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the JCS. As in other areas with important multi-Service considerations, the JCS are incapable of non-parochial evaluation of the UCP. The inability of the JCS to objectively review command arrangements for the Southwest Asia region is a recent example of their failure to adequately address difficult unified command issues. In this instance, the members of the JCS were apparently more interested in protecting parochial Service interests than in devising the most effective command arrangements for defense of Southwest Asia. The Army and Air Force wanted the new command to be a sub-unified command under USEUCOM. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps wanted the new command to be a sub-unified command under USPACOM. The Secretary of Defense rejected these parochial positions and created a new, separate unified command, the U.S. Central Command.

Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier have commented on the negative effect of the institutional deficiencies of the JCS on the review of the UCP:

Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has usually been reluctant to open the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to change because of the concern that it could result in dysfunctional battles between the Services as they attempt to stake out positions. Only role and mission battles have proven to be more divisive. Thus, it can be anticipated that suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however well-meaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of perhaps even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests. (page 12)

b. Limited Review of the UCP by OSD and NSC

As the UCP is a formal document prepared by the JCS, OSD and NSC have played only a limited role in reviewing the work of the JCS. Given the inability of the JCS system to objectively review the UCP, the passive role of OSD and NSC precludes a more useful and comprehensive consideration of UCP issues.

6. UNNECESSARY MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING CRISES

The convergence of two trends addressed in Section C of this chapter has contributed to this problem area. Specifically, improvements in communications capabilities and the requirement for increased presidential control during certain crises have created an environment that promotes micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the National Command Authority (NCA). There has also been an occasional problem within the NCA when the Secretary of Defense has been circumvented, usually by presidential advisors, on operational command matters. For simplicity, micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the NCA will often be termed "overinvolvement" in the remainder of this subsection.

As Commander in Chief, the President has authority to become involved in tactical operations and to specify an *ad hoc* chain of command. In certain situations, presidential needs for effective control of crises may absolutely require such arrangements. In such situations, the benefits of effective presidential control outweigh the risks of by-passing key elements of the chain of command and of being overly specific in operational direction. These situations are not the focus of this discussion; rather this problem area addresses those instances when the NCA has become unnecessarily overinvolved in a crisis.

The Steadman Report discusses the factors that lead to NCA overinvolvement:

Some believe that the very existence of this [improved communications] capability impels decisionmakers to become overly involved in the details of crisis management. Crises are important events and the speed and extent of the flow of information to the public makes every crisis an event with political implications. Thus, key decisionmakers get involved in what may seem to some to be minute details because they want personally to insure a successful outcome. In addition, there is a natural tendency for a key decisionmaker to want to speak with someone at the scene of the crisis —to add a flavor that is unobtainable in Washington or to verify a key piece of information upon which to base a subsequent decision. (page 28)

Much could be written about NCA overinvolvement; however, for the most part, this topic is beyond the scope of this study. Accordingly, only brief evidence will be presented to give some appreciation of the problem. For example, NCA conduct during the Vietnam war has often been characterized as overinvolvement. The Steadman Report stated:

...Washington certainly was too deeply involved in the details of actually running the war, particularly the air war in the north. (page 25)

In *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect*, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Retired) presented his criticism more strongly:

...civilian politico decision makers have no business ignoring or overriding the counsel of experienced military professionals in presuming to direct the day-to-day conduct of military strategy and tactics from their desks in Washington, D.C. (page 270)

General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) discusses circumvention of the Secretary of Defense in his book, *The 25-year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*:

Under the present law, the JCS can be subjected to conflicting orders and guidance. This happened both to General Wheeler while he was CJCS, and to his successor, Admiral Moorer. Both men, Wheeler in 1970 and Moorer in 1972, received orders personally from President Nixon with instructions that Secretary of Defense Laird was not to be informed. Military men obviously must not be placed in such an untenable position. Under the circumstances these incidents did not matter very much because the Vietnam War did not put our

survival at risk, nor was Vietnam vital to U.S. interests. In future situations in which national survival might indeed be at stake, I do not believe the nation can accept this state of affairs. (page 202)

The Steadman Report also notes the dangers of by-passing the Secretary of Defense:

...Although in a crisis the President has a number of advisers in addition to the Secretary of Defense, orders to the field commands should be clearly identified as emanating from the Secretary as well as from the President —and not be transmitted separately by Presidential advisers acting in his name. By-passing the Secretary undermines his authority over the combatant forces. (page 29)

There are three major shortcomings of NCA overinvolvement during a crisis. First, the expertise of key elements of the military chain of command may not be effectively applied. The operational commanders, their staffs, and their immediate subordinates have valuable insights into the situation, the threat, and U.S. force capabilities. As the Steadman Report notes, by-passing these levels of command “increases the risk of failure and the risk to the forces involved” (page 28).

The second shortcoming involves the loss of initiative by tactical commanders. When the NCA immediately scrutinizes every tactical movement, on-scene commanders may be reluctant to take decisive action. In today’s fast-paced combat environment, such a loss of initiative may preclude effective military action.

The third shortcoming arises from the confusion that results from employing *ad hoc* command arrangements. The benefits of a structured command chain are lost when certain echelons are by-passed.

There are many possible causes of NCA overinvolvement including:

- a lack of discipline in the staff advising the NCA;
- inadequate expertise on operational matters at the NCA level;
- the desire for a military success by a politically troubled administration; and
- a lack of confidence in the judgment of the military chain of command.

It is not possible within the scope of this study to assess whether these possible causes actually played a factor in instances of NCA overinvolvement.

The problem of NCA overinvolvement in crisis is a management one and not a structural or procedural one. The problem can only be solved by presidential leadership in disciplining the system. In this regard, the current Administration has demonstrated much more discipline. While this problem area cannot be specifically identified with the current Administration, it has appeared with sufficient frequency within the last 20 years to be of continuing concern. This is especially so because the underlying trends that promote it will continue.

Given the management nature of this problem and the absence of useful congressional remedies, this study will not seek to propose

possible solutions. This is in no way, however, a lessening of congressional concern about the overinvolvement of the NCA in crises that do not justify high-level intervention.

F. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to the problem areas of the unified and specified commands are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—CONFUSED CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS

The principal guideline for solving this problem area is to clarify the statutes and DoD directive dealing with the operational chain of command. The seven options for solving this problem differ as to what specific responsibilities in any clarification should be assigned to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS Chairman, and the JCS.

- Option 1A—remove the Secretary of Defense from the chain of command

Some observers argue that the Secretary of Defense has never acted as a full-fledged member of the chain of command. Moreover, since 1958, Secretaries of Defense have had little military experience and seem to have conducted themselves more as managers and policymakers than as military commanders. In his book, *Organization for National Security, A Study*, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired) argues: "...the law still holds a civilian executive [the Secretary of Defense] legally responsible for professional military matters which, for the most part, are beyond his competence." (page 115) Removing the Secretary of Defense from the chain of command would merely be a formal recognition that Secretaries of Defense, for a variety of reasons including inexperience, have not usually been heavily involved in the command function.

Under this option, the chain of command would run directly from the Commander in Chief to either the JCS Chairman or the JCS. The Secretary of Defense would be involved only if the Commander in Chief requested his participation.

- Option 1B—clearly assign to the Secretary of Defense the role of commander of the operational commanders

This option would clarify the current ambiguous chain of command by specifying that the Secretary of Defense is the sole commander of the operational commanders. The Secretary's authority "to command" would be specifically included in the statutes. It may be even desirable to designate the Secretary of Defense as the Deputy Commander in Chief. Moreover, it would be absolutely clear that the Secretary of Defense was the principal contact in the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders.

- Option 1C—establish a position for a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would be responsible for assisting the Secretary of Defense on military operational matters

The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* concluded: