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CHAPTER 6

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

A. EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

1. Introduction

The origins of the three Military Departments in existence today can be traced in the history of the Federal Government to almost 200 years ago with the creation, as executive departments, of the Department of War in 1789 and the Department of the Navy in 1798. With the exception of uniformed military components under their jurisdiction, the Military Departments are the most abiding components of the present U.S. military establishment.

Although numerous internal changes of an evolutionary nature occurred, the essential organizational structure of the War and Navy Departments as co-equal, executive-level departments remained unchanged through World War II. The experiences of that war led to a recognition of the need for major structural changes in the U.S. national security apparatus, especially within the military establishment.

2. The National Security Act of 1947

In April and May 1944, the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy held hearings on a "Proposal to Establish a Single Department of the Armed Forces." During those hearings, War Department officials urged the establishment of a single Department of Armed Forces while officials of the Navy Department urged further study.

In October 1945, a report from a committee established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and forwarded to the President recommended (with one member dissenting) that a single Department of Armed Forces be established. Both the proposal before the House Select Committee and the JCS committee report recommended the creation of a separate air force component within the single department. Also in October 1945, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the Congress a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt at the request of the Secretary of the Navy and upon the suggestion of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. The Eberstadt report advised against the establishment of a single defense department, but did recommend the creation of a new, executive-level air department to be headed by a Secretary who would be an equal of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

In October and December of 1945, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs conducted hearings on two bills proposing the establishment of a single defense department. During those hearings, the War Department favored a single department with three autonomous Services — Army, Navy, and Air. The Department of the

Navy opposed the single department, suggested the organization proposed in the Eberstadt report, and urged further study of organizational problems.

On December 19, 1945, President Truman stated in a Message to the Congress: "...There is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department." (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 11) The message also suggested a broad outline for reorganization. Among other things, it proposed a single "Department of National Defense" consisting of all armed and civilian forces then within the War and Navy Departments and organized into three coordinated branches (land forces, naval forces, and air forces), each under a civilian Assistant Secretary of National Defense. Additionally, the outline suggested that there should be a Chief of Staff of the Department and commanders of the three component branches and that these four military officers should constitute an advisory board to the Secretary of National Defense and the President.

Throughout 1946, President Truman urged War and Navy Department officials to devise a mutually acceptable plan to provide greater unification of the Services. On January 16, 1947, the Secretaries of War and the Navy reported to the President that they had reached agreement on a plan that both Departments would accept. On February 26, 1947, President Truman submitted to the Congress a draft bill for unification that had the approval of the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the JCS. With minor changes, the Senate approved the bill on July 9, and the House of Representatives, with numerous changes, approved a bill on July 19, 1947. After conference action, the President signed the National Security Act of 1947 on July 26, 1947.

The Act provided, among other things, for the creation of a unified National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense and composed of three departments: Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense was given authority to "establish *general* policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all the departments or agencies therein" and to "exercise *general* direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies." (emphasis added).

The three Military Departments in the National Military Establishment were to be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries, and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense were retained by each of the respective Secretaries. Additionally, each Service Secretary was specifically authorized, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present to the President or the Director of the Budget any report or recommendation relating to his respective department. Finally, the roles and missions assigned to each department were set forth in a very general fashion in the Act.

The resolution of the detailed assignment of roles, missions, and functions was left to the JCS. When they were unable to resolve some basic differences, the Secretary of Defense met with the JCS at the Key West Naval Base in 1948. The agreement, produced by that meeting and ultimately approved by the President, was re-

flected in a document entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." With only minor changes, the agreement reached in 1948, usually referred to as the Key West Agreement, remains in effect today.

3. The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act

The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, soon discovered that he did not have authority commensurate with his responsibilities. He pointed this out in his first report which covered the first 15 months of operation under the National Security Act of 1947. In that report, he made several suggestions for change, including strengthening the Secretary of Defense's authority over the three Military Departments. He suggested that if the statute were amended to clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to establish policies and programs for and to exercise direction, authority, and control over the Military Departments (as opposed to establishing "general" policies and programs and exercising "general" direction, authority and control), then there would be no need to change the titles of the Service Secretaries, as they clearly would serve under the Secretary of Defense.

In November 1948, a Committee on National Security Organization (known as the Eberstadt Task Force), of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (usually referred to as the Hoover Commission) submitted a report to the Hoover Commission expressing many of the same concerns as Secretary Forrestal. Included in the recommendations of this report were several specific changes to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's control and direction over the Military Departments. These may be summarized as follows: (1) removing the limiting term "general" from the Secretary of Defense's basic authority statute; (2) giving the Secretary of Defense authority to exercise "direction and control" over the preparation of military budget estimates; (3) giving the Secretary of Defense authority to supervise expenditures of the Military Departments in accordance with appropriations and control and direction over requests for authorization; (4) repealing the Service Secretaries' right to appeal to the President or the Director of the Budget and repealing the reservation to those Secretaries of powers not specifically conferred on the Secretary of Defense; and (5) making the administration of the three departments by the respective Secretaries subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The Hoover Commission itself, in its report of February 1949, agreed with the major recommendations of the Eberstadt Task Force, but also recommended that the Service Secretaries be designated as Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and that the three military Services be administered by these three under secretaries subject to the full direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense.

In a message to the Congress transmitted on March 7, 1949, President Truman recommended most of the changes previously suggested by Secretary Forrestal, the Eberstadt Task Force, and the Hoover Commission. While recommending that the Secretary of Defense's responsibility for exercising direction, authority, and control over the affairs of the Department of Defense be made

clear, the President did not endorse abolition of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and their respective Service Secretaries, as recommended by the Hoover Commission. Rather, he recommended these departments be designated as "military departments" (as opposed to executive departments), that the Secretaries of these departments no longer serve on the National Security Council, and that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force administer their departments under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and without the right to appeal to the President or Director of the Budget. He specifically did not recommend blanket transfer of all statutory authority of the three Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense or any change to the statutory assignment of combat functions to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The recommendations of the President, with two significant changes, were enacted into law on August 10, 1949. The two significant changes were (1) that, while the Secretary of Defense's authority over the Military Departments was made clear, the Secretary was prohibited by law, from transferring, reassigning, abolishing, or consolidating any of the combatant functions assigned to the various Military Departments, and (2) that, while the Secretaries lost their right of direct appeal to the President or the Director of the Budget, they, along with the members of the JCS, were given the right to present recommendations on their own initiative to the Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. (The Senate position on this matter had been to terminate any right of the Service Secretary to direct appeal above the Secretary of Defense. However, the House of Representatives insisted on such a right.)

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In April 1953, President Eisenhower, after having received reports from the Secretary of Defense and from a Committee appointed by the Secretary and headed by Nelson Rockefeller, transmitted Reorganization Plan No. 6 to the Congress. That plan further strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense as the head of the Department of Defense. At the same time, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to revise the Key West Agreement to clarify that the chain of command to the unified commands was from the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of the Military Department designated by the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the unified command concerned. This was designed to ensure clear lines of civilian control over the unified commands.

5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

The final major historical step leading to the present organization, structure, and functions of the Military Departments occurred in 1958. This step followed the report of the second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government which, in short, recommended strengthening the role of the Secretary of Defense over the business affairs of the Department, and a Presidential Message to the Congress which, likewise, recommended increased authority for the Secretary of Defense. The re-

sulting legislation, Public Law 85-599 (the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958) was designed to leave little doubt that the management, control, and direction of the Department of Defense were the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The explicit changes of the 1958 amendment were as follows:

(1) The Secretary of Defense was authorized to assign common supply or service activities to a single department or agency.

(2) The Secretary of Defense was authorized to assign development and operational use of new weapons to any department or service.

(3) Functions assigned by law could be transferred or abolished after 30 days notice to Congress, except major combatant functions could not be transferred or abolished if disapproved by either House of Congress.

(4) Assistant Secretaries of Defense were permitted to issue orders to Secretaries of the Military Departments by written authorization of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs were removed from the chain of command to the unified and specified commands.

(6) The Military Departments were to be separately organized (as opposed to being separately administered) under the Service Secretaries but would function under the direction, control, and authority of the Secretary of Defense, and the number of Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments was reduced from 4 to 3. However, the Service Secretaries retained their right to make recommendations directly to the Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. (Once again, as had been the case in 1949, the Senate supported abolition of this Service Secretary authority. However, the House insisted that existing law be continued, and the House position prevailed in conference.)

6. Developments Since 1958

Since 1958, various minor changes have occurred in the organization, structure, and functions of the Military Departments, mostly relating to the number of assistant secretaries and the duties to be assigned to them. For example, Public Law 91-611 added a fifth Assistant Secretary of the Army, mandated that one of those assistant secretaries be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and prescribed the duties of that position. In March 1978, the Secretary of Defense, exercising the reorganization authority of section 125(a) of title 10, United States Code, reduced the number of assistant secretaries in each of the Military Departments by one. Finally, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-94), enacted on September 24, 1983, restored one assistant secretary to both the Army and Navy.

B. KEY ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS

1. Strengthening of the Authority of the Secretary of Defense at the Expense of the Service Secretaries

As the recent history of the Military Departments shows, the most important organizational trend since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 has been the strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense and his staff, usually to the derogation of the Service Secretaries and the Military Departments. (Because there are four Services, "Secretaries of the Military Departments" would be the proper title for the civilian heads of the three Military Departments. However, the colloquial term "Service Secretaries" is used extensively and is adopted for use in this study.) In his book, *Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, Colonel Richard J. Daleski, USAF notes this trend:

Prior to 1947, Service Secretaries were the sole members of the President's Cabinet responsible for military affairs. However, subsequent defense reorganizations have gutted the Service Secretaries' legal prerogatives. Especially between 1949 and 1958, there was a sharp erosion in the Service Secretaries' organizational position and opportunities for influence in defense matters. (page 5)

Evidence of this trend is found in the following:

- the strengthening of the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense by the 1949 and 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1953 Reorganization Plan;
- the substantial increase in the number of assistants to the Secretary of Defense provided in statute, especially the provisions resulting from the 1953 Reorganization Plan;
- the substantial increase in the number of personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- the consolidation of supply and service functions common to the Services in Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities under the control of the Secretary of Defense;
- the assignment of nearly all Service combat forces to unified and specified commands which report (through the JCS) to the Secretary of Defense;
- the development of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System which substantially enhanced the control of the Secretary of Defense over the Department's resource allocation process; and
- the establishment of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council which strengthened the Secretary of Defense's review and oversight of major research and development and acquisition programs.

The one change in executive authority that, perhaps, can be viewed as contrary to this trend was the presidentially approved revision in 1953 of the portion of the Key West Agreement dealing with the chain of command. This revision provided that the chain of command above each unified command was from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Military Department designated as executive agent for that unified command, to the Chief of the Service, to the unified commander. However, while the Service Secretary had not been previously included in the chain of command, the 1953 revision was designed to clarify

the authority of the Secretary of Defense at least as much as it was designed to clarify the authority of the Service Secretaries. Moreover, even if this particular step were viewed as a reversal of the overall trend of increasing authority of the Secretary of Defense, that reversal was short-lived. In his Message to the Congress in 1958, President Eisenhower explained that he was removing both the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs from the operational chain of command.

Overlaying the basic trend of increased authority for the Secretary of Defense has been the management styles of various Secretaries of Defense. Some Secretaries, notably Secretary McNamara, favored a highly centralized decision-making process. Others, especially Secretaries Laird and Weinberger, promoted a greater degree of decentralization. In particular, Secretary Weinberger has sought to shift more authority and accountability to the Service Secretaries than had been the case during the previous Administration. This shift is evidenced visibly by the inclusion of the Service Secretaries as permanent members of the Defense Resources Board. The power and influence of the Service Secretaries and their Departments have been increased or decreased as a result of the management style of the Secretary of Defense. These changes, however, can be viewed as marginal fluctuations when compared with the impact of the basic trend of increased authority for the Secretary of Defense.

In summary, the overall trend for the past 40 or more years in the organization of the U.S. military establishment has been to invest more authority and responsibility in the Secretary of Defense while decreasing the authority and responsibility of the Service Secretaries. Recognition of this trend does not, however, necessarily answer the question of what is the optimal balance (or separation) of powers between the Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries within the single Department of Defense.

2. Weakening of the Ties Between Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff

The second major organizational trend is the weakening of the ties between Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff. These ties, especially in the War Department, were weakened by the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 and the position of Secretary of Defense in 1947. As these two central organs in the unified Department of Defense consolidated their power and influence in the new bureaucracy, the ties between the Service Secretaries and Chiefs were further weakened.

When the War and Navy Departments existed as separate executive-level departments, there were powerful forces that could make the civilian Secretary and his military Chief natural allies. A strong alliance between the Secretary of War and his Chief of Staff began to develop shortly after the Spanish-American War and endured through World War II, although its intensity declined during the war. (Hammond, *Organizing For Defense*, pages 24 and 183). In the Navy Department, this natural alliance never materialized due to the continuing search by senior naval officers "towards a way to minimize the power of the Secretary over naval affairs." (Hammond, page 76)

Both internal and external challenges forced the Secretary-Chief alliance in the War Department. The internal challenges were from the insubordinate, autonomous bureaus. The external challenges were from the Congress. The Chief had to rely on the Secretary to gain and maintain control over the bureaus "for the bureaus were simply not subservient to the Chief." (Hammond, page 25). In addition, the Chief found the Secretary valuable in protecting the Army from involvement in politics and non-military policy-making. (Hammond, page 183). For his part, the Secretary needed the Chief to help provide central direction and control of the Department.

The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly affected this Secretary-Chief alliance. Service Chiefs became powerful figures, working directly with the President and having an important role in the direction of the U.S. war effort. Paul Hammond comments on the results of the new stature of the Service Chiefs:

...Where before the central authority of the Chief of Staff had never been secure from successful challenge, so that he always required the Secretary's active support, in World War II the risk of challenge all but disappeared. (page 183)

Moreover, the JCS gave the Service Chiefs an avenue independent of the Service Secretary for pursuing the interests of the uniformed Services and for assuming the role of Service spokesmen. In his book, *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries confirms this outcome:

...As individuals, the Joint Chiefs were responsible to their service secretaries. Collectively, the Joint Chiefs constituted the military advisors of the secretary of defense. And since the Joint Chiefs were the only service department representatives with a statutory role in the departmental policy process, they became the *spokesmen* for the services. The service secretaries...were bypassed. (page 148)

In addition, as the Secretary of Defense became a more powerful figure, the Service Chiefs began to use the JCS channel on non-JCS issues in order to circumvent the Service Secretaries and present their views directly to the Secretary of Defense.

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond discusses the weakening of the ties between Service Secretaries and Chiefs and the resulting erosion in the role of the Secretaries:

In the 1950's, the Secretary was less necessary to the service, for its Chief was often a more effective champion than he in OSD, the new layer of government where so many of the questions vital to it were settled. And by this time, bureau independence was negligible. As the bonds of the Secretary-Chief alliance were weakened by unification, nothing took their place, for the alternative basis for secretarial control, a civilian staff, had neither the cohesion nor the position in the military establishment necessary to make it a counterweight to the policy planning of the Chief of Staff. In the service departments the civilian Secretaries have therefore been largely advocates and expeditors of policies formulated by others. (page 298)

3. Erosion of the Contributions of Service Secretaries to Civilian Control of the Military

The trend discussed in the preceding subsection has been the major factor in the erosion of the Service Secretaries' contributions to civilian control of the military. It was only in an environment in which the Service Chief and his staff had to depend on the Secretary for its own authority that the Secretary was able to exercise responsible control. The Service Secretary has lost the independence from the military headquarters staff that their former dependence on him provided. While there have been exceptions to this general rule—a contemporary example being the forceful management style of the current Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman—the overall trend has been unaltered.

The Service Secretary, as a result, has become heavily dependent on, if not the captive of, the Service Chief and the military headquarters staff. In *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Dr. Lawrence J. Korb comments on this situation:

Except in rare cases, the service secretaries play a very small part in the major areas of the service policy-making process. The initiatives and positions are developed by the service chief and his military staff, and the secretary usually contents himself with acting as a spokesman for these service positions. For example, the secretary usually has very little say in the preparation of his departmental budget. (page 4)

Noting the strong orientation of Service Secretaries to the role of advocate, the Symington Committee concluded that the Service Secretaries diminished, rather than enhanced, civilian control:

...The Committee (including its Chairman) now believes, however, that, by perpetuating separate Service secretariats, it will be more difficult to subordinate service interest to national interest. The Committee therefore considers that it would be wise to discontinue what is now a *dual system* of civilian control as a result of interposing between the Secretary of Defense and the Services themselves a set of Secretaries identified with each service. (page 8)

Identification of this trend does not suggest that the Service Secretaries do not have an important role to play in providing civilian control of the military. The trend merely signifies that, whatever their role, Service Secretaries are having less success in fulfilling it.

4. Trends in the Personnel Strengths of the Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments

The history of the personnel strengths of the top management headquarters of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are shown in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 respectively. Within the scope of this study, it was not possible to determine the reasons for fluctuations in the number of personnel assigned to these top management headquarters. In many instances, activities and their assigned personnel were transferred from headquarters to field activities. The trends for the Secretariats, military headquarters

staffs, and combined staffs are evaluated in the following paragraphs.

TABLE 6-1

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY^a

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff			Combined		
	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total
1934	10	4	14	39	137	176	49	141	190
1941	23	6	29	36	172	208	59	178	237
1945	1613	357	1970	1685	2228	3913	3298	2585	5883
1948	891	114	1005	12266	3349	16115	13157	3963	17120
1950	925	120	1045	9992	2998	12990	10917	3113	14035
1955	785	150	936	13788	3662	17450	14574	3812	18386
1960	717	152	869	11145	3278	14423	11862	3430	15292
1965	799	134	933	6092	2599	8691	6891	2733	9624
1970	653	136	789	4937	3035	8073	5590	3222	8812
1971	654	133	787	4820	2928	7748	5474	3061	8535
1972	374	139	513	4907	2314	7221	5281	2953	8234
1973	314	109	423	2766	1957	4723	3080	2056	5146
1974	274	102	376	2313	1530	3843	2587	1632	4219
1975	251	107	358	2093	1490	3583	2344	1597	3941
1976	250	90	340	2053	1505	3558	2303	1595	3898
1977	259	119	378	1989	1549	3538	2248	1568	3816
1978	220	113	333	1856	1474	3330	2076	1587	3663
1979	222	112	334	1821	1485	3306	2043	1597	3640
1980	242	117	359	1755	1564	3319	1997	1681	3678
1981	234	138	372	1800	1622	3422	2034	1760	3794
1982	295	129	424	1850	1623	3473	2145	1752	3897
1983	283	133	416	1830	1582	3412	2113	1715	3828
1984	278	113	391	1832	1559	3391	2110	1672	3782
1985 ^b	251	117	368	1792	1419	3211	2043	1536	3579

a Data for 1934-1970 provided in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Secretary of the Army, dated August 16, 1985; data for 1971-1985 provided in a letter to the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Chief, Plans and Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, dated July 30, 1985.

b Programmed.

TABLE 6-2

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY^a

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff						Combined		
	Civ	Mil	Total	Navy			Marine Corps			Civ	Mil	Total
				Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total			
1950	1244	421	1665	1036	935	1971	1450	1059	2509	3730	2415	6145
1955	1225	373	1603	1232	1497	2779	1626	1017	2643	4133	2892	7025
1960	1356	333	1739	1115	1248	2364	1233	965	2203	3710	2596	6306
1965	1018	396	1414	721	1208	1929	1179	1126	2305	2918	2730	5648
1970	916	397	1313	1042	1372	2414	1163	1433	2596	3121	3202	6323
1971	742	377	1119	902	1276	2178	1073	1284	2357	2717	2937	5654
1972	674	331	1005	1442	1255	2707	1056	1173	2229	3172	2769	5941
1973	632	319	951	797	1234	2031	1196	1409	2605	2625	2962	5587
1974	650	306	956	793	1065	1858	1149	1728	2877	2592	3099	5691
1975	755	300	1055	737	1085	1872	656	997	1663	2208	2382	4590
1976	793	311	1104	783	1042	1825	566	1032	1698	2242	2385	4627
1977	747	284	1031	693	1054	1747	149	460	609	1539	1798	3387
1978	585	294	979	597	1062	1659	130	395	525	1412	1751	3163
1979	515	275	790	609	1042	1651	126	409	535	1250	1726	2976
1980	525	232	807	551	1178	1729	129	379	508	1205	1339	3044
1931	610	304	914	606	1240	1846	123	413	536	1339	1957	3296
1932	569	283	852	694	1322	2016	133	424	557	1395	2029	3425
1933	569	231	800	633	1333	2021	123	453	576	1375	2072	3447
1934	562	270	832	688	1303	1991	133	420	553	1383	1993	3376
1985 ^b	547	259	806	714	1315	2029	133	370	503	1394	1944	3338

a Data provided in a memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy), dated August 23, 1985.

b Programmed.

TABLE 6-3

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE^a

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff			Combined		
	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total
1943	234	143	332	2595	2279	4874	2329	2427	5256
1950	307	145	452	3969	2713	6682	4276	2353	7134
1955	358	200	558	4909	3320	8229	5257	3520	8787
1960	317	219	536	3869	2700	6569	4186	2919	7105
1965	334	197	531	2840	2422	5262	3174	2619	5793
1970	301	183	484	2414	2198	4612	2715	2331	5095
1973	291	201	492	2366	2353	4719	2657	2554	5211
1974	278	199	477	2191	2330	4521	2469	2529	4993
1975	302	193	495	2159	2262	4421	2461	2455	4916
1976	290	187	477	2000	2207	4207	2290	2394	4684
1977	212	135	348	1803	1964	3767	2015	2100	4115
1978	180	145	325	1364	1787	3151	1544	1932	3476
1979	161	138	299	1231	1664	2895	1392	1802	3194
1980	181	139	320	1256	1674	2930	1437	1813	3250
1981	184	136	320	1251	1679	2930	1435	1815	3250
1982	178	142	320	1246	1584	2930	1424	1826	3250
1983	177	143	320	1241	1689	2930	1418	1832	3250
1984	171	134	305	1171	1629	2800	1342	1763	3105
1985 ^b	171	133	304	1139	1630	2769	1310	1763	3073

a Data for 1943-1970, 1975, and 1980-1985 provided in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of the Air Force, dated August 13, 1985; data for 1973, 1974, and 1976-1979 provided by the Department of the Air Force on August 14, 1985.

b Programmed.

a. Secretariats

Since the end of World War II, the overall trend has been a substantial reduction in the number of personnel assigned to the Service Secretariats. The numbers of personnel authorized to be assigned to the three Secretariats in 1985 are at or near their lowest levels in the last 40 years.

The Army Secretariat reached its peak end strength in 1946 (2,156 personnel). While the end strength was reduced substantially in 1947 (531 personnel) with the creation of the Department of the Air Force, by 1948, it had nearly doubled (1,005 personnel). Modest growth continued over the next several years with a spike during the Korean War year of 1951 (1,241 personnel). Since 1951, the trend has been a near continuous decrease in assigned personnel.

Like the Army Secretariat, the end strength of the Navy Secretariat peaked in 1946 (4,331 personnel). From 1948 through 1963, the end strength remained relatively constant. The downward trend in the personnel strength of the Navy Secretariat began in 1964 although reversed briefly in 1967 and 1968.

The Air Force Secretariat has a different history of end strengths. After the Department of the Air Force was created, the personnel strength grew steadily from 382 in 1948 to 541 in 1951. Between 1953 and 1976, the size of the Secretariat staff remained relatively constant, reaching a peak strength of 583 in 1962. The Secretariat was substantially reduced in 1977 and has continued a downward trend in subsequent years:

The overall downward trend in the end strengths is shown in the following summary table:

**TRENDS IN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF SERVICE
SECRETARIATS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	1,045	869	789	359	368
Navy	1,665	1,739	1,313	807	806
Air Force.....	452	536	484	320	304

Regarding the relative number of civilian and military personnel assigned to the Service Secretariats, there is a trend toward greater percentages of military personnel. This trend is pronounced in the Army, modest in the Navy, and small in the Air Force. The following table presents the data reflecting this trend:

**MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
SERVICE SECRETARIATS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	11.5	17.4	17.2	32.5	31.8
Navy	25.3	22.0	30.2	34.9	32.1
Air Force.....	32.1	40.9	37.8	43.4	43.8

b. Military Headquarters Staffs

While the personnel strengths of the military headquarters staffs also have a downward trend, the history of these staff sizes varies from that of the Secretariats. In general, these staffs grew in size and reached their peak strength sometime during the 1950's (except the Marine Corps whose peak was reached in 1969).

The Army Staff grew steadily from 4,996 personnel in 1946 to 19,958 personnel in 1952, nearly four times its strength at the end of World War II. Since 1952, the Army Staff has continued to decline in personnel strength. Its authorized strength in 1985 is its lowest level in the postwar period.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations also grew in the immediate postwar period, reaching a peak of 2,798 personnel in 1956. As data for this entire staff is not available prior to 1949, this statement is based upon the growth of the staff beginning in 1950 and the growth in the military component of this staff from the 1947 level. After 1956, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations began to decline in personnel, although this reduction was not continuous.

Data for the personnel strengths of Headquarters, Marine Corps are available only for 1950 and subsequent years. After 1951, the number of personnel assigned to this staff continued to decrease until 1961, with an overall reduction of 35 percent. After stabilizing briefly, the personnel strength of Headquarters, Marine Corps grew sharply from 1965 to 1969, reaching a postwar high of 3,490 personnel in 1969. Beginning in 1970, the trend has been downward with a significant reduction in 1977.

The Air Staff also grew in the immediate postwar period: from 4,874 personnel in 1948 to a peak of 8,339 personnel in 1956. Since that time, the size of the Air Staff has continued to decline. The authorized strength in 1985 is a postwar low.

The overall downward trend in the end strengths of the military headquarters staffs is shown in the following summary table:

**TRENDS IN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF MILITARY
HEADQUARTERS STAFFS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	12,990	14,423	8,023	3,319	3,211
Navy	1,971	2,364	2,414	1,729	2,029
Marine Corps.....	2,509	2,203	2,596	508	503
Air Force.....	6,682	6,569	4,612	2,930	2,769

Regarding the relative number of civilian and military personnel assigned to the military headquarters staffs, there is a significant trend toward greater percentages of military personnel in all four staffs. The data in the following table show this trend:

**MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	23.1	22.7	38.5	47.1	44.2
Navy	47.4	52.8	56.8	68.1	64.8
Marine Corps.....	42.2	43.8	55.2	74.6	73.6
Air Force.....	40.6	41.1	47.7	57.1	58.9

c. Combined Staffs

When the personnel data for the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are combined, the greater extent to which the work of the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is conducted by military personnel is quite clear.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOP
MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DE-
PARTMENTS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	22.2	22.4	36.6	45.7	44.2
Navy	39.3	41.2	50.6	60.4	58.2
Air Force.....	40.1	41.1	46.7	55.8	57.3

In the Army and Air Force, the Secretariats have increased as a percentage of the total personnel assigned to the top management headquarters. While the Navy Secretariat represents a substantially greater portion of the total work force of the top management headquarters, its current percentage is lower than in 1950 and 1960.

**PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEAD-
QUARTERS**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	7.4	5.7	9.0	9.8	10.3
Navy	27.1	27.6	20.8	26.5	24.1
Air Force.....	6.3	7.5	9.5	9.8	9.9


**C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY DEPART-
MENTS**

The Military Departments are large organizations encompassing both Washington headquarters organizations and substantial field commands, bureaus, and activities. The major organizational elements of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are graphically presented in Charts 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3, respectively. This study will focus on seven organizations that constitute the top management headquarters of the three Military Departments:

- Office of the Secretary of the Army
- Office of the Secretary of the Navy
- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
- Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
- Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

While organizations subordinate to these seven headquarters may be in need of structural and management reform, evaluation of such needs are beyond the scope of this study.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY



NAVY DEPARTMENT


SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

OPERATING FORCES

*ALSO INCLUDES OTHER DESIGNATED ACTIVITIES NOT SHOWN ON THE CHART WHICH ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS DEPICTED.

Department of the Air Force

CHART 6-3



1. Service Secretariats

a. Organization

The current structure of each Military Department is generally similar. Each is headed by a Secretary whose position and general duties are mandated by statute (Sections 3012, 5031, and 8012 of title 10, United States Code). Under these statutes, only the Secretary of the Air Force is required to be "appointed from civilian life by the President, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." (Requirements and procedures for appointment of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy are not prescribed in statute.) However, the Air Force requirement and procedure are followed for all three Service Secretaries.

Additionally, each Military Department is authorized an Under Secretary who is appointed by the President from civilian life, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each Under Secretary succeeds to the duties of the respective Service Secretary if there is a vacancy in that office or during the Secretary's temporary absence. The duties of the Service Under Secretaries are not prescribed by law.

Each Military Department has a number of assistant secretaries. The Department of the Army is authorized five; the Department of the Navy, four; and the Department of the Air Force, three. Under the authorizing statutes, each Military Department must designate one of its assistant secretaries as Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the duties of that position are prescribed by law. In addition, the Department of the Army also must designate one of its assistant secretaries as Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, and the duties of that position are prescribed by law. The titles and duties of the remaining authorized assistant secretaries (three in the Army, three in the Navy, and two in the Air Force) are not mandated by law. Administratively, the departments have established these positions as follows. Each Military Department has an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management. Likewise, an assistant secretary exists in each Department to handle research and development and related activities. Finally, the Army has an Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics while the Navy has an Assistant Secretary for Shipbuilding and Logistics. In the Air Force, the logistics function is assigned to the assistant secretary who handles research and development.

Additionally, each Military Department is required by law to have a Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller, to be appointed by the Service Secretary. The authorizing statutes specify the duties of these positions and require that at least one of these two positions in each department be occupied by a civilian.

Finally, within each Secretary's Office, there is an Office of General Counsel, an office for public affairs, an office for legislative affairs, and an administrative assistant to the Secretary. (In the Army, the position of Administrative Assistant is authorized by law.)

The organization of the three Service Secretariats is graphically depicted in Charts 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6.

CHART 6--4

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY




CHART 6-5

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY





CHART 6 - 6

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE



b. Personnel Strengths

The number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be assigned during fiscal year 1985 to the three Service Secretariats are shown in the following table:

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO SERVICE SECRETARIATS

[Fiscal Year 1985]

	Military	Civilian	Total
Army Secretariat	117	251	368
Navy Secretariat	259	547	806
Air Force Secretariat.....	133	171	304

As these personnel strengths indicate, there is a wide disparity in the size of the three Secretariats. The Navy Secretariat is more than twice as large as the Army office and 2½ times the size of the Air Force office. Section 1303 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1985 requested the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Congress on the reasons for these disparities.

In response to this requirement, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft submitted on January 7, 1985 a report, entitled *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense*. This report concludes that:

...the differences among the three organizations are attributable to the fact that each secretariat is tailored to meet the particular needs of the military department which it oversees and the management style of its chief executive, the military department secretary. They do not reflect the existence of more or less "fat" in one secretariat as compared to another, or greater efficiency in the management of one military department as compared to another. Further, the size of the secretariat, alone, does not accurately represent the management overhead of a military department. To get a complete picture, the service secretariat and service staff must be considered together. When this is done, the departmental staffs of the three military departments appear to be sized comparably in relation to the total forces which they are required to manage. (page 14)

In arriving at these conclusions, this report analyzes the number of personnel in each Military Department assigned to perform 19 major functions. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6-4. Based upon this functional comparison, the report placed the reasons for a Secretariat to have a substantially higher staffing level for particular functions into four major categories:

- *Service-unique function* —A function is performed in one Secretariat, but not in others, because it is a unique requirement of that Military Department's mission.
- *organizational placement decision* —A function is performed in a particular Secretariat, but not in others, because of a decision by a Service Secretary.
- *expanded function* —A function exists in all three Secretariats, but it is substantially broader in one Secretariat compared to another.

TABLE 6-4

Functional Comparison of Service Secretariats

	<u>FY 1985 Authorized Strengths</u>	<u>Immediate Office</u>	<u>Public Affairs</u>	<u>Operations Research</u>	<u>Legislative Liaison</u>	<u>General Counsel</u>	<u>Judge Advocate General</u>	<u>Auditor General</u>	<u>Admin Services</u>	<u>Space Policy & Systems Mgmt</u>	<u>Financial</u>	<u>Comp- troller</u>	<u>Civil Works</u>	<u>Manpower & Reserve Affairs</u>	<u>Install- ation</u>	<u>Logis- tics</u>	<u>Research & Devel- opment</u>	<u>Acquisition & Procurement</u>	<u>Ship- Building</u>	<u>Small Business</u>
ARMY	373	22	50	13	54	22	0	0	54	0	30	0	18	35	16	13	18	21	0	7
NAVY	806	20	67	22	58	73	79	2	115	0	19	184	0	53	12	10	52	13	22	5
AIR FORCE	304	19	65	0	54	35	0	0	10	25	26	0	0	21	14	10	11	14	0	0

- *program/workload emphasis* —A function exists in all three Secretariats, but it is staffed more heavily in one compared to another, because of greater workload or a decision by a Service Secretary to emphasize oversight of that function at the Secretariat level.

The following table shows the disparities between Service Secretariat staffing of functions grouped in the four categories listed above. In parenthesis behind each entry is the number of personnel assigned to that function above the lowest level assigned to either of the other two Secretariats.

DISPARITIES IN SECRETARIAT STAFFING OF VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

	Army Secretariat	Navy Secretariat	Air Force Secretariat
Service Unique Function.	Civil Works (+18).....		
	Shipbuilding (+22).
		Space Policy and Systems (+25)
Organizational Placement Decision.	Operations Research (+13).	Operations Research (+22).
	Judge Advocate General (+79).
	Comptroller (+184).
Expanded Function.	Administrative Services (+44).	Administrative Services (+105).
	General Counsel (+51).	General Counsel (+13)
Workload/ Program Emphasis.	Manpower and Reserve Affairs (+14).	Manpower and Reserve Affairs (+32).
	Research and Development (+7).	Research and Development (+41).
	Acquisition and Procurement (+8).
	Public Affairs (+17).	Public Affairs (+15)
		

The following observations can be drawn from this table:

- while each Service has one unique function, they do not have a noticeable impact on the size of the Secretariat because of the relatively similar number of personnel assigned to them;
- the placement of the Judge Advocate General and the Comptroller in the Navy Secretariat is a major cause of its larger staff size;
- the expanded functions for Administrative Services and General Counsel in the Navy Secretariat also are major causes of its larger staff size; and

- while the Navy Secretariat has more personnel assigned to Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Research and Development, these are more modest differences than in other functions.

The *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense* justifies several of these increased staff levels for the Navy Secretariat in light of the dual-Service (Navy and Marine Corps) structure of the Department of the Navy:

- the Office of the Judge Advocate General is located in the Navy Secretariat because, by law, it must provide support to two military Services, the Navy and Marine Corps. (page 12)
- the Comptroller's Office is located in the Navy Secretariat because it must oversee and integrate budget activities for two Services. In addition, a large portion of the Comptroller's organization, the Office of Budgets and Reports, is required, by law, to be located in the Navy Secretariat. (page 12)
- the Manpower and Reserve Affairs staff in the Navy Secretariat must be concerned with two separate personnel systems, each with its own particular occupational specialties, promotion and assignment practices, rank structure, manpower utilization priorities, and training needs. (pages 3 and 4)
- certain other functions demand higher staffing levels due to the increased number of staff actions required to oversee, coordinate, and integrate the activities of two separate Services and to interface with two separate Service headquarters staffs. (page 3)

There are increased staff levels for two functions that do not fit into the category of being caused by the dual-Service nature of the Department of the Navy: Administrative Services and General Counsel. These are justified in the *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense* as follows:

- The Navy Secretariat provides for most of its administrative support on an in-house basis and, in addition, supports other Navy organizations, such as the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in such areas as civilian personnel, mail, and correspondence control. (page 13)
- In addition to supporting its secretariat, the Navy General Counsel provides department-wide legal advice and services and, also, has a large centralized litigation staff which handles all major law suits involving the Navy. (page 12)

2. Service Military Headquarters Staffs

a. Organization

The headquarters staffs of the four Services are organized under the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. These positions are each mandated by statute (sections 3034, 5081, 8034, and 5201 respectively of title 10, United States Code), and the incumbents are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. While each of these officers performs his duties under the direction of his Service Secretary, the statutes clearly provide for such direction only for the Army

and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. In statute, the Chief of Naval Operations is given a special status not provided to the other Service Chiefs:

The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval adviser to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war... (section 5081, title 10, United States Code)

The headquarters staffs that support the four Service Chiefs are addressed differently in the statutes. For the Army and Air Force, these staffs are identified in statute as the Army Staff and the Air Staff (Chapters 305 and 805, respectively, of title 10, United States Code). The composition of these two staffs and a limitation on the number of military officers that may be assigned to them in peacetime are prescribed in the statutes. In the case of the Army Staff, the limit is 3,000 officers. For the Air Staff, no more than 2,800 officers may be so assigned.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps are not prescribed in statute. In addition, there are no limitations on the number of officers who may be assigned in peacetime to these headquarters staffs.

Each Service Chief has a Vice Chief, entitled Vice Chief of Staff in the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy, and Assistant Commandant in the Marine Corps. Of these four officers, only the Vice Chief of Naval Operations is required by law to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The statutes also differ in prescribing the positions of less senior military officials in these four headquarters staffs:

Army—the Army Staff may have four Deputy Chiefs of Staff and five Assistant Chiefs of Staff;

Navy—the Chief of Naval Operations may have six Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations, and there is no limit on the number of Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations;

Marine Corps—there is no limit on the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff serving the Commandant; and

Air Force—the Air Staff may have five Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and there is no limit on the number of Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

The senior leadership positions in each of the four military headquarters staffs are compared in Table 6-5. The organization of these staffs is graphically depicted in Charts 6-7 through 6-10.

The statutes also vary widely in terms of military officials who must be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. These differences are shown in Table 6-6.

TABLE 6-5

COMPARISON OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
1. Senior Administrative Officer	Director of the Army Staff	Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Chief of Staff	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
2. Deputy Chiefs of Staff/Naval Operations	Personnel Operations and Plans Logistics Research, Development, and Acquisition	Manpower, Personnel, and Training Plans, Policy, and Operations Logistics Submarine Warfare Surface Warfare Air Warfare	Manpower Plans, Policies, and Operations Installations and Logistics Research, Development, and Studies Requirements and Programs Aviation Training Reserve Affairs	Manpower and Personnel Plans and Operations Logistics and Engineering Research, Development, and Acquisition Programs and Resources
3. Senior Financial Officer	Comptroller of the Army	---	Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps	Comptroller of the Air Force
4. Assistant Chiefs of Staff/ Navy Directors	Intelligence Information Management	Naval Intelligence Command and Control Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program Planning Naval Warfare	---	Intelligence Information Systems Studies and Analyses

CHART 6-7
THE ARMY STAFF




CHART 6-8

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS




CHART 6-9

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS




CHART 6-10
THE AIR STAFF




TABLE 6-6

MILITARY OFFICER POSITIONS REQUIRING APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND
CONSENT OF THE SENATE

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
Chief of Staff	Chief of Naval Operations Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Commandant	Chief of Staff
Surgeon General	Surgeon General		Surgeon General
Judge Advocate General	Judge Advocate General		Judge Advocate General
Assistant Judge Advocate General			Deputy Judge Advocate General
General Officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps			
Chief of Chaplains	Chief of Chaplains of the Navy		
Chief of Army Reserve			Chief of Air Force Reserve
Chief of National Guard Bureau			
Chief of Engineers	Chief of Naval Personnel Chief of Naval Research Director of Budgets and Reports		

b. Personnel Strengths

The number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be assigned during fiscal year 1985 to the Service headquarters staffs are shown in the following table. To establish the total size of the top management headquarters of each Military Department, the personnel strengths of the Secretariats are also included in this table.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

[Fiscal Year 1985]

	Service Staffs			Service Secretariats			Combined		
	Mil.	Civ.	Total	Mil.	Civ.	Total	Mil.	Civ.	Total
Army	1,419	1,792	3,211	117	251	368	1,536	2,043	3,579
Navy/Marine									
Corps	1,685	847	2,532	259	547	806	1,944	1,394	3,338
Air Force	1,630	1,139	2,769	133	171	304	1,763	1,310	3,073

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

The predominance of the power and influence of the four Services in decision-making is the most critical organizational problem of DoD. As John G. Kester states in his paper, "Do We Need the Service Secretary?":

...the greatest organizational shortcoming of the Department of Defense always has been dominance by the services at the expense of truly joint military preparation and planning. That difficulty has been papered over, since McNamara's time, by building a large OSD staff around the secretary of defense to do things that the parochial services cannot be trusted to do. The underlying defect has never been cured. (*The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 166)

Parochial Service positions have dominated for three basic reasons: (1) OSD is not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill the major missions of DoD; (2) the JCS system is dominated by the Services who retain an effective veto over nearly every JCS action; and (3) the unified commands are also dominated by the Services primarily through the strength and independence of the Service component commanders and constraints placed upon the power and influence of the unified commanders. In sum, the problem of undue Service influence arises principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for "truly joint military preparation and planning."

Noting this critical problem, some have urged that the four separate Services be disestablished and combined into one uniformed Service, as Canada has done. There is little evidence to support the need for such drastic action in the U.S. military establishment. First, there are substantial benefits to having the four separate