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### b. Personnel Strengths

The number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be assigned during fiscal year 1985 to the Service headquarters staffs are shown in the following table. To establish the total size of the top management headquarters of each Military Department, the personnel strengths of the Secretariats are also included in this table.

## PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

[Fiscal Year 1985]

	Service Staffs			Service Secretariats			Combined		
	Mil.	Civ.	Total	Mil.	Civ.	Total	Mil.	Civ.	Total
Army .....	1,419	1,792	3,211	117	251	368	1,536	2,043	3,579
Navy/Marine									
Corps .....	1,685	847	2,532	259	547	806	1,944	1,394	3,338
Air Force .....	1,630	1,139	2,769	133	171	304	1,763	1,310	3,073

### D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

The predominance of the power and influence of the four Services in decision-making is the most critical organizational problem of DoD. As John G. Kester states in his paper, "Do We Need the Service Secretary?":

...the greatest organizational shortcoming of the Department of Defense always has been dominance by the services at the expense of truly joint military preparation and planning. That difficulty has been papered over, since McNamara's time, by building a large OSD staff around the secretary of defense to do things that the parochial services cannot be trusted to do. The underlying defect has never been cured. (*The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 166)

Parochial Service positions have dominated for three basic reasons: (1) OSD is not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill the major missions of DoD; (2) the JCS system is dominated by the Services who retain an effective veto over nearly every JCS action; and (3) the unified commands are also dominated by the Services primarily through the strength and independence of the Service component commanders and constraints placed upon the power and influence of the unified commanders. In sum, the problem of undue Service influence arises principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for "truly joint military preparation and planning."

Noting this critical problem, some have urged that the four separate Services be disestablished and combined into one uniformed Service, as Canada has done. There is little evidence to support the need for such drastic action in the U.S. military establishment. First, there are substantial benefits to having the four separate

Services. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown addresses this issue in his book, *Thinking About National Security*:

Any organization as large as the Department of Defense must be divided into major operating units, with appropriate authority delegated to them. Historically, having an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines has made considerable sense. Each service has definable functions, and the land, sea, and air environments differ sufficiently to call for differing skills, experience, and sometimes even equipment. The morale and esprit in the military have largely come from service identifications. Recruiting, training, and personnel functions up to a certain level are clearly best carried out in such a structure. Attempts to substitute for service identification some general professional military identification, or a functional identification that would go with the activities of particular unified or specified commands, are unlikely to work as well. (page 207)

Former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert supported this view in his article, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?":

Looking at the big picture of service roles and missions, no reason for separate services seems more important than the freedom to apply many years of thinking and experience to operational concepts and weapon requirements. In the Army, Navy and Air Force, and in the Marines, too, a sense of professionalism has been distilled to: develop each requirement; design and produce the suitable weapon; devise the doctrine to govern its proper use in battle; then train and supply the troops to operate that weapon effectively in a familiar medium. (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, pages 477 and 478)

The second reason for retaining the four-Service structure of DoD is that there are numerous and less drastic actions that can be taken —as presented in this study —to provide for more effective integration of Service capabilities and for more useful joint military preparation and planning. For these reasons, the basic four-Service structure of the Department of Defense remains a viable concept.

While the larger problem of undue Service power and influence can most effectively be corrected by changes outside of the Military Departments, there are deficiencies internal to the Departments that, if corrected, could improve their organizational performance. This section discusses four problem areas that have been identified within the Military Departments and presents analyses of their contributing causes. First, there is substantial confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the Service Secretaries. Second, there are unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort within the top management headquarters of the Military Departments. The third problem area is that the Military Departments, like OSD, suffer from inexperienced political appointees. The last problem area is the limited utility of the current assignments of Service roles and missions and the absence of effective mechanisms for changing those assignments.

## 1. CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

The confusion concerning the roles of Service Secretaries is most clearly confirmed by the divergent views of those roles by individuals who are or have been a part of the U.S. military establishment. These individuals share some common views. Most believe that the Service Secretary has an important role as an implementor of effective civilian control of the military although those who cited this role did not agree upon the meaning of civilian control. Many others, but not all, believe that it is the Service Secretary's role to be an advocate for his Military Department's point of view. While some common views were found, conflicting views were prevalent.

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the three incumbent Service Secretaries and one former Service Secretary presented divergent views on principal Service Secretary roles. The Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., emphasized the role of Service advocate:

...if Service Secretaries and their staffs are eliminated it would deny one element in the present structure which I believe to be a considerable source of strength. That element is the role of the Service Secretary as the advocate for the Service... (Part 6, page 217)

In contrast, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, stated:

...In practice the Service Secretaries should be the senior civilian counselors to the Secretary of Defense on all military matters, operational as well as administrative. (Part 6, page 226)

In line with this, Secretary Lehman stated:

...The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries must worry as much about the soundness of military strategy, military operations, military weapons and military leadership as they do about the soundness of contract procedures and spare parts procurement. (Part 6, page 225)

In this same context, he adds:

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, as the principal civilian advisors to the Secretary of Defense, have a voice in the formulation of military strategy. (Part 6, page 260)

Secretary Lehman's views regarding the similarity of the roles of the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries can be better understood by his statement that

...I am sure had I been Secretary of the Navy in the fifties, I would have opposed strongly the deletion of the Service Secretaries from both the chain of command and the Cabinet... (Part 6, page 228)

The Secretary of the Air Force, Verne Orr, emphasized the role of exercising civilian supervision of Military Department programs as well as the following role:

...I also perform a coordinating role between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its staff and the Air Force. (Part 6, page 231)

Former Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas emphasized a different role:

...it seems to me that their [Service Secretaries] principal role is and ought to be a managerial one. (Part 6, page 255)

John G. Kester, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army and a former Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, has written that:

Today how a service secretary fills his day depends mostly on himself. Although there are few limits on what an active secretary might do, there are few particular things he must do. Staffs above and below would be happy to take over most of his activities. His office, though it has a traditional title, really is defined so broadly as hardly to be described at all. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 154)

From the foregoing, there can be little doubt that there is confusion and lack of understanding about what the Service Secretary should be doing as the "head" of a Military Department. There are three basic causes of confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries: (1) misconceptions about the roles of the Service Secretaries in the unified Department of Defense; (2) efforts to provide independence for the Service Secretaries from the Secretary of Defense; and (3) lack of consistency and specificity in statutory descriptions of Service Secretary positions.

#### a. Misconceptions about the Roles of Service Secretaries

As in many other areas, there has been a failure to determine what role the Service Secretaries should play in the unified Department of Defense. With the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947, the Service Secretaries remained powerful individuals. Their relationship to the Secretary of Defense, however, was never precisely defined. As the role of the Secretary of Defense was clarified and strengthened in 1949, 1953, and 1958, little attention was given to what roles could usefully be fulfilled by the Service Secretaries. In essence, there has been little, if any, redefining of the Service Secretary's roles during his transition from head of an independent, executive-level department to a subordinate of a powerful Secretary of Defense. As John Kester notes:

The role secretaries of Defense have allocated for service secretaries never has been fixed. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 159)

Similarly, the Defense Manpower Commission stated:

In all of the services there is a distinct lack of definition as to what the duties of this layer (service secretaries) are other than being "responsible" for policy. (Volume I, Working Paper C, page 25)

Similarly, Eugene M. Zuckert discusses the confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries that existed when he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Air Force in 1961 —14 years after the position of Secretary of Defense had been established. In his article, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?", Zuckert confirms that the roles of the Service Secretary had not been redefined:

Those first six months [of Zuckert's tenure as Secretary of the Air Force] were frankly disappointing because the scope and duties of the job were stripped down from those which had surrounded Symington's stewardship [as Assistant Secretary of War for Air in the immediate post World War II period]. A comprehensive management study was prepared by my staff and the barriers that lay between my office and the job I thought I had been hired to do were laid out in detail. (page 465)

While Zuckert later recognized the emergence of "a new, important job for the Air Force Secretary as a defense manager," (page 465) it is uncertain that such a clarification of the roles of the Service Secretary were understood or accepted by many others, either during the 1960's or now.

The most important change in the position of the Service Secretary is that he no longer is at the top of the organization, but rather in the middle. While he continues to represent his Service —his principal role prior to 1947 —the Service Secretary must now also meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense. John Kester comments on this new role and its demands:

The secretary inevitably is a man in the middle —in part an advocate for his service to the secretary of defense, in part a firm preceptor who must persuade his service and the Congress that it should accept the secretary of defense's program and the president's budget, even if he personally disagrees with some of the decisions. He has to know what balance to strike, and when to inject some ideas of his own. If his service perceives him as a politically ambitious transient or a supine tool of the Defense staff [OSD], he will be unable to keep them from running around him to the Congress and the press, and will lose their needed help. But if he becomes simply a loudspeaker for service demands, he will not be able to help his service at all. The secretary of defense will pay him no heed (as happened in the 1950s with Army Secretary Wilber Brucker). ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", pages 157 and 158)

Misconceptions about their roles have precluded Service Secretaries from striking the proper balance between their two major responsibilities. They have generally given much more attention to their role as Service advocates. Kester notes the problem of overemphasis of the advocacy role:

As these three offices are used now, they are misconceived. The service secretaries are not needed in order to bolster the services. The service staffs are too strong already. What the service secretaries ought to be doing is not acting as uncritical service advocates, but rather riding herd on the service staffs

to make sure that their activities really fit into the overall defense plan and that it is the overall defense needs that dominate. Their preoccupation should be, not service prerogatives, but rather to protect Defense activities from service parochialism. (page 165)

...This is not to say that a service secretary should never argue for his service's favorite programs. It does not deny that each service has perspectives that ought to be brought to the secretary of defense's attention. It is, though, to suggest that the service secretary ought to use far more selectivity, and support his service staff when he knows that its position really fits into the larger defense needs. "They ought to be filters," one secretary of defense complained. "Instead, they're amplifiers." The service secretary's reason for being is not to provide yet another voice for parochialism in a department that is far less effectively centralized, and far less capable of joint military activities, than many people imagine. (page 166)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* also noted a lack of balance in the roles played by Service Secretaries:

...The time has passed when the Service Secretary's role can be confined to advocacy alone. The Department of Defense, after all, is a single department with its component elements constituting a Defense team. As such, the Service Secretary must be both an advocate for his Service as well as a representative at the Service level of the Secretary of Defense. If the job is to be carried out properly, it must be regarded by both the Service Secretary and the Secretary of Defense as consisting of two parts —the proponent head of a major operating element, and an official of the DoD as a whole, subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. (page 42)

Secretaries of Defense apparently are also confused about the roles of the Service Secretaries. Consistently, Secretaries of Defense have failed to understand the important roles that Service Secretaries can play and have increasingly paid less attention to them. Too often the Secretary of Defense and OSD have dealt directly with Service Chiefs on issues that should be taken up with the Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense has also permitted Service Chiefs to end-run their Secretaries by raising issues through the JCS system that should not be addressed in that forum. Both of these actions undercut the Service Secretaries.

Secretaries of Defense have also failed to ensure that highly qualified and skilled personnel are appointed as Service Secretaries. John Kester cites this fact:

There has always been a temptation, for presidents and secretaries of defense, to assume that the services run themselves well enough, so that the service secretary positions can safely be distributed as political patronage or to satisfy particular constituencies. (page 156)

Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Retired) believes that there may also be a desire by Secretaries of Defense to avoid the appointment of powerful Service Secretaries who could challenge the authority of the Secretary of Defense and be "divisive obstacles to progress."

This could be especially troubling if they were heavily focused on advocating Service interests. Captain Schratz cites this as the initial view of Secretary McNamara (who later changed his position and sought strong Service Secretaries):

...McNamara initially saw a strong, analytical type of service secretary as a rallying point for service loyalties and hence a divisive threat to his own full exercise of authority. ("The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 23)

As a result of these tendencies by Secretaries of Defense and Presidents, the capabilities of Service Secretaries have varied greatly. Colonel Daleski, USAF comments as follows on the capabilities of Service Secretaries:

...it has been argued convincingly that the Service Secretaries' actual contributions...have been minimal because of the personal characteristics of many who have served in those positions. More often than not, secretarial positions have been seen as ways of satisfying political debts with the result that incumbents typically have suffered from little or no relevant experience in defense management. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, page 12)

b. Efforts to Provide Independence for the Service Secretaries from the Secretary of Defense

Since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, there has been a concerted effort to ensure that the Military Departments and their civilian Secretaries retained sufficient influence to protect Service interests and to voice Service points of view. At issue is whether such efforts have gone too far and have given the Services too much power to pursue their narrow interests. The evidence suggests that the degree of Service independence hinders unified direction and control of the Department of Defense.

Specifically, efforts to provide independence for the Services and their Secretaries have led to a lack of assurance that decisions by higher authority will be faithfully executed by the Military Departments. While seeking to ensure that the Military Departments have the ability to forcefully present divergent views in the DoD decision-making process, the independence provided to them and their Secretaries from various sources has given them the ability to impede the execution of major decisions.

While the Services employ numerous methods for impeding execution of major decisions, a frequent tactic is delay. During a period of delay, a Service will seek to develop new considerations that will force a formal reexamination of the issue. While these new considerations may sometimes lead to a better decision, this period of delay may frequently result in the loss of important opportunities. Given their remoteness from actual implementation, the Secretary of Defense and his staff are not likely to be aware for an extended period that implementation is being delayed. The Secretary of Defense needs the forceful support of the Service Secretaries to protect the integrity of his decisions. The support that the

Secretary of Defense has traditionally received has been inadequate.

There is, however, another point of view on this issue: the capacity of the Military Departments to impede the execution of major decisions is a necessary check upon the centralized power of the Secretary of Defense. That is, the ability of the Military Departments to exercise this type of veto power on some apparently final decisions is really a part of the decision-making process, because it assures the fullest consideration of the military's point of view. This view, however, appears to contradict the underlying principles of a unified Department of Defense and of a Secretary of Defense with "authority, direction, and control of the Department of Defense."

It also is said that leadership, not organization, is at the heart of this problem. Some observers doubt that any organizational change will alter this practice. Rather, they believe this type of practice exists in any large organization and that the leadership qualities of the Secretary of Defense and his relationship to his Service Secretaries are far more important in getting decisions executed than are organizational arrangements. For example, Martin Hoffman, a former Secretary of the Army, former General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and former Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, holds this view. In his opinion, the present organizational structure in the Department of Defense is capable of making optimal decisions and obtaining effective execution if, *but probably only if*, the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries are each good leaders and the Secretary of Defense uses the Service Secretaries as a "kitchen-cabinet." Hoffman believes that this type of organizational relationship was the one intended by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments.

In line with this view, observers believe that the Secretary of Defense presently has the legal authority to ensure that decisions are properly executed by the Military Departments, and it is only because the Secretary of Defense fails or chooses not to exercise that power that the Military Departments can hinder apparently final DoD decisions. While it is clear that the Secretary of Defense has the necessary legal authority, there are many obstacles to his use of that authority and to his efforts to exert stronger leadership.

Independence for the Service Secretaries and the Military Departments results from: (1) statutory authority for independent recommendations by the Service Secretaries to the Congress; (2) independent political bases of Service Secretaries and other senior civilian officials in the Military Departments; and (3) the sheer size of the top management headquarters of the Military Departments.

#### (1) Statutory Authority for Independent Recommendations

When the position of Secretary of Defense was created in 1947, opponents of unification and those who desired to check the power of this new official sought to preserve a degree of independence for the three Service Secretaries. One of the means that the Congress chose in 1947 to provide independence was to give statutory authority to each Service Secretary, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to make any recommendation to the President or to the Director of the Budget relating to his department as that Servic

Secretary deemed appropriate. In 1949, the Congress changed this authority to permit the Service Secretaries (and JCS members), after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to make any recommendation to the Congress relating to the Department of Defense. This latter statutory authority—which still exists—contributes to confusion about the authority, responsibility, and role of the Service Secretaries. The history of this authority is traced in more detail in the following paragraphs.

When the National Military Establishment was created in 1947, the three Military Departments were executive level departments and the Service Secretaries were permanent members of the National Security Council along with the Secretary of Defense. During that organizational era, the Congress gave the three Secretaries the right, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present any report to the President or the Director of the Budget. President Truman, in his Message to Congress on March 7, 1949, recommended that the Secretaries lose that right of appeal as part of the reorganization of the U.S. military establishment and the redesignation of the three executive departments as Military Departments. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 79)

In considering the legislation encompassing the President's recommendations, the Senate supported the abolition of the Service Secretaries' right to appeal directly to the President. The Senate Committee on Armed Services said in its report on the bill:

This proviso as set forth in the 1947 act specifically continued to the Secretaries of the military departments their authority as heads of executive departments to present recommendations and reports directly to the President or the Director of the Budget, after first informing the Secretary of Defense. The elimination of this wording is considered essential by the committee in view of the fact that under the proposed legislation the three military departments no longer have status as executive departments, as they did under the 1947 act. This change reflects the evidence presented to this effect by the overwhelming majority of witnesses which testified before the Committee. It is, of course, quite obvious that nothing in the 1947 act or the amendments proposed herein limits in any way the power or the propriety of the Congress calling upon the Secretaries of the military departments, or anyone else in the Military Establishment, for such reports or recommendations as the Congress may desire. (Senate Report No. 366, 81st Congress, 1st Session, to accompany S. 1843, page 7).

The House of Representatives did not, however, agree with the Senate position. As a result, the conference committee adopted language permitting the Service Secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to the Congress (vice the President or the Director of the Budget) any recommendation on national defense, after first informing the Secretary of Defense.

Despite the objections of President Truman to the statutory independence provided the Service Secretaries, the net effect of congressional action on the 1949 amendment was to strengthen this independence. While the earlier authority of the Service Secretaries permitted them to circumvent the Secretary of Defense, after 1949,

they were also authorized to end-run the President. In addition, while the earlier authority was restricted to addressing Executive Branch relations, the 1949 amendment authorized direct appeal outside the Executive Branch. The Congress essentially transformed the Service Secretaries and JCS members into quasi-agents of the Legislative Branch.

In 1958, this issue again arose after President Eisenhower sent a Message to the Congress suggesting certain reorganizations of the Department of Defense. In that message, President Eisenhower had emphasized that, "(We) must remove all doubt as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense," and that "we be done with prescribing controversy by law." He further recommended "eliminating from the National Security Act...the other needless and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secretary of Defense." Shortly thereafter, the President transmitted proposed legislation to the Congress which would have abolished the right of the Service Secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense. The resulting bill, as reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services and passed by the Senate, would have abolished the Service Secretaries' right to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, but would have permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either individually or as a group, to make such recommendations to committees of the Congress.

However, the bill reported by the House Committee on Armed Services continued the existing authorities. When the President objected in writing to this provision, which he viewed as an invitation to "legalized insubordination", an amendment in support of the President's objection failed on the House floor by a vote of 192 to 211. In conference, the House position once again prevailed and was explained in the conference report as a "simple repetition" of the "law which has been in existence for the past 9 years."

This right of Service Secretaries to present recommendations to the Congress, still in law 36 years after the Military Departments lost their executive department status and 38 years after the Service Secretaries became subordinates of the Secretary of Defense, continues to contribute to the confusion surrounding the role of the Service Secretaries. By continuing the authority of the Service Secretaries to present independent recommendations to the Congress, the Congress has encouraged Service Secretaries and their staffs to take the case for their point of view outside of DoD.

A contemporary example of this capacity is the Navy's successful blockage of the Secretary of Defense's decision to consolidate the Army's Military Traffic Management Command and the Navy's Military Sealift Command. In that situation, discussed fully in Chapter 9, the Secretary of the Navy directly sought support from Members of the Congress to legislatively block this consolidation even though the Secretary of Defense, supported unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had decided and directed that the consolidation occur. This situation provides clear evidence of the lack of a clearly defined superior-subordinate relationship between a Secretary of Defense and a Secretary of a Military Department. The source of this particular problem again is the historical status of

the Military Departments as separate, independent, executive-level entities.

## (2) Independent Political Bases

Beyond the independence provided to the Service Secretaries in statute, there have also been concerted efforts to appoint senior civilian officials in the Military Departments who have independent political bases either in the White House or the Congress. Service officials with substantial outside political support can effectively frustrate initiatives of the Secretary of Defense, either by preventing issues from being raised or blocking implementation of decisions. Even when the Secretary of Defense is aware of such activities by the Service Secretaries, he may not have the political muscle to discipline or fire them. As John Kester notes:

...the secretary of defense, if he wants to be sure of their loyalty, is better off with service secretaries who do not have powerful independent political bases on Capitol Hill or in the White House, or who for any reason can think of themselves as "fire-proof." ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 158)

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also notes this problem:

...In recent years Assistant Secretaries of the Military departments have often been appointed from the ranks of Congressional staffers in an attempt to cement departmental relations with Congress. Unfortunately, this practice has increased the likelihood of Service Secretariats' trying to bypass the Secretary of Defense in dealing with Congress...short circuits result, as the former Congressional staffers revert to their earlier loyalties. (*Thinking About National Security*, page 208)

## (3) Size of the Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments

Statutory and political independence, combined with the sheer size of their top management headquarters, give the Military Departments substantial capacity to block decisions that are not consistent with their point of view from being made or implemented. As Edward N. Luttwak observed about the military headquarters staffs in his book, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*:

...At present, they [the military headquarters staffs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force] employ almost 9,000 people in uniform (mostly officers, and many of them of middle rank) —far more than in the Office of the Secretary, the Joint Staff (1,300) and the civilian-run secretariats of the Army, Navy, and Air Force combined (1,600). These numbers reveal the true balance of power: although the official table of organization puts them at the bottom —below the civilian secretariats, who are in turn below the Secretary of Defense and his Office —it is in fact the service headquarters that have the greatest power. Their huge size is only partly explained by their supervisory role over their own services (which is already the second layer of supervision, the first being provided by the management and force commands outside the Pentagon). In

fact, the size of the Washington headquarters of each service also reflects their undeclared function, which is to manipulate the Joint Staff and even more to outmaneuver the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When a civilian official in that office produces a ten-page paper to argue for some decision or other that is uncongenial to a service, its Washington staff can reply with a one-hundred-page refutation; when three civilian officials probe a questionable service proposal, its staff can assign ten officers to defend the service point of view. By controlling the information on detailed matters within the service domain, and by sheer numbers, the headquarters of each service thus systematically resist central direction. If only because of the lively possibility of a hostile Congressional reaction, stimulated by the friends of each service on Capitol Hill, Secretaries of Defense are usually reluctant to overrule professional military advice —which now comes from the service headquarters alone; and to seek alternative options from the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff is futile. (pages 280 and 281)

Luttwak notes only the power of the military headquarters staffs. However, if the military headquarters staffs have the capability to block decisions by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments —with the resources of both the military headquarters staffs and the Service Secretariats working in concert —have an even greater capacity to ensure that many unfavorable decisions are not made or, being made, are not implemented.

c. Lack of Consistency and Specificity in Statutory Descriptions of Service Secretary Positions

Part of the confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the Service Secretaries results from the different statutory descriptions of those positions. The position of Service Secretary is mandated by law, and the statutes describe each Service Secretary as the “head” of the respective Military Department. However, those same statutes, in attempting to describe what it is that the three Service Secretaries shall do as the “head” of their Departments, are neither consistent nor specific. Table 6-7 presents the statutory description of the roles of the three Service Secretaries.

TABLE 6-7

STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES  
(As Specified in Title 10, United States Code)

**§ 3012. Secretary of the Army: powers and duties; delegation by**

(a) There is a Secretary of the Army, who is the head of the Department of the Army.

(b) The Secretary is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including—

- (1) functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Army, including research and development; and
- (2) direction of the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities for the Army;
- (3) acquisition of all real estate and the issue of licenses in connection with Government reservations;
- (4) operation of water, gas, electric, and sewer utilities; and
- (5) such other activities as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense as authorized by law.

He shall perform such other duties relating to Army affairs, and conduct the business of the Department in such manner, as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(c) The Secretary may assign such of his duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army and to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army. Officers of the Army shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or any Assistant Secretary.

(d) The Secretary or, as he may prescribe, the Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary shall supervise all matters relating to—

- (1) the procurement activities of the Department of the Army; and
- (2) planning for the mobilization of materials and industrial organizations essential to the wartime needs of the Army.

(e) The Secretary, as he considers appropriate, may assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army and civilian personnel of the Department of the Army.

(f) The Secretary may change the title of any other officer, or of any activity, of the Department of the Army.

(g) The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

**§ 5031. Secretary of the Navy: responsibilities**

(a) There is a Secretary of the Navy, who is the head of the Department of the Navy. He shall administer the Department of the Navy under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to—

- (1) the procurement of naval stores and material;
- (2) the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of naval vessels; and
- (3) all matters connected with the Department of the Navy.

(c) The Secretary of the Navy has custody and charge of all books, records, and other property of the Department.

(d) The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence is in addition to the authority of the Secretary under section 6011 of this title.

**§ 8012. Secretary of the Air Force: powers and duties; delegation by**

(a) There is a Secretary of the Air Force appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Air Force.

(b) The Secretary is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including—

- (1) functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Air Force, including research and development; and
- (2) such other activities as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense as authorized by law.

He shall perform such other duties relating to Air Force affairs, and conduct the business of the Department in such manner, as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(c) The Secretary may assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Air Force and to the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. Officers of the Air Force shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary.

(d) The Secretary or, as he may prescribe, the Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary shall supervise all matters relating to—

- (1) the procurement activities of the Department of the Air Force;
- (2) planning for the mobilization of materials and industrial organizations essential to the wartime needs of the Air Force; and
- (3) activities of the reserve components of the Air Force.

(e) The Secretary, as he considers appropriate, may assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of the members of the Air Force and civilian personnel of the Department of the Air Force.

(f) The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

The lack of consistency in these descriptions can be explained, to a limited extent, by the differences in forces, roles, and missions assigned to the three Military Departments. However, these differences do not explain, for example, why the Secretary of the Navy has been given the specific statutory responsibility and authority to "execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to" the procurement of naval stores and materials, the construction, armament, equipment and employment of naval vessels, and all matters connected with the Navy. (Section 5031 of title 10, United States Code) While both the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force have the statutory responsibility and authority to conduct activities prescribed by the President and to conduct departmental affairs directed by either the President or Secretary of Defense, neither of these two Service Secretaries have the special statutory responsibility for Presidential orders as does the Secretary of the Navy.

It appears that this special statutory relationship between the President and the Secretary of the Navy is a holdover from an earlier organizational era when there was no government official other than the President to whom the Secretary of the Navy was subordinate. That is no longer the case and has not been since the creation of the position of Secretary of Defense. The continued existence of this apparently special responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy, without any evidence of need, can cause confusion and misunderstanding when attempting to define the role of the Service Secretaries.

## 2. UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

A problem area that has frequently been identified is the existence of two separate headquarters staffs (three in the Navy) in the Military Departments: the Secretariat and the military headquarters staff. Critics believe that this arrangement results in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication of effort. This criticism must be considered in the context of the numerous staff layers that are involved in virtually every issue having multi-Service considerations: substantial staffs at one or more field commands or activities of each Service, the large military headquarters staffs, the Service Secretariats, the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and often the staffs of one or more unified or specified commands and the Joint Staff.

It is a generally accepted principle of organization that unnecessary layers of supervision result in delays and micro-management and are counterproductive and inefficient. Additionally, while duplication of effort within an organization may be useful at times, if that duplication of effort does not result in some specific benefit to the organization, then the duplication is unnecessary and inefficient.

The problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is compounded by the excessive spans of control of the Service Chiefs of Staff. (For this discussion of span of control, the Service Chief, Vice Chief, and senior administrative officer (e.g., Director of the Army Staff) are treated as one entity.) The Army Chief of Staff

has 42 officials reporting directly to him (25 of whom are on the Army Staff); the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials (23 in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations); the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials (21 on the Air Staff); and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials (23 in Headquarters, Marine Corps). The large and cumbersome spans of control make effective supervision and coordination much more difficult.

A number of studies of DoD organization have identified the existence of two separate headquarters staffs in the Military Departments as a problem. In December 1960, the report of the Committee on the Defense Establishment, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, identified this issue as a problem and emphasized the need

...to minimize the duplication and delay growing out of the present multiple layers of control...(page 7)

Similarly, the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* in July 1970 found:

There also appears to be substantial duplication in all Military Departments between the Secretariat staffs and the military staffs. (page 38)

The April 1976 report of the Defense Manpower Commission cast the issue of duplication of effort in a large context:

Three layers [OSD, Service Secretariats, and military headquarters staffs] at the Department of Defense (DoD) executive level involved in manpower and personnel policy, planning and programming, and to some extent, operations, appear to be excessive. Given the basic nature of the Department of Defense, two layers —Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services [military headquarters staffs] —should suffice... (*Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security*, page 89)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study*, submitted in June 1978, also focused upon layering in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments and its associated redundancy and duplication. In this regard, the study stated:

...we believe that layers should be reduced when their number produces duplication rather than a needed diversity of views. (page 45)

In his book, *Thinking About National Security*, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that within the Military Departments there is a need

To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure...(page 208)

Some integration of the Service Secretariat and the military headquarters staff has been undertaken in each of the Military Departments. In each department, there is only one staff for legislative affairs and only one staff for public affairs. Each of these staffs have civilian and military members, but the staffs in both of these areas provide single-source support for both the Service Secretary and Chief. A number of years ago, the Air Force integrated its two staffs for civilian personnel matters into one staff, and the Army

has recently completed an integration of its two staffs in this functional area.

However, not everyone agrees that the existence of two separate Service headquarters staffs results in either an unnecessary layer of supervision or unnecessary duplication of effort. There is a body of opinion that the two staffs serve separate and necessary functions. Some believe, for example, that the advice and recommendations by the military headquarters staff, not only in operational areas but also on resource allocation issues, should be unfettered by political considerations. These individuals argue that it is the responsibility of the Service Secretariats to interpose these considerations and that this responsibility is necessarily separate from the responsibility of the military headquarters staff.

Others urge that the Service Secretariats provide a measure of continuity and "corporate memory" to the Military Departments which is not possible with an essentially "transient" military headquarters staff. Such arguments are based, however, upon the mistaken assumption that the Service Secretariat is composed of permanent civilian, as opposed to transient military, personnel. In fact, between 32 percent and 44 percent of the Service Secretariats are military personnel. In addition, between 26 percent and 56 percent of the military headquarters staffs are composed of permanent civilian employees. Assuming that continuity and corporate memory come from permanent civilian employees as compared to military personnel, it seems those factors are not unique to the Service Secretariats. It should also be noted that in the senior leadership positions, the Secretariats are just as transient as the military headquarters staffs, given the relatively rapid rate of turnover of political appointees.

Finally, others note that the Service Secretaries and their staffs bring a different set of experiences and viewpoints to bear on program management and on many other military departmental matters which are helpful in reaching optimum decisions. That is, the political, budgeting, acquisition management, civic, and academic points of view and skills interposed into the decision-making process by the Service Secretariat can help provide better overall decisions than if only military skills and points of view are present. For example, the opportunity to manage or the experience in overseeing budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars or programs having nationwide political impact does not often arise in the military environment. Yet, a Service Secretary needs people on his staff that have that experience and expertise.

The need of a Service Secretary to have such experience and expertise available to him does not seem, however, to be relative to the issue of whether separate staffs are necessary, but only whether the Service Secretary will be permitted appropriate flexibility to obtain those experts and experienced personnel who are necessary to advise him. That is, it may be sufficient to ensure that such experience and expertise is available to the Service Secretary, without regard to whether it comes from the Secretariat, military headquarters staff, or an integrated staff. In short, this issue seems more related to the Secretary's ability to obtain needed support, not whether unnecessary supervision and duplication exist.

There are two causes of the unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort: (1) the current organizational arrangements are a holdover from an earlier era when the Service Secretaries headed executive-level departments; and (2) inability of the Service Secretaries to effectively control the military headquarters staffs.

a. Holdover from an Earlier Era

The existence of two separate headquarters staffs predates the creation of the Department of Defense. Prior to the National Security Act of 1947, the staff of each Service Secretary as a head of an executive-level department was a very small cadre of advisors. Under the 1947 Act, the departments were continued as executive-level departments and the Service Secretaries retained their own staffs. This organizational scheme continued through the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, even though the departments lost their status as executive departments and even though the Service Secretaries were removed from the National Security Council. Although there have been minor changes in the Service Secretariats in the intervening 30 years, the existence of a Service Secretariat and a military headquarters staff in each of the Military Departments essentially is the result of the structure in effect prior to the creation of the Department of Defense.

b. Failure of the Service Secretaries to Effectively Control the Military Headquarters Staffs

The second cause of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is the failure of the Service Secretaries to effectively control the military headquarters staffs. Given this failure, the Service Secretaries created or maintained large Secretariats in an attempt to provide this control.

John Kester comments on this issue as follows:

DoD officials have not been immune to the bureaucratic tendencies to build new staffs rather than try to make the existing ones work, and to assume, contrary to managerial logic, that any new task assigned should mean not reordering of priorities, but addition of more people. For instance, the endemic failures of the JCS to support successive secretaries of defense led not to reform of the JCS, but rather to a mammoth Office of the Secretary of Defense. The failure of service secretaries to get control of the military staffs of their departments led to the expansion of secretariats of their own that they could order around without having to worry about footdragging by a double-hatted chief of staff and his deputies....In spite of ritual complaints, the chiefs of staff have not particularly resisted the trend of service secretariat expansion; for if the civilian secretary has his own secretariat to play with, he may stay more out of the chief's hair and leave the large military staff to him. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", pages 161-162)

In essence, the large Service Secretariats exist because the Secretaries could not make the military headquarters staffs responsive to them. Instead of attacking the basic problem, the solution was to create or maintain a large bureaucracy—the Secretariat—to supposedly provide this control. It is not evident that the desired con-

trol has been achieved. It is evident that unnecessary layers and duplication have resulted.

### 3. INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

In Chapter 3 dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the problem area of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions was identified. The Service Secretariats have the identical problem with many of the same causes. The basic causes identified in Chapter 3 are: (1) appointment of senior civilian executives who lack a substantial background in national security affairs primarily because senior civilian appointments are used as political patronage; (2) a high turnover rate of senior civilians; (3) numerous and lengthy vacancies in these positions; and (4) substantial financial disincentives for individuals appointed to such positions. As these causes are presented in detail in Chapter 3, they will not be repeated here.

The problem of inexperienced political appointees is even more critical in the Service Secretariats than in OSD. This results from the unfavorable perceptions of key offices in the Secretariats, including the position of Service Secretary. John Kester discusses the unfavorable perception of the position of Service Secretary:

We do not have to search long to find civilians —many close to the secretary of defense —who sneer that the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are today about as obsolete as the rigging on the *Pinafore*. Nor is there a shortage of uniformed officers who maintain that civilian appointees in the Department of Defense in general, and the three service secretaries in particular, too often are naive and transient amateurs who know little about their jobs; who act at the whim of a mysterious and unprincipled force called politics; who if they begin to learn anything about their duties will leave office soon after; and who are best treated like a senile great-uncle — with honor, compassion, comfortable surroundings, and no important responsibilities. By that view, such eminences are to be piped aboard, chauffeured about, and generally kept harmlessly amused while the serious work of the world goes on around them. (“Do We Need the Service Secretary?”, page 149)

Colonel Daleski also found unfavorable views of the Service Secretaries:

...To some, Service Secretaries are anachronisms —without useful function, irrelevant to contemporary defense policy — and indeed major contributors to the “confusion” that surrounds the discussion of important defense issues. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, page 1)

These attitudes result from misconceptions of the role of the Secretary and his staff and from the failure of the Secretary of Defense to emphasize these important positions. Since there is no clear understanding of what a Service Secretary and his principal assistants should do, there is not clear understanding of the types of experience and qualifications which should be sought for these

positions. As to the failure of Secretaries of Defense to emphasize these positions, Kester notes:

...secretaries of defense in recent years have acted less and less as if service secretaries mattered; that sends a message, too. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 150)

Given this unfavorable perception, Service positions have limited appeal to talented and experienced candidates.

#### 4. LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

A final problem area relating to the Military Departments is the limited utility of the general statutory and administrative assignment of roles and missions among the Services and the absence of effective mechanisms for changes to these assignments. The assignment of roles and missions was an overriding concern since the earliest proposals for unification. While the Congress prescribed the general functions of each Service in the National Security Act of 1947, the fundamental document that assigns more detailed functions, or roles and missions, to the Services is the Key West Agreement negotiated in March 1948. While some Service witnesses have testified that the assignment of roles and missions is constantly under review, it is difficult to understand how, in light of the tremendous changes in technology, strategy, and tactics over the past 40 years, there has been no major change in the roles and missions of the Services since 1948. As *The Department of the Army Manual* states:

Service roles and missions require continuing reexamination to keep pace with the changing nature of war and with the accelerating pace of technological change. (page 4-20)

The problem arises because this continuing reexamination has not taken place to the extent necessary to avoid wasteful duplication and to maximize force effectiveness.

##### a. History of the Assignment of Service Roles and Missions

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond notes that the principal focus of congressional consideration of unification legislation from early 1946 to July 1947 was on roles and missions issues. According to Hammond, this period

...was dominated by the practical and profoundly political questions about the forces, functions, and status of the Navy...proposals for major structural change had originated out of the roles and missions disputes and their acceptance finally turned on some kind of settlement of the latter, largely in the Navy's favor. (page 222)

On January 16, 1947, Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal reported to President Truman their agreement on a plan for unification. As part of this agreement, the two Secretaries had drafted a mutually agreed Executive Order to specify Service functions. In their letter to President Truman, Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal stated:

We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive Order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, pages 32-33)

This proposed Executive Order was discussed at length during the 1947 hearings on unification legislation.

The Congress, however, was concerned about the sole use of an Executive Order to specify Service roles and missions. The Congress viewed the roles and missions issue as a problem of Executive-Legislative relations. In *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries stated the dilemma facing the Congress as follows:

...If Congress permitted any executive officer to reallocate or restrict service roles and missions, it would be delegating him some of its own prerogatives. But if Congress did not allow an executive officer to consolidate or reassign service functions, its prerogatives would be preserved, but existing duplication would be perpetuated. (page 96)

The Congress attempted to resolve this dilemma in two ways. First, it prescribed minimum functions for each Service in the National Security Act of 1947. These Service functions as embodied in title 10, United States Code, are presented in Table 6-8. These congressional prescriptions have been altered in only one instance since 1947: the Marine Corps Act of 1952 introduced specific language on the composition of the Marine Corps which shall "...include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings..." The second way that the Congress sought to resolve this dilemma was its agreement to the use of an Executive Order, concurred in by the Services, which specified respective functions in greater detail.

TABLE 6-8

FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE  
PRESCRIBED IN TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

ARMY (Section 3062(b))

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

NAVY (Section 5012)

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(d) The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

MARINE CORPS (Section 5013)

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

AIR FORCE (Section 8062(c))

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

On July 26, 1947 —the same day that he signed the National Security Act of 1947 —President Truman issued Executive Order 9877 setting forth the more detailed assignment of Service roles and missions. However, differences in language between this executive order and the general statements of Service functions that the Congress decided to include in the National Security Act led to efforts to revise the Executive Order. The key language differences were over Navy and Air Force responsibilities for air missions.

On January 20, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal sent a draft revision of the Executive Order to the JCS for comment. The JCS was unable to reach agreement on a revision. As a result, Secretary Forrestal met with the Service Chiefs at the Key West Naval Base in Florida from March 11–14, 1948. At this conference and a subsequent meeting in Washington on March 20, agreement was negotiated on the assignment of Service roles and missions. President Truman approved this agreement on April 21, 1948, and on the same day, Secretary Forrestal released a paper, entitled “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff”, that documented the agreement. This paper has been commonly referred to as the “Key West Agreement.” This agreement is now embodied in DoD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components,” first promulgated on March 16, 1954.

The Key West Agreement assigns primary and collateral functions to each Service. The use of collateral or secondary functions was the most innovative feature of the Key West Agreement. Where it had been impossible to define Service responsibilities, collateral functions were assigned in an effort to foster joint activity. In summary, the Key West Agreement assigns key primary functions as follows:

*Army*

- sustained combat operations on land
- Army antiaircraft artillery
- primary interest in the development of airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment

*Navy and Marine Corps*

- sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components
- naval forces, including naval close air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations
- seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign

*Air Force*

- sustained combat operations in the air
- strategic air warfare
- close combat and logistical air support for the Army
- air transport for the Armed Forces

In their paper, “The Key West Key”, Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin characterize this agreement as follows:

The Key West agreement represented a compromise of sorts. The Navy gained many of its goals: retention of the Navy-based Marine Corps; the authority to provide close air support for Marine land operations; and the authority to carry out those air operations, including ground-launched missions, which are required for sea battles. The Army and the Air Force, convinced that the services should avoid excessive duplication, were willing to give the Navy control over almost all sea operations. And the Army and Air Force agreed to cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions. Specifically, this meant that the Air Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air support. (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 117)

While there have been no major changes to the portions of the Key West Agreement dealing with Service roles and missions, there have been a number of clarifications:

- *Memorandum for the Record of the Newport Conference of August 20-22, 1948* —Two roles and missions clarifications resulted from this conference. The first was a clarification of the term “primary mission” so that “the Air Force could not deny the Navy access to atomic weapons or exclude it from planning for strategic air operations.” (Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years*, page 401) The second was the placement of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project—an interservice organization responsible for the handling and assembly of nuclear weapons—under Air Force control on an “interim” basis.
- *Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force., October 2, 1951* — This memorandum, known as the Pace-Finletter agreement (after the two Service Secretaries who negotiated it), sought to delineate the meaning of the phrase in the National Security Act of 1947 that specified that the Army shall include land combat and services forces and “such aviation...as may be organic therein.” Army organic aviation was defined to consist of aircraft utilized by the Army within the Army combat zone which was defined as not normally exceeding 50 to 75 miles in depth. The functions that could be performed by Army aircraft were specified as were functions for which Army aircraft were not to duplicate Air Force functions.
- *Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation, November 4, 1952* —This second Pace-Finletter agreement modified the previous agreement to: (1) redefine the combat zone to normally be 50 to 100 miles in depth; and (2) more importantly, limit Army fixed wing aircraft to an empty weight of not more than 5,000 pounds.
- *Memorandum for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, November 26, 1956* —This clarification addressed five subjects:
  - use of aircraft by the Army.* Specific limitations were placed on the use of aircraft by the Army. Key among these was the reaffirmation of the limitation that Army fixed wing aircraft would have an empty weight not to exceed 5,000 pounds.

—*adequacy of airlift* —Air Force capability to provide airborne lift was viewed as being adequate “in the light of currently approved strategic concepts.”

—*air defense* —The Army was assigned responsibility for land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense (100 nautical miles), and the Air Force was assigned responsibility for such missile systems for area defense.

—*Air Force tactical support of the Army* —The Army would develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. Other tactical air support functions were to remain the responsibility of the Air Force.

—*Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)* —Operational employment of the land-based IRBM system was assigned as a sole responsibility of the Air Force, thus removing the Army from this function.

- *Department of Defense Directive 5160.22, March 18, 1957* —The Army and Air Force continued to have sharp disagreements over the provision of tactical air support for the Army. This directive, which superceded the Pace-Finletter agreements of 1951 and 1952, sought to clarify these disputes. On March 8, 1971, this directive was cancelled, especially in light of the view that the 5,000-pound limitation on Army fixed-wing aircraft was inappropriate.
- *Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, March 6, 1961* —The advent of military satellite and space vehicle systems in the late 1950's created problems of control and coordination within the Department of Defense. This directive assigned responsibility to the Air Force for research, development, test, and engineering of space development programs or projects. This directive was revised on September 8, 1970 to enable the other Services to pursue space development programs related to the major weapon systems for which they had responsibility.
- *Agreement between Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, April 6, 1966* —This Army-Air Force agreement, known as the Johnson-McConnell agreement (after the two Chiefs of Staff), sought to reach an understanding on the control and employment of certain types of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Disputes in this area had been intensified by increasing levels of warfare in Southeast Asia. For its part, the Army agreed “to relinquish all claims for CV-2 [CARIBOU] and CV-7 [BUFFALO] aircraft and for future fixed wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift.” Under this agreement, all CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft in the Army inventory were transferred to the Air Force. The Air Force agreed “to relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intra-theater movement, fire support, supply and resupply of Army forces” and for certain Air Force control elements.
- *Navy-Air Force Agreement, May 22, 1974* —This agreement covered the use of B-52 aircraft to provide aerial delivery of Navy sea mines.
- *Navy-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on the Concept of Operations for USAF Forces Collateral Functions Training,*

*September 2, 1975* —This agreement provided a general concept of operations for Air Force resources training to perform collateral functions in sea control operations. It was envisioned that Air Force capabilities might be employed to perform the following tasks as part of sea control operations:

- search and identification;
- electronic warfare;
- tactical deception;
- attack against surface and air units; and
- aerial minelaying.

- *Memorandum of Agreement on U.S. Army —U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process, May 22, 1984* —In this agreement—signed by the respective Chiefs of Staff, Generals Wickham and Gabriel—the Army and Air Force affirmed that “they must organize, train, and equip a compatible, complementary and affordable Total Force that will maximize our joint combat capability to execute airland combat operations.” The initial agreement contained 31 initiatives for action by the Army and Air Force; this list was later expanded to 34 initiatives. These initiatives addressed several areas where the Army and Air Force have traditionally experienced jurisdictional disputes: air defense, close air support, guided missiles, and intratheater airlift. About half of the initiatives directly addressed these areas. However, initiatives were taken in a number of new areas such as air base ground defense, combat search and rescue, Special Operations Forces, and night combat.

Beyond these specific initiatives, the Army-Air Force agreement of May 1984 sought to institutionalize a joint force development process. With this objective in mind, the agreement provided for:

- establishment of a long-term process that would include an annual update and review of the initiatives for action;
- expansion of the agreement to include future initiatives;
- annual exchange between the Army and Air Force of a formal priority list of those sister Service programs essential to the support of their conduct of successful airland combat operations, the purpose of which is to ensure the development of complementary systems without duplication;
- resolution of joint or complementary system differences prior to program development;
- high priority in the Army and Air Force development and acquisition processes for programs supporting joint airland combat operations; and
- dedication to providing the best combat capability to the unified and specified commanders.

#### b. Evaluation of the Key West Agreement and Subsequent Clarifications

##### (1) Key West Agreement

The Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions did little to settle roles and missions disputes among the four Services. It did resolve some of the most fundamental issues raised by unification

—in particular, preservation of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Beyond these issues, however, jurisdictional boundaries remained blurred. In essence, the Key West Agreement “called for the Services, under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs, to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward ‘maximum practicable’ integration of policies and procedures.” (*The Formative Years*, page 396) Given the environment of extensive suspicion and rivalry among the Services, effective coordination did not result. As Steven L. Rearden noted in *The Formative Years*:

...Until the actual cooperation matched the resourcefulness of the semantic compromises [of the Key West Agreement], there could be no genuine harmony or teamwork, and no true resolution of the more troublesome roles and missions questions. (page 397)

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond also concludes that the Key West Agreement had limited utility in solving the issues of Service jurisdiction:

...Its delineation of service functions has endured, though only because there is little of a general character which can be said about service functions, not because it settled anything.

...[Secretary of Defense] Forrestal found little immediate comfort in the agreement. Before he could publish it, Generals Spaatz and Norstad of the Air Force had qualified their approval by indicating that they accepted it as an interpretation of the National Security Act, but disagreed with it in principle. Since a major purpose of the agreement was to circumscribe the behavior of the Chiefs and their services with the public and Congress, the practical effect of such a qualification was to nullify the agreement, for the major roles and missions dispute in the military establishment, between the Navy and the Air Force over naval aviation, had never turned on the interpretation of the statute, but always on the contended merits of the roles and missions issue. (pages 237 and 238)

John C. Ries in *The Management of Defense* reached similar conclusions:

...The product of this meeting, the Key West Agreement, failed completely as a basis for service agreement. In fact, the services disagreed about correct interpretation even before publication.

As in any attempt to state policy separate from the specific means of implementation, the Key West Agreement did not contain clear criteria for choosing one particular set of means over another. The agreement could not substitute for a final choice or negotiation among specific service proposals. And in spite of the agreement, the JCS, a committee of equals, could not do more than endorse the proposals of each individual service. (page 126)

In *The Uncertain Trumpet*, written in 1959, General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Retired) cited the need to rewrite the assignment of Services roles and missions in light of the limited utility of the Key West Agreement:

This housecleaning should start with a rewriting of the roles and missions of the three services. The present roles and missions were promulgated in 1947 at the time of the famous Key West conference and have not been changed in any significant way since then. In their initial form, their statement was little more than a description of the capabilities of the services at the time of the promulgation of the Key West Agreement. Since that time, weapons systems, tactics, and strategy have changed, and with them the capabilities of the services. (page 165)

## (2) Clarifications of the Key West Agreement

There have been ten clarifications (of varying degrees of significance) of the Key West Agreement over a 37-year period. Six of these clarifications involved only the Army and the Air Force and were usually focused on aviation support for Army combat forces. The first clarification, resulting from the Newport Conference, sought to end a dispute between the Navy and Air Force over access to atomic weapons. The eighth clarification was made necessary by military use of space and involved all four Services. The remaining two clarifications, involving the Navy and Air Force, were focused on Air Force collateral functions in sea control operations.

The first seven chronological clarifications sought to resolve specific disputes and did not reflect an approach by the Services in Reardon's words "to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward 'maximum practicable' integration of policies and procedures." In his book, *The Department of Defense*, Carl W. Borklund characterized the nature of inter-Service conflict and controversies, of which these seven clarifications were a part, as follows:

In general terms, during all these squabbles, where separate service functions and combat capabilities supposedly interlocked, the tendency was to neglect those links. Where the weapon system had glamour and could command or attract large amounts of budget appropriations, each service concentrated on it, especially if the weapon function was to deliver an atomic warhead. The emphasis was on competition, rather than on complementary effort toward a common combat capability goal. (page 271)

While a more cooperative approach began to emerge in the minor Navy-Air Force agreements of 1974 and 1975, it was not until the Army-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement in 1984 that this approach was clearly evident. It is particularly notable that the 1984 agreement not only proposed to resolve numerous specific issues, but also sought to institutionalize a process by which Army/Air Force cooperation and coordination could be maximized. In the press conference, General Gabriel noted the significance of the agreement:

What we have come up with, I think, is a very historic thing. It's kind of a revolutionary approach... Pentagon News Briefing, May 22, 1984, page 2).

### c. Reasons for Concern

Underlying concerns about the adequacy of Service roles and missions assignments are three facts: (1) the Key West Agreement of 1948 made only general assignments of areas of jurisdiction; (2) no major changes to the Key West Agreement have been made; and (3) despite the Army —Air Force agreement of 1984, there do not appear to be effective mechanisms for considering necessary revisions to roles and missions assignments. The second and third facts may be more significant. The agreement negotiated in 1948 may have gone as far as the Services could go during the immediate post-war period which was characterized by substantial bureaucratic turmoil. Samuel P. Huntington describes this environment as follows:

...In the immediate postwar period, fundamental issues of service existence and strategy were at stake. After a major war, military policy is in a state of flux. The cake of custom, bureaucratic routine, and sustained habits of behavior—executive, congressional, and popular—are broken. Change is not only possible, but expected. In such periods, existing organizational units have the most to fear from major threats to their existence, and new organizational units have the best prospects for an easy birth or growth. ("Inter-Service Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services", *Problems of National Strategy*, page 469)

In such an environment with many important issues of strategy and concepts still evolving, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach wide agreement on the jurisdiction of each Service. Huntington cast Service activity during the immediate, post-war period in the following terms:

After World War II, each service and hoped-for service was anxious to carve out a role for itself suitable to its ambitions and self-conceptions before a postwar equilibrium was established and the patterns of organization and behavior jelled into enduring form. The unification battle involved the general pattern of postwar organizational relationships for all the services and, specifically, the formal recognition of the separate existence of the Air Force. Closely linked with this were the legitimate fears of the Navy and Marine Corps for their future being. "Why should we have a Navy at all?" asked the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, and answered himself by declaring that, "There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force." Similarly, the then Chief of Staff of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, made it quite clear that the Marines ought to be maintained as only a minor landing force. The uneasiness these views inspired in the sea-going services was not allayed until their functions were carefully defined in the National Security Act and the Key West roles-and-missions paper, the Forrestals [a 4-ship class of aircraft carriers] floated forth on the flood of Korean War appropriations, and the Marine position was sanctified in the Marine Corps Act of 1952. By 1952, the United States had four recognized services instead of the two it had had in 1940.

After 1952, whatever the vicissitudes of budgets and strategy, the existence of no service was in serious danger from another. An equilibrium had been reached. (pages 469 and 470)

Once this equilibrium had been reached, there was greater potential for more specificity in the assignment of Service roles and missions. This potential has never been realized (for reasons explained later in this subsection).

The failure to more adequately and continuously address Service roles and missions is of concern for three basic reasons: (1) the Key West Agreement permitted duplication of effort among the Services in many areas; (2) the advance of technology posed many new jurisdictional issues not anticipated at the time of the Key West Agreement; and (3) the Key West Agreement may have artificially constrained the development of force capabilities necessary to meet the changing needs of warfare.

#### (1) duplication of effort

Duplication of effort is a topic that needs to be addressed carefully. Duplication is normally viewed as unnecessary and, therefore, wasteful. However, for the Department of Defense, duplication may provide a degree of insurance against unforeseen changes in the threat or evolution of warfare and against the pursuit of a single solution to a complex military requirement. In *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries articulates this point:

...The greatest threat to adequate defense comes from gaps in defense capabilities, not from duplication. The existence of several agencies [the Military Departments] with overlapping missions encourages competition in determining alternative ways of doing the same job and provides the incentive to find gaps that need filling. Competition, far from being extravagant, is probably the surest and cheapest insurance that can be purchased against a fatal gap in defense capabilities. Even if gaps do not occur, the single way is often the most expensive way. The costs are the undiscovered cheaper ways of developing the same capability. (page 207)

In *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, Edward N. Luttwak discusses the benefits of duplication, or diversity, in conflict. Luttwak argues that efforts to standardize and avoid duplication are focused on business efficiency whereas military effectiveness in combat demands diversity. He argues that

...less standardized military forces are more resilient. (page 135)

Luttwak uses the following among many examples to explain this point:

...If, for example, our forces use a single, standardized type of anti-aircraft missile for the sake of efficiency, enemy pilots will be able to underfly its minimum operating altitude or overfly its maximum ceiling, and the enemy's electronic wizards can devote all their efforts to countering its specific detection and guidance systems. If efficiency is sacrificed and a second, different type of missile is added with higher or lower altitude

limits, or merely different electronic specifications, the enemy's pilots will find it that much more difficult to avoid both missiles, while the enemy's electronic countermeasures must cope with two different challenges. (page 135)

While the points made by Ries and Luttwak have merit, unconstrained duplicative activities are not the answer. Just as an excessive focus on business efficiency can lead to the pursuit of single, high-risk solutions and vulnerable forces, duplication can be unnecessary and wasteful of scarce defense resources. This is of particular concern because the costs of unnecessary duplication in DoD are greater than for other organizations, particularly those in private business. This is so because of the separateness of the Services. Once unnecessary duplication has been determined to exist, it is much more difficult to eliminate. In *The Organizational Politics of Defense*, William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson explain these points:

If the central management can cut through the debate and make a firm conclusion that an activity is wasteful duplication, that does not mean the activity is necessarily closed down. A weakness of using the budget as an instrument of control is that by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late to do much about it. "Sunk costs" and organizational barriers to transferring activities often make it simpler to accept the duplication.

...A commercial firm might firmly consolidate activities by transferring personnel, assigning the responsibility to one of the competitors. This step can be difficult for a business firm, but transferring defense activities can be extraordinarily difficult because of the powerful traditions surrounding the military services. Consider the consequences should the Secretary of Defense choose to transfer a group of career Air Force officers doing meteorological work to the Navy. While it would be a technically feasible task, although administratively horrendous, such a step is especially difficult because the services are indeed separate. This special uniqueness of the military services is reinforced by the support offered the services by constituencies outside the Department of Defense. Foremost among these is Congress, which includes many partisans of the different services. In addition, for each military uniform, there are reserve organizations, National Guard components, veterans and all of their formidable political allies ready to leap to the defense of the sanctity of service traditions.

If conflict over jurisdiction does develop in the military establishment, it thus has to center around the transfer of jurisdictions alone. But it is difficult to close down an on-going activity in any business, and doubly so in the Defense Department. To establish a program, to buy the material necessary, and to train the personnel is often a major investment. Once in operation, the costs of the activity are relatively small. If faced with the prospect of having to close one program and expand the same activity in another department, the central management of any company or bureaucracy is likely to leave well enough alone. The major investment in expertise from training

and experience is not transferable when the personnel are not; the costs of moving a jurisdiction from one military service to another, therefore, become virtually prohibitive. Even when an iron-clad case can be made for the transfer and consolidation of an activity, it is often not worth the political costs. The distinctive nature of the military services thus helps to preclude simple reallocation of established jurisdictions. Duplication, once established and allowed to grow to significant proportions, is very hard to eliminate. (pages 45 and 46)

Given the costs associated with unnecessary duplication, DoD must make every effort to ensure that appropriate jurisdictional boundaries are established. It is not clear that the rigorous analysis required to establish these boundaries has been conducted at any time since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.

(2) advance of technology

Technology with application to warfare has advanced at an ever increasing rate. The emergence of new technology has posed new jurisdictional issues. Unfortunately, there has been no effective mechanism for resolving them until the costs of duplicative efforts become substantial. Key examples of DoD jurisdictional disputes arising from new technology include the intermediate-range ballistic missile competition between the Army's Jupiter and Air Force's Thor and the guided missile competition between the Army's Nike Hercules and the Air Force's Bomarc and land-based Talos.

Lucas and Dawson discuss duplication in new fields, which they term "pre-emptive duplication," as follows:

Duplication in new fields is usually the result of the absence of jurisdictional boundaries, or of boundaries made obsolete or ambiguous by rapid social or technological change. In areas the organization has not previously entered, no "zoning laws" delimit where a department can and cannot probe. The exploration of new fields is thus a tempting opportunity to establish small activities that may prove fruitful, particularly in view of the natural tendency of organizations to allocate an emerging activity to the department that has already developed some familiarity with it. The leadership of departments is only too well aware of the fact that small decisions awarding jurisdiction over marginal functions to a department may be decisive in future organizational bargaining over that function if and when it has taken on importance. There is, then, a powerful incentive to set up shop in a field before jurisdictional boundaries are established. An activity has only to offer faint promise, and departments will tend to establish some proprietary program. As a consequence, management frequently finds that the departments are already engaged in small-scale duplicative activity in a new field.

Once established, these activities may gradually grow or be maintained at a low level until the goals they serve take on new importance. When that occurs, the central management may find several activities, each arguing that it alone should be the recipient of further organizational growth in the same general area. In each case, managers and specialists have de-

veloped expertise in solving the managerial and technical problems associated with that area. Relevant equipment has often already been obtained. The organization finds it has "sunk costs" in fostering more than one department's ability to cope with the given problem area. (page 45)

Lucas and Dawson draw the following analogy to pre-emptive duplication:

...One is reminded of the practice of the explorers of the Age of Discovery, who carried the royal banner onto the beach and claimed all the lands they had discovered in the name of their king. (page 85)

John C. Ries describes the situation:

...the first service to develop a suitable weapon would acquire the mission that went with it. (page 130)

The absence of a continuing review of Service roles and missions has precluded the establishment of jurisdictional lines that would bring duplicative conflict among the Services under control.

### (3) artificial constraints

The third area of concern is that the Key West Agreement placed artificial constraints on the development of force capabilities to meet the changing needs of warfare. In their article, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin describe the overriding influence of the Key West Agreement on today's military operations, procurement, and thinking. They conclude that the Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions "have contributed to some of the most glaring failures and shortcomings of American military policy in the postwar era." (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 114)

In support of this conclusion, Morton and David Halperin cite:

- the overreliance of the Army on the helicopter because of limitations on Army aviation;
- the failure of the Air Force to provide adequate close air support for the Army;
- the failures of the Navy to acquire sufficient sealift and the Air Force to acquire sufficient airlift;
- the inability to provide an effective force to conduct the Iranian hostage rescue mission; and
- the inability to consider a sea-based alternative for the MX missile.

The Halperins argue that the constraints of the Key West Agreement have hindered the search for more effective forces and program alternatives. They argue the need for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the Key West Agreement in the following terms:

An examination of the agreements and their sometimes disastrous consequences suggests that the Key West approach was fundamentally flawed. If the United States is to continue to defend its interests effectively without wasting vast sums of money, serious revisions of the responsibilities and missions of the armed forces will be needed. (page 116)

d. nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the three Service Secretaries and four Service Chiefs were questioned on the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. Their responses offer supporting evidence of the inadequacy of this review process. Secretary of the Army Marsh stated:

...I know of no present effort within DoD to make a fundamental re-examination of the assignment of Service roles and missions....I'm not aware of any deliberate, periodic effort to examine roles and missions on a regular basis; nor do I believe a need exists to do this at the present time. (Part 6, page 264)

Similarly, Secretary of the Air Force Orr stated:

There are no formal efforts within DoD to re-examine roles and missions. (Part 6, page 264)

Secretary of the Navy Lehman had an apparent, although not necessarily, contrary view if considered in the context of the Service Chief statements which follow:

...the assignments of functions, roles, and missions within and among the Services is a subject of almost daily discussion and review. (Part 6, page 264)

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, stated:

We don't have an annual roles and missions conference...but I have to say in the budget development, the Defense Resources Board procedure, our debate with the Congress and the like, we essentially mold the roles and missions so they do evolve and they do change.

...This is a roles and missions shift in a sense, but we are doing it not in the context of meeting and discussing it, but getting on with what do we need to fight our forces better and, out of that, roles and missions changes are taking place.

...I believe that if we try to formalize or institutionalize the process, it could be very unwieldy and debilitating. (Part 8, page 353)

The Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham, added:

The DRB [Defense Resources Board] process, I believe, forces a good degree of review of roles and missions through the programmatic dimensions. (Part 8, page 353)

General Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, commented:

In the effort that General Wickham just mentioned—roles and missions are not the driving factor.

It is who can do what, what is the smartest way to do it and the most affordable way to do it. We have really thrown out the roles and missions issues...

It is working well and the more we do this, of course, the more we find out there are other things that we can help each other on without bumping into the parochial problems of the past. (Part 8, page 354)

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley, stated:

...I don't think the subject is necessarily a change of roles and missions but rather a continued emphasis on this harmonization of capabilities that exist within the Armed Forces of the United States. (Part 8, page 354)

These seven statements reveal the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. First, there is no mechanism for formal review of roles and missions assignments. Formal reviews are being avoided apparently because they are expected to be "debilitating" given the historical record of roles and missions disputes. Second, the budget, through the Defense Resources Board process, is used as the sole source of roles and missions changes. This is of concern because as the previously quoted conclusion from Lucas and Dawson noted:

...A weakness of using the budget as an instrument of control is that by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late to do much about it.

Third, the central management of DoD appears to be playing a passive role in reexamining roles and missions issues. The major activity appears to be allowing the Services to cooperate as they see fit.

#### e. causes of the problem

The causes of the problem of an absence of a comprehensive and objective review of Service roles and missions are clearer than the source of any other problem. There are two causes: (1) statutory restrictions on changes to the combatant functions of each Service which have served to inhibit central management in this area; and (2) the desire of the Services to avoid reconsideration of these controversial issues.

#### (1) Statutory Restrictions on Changes to the Combatant Functions of the Services

The present statutory language regarding the authority of the Secretary of Defense to make changes to combatant functions, codified in section 125 of title 10, United States Code, was enacted as part of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947. Under present law, the Secretary of Defense must notify the Congress of a proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of a major combatant function, power, or duty assigned by law to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Congressional power to block such changes was provided for in a one-House veto. While this congressional obstacle has been rendered constitutionally suspect by recent Supreme Court rulings, it is clear that the Secretary of Defense could anticipate substantial congressional scrutiny and opposition to any such attempted changes.

An historical review of the statutory limitations placed on the the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the assignment of Service roles and missions reveals a clear concern on the part of the Congress not to surrender its constitutional authority in this field. Congressman Carl Vinson elaborated on this concern in the House Armed Services Committee report on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958:

Congress cannot abdicate the responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. It must continue to reserve to itself decisions as to the basic duties of each of the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) is to perform. This has the great advantage of insuring that matters of such vital import to the defense of the nation are not left to the Executive alone, but are subject to the collective judgment of the Congress. (page 37)

The first explicit statutory limitation on Executive changes to combatant functions was contained in the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. The National Security Act of 1947 had been silent on this issue. Ironically, one of the main purposes of the 1949 amendments was to clarify and strengthen the powers of the Secretary of Defense. While this goal was achieved in many areas, a direct prohibition was placed on the Secretary of Defense's ability to change combatant functions. Interestingly, a version of this prohibition was part of the Administration's legislative proposal. During the Senate hearings on the 1949 amendments, Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Administration recognized congressional authority in this area.

As part of its legislative proposal for the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Eisenhower Administration called for the repeal of the restrictions on the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change combatant functions. Secretary of Defense McElroy gave the following explanation to the House Armed Services Committee for this proposal:

The changes in the law which we are proposing do not change the present statement of functions of the armed services. The crux of the discussions, therefore, is the question of the authority of the Secretary of Defense to eliminate overlapping in combat functions as may be required by changing circumstances. This provision is considered necessary because the advent of modern weapons has eliminated the clear distinction which could at one time be made between combat on land, combat at sea, and combat in the air. Thus the advent of modern weapons has led to overlapping which is confusing and wasteful, and has underscored the vital need for unified direction and operational use of combatant forces. (page 6392)

This desire for greater flexibility on the part of the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid duplication and overlapping ran counter to congressional interest in maintaining control over the assignment of Service roles and missions. Congressman Rivers stated the basic issue during the House Armed Services Committee hearings on the 1958 legislation:

The more executive authority we put in one man, the less constitutional-mandated authority we retain for ourselves. (page 6216)

The result of this debate was the compromise embodied in current law. For the first time, the Secretary of Defense was given explicit authority to change combatant functions, but this new authority was made subject to congressional review and veto.

Despite this congressional obstacle, the Secretary of Defense has substantial discretion, in theory, over the assignment of more de-

tailed roles and missions to the Services as long as he does not violate the general statements of Service roles and missions prescribed in various sections of title 10, United States Code. In practice, Secretaries of Defense have avoided roles and missions controversies because they apparently believe that Service opposition will be translated into congressional opposition. In his book, *On Watch*, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Retired) confirms that this belief has led to inaction by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Zumwalt had proposed that at least some Air Force aircraft should be required to be capable of operating from aircraft carriers. He relates the outcome of his effort after failing at the Military Department level:

...I then went to Melvin Laird and his deputy David Packard and urged that they get it done. Both of them thought it was a good idea, yet both declined to touch it. Their reason was probably a good one, that the Congress and its lobbies would not permit it, and a jurisdictional wrangle would hurt the Defense budget. (page 70)

(2) Desire of the Services to Avoid Reconsideration of Controversial Roles and Missions Issues

In the immediate post-World War II period, the Services were unable to reach agreement on the assignment of roles and missions. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was forced to intercede and forge the necessary (although general) compromises. The intensity of interservice conflict and suspicion during this period was so great that the Services have made every effort to keep roles and missions issues dormant. In *The Common Defense*, Samuel P. Huntington remarked of this period:

...The years from the beginning of the struggle over unification in 1944 until the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 stand out in American military history as a high-water mark of interservice competition. The issues at stake were vital to the services; the means employed were varied; the intensity and passion of the debate were unprecedented. (page 369)

The Services have been successful in avoiding roles and missions issues. Unless substantial pressure is exerted on the Services to re-examine these assignments, they will not, as a general rule, volunteer to address them. Admiral Zumwalt found this to be the case. During June 1971, he wrote to Admiral Moorer, then JCS Chairman, proposing reconsideration of roles and missions assignments:

...The current fiscal and domestic political climate makes it more and more important that we break away from rigid boundaries established by traditional service roles and missions. To a limited degree, this has already begun. Examples are cooperation in ocean surveillance and the USAF mining role. These represent a beginning—much more can be done; for example, the Air Force can contribute to ASW and to the Navy's sea control requirements (both of which are essential to providing the logistics for deployed tactical AF units). What makes each service avoid this kind of thinking is that if accept-

ed, it may result in de facto alteration of relative funding profiles. (*On Watch*, page 71)

The outcome, in the words of Admiral Zumwalt, was that:

...the problem was put in the "too hard to" file. (page 71)

While this study project has not attempted to conduct an in-depth analysis of the present assignment of the roles and missions of the Services, it appears that a comprehensive analysis of present day requirements, capabilities, and roles and missions is as necessary to ensuring an optimal national defense structure as is the study of any other set of relationships in the U.S. military establishment.

## **E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS**

Possible solutions to the problem areas of the Military Departments are described in this section. The options presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, the implementation of one option would preclude the implementation of other options; in other cases, several options could be implemented.

### **1. PROBLEM AREA #1—CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES**

The Service Secretaries currently play a limited and confusing role in the management of the U.S. defense effort. In response to this unsatisfactory situation, two broad approaches are possible: (1) abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secretary positions while retaining the four-Service structure of DoD; and (2) clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Within these two broad categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

#### **a. abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secretary positions**

If one believed that the position of Service Secretary were no longer needed or that its disadvantages were greater than its advantages, two options are possible: (1) make each Service Chief the senior official responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces and have him report directly to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These options are based on the view that integration of Service capabilities cannot be attained so long as three separate Military Departments—each headed by a relatively independent Secretary—continue to exist, or that integration of Service capabilities can only be attained if senior members of the staff of the Secretary of Defense, having an integration mission and owing no duty to the separate Services, exercise direction and control over them.

- Option 1A —have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense

This option was recommended by the Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, whose report

was submitted to President-Elect Kennedy on December 5, 1960. The Symington Committee Report recommended:

...the elimination of the present departmental structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but would preserve the military Services as separate organic units within a single Defense Department. Such a step would do away with the present departmental Service Secretaries and their Under and Assistant Secretaries, fifteen in all. (page 7)

In line with this recommendation, this option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments, Service Secretaries, and Secretariats. The four Service Chiefs would become the senior officials responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces. The four Service Chiefs would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 1B —create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

This option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments and the three Service Secretaries. The three Secretariats would be substantially reduced in size and transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Within OSD, these Service-oriented offices would each be headed by an Under Secretary of Defense. This option was studied, although not recommended, by the *Departmental Headquarters Study*. In commenting on this option, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* stated:

...Proponents of this concept have more in mind than merely a change in titles; what is intended is a single level of civilian authority with designated civilians in OSD responsible for overseeing the operations of the Military Services. (page 39)

- b. clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense

The options developed within this broad category are based upon the premise that the Service Secretaries can make important contributions to defense management if confusion about their roles can be clarified.

- Option 1C —specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense

The responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense are stated in very general terms in title 10, United States Code. Each Service Secretary's responsibilities are stated in an identical sentence in three separate sections of law:

...The Secretary [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force]. (sections 3012, 5031, and 8012)

Given that Service Secretaries have failed to balance their Service advocate roles with their roles as principal assistants to the Secretary of Defense, it appears that it might be useful to more precisely specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. This option proposes appropriate

revisions to title 10, United States Code, based at least upon the following principles:

- beyond their roles of heads of Military Departments, the Service Secretaries are officials of the Department of Defense as a whole;
- as such, Service Secretaries should ensure that the policies and programs of their Departments are consistent with broad national security policy and the resource allocation needs of DoD;
- the Service Secretaries are the principal assistants of the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and execution of the resource allocation process;
- the Service Secretaries are responsible for ensuring that decisions of higher civilian authority are implemented by the Military Departments.
- Option 1D —remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries

This option is based on the belief that the present statutory descriptions of roles and authorities contain unnecessary distinctions among the Service Secretaries and that such inconsistencies promote uncertainty in terms of their authority and responsibility. In particular, the specific responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy to the President appear to be an anachronism that would be eliminated under this option.

- Option 1E —repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress

The three sections of title 10, United States Code, dealing with the powers and duties of the Service Secretaries contain the following provision:

...After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate. (sections 3012, 5031, and 8012)

This option would repeal this authority. Such action would be based on the belief that this statutory authority contradicts the role of the Service Secretary as a subordinate of the Secretary of Defense and the President, permits the Military Departments to operate outside of the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and even if not exercised, creates uncertainty about the Secretary of Defense's authority to control the Military Departments.

- Option 1F —give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries

Article II of the Constitution of the United States provides authority for the Congress to vest appointment powers in officials other than the President. The pertinent portion of Article II is:

He [the President]...by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: *but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-*

*ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.* (emphasis added)

This option would exercise congressional authority to vest appointment power in the Head of a Department, in this instance, the Secretary of Defense.

This option is designed to ensure that the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to other Executive Branch power centers, selects his principal executives and advisors in the Military Departments, the Service Secretaries. This option is based upon the premise that the Secretary of Defense is more knowledgeable than anyone else in evaluating the qualifications of prospective candidates and more capable of identifying his management needs. This option also recognizes the importance of the Secretary of Defense having a "team" management approach comprised of individuals who will owe their loyalty to him. Only in this way can the Secretary of Defense be confident that his policies will be faithfully executed, particularly with the diffused authority that exists in the Department of Defense. As a last point, this option would likely give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the removal of Service Secretaries who, for whatever reason, were unable to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 1G —strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities

If the Secretary of Defense expects to utilize the three Service Secretaries as principal advisors with perspectives and concerns similar to his, he must seek to broaden their vision from relatively narrow Service interests and issues. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense develop a pattern of involvement of Service Secretaries on broad defense issues. This effort could include (1) participation of the Service Secretaries in the strategic planning process; and (2) occasionally, assignment to the Service Secretaries of DoD-wide issues for study, organization, or resolution.

- Option 1H —strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination

This option is an extension of the concept presented in Option 1G. Given the needs of DoD for improved mission integration, it might be useful to assign to the second-ranking civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Among the specific roles that it recommended for Service Under Secretaries, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* proposed that each Under Secretary serve as "Executive for the Service Secretary for multi-service assignments and initiatives." (page 74)

- Option 1I —prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries

The Service Chiefs circumvent the Service Secretaries on topics which the civilian heads of the Military Departments should be involved by raising issues directly with OSD or through the JCS

system. Without the active support of OSD and the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries do not have an effective means of curtailing this disruptive practice. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense carefully monitor such efforts and bring them to an end. The Secretary of Defense will need to establish guidelines on actions he finds undesirable. Forceful action against any violations should help end such efforts and restore the authority of Service Secretaries.

- Option 1J —remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

Chapter 4 concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops two options that would remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice. Arguments for such actions are presented in detail in that chapter. This option is presented here in recognition of its contribution to clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries. Specifically, as John Kester notes, removing a Service Chief from the JCS system would “make him and the military staff more dependent on, and therefore more responsive to, the service secretary.” (“Do We Need the Service Secretary?”, page 163) In essence, this option would seek to restore the Secretary-Chief alliance that provided effective civilian control and management in the War Department prior to and during World War II.

## 2. PROBLEM AREA #2—UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

The most forceful options to correct the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments involve either full or partial integration of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. There is also the possibility that this problem could be lessened by unilateral reductions in the size of the military headquarters staffs.

- Option 2A —fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy

This option proposes an across-the-board merger of the Army and Air Force Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. The single integrated staffs would serve both the Secretary and Chief of Staff in the Army and Air Force. The dual-Service structure of the Department of the Navy precludes full integration of the Secretariat and the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs. The Navy Secretariat continues to be necessary as a separate organization providing overall management of the department. Despite the continuing requirement for a Navy Secretariat, there appear to be opportunities for partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel appeared to be proposing this option when it recommended:

...The Secretariats and Service staffs should be integrated to the extent necessary to eliminate duplication...A study of the present staffs indicates that the Secretariats and Service staffs

combined should total no more than 2,000 people for each Department. (page 42)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* made three recommendations concerning selective integration of the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. Specifically, it proposed to:

- conduct the manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions only in the military headquarters staffs in support of both the Service Secretary and Chief;
- integrate the research and development staffs of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs under a Service assistant secretary; and
- provide common access for both the Service Secretary and Chief to the systems analysis, inspector general, and audit service capabilities.

While this option includes these three recommendations for the Army and Air Force, it goes beyond the theme of selective integration and proposes fully integrated top management headquarters staffs for these two Military Departments. For the Department of the Navy, only the first of the three recommendations of the *Departmental Headquarters Study* is included in this option.

Under this proposal, each Military Department would be authorized a civilian secretary and under secretary, two civilian assistant secretaries (one for financial management and one for research, development, and acquisition), and a civilian general counsel. All other functional offices would be headed by a military officer. The Service Secretary and Under Secretary would be assisted by an executive office of not more than 25 personnel to be organized as they deem appropriate.

In the following paragraphs, specific proposals to integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are presented. These proposals—despite the detail in which they are portrayed—are provided only for illustrative purposes. They represent only one of many possible schemes of integrating these staffs. Accordingly, they should not be considered recommended courses of action. Their purposes are solely to: (1) demonstrate that the concept of an integrated staff is a valid alternative; (2) serve as a starting point for efforts to design a more logical integrated staff; and (3) identify for the Congress the underlying principles to be addressed in legislation.

#### a. Department of the Army

At present, 13 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army and 25 senior military officials in the Army Staff report to the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief, and Director of the Army Staff. While integration of the two staffs would eliminate some of these officials, a general streamlining of the integrated staff would be necessary to permit effective management by the Secretary and Chief of Staff.

CHART 6-11

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY




Chart 6-11 presents an illustrative proposal for integrating the Army Secretariat and military headquarters staff. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

- three Assistant Secretary positions would be eliminated: Civil Works, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Installations and Logistics;
- the two Deputy Under Secretary positions would be eliminated;
- the position of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary would be eliminated;
- the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition would be eliminated;
- the Comptroller of the Army and the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- the Assistant Chief of Staff (Information Management) and Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Chief of Staff and Secretary respectively;
- the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Chief of Staff;
- the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- the Surgeon General, the Adjutant General, and the Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- the title of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) would be changed to Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations and Logistics) to reflect sole responsibility for the installations function; and
- a new position of Assistant Chief of Staff (Program Analysis and Evaluation) would be created to replace the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

#### b. Department of the Navy

At present, 12 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 23 senior military officials report to the Chief, Vice Chief, and Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Within Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23 senior civilian and military officials report to the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Chief of Staff. Beyond partial integration of the Secretariat and the military headquarters staffs, some streamlining of these organizations will be necessary to permit effective management.

CHART 6 - 12

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY




Chart 6-12 presents an illustrative proposal for partially integrating the Navy Secretariat, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Headquarters, Marine Corps. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

- the positions of Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Assistant Secretary (Shipbuilding and Logistics) would be eliminated;
- the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Secretary;
- the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
- the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Secretary;
- the Office of Program Appraisal would be retitled the Office of Naval Program Integration and would assume responsibility for ensuring that Navy and Marine Corps programs are consistent and complementary;
- the Inspector General would report to the Secretary instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the Director of Naval Medicine and the Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the Director of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation would be retitled the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation);
- the Director of Space, Command and Control would report to the new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the Director of Naval Warfare and the Director of Naval Intelligence would report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the position of Director of Naval Program Planning would be retitled Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Program Planning);
- the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Submarine Warfare would be retitled Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations and report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Program Planning);
- the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) would be retitled to include the installations function;
- the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Shipbuilding) would be established;
- the Deputy Chief of Staff (Training) of the Marine Corps would be retitled Assistant Chief of Staff and would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower) instead of the Commandant; and
- the Deputy Chief of Staff (Aviation) of the Marine Corps would be retitled Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff and would

report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Requirements and Programs) instead of the Commandant.

c. Department of the Air Force

At the present time, the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Air Force have 12 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat who report directly to them. Within the Air Staff, the Chief, Vice Chief, and Assistant Vice Chief of Staff have 21 senior civilian and military officials reporting directly to them. Given the management problems associated with such wide spans of control, the integration of the two staffs should also focus on streamlining the organization.

CHART 6 - 13

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE




Chart 6-13 presents an illustrative proposal for integrating the Air Force Secretariat and military headquarters staff. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

- the position of Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) would be eliminated;
  - the position of Deputy Chief of Staff (Research, Development, and Acquisition) would be eliminated;
  - the position of Deputy Under Secretary (Space Systems) would be eliminated;
  - the position of Special Assistant (International Affairs) would be eliminated;
  - the position of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary would be eliminated;
  - the Comptroller of the Air Force would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Chief of Staff;
  - the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Secretary;
  - the title of the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Logistics) would be changed to Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) to reflect the loss of the logistics function and responsibility for the acquisition function;
  - the Chief Scientist, USAF Scientific Advisory Board, and Assistant Chief of Staff (Information Systems) would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Chief of Staff;
  - the Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Secretary;
  - the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Chief of Staff;
  - the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) and the Chief of the Office of Air Force History would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Operations) instead of the Chief of Staff;
  - the Surgeon General and Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Personnel) instead of the Chief of Staff; and
  - the title of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics and Engineering) would be changed to Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations, Logistics, and Engineering) to reflect sole responsibility for the installations function.
- Option 2B —selectively integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs

This option differs from Option 2A in that it would integrate the Secretariats and military staffs in only four functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics. Officials and offices in the Secretariats dealing with these four areas would be eliminated, and the Secretary and Chief would depend on the same offices, headed by a military officer, for staff assistance.

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* included this option as one of its recommendations for the Military Departments:

...As a start toward reducing staff layers and individual staff components, authorize the Service Secretaries to eliminate their Assistant Secretaries for the Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics functions, placing reliance for conduct of these functions on the respective Service Chiefs and on the OSD staffs in the two functional areas. (pages 74 and 75)

For the Department of the Navy, the organizational changes proposed in this option are identical to those proposed in Option 2A. However, for the Department of the Army and Air Force, the staff integration proposed in this option is considerably less extensive than in Option 2A. The specific changes resulting from this selective staff integration in the Departments of the Army and Air Force are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Department of the Army

Under this option, the Army Secretariat would continue to exist. The number of assistant secretaries, however, would be reduced from five to three. The positions and offices of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) would be eliminated. The Secretary and Chief of Staff would receive their staff support in these functional areas from the same offices, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel) and the retitled Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations and Logistics). While no offices in the Army Staff would be abolished or created under this option, it might be desirable to make a number of the streamlining changes proposed in Option 2A for the Army Staff as well as for the Secretariat.

b. Department of the Air Force

Under this option, the Air Force Secretariat would continue to exist. The number of assistant secretaries, however, would be reduced from three to two. The position and office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) would be eliminated. In addition, the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Logistics) would lose responsibility for the logistics function; accordingly, this position would be retitled Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition). The Secretary and Chief of Staff would receive their staff support in the manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics functions from the same offices, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Personnel) and the retitled Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations, Logistics, and Engineering). While no offices in the Air Staff would be abolished or created under this option, it might be desirable to make a number of the streamlining changes proposed in Option 2A for the Air Staff as well as for the Secretariat.

- Option 2C —reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs

Options 2A and 2B would have the impact of eliminating or reducing the size of the Service Secretariats. If it is determined that such actions are not desirable, it may be possible as an alternative to reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs. This

option proposes that additional reductions be made in the personnel strengths of each Service military headquarters staff. The focus would be on those personnel who are unnecessarily duplicating work performed in the Secretariats, elsewhere in the Military Departments, or in other DoD organizations. For example, Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes a reduction of about 200 military officers in each Military Department who are assigned either full—or part-time to work on joint issues. In this regard, if the Service Chiefs are removed from the institution that provides unified military advice, the need for the operations, plans, and policy staffs in the military headquarters staffs should be reevaluated.

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* included a recommendation to reduce the size of the military headquarters staffs:

...Encourage a continuation of the effort already underway to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area. (pages 78 and 79)

### 3. PROBLEM AREA #3 —INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

The problem of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions affects all three Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The options developed in Chapter 3 dealing with this problem area in OSD can also be applied to the Service Secretariats. Three options appear to be most appropriate:

- require that political appointees have strong defense management credentials;
- require a longer commitment of service from political appointees; and
- formulate monetary incentives or lessen the monetary disadvantages for political appointees.

As these options are described and evaluated in sufficient detail in Chapter 3, they will not be addressed here.

There is one area where political appointments in the Service Secretaries differ from those in OSD: their generally unfavorable perception. Many of the options proposed for problem area #1 relating to the confusion over the roles of the Service Secretaries would improve understanding of the importance of Secretariat positions, especially the Service Secretary. However, given the seriousness of this deficiency, a specific option is presented here.

A second option is presented that would give each Service Secretary increased authority in the selection of political appointees in his Secretariat. Such a proposal is designed to ensure that the Secretary would be able to insist upon high quality assistants who would be responsive to his leadership.

- Option 3A —correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments

Administrations will continue to have difficulty in recruiting talented and experienced civilian officials for appointments in the

Military Departments if the perception persists that these positions are not important. This option proposes a concerted effort to correct this negative perception. The best possible means of implementing this option is a change in the behavior patterns of the President, Secretary of Defense, and senior OSD officials. As long as these officials act as if Service appointments are not important, others will share this view.

- Option 3B —give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint their under and assistant secretaries

This option is designed to help insulate the selection of political appointees in the Military Departments from excessive political considerations. A Service Secretary could increase the weight given to the qualifications and defense management credentials of various candidates. In addition, the Service Secretary would have a greater capacity to ensure that his principal assistants would be supportive of him and not oriented to a separate agenda. Moreover, the Service Secretary would be more likely to have available the advice and expertise that he believes will be needed in the performance of his duties.

#### 4. PROBLEM AREA #4 —LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

As noted in Section D of this chapter, this study has not attempted to conduct a detailed analysis of the present roles and missions assigned to the four Services. However, there have been suggestions that those assignments should be completely reviewed, that effective mechanisms for changes to roles and missions assignments be developed, and that the statutory impediments to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change those assignments be repealed. Each of these suggestions has been developed into an option.

- Option 4A —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions

Given the reluctance of the Services to address roles and missions issues, this option would force a comprehensive review of these assignments. This report would, at a minimum, provide for the updating of the Key West Agreement.

- Option 4B —require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions

This option would seek to institutionalize a continuing review of Service roles and missions that would identify at an early stage needed changes in such assignments. This report may correct the current deficiency of relying solely on the budgetary process as a means of identifying roles and missions changes. In preparing this report, the JCS Chairman should consider the impact of changes in the threat, technology, weapon systems, strategy, and tactics on the assignment of Service roles and missions.

- Option 4C —authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions

This option would revise section 125 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense, following presidential approval, to alter the assignment of roles and missions to the four Services.

## F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the Military Departments that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

### 1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES

The fundamental issue in evaluating options to solve this problem area is whether the Service Secretaries can play a useful role in the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, continue to be needed. In other terms, the issue can be stated as whether the Service Secretaries are assets or liabilities to the Secretary of Defense in his efforts to manage DoD. Too frequently, the Secretary of Defense is likely to have viewed the Service Secretaries more as liabilities. The heavy emphasis that Service Secretaries have placed on their roles as advocates has added to the Secretary of Defense's problems. This has been especially true when Service Secretaries have used their independent political standing to vigorously pursue Service interests in external fora. Often the Secretary of Defense has been confronted with Service Secretaries who have sought to advance their personal agenda. Moreover, Service Secretaries have rarely brought substantial expertise to their positions. As a last point, the Secretaries of the Military Departments have been playing a diminished role in providing civilian control of the military.

Despite these shortcomings in past performance, there appears to be substantial potential in the positions of Service Secretary for meaningful contributions to DoD management. As Colonel Daleski has noted:

Compelling as this case against the Service Secretaries may be, it is not conclusive. Several factors suggest a more positive view of the Secretaries and their potential contribution to defense management. Despite frequent DoD reorganizations, which have indeed diminished the Service Secretary's legal authority, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary's ability to contribute meaningfully to defense management has thereby been irreparably impaired. (*Defense Management in the 1980's*, page 17)

The Service Secretary can play a useful role in five areas: (1) civilian control of the military; (2) essential link between detailed Serv-

ice programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily management of his Department; (4) political spokesman for the needs of his Department; and (5) salesman within his Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority.

a. civilian control of the military

Efforts to provide for civilian control of the military appear to be most effectively pursued on a decentralized basis. The Service Secretary is uniquely positioned to provide civilian control. Alternative arrangements require a greater degree of centralization which is likely to be less effective. Colonel Daleski supports this view:

...Service Secretaries continue to enhance civilian control because they and their staffs are uniquely situated to exercise civilian oversight on military departmental programs. As heads of departments, Secretaries alone can possess the requisite independence, authority, credentials and intimate knowledge of operating programs to assure that departmental activities are conducted in the public interest. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretary*, page 18)

John Kester agrees:

...the service secretary also is a unique engine of civilian control—a slippery term that is invariably saluted but seldom defined. If civilian control refers to civilian appointees making the ultimate program and budget decisions, and being the ultimate command authority, we unquestionably have that now—but it comes from the secretary of defense, and does not require the service secretaries. There is another aspect of civilian control, however, which the secretary of defense, busy and distant as he is, can never hope to provide: it is a qualitative check on the way each service runs itself, and an authority that the service knows will step in if corruption, blundering or excessive zeal start to veer the service off the reasonably wide road that the larger society tolerates. The civilian secretary can provide someone close enough to the service to have some idea what is going on and who in holding the service to external standards can do so with sensitivity to and sympathy for the traditions and values that give the service its identity. It is the service secretaries who help pick up the pieces when the system has gone off the track—cheating at service academies, misconduct in training, corruption in a PX system, mistreatment of recruits, My Lai. At the same time they may be able to hold off short-term press or congressional pressure while the service tries to heal itself. This sort of qualitative control and special monitoring can never adequately come from the Secretary of Defense's office, which is both too distant and too little involved in the unique values and personality of each service itself. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 156)

A report of the House Committee on Government Operations presents a similar view:

It is not sufficient to say that civilian interests are protected by the Secretary of Defense or the President himself. The interests of the country require civilian leadership, including ci-

vilian secretaries, at as many key points in the military organization as is possible. (*Access of Service Secretaries*, page 11)

b. essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals

As the "man in the middle", the Service Secretary has a special perspective that may be of great assistance to the Secretary of Defense in the resource allocation process. The Service Secretary can serve as the essential link between detailed Service programs, with which he is more familiar than the Secretary of Defense and his staff, and broader DoD policy and strategy goals. John Kester speaks about the essential link provided by the Service Secretary when he discusses the role of the Service Secretary in

...making sure that the service's activities fit into the Department of Defense as a whole and the national strategy. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 155)

and in being

...able to fit the positions he advocates into the larger defense programs and policies with which the secretary of defense is concerned. (page 159)

In his article, "The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Retired) comments on a role of the Service Secretary during Secretary McNamara's tenure:

...The service secretary emerged not as a special pleader for a service viewpoint, not self-identified with service programs, but with a special perspective in coordinating Defense policy which could not be fulfilled by an Assistant SecDef [Secretary of Defense]. He advises the Secretary of Defense and serves as an intelligent advocate of service interests at the Defense [OSD] level...

...the service secretary is able to preserve his own unique perspective, serving as an effective check on both the Defense [OSD] and military [Service] views. (*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 24)

c. daily departmental management

In addition to enhancing civilian control, the unique position of the Service Secretary enables him to effectively manage the daily activities of his Department. As Eugene M. Zuckert notes:

...the Service Secretary...fulfills a managerial responsibility at precisely that middle level which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense as now constituted. ("The Service Secretary: Has He A Useful Role?", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, page 458)

The Department of Defense is too large and complex to be managed solely from the top. The details of daily management of the major components are too great to be effectively handled by any central staff. Such management responsibilities must be decentralized. The Service Secretary is the logical official to fulfill this management need.

d. political spokesman

The Service Secretary also has an important role as political spokesman for his Department. The Secretary of a Military Department can insulate the military Service leaders from politics. As John Kester argues:

...tasks, that reek of politics, are not appropriately imposed on someone in uniform. The civilian secretary can spare his uniformed officers the indignity of having to mix in them. He protects his service from political pressures that without him it is not equipped to handle...("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 154)

The Service Secretary can represent the programs and policies of his Department with the Congress and the public. Given the economic and political dimensions of defending Service positions in these fora, the Secretary is a more appropriate spokesman than the Service Chief. In addition, by fulfilling this role, the Service Secretary removes an enormous burden from the Secretary of Defense.

As part of this role, the Service Secretary should absorb outside political heat—especially from the Congress—and barbs from the media and thereby deflect these burdens from the Secretary of Defense. The Service Secretary should also be prepared to handle the majority of congressional investigations, only involving the Secretary of Defense when absolutely necessary.

e. salesman within the Military Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority

As a member of the Service "family", the Service Secretary can be effective salesman of decisions by higher authority. As an insider in the Service system, the Secretary's influence in obtaining a favorable Service response—even to decisions that vary from strongly held Service positions—is likely to be greater than that of any other senior civilian official. If he skillfully performs this duty, the Service Secretary will provide valuable assistance to the Secretary of Defense. John Kester comments on this role:

...The secretary of defense is too far removed to press the services to overcome reluctance to adopt or implement necessary new policies; the service secretaries can insist that they follow through. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 154)

He also discusses another dimension of this role:

...The service secretary is also needed to soothe inevitable service program and budget disappointments; because the Defense budget each year is the resultant of political bargaining as well as of the external threat, the services never will receive as much as they think they should have. The service secretary should be a political buffer to help them swallow it. (page 160)

In combination, these five roles suggest a range of potentially important contributions by Service Secretaries. Moreover, it is difficult to envision alternative organizational arrangements that would have greater management potential. As Colonel Daleski notes:

...these contributions are available *only* through Service Secretaries. There are simply no alternatives to the Service secretarial role in enhancing civilian control and in making defense management more efficient and responsive. (*Defense Management in the 1980s*, page 17)

- Option 1A —have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense

This option has the advantage of eliminating one of the two layers—the Secretariat—in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments. It would also enable senior military officials to more directly and forcefully argue the Service point of view with the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants.

This option, however, has a number of critical drawbacks. Key among these is its adverse impact on civilian control of the military. Under this option, the Secretary of Defense would have sole responsibility for providing civilian control. The breadth of this task is too great to be effectively performed by one official.

The second drawback is the absence of a civilian input in the formulation of Service programs and policies. While military perspectives have an important role, the complexity of defense issues requires broad consideration of economic, political, and diplomatic factors. The absence of a Service Secretary and Secretariat diminish the prospects that this broader perspective would receive the attention that it deserves.

- Option 1B —create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

The principal advantage of this option is that it would likely provide senior civilian officials responsible for Service matters who are substantially attuned to the perspective, agenda, and needs of the Secretary of Defense. Such officials would appear to be more capable of striking a balance between the roles of Service advocate and principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This option also has the apparent advantage of eliminating one of the three layers—OSD, Service Secretariat, and Service military headquarters staff—in DoD management. However, it is not clear that this would be the result. While the Service Secretariat would essentially be transferred to OSD, giving the appearance of one management layer, OSD could in practice continue two separate layers of management activity.

This option has a number of serious deficiencies. Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force would not be as capable as Service Secretaries in performing the five key roles discussed earlier in this subsection: (1) civilian control; (2) essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily departmental management; (4) political spokesman; and (5) salesman within the Military Department of decisions by higher civilian authority. In each instance, Under Secretaries of Defense would suffer from their organizational remoteness from the Services. They would be viewed as outsiders, not as members of the Service family. This status would greatly hinder their effectiveness. As Captain Schratz notes:

The military chief enjoys a special relationship with the [Service] secretary which would hardly emerge were his immediate civilian superior on the Defense [OSD] staff. "The system" may make the DoD official too often a natural adversary...("The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 24)

Beyond these deficiencies, the transfer of Service Secretaries' responsibilities to Under Secretaries of Defense would be a downgrading of these positions. As a result, it would likely be more difficult to attract highly talented and experienced people to these positions.

- Option 1C —specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense

If the positions of Service Secretary are to be retained, this option appears to be highly desirable. One of the deficiencies that has been perceived in the performance of the Service Secretaries is their failure to recognize and to fulfill their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Specifying these responsibilities in statute may lessen this problem. In any case, no disadvantages of this option have been identified.

- Option 1D —remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries

At present, there is no clear basis in law for determining the proper roles of Service Secretaries. Moreover, there are conflicting authorities in existing law. The inability to determine what it is that a Service Secretary is to do results partially from the failure of the statutes describing the position to do so clearly. This is compounded further by a failure to update the existing statutes so that the duties and responsibilities of the Service Secretaries are internally consistent. There is no evidence to indicate that the scope of authority of the three Service Secretaries should differ, except as they relate to functions that exist in only one Military Department. This option does not imply the need for a laundry-list of duties. Rather, it recognizes the need for a clear statement of responsibility and for removing inconsistent responsibilities.

The present inconsistencies and unclear descriptions of the duties and authorities of the Service Secretaries, especially as they relate to the roles of other DoD officials, make the fixing of accountability difficult. Merely bringing the authorizing statutes into conformance with each other will not result in immediate changes in the way the position of Service Secretary is viewed. However, it should remove one impediment to a clear understanding of the roles of the Service Secretary.

No disadvantages of this option have been identified.

- Option 1E —repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress

The authority of the Service Secretaries to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, appears to be wholly inconsistent with the subordinate role of the Service Secretary. This essentially un-

limited authority appears to be unlike any other in the Federal Government. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has supported abolition of this authority on two separate occasions, and apparently nothing has changed since either of these attempts. This authority has rarely, if ever, been exercised, and it may not be serving the Congress well. Yet, at the same time, the mere existence of this authority, permitting subordinate officials to bypass the President and the Secretary of Defense, clouds the lines of authority and responsibility.

The time has long passed when the Congress and the public can continue to treat the three parts (the Military Departments) of the whole (the Department of Defense) as independent and non-contiguous institutions, or to permit the senior officials of those parts to operate as plenipotentiaries. It must be recognized that each action by a Military Department or a Service Secretary has some effect on the other Military Departments and the Department of Defense as a whole. It is rarely helpful and virtually never appropriate that subordinate officials be permitted to bypass superiors to go to higher authority when such actions will effect the entire organization for which the superior officer is charged with responsibility.

In short, it appears that this authority could be abolished without the Congress losing its ability to get needed information. Such a change should help clarify the relationships of Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 1F —give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries

The Congress has the authority under the Constitution to vest the Secretary of Defense with appointment power for the positions of Service Secretary. This change in appointment power would strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the President.

Historically, the process by which Service Secretaries are selected has given limited attention to (1) the qualifications of candidates; (2) the management needs of the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the value of forming a management team of Service Secretaries who are compatible with and loyal to the Secretary of Defense. Inattention to these factors has greatly diminished the assistance that Service Secretaries have provided to the Secretary of Defense in managing DoD.

This option clearly offers the potential for correcting shortcomings in the selection of Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense may be able to play a forceful role in the selection of his Service Secretaries.

On the other hand, despite the change in formal authority, there may be no alteration in the location of ultimate decision authority on Service Secretary appointments. Through its personnel office, the White House may continue to dominate the selection process. Given the subordinate position of the Secretary of Defense and his loyalty to the President, it is not likely that the Secretary of Defense could exercise substantial independence in the selection of key political appointees, such as Service Secretaries. Notwithstanding this possibility, this option may increase the influence that the Secretary of Defense could exert in this process.

Presidents are likely to oppose the loss of this appointment power. Their ability to make appointments to serve their interests—whatever they may be—would be constrained. Moreover, Presidents may lose the ability to establish a system of checks and balances within DoD that would prevent any one official—the Secretary of Defense most likely—from gaining too much power. The President would want to avoid a situation in which a Secretary of Defense develops a constituency that makes him unresponsive to presidential leadership.

The most persuasive argument against this option from the congressional perspective is that the requirement of Senate confirmation of Service Secretaries would be foregone if these appointments were vested in the Secretary of Defense. Article II of the Constitution provides for Senate confirmation only for officials appointed by the President and would not apply to non-presidential appointments. In his paper, “Senate Confirmation of Non-Presidential Appointments”, Richard C. Ehlke argues:

The explicit terms of Article II with respect to the appointing power and the separation of powers analysis of the Court in *Buckley v. Valeo* and *INS v. Chadha* would seem to preclude attaching the requirement of Senate confirmation to appointments vested in the heads of agencies. The Court in *Buckley* and *Chadha* strictly interpreted provisions in the Constitution that delineated the respective roles of the Congress and the Executive in important governmental processes—the appointment of officers and the making of law. Deviations from those explicit constitutionally—prescribed procedures have been struck down by the Court in unequivocal terms in both *Buckley* and *Chadha*. (page CRS-6)

Given the importance of the Service Secretary positions, it is highly unlikely that the Senate would view the loss of the confirmation requirement for these positions to be in the public interest. In addition, the prestige of these positions might be diminished if they were no longer presidential appointments.

- Option 1G—strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities

This option would have the objective of eliminating the common notion that Service Secretaries should simply be advocates of their Services’ policies and programs. It may help elevate Service Secretaries to a role of being principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of issues, including those that cross Service lines. This may encourage the perception of the Service Secretaries as DoD managers as well as the heads of the component Military Departments.

On the negative side, if the Service Secretaries were given an expanded role in policymaking and other DoD-wide activities and yet retained a strong orientation to the Service advocate role, they would prove to be obstacles in the search for more effective DoD policies and programs. If Service Secretaries cannot develop a balanced approach to Service and broader DoD interests, then it may be disadvantageous to expand their involvement.

- Option 1H —strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination

Chapter 3 dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense identifies mission integration as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense. In that context, mission integration means the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and to conduct effective unified operations in discharging the major U.S. military missions. Currently, the Military Departments have limited involvement in efforts to provide for effective mission integration.

It would seem useful and appropriate to assign to a senior civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Such assignments would improve the visibility and continuity of cooperative efforts.

This appears to be an assignment that could be effectively discharged by Service Under Secretaries. The Under Secretaries have the same perspective as the Service Secretary but have fewer burdens.

On the other hand, one could argue that a greater level of involvement by Service Under Secretaries would complicate the work of OSD officials who are the principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on mission integration efforts. While OSD officials would need to remain informed of cross-Service efforts initiated at the Military Department level, it would seem preferable to have as many of these issues as possible resolved at the Service level without continuously forcing OSD into a referee role.

- Option 1I —prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries

This option is clearly desirable. Circumvention of the Service Secretaries by the Service Chiefs undermines the Secretaries' authority and weakens many aspects of civilian management, especially effective civilian control of the military.

- Option 1J —remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

In the context of clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries, this option would be advantageous. As members of the JCS, Service Chiefs have the stature and independence to lessen control by the Service Secretaries.

## 2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

- Option 2A —fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy

The creation of a single top management headquarters staff in the Departments of the Army and Air Force should substantially reduce unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort. The dual levels of staff review would be eliminated and paperwork reduced. In addition, substantial manpower savings would be possible. In

terms of senior positions, the illustrative proposals suggest that six civilian positions and one military position could be eliminated in the Department of the Army; and four civilian positions and one military position, in the Department of the Air Force.

Beyond the benefits of staff integration, the streamlining of the top management headquarters proposed as part of the illustrative proposals of Option 2A should permit more effective management by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. The integrated Army staff would have only 14 major offices while the integrated Air Force staff would also have only 14 major offices. Presently, the top management headquarters of the Army and Air Force have 35 and 31 major offices respectively.

By far, the greatest advantage of this option is that it provides the Army and Air Force Secretaries the opportunity to exercise effective control over the military component of the headquarters staff. The Secretary and Chief will have equal access to all offices and officials—whether civilian or military. The entire headquarters staff, however, would work under the direction of the Secretary. Civilian control would be particularly enhanced in the financial management and research, development, and acquisition functions through their consolidation under a civilian assistant secretary.

One of the disadvantages of this option is that the authority and responsibilities of the Army and Air Force Secretaries and Chiefs could become confused with an integrated staff. When the Secretary and Chief have their own separate staffs (as they do now), it is easier to delineate the authority and responsibilities of these two officials. In an integrated staff, it must be made absolutely clear that the Service Secretary is the single superior official and the line of authority flows solely from him to every subordinate civilian and military position. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff will no longer preside over the military headquarters staffs as now authorized in title 10, United States Code.

JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, offers four separate, although not distinct, definitions of the term "chief of staff":

- the senior or principal member or head of a staff;
- the principal assistant in a staff capacity to a person in a command capacity;
- the head or controlling member of a staff, for purposes of the coordination of its work;
- a position, which in itself is without inherent power of command by reason of assignment, except that which is invested in such a position by delegation to exercise command in another's name. (page 64)

At present, the Army and Air Force Chiefs have assignments and perform duties that encompass the first, second, and fourth definitions. In the narrow context of the military headquarters staff, they serve as the head of staff (definition 1). In the broader context of the Army and Air Force Departments, they serve as the principal assistant in a staff capacity to the Service Secretary (definition 2) and exercise command delegated by the Secretary (definition 4).

In an integrated staff, the Army and Air Force Chief would no longer qualify as the head of the staff (definition 1); the Service Secretary would unquestionably occupy that role. The Service Chief would assume the responsibilities envisioned in definition 3: controlling member of a staff for purposes of the coordination of its work. In essence, the Army and Air Force Chiefs will become the Chief of Staff of the Service Secretary's staff. (In performing these responsibilities, whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs and Vice Chiefs will need the assistance of the Director of the Army Staff and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff respectively. It is possible that these two positions could be eliminated.) The Army and Air Force Chiefs would continue to fulfill the roles envisioned by definitions 2 and 4.

The partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy would have the same advantages and disadvantages as the full integration of the Army and Air Force staffs, but to a lesser extent.

- Option 2B —selectively integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs

The basic advantage of this option is that it eliminates the dual levels of staff review in four functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, logistics, and installations. Modest reductions in manpower and paperwork should result.

The disadvantage of this option is that it would continue to permit unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in all other functional areas.

- Option 2C —reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs

Given the absence of attention in this study to field command and activities of the four Services, it is not possible to evaluate a proposal to reduce the military headquarters staffs through greater dependence on subordinate organizations. While useful possibilities in this regard may exist, they cannot be identified within the scope of this study.

If proposals to fully or partially integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are not adopted, the only reductions in the military headquarters staffs that are possible within the scope of this study are the elimination or reduction of Service staffs that unnecessarily duplicate or interfere in the work of joint organizations, particularly the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### 3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

- Option 3A —correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments

This option is clearly desirable. There is little that can be done about this in legislation. The President, Secretary of Defense, and other Administration officials must begin to understand the importance of these positions, use these officials more appropriately, and

emphasize the need to have highly qualified and experienced appointees.

The Senate could help change perceptions by insisting on nominees with stronger defense management credentials. However, without a change in the behavior patterns of the President and Secretary of Defense, such congressional action is likely to have little impact.

- Option 3B —give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint their under and assistant secretaries

The arguments for and against this option are the same as for Option 1F which would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries.

In brief, vesting such appointment power in the Service Secretaries would enable them to (1) emphasize the defense management credentials of appointments; (2) select principal assistants who met their management needs; and (3) form a management team of principal assistants who are compatible with and loyal to them.

On the negative side, the loss of this appointment power would diminish the authority of and control by the President. In addition, the requirement for senatorial confirmation would no longer apply to these positions if the appointment power were vested in the Service Secretaries. While the loss of the confirmation requirement for Service under and assistant secretaries would be less critical than for Service Secretaries (as would result from Option 1F), it would have to be carefully weighed by the Congress.

#### 4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

- Option 4A —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions

Since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. military establishment has had considerable difficulty in resolving Service roles and missions disputes. The Key West Agreement laid some basic ground rules, but failed to address the more detailed guidelines for jurisdictional boundaries that are needed. Moreover, mechanisms for change or for addressing new jurisdictional issues arising from new strategies, tactics, or technology have not been available.

This option may or may not force serious study of these long neglected issues. If the officials responsible for preparing and reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the issues, the assignment of Service roles and missions might receive an objective review. If, however, these officials saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained. There is also the possibility that Administration officials would like to avoid the controversy associated with a rigorous review of roles and missions assignments.

- Option 4B —require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions

The absence of mechanisms, other than the budgetary process, for making changes in Service roles and missions is a serious deficiency in DoD management. The sole use of the budget for this purpose is too costly because of the unnecessary duplication that it permits and too inefficient because it is difficult to eliminate duplication that is entrenched in the budget.

This option would provide for a continuous, high-level, joint military review of roles and missions assignments which might permit earlier identification of unnecessary duplication and of more effective alignments of capabilities. In making recommendations for changes, the JCS Chairman would have to be careful that he does not propose the premature curtailment of useful competition.

The JCS Chairman is the most logical DoD official to submit this report. The multi-Service perspective of his position and his substantial military experience would enable him to better analyze these complex issues. Obviously, the JCS Chairman would be able to perform this responsibility more effectively if his independent authority were enhanced as proposed in several options in Chapter 4.

The Secretary of Defense may or may not seek to forcefully implement the recommendations that he receives from the JCS Chairman. Secretaries of Defense have traditionally been reluctant to enter the controversial arena of Service roles and missions. Armed with the JCS Chairman's report, he may be willing to engage the Services on these issues if his fear of congressional opposition were lessened. The Congress can play a useful role by encouraging the Secretary of Defense to act on roles and missions issues.

- Option 4C —authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions

The Executive Branch and the Congress share responsibility for assigning Service roles and missions. For whatever reason, this power-sharing arrangement has inhibited the necessary review and alterations to Service roles and missions. Based upon the actual language, the statutory description of Service functions leaves the Executive Branch with considerable freedom in assigning detailed roles and missions. Yet, the Executive Branch has not taken advantage of this freedom; there has been great reluctance to pursue roles and missions issues. For the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been prepared to live with the duplications and inefficiencies permitted by the Key West Agreement and subsequent clarifications.

The Executive Branch apparently believes that the Congress will become heavily involved in roles and missions disputes whether or not they impinge on functions prescribed in statute. Moreover, the Congress has historically been sympathetic to Service positions on roles and missions issues. For these apparent reasons, reconsideration of controversial roles and missions issues has been avoided by the Executive Branch.

This option seeks to remedy this unfavorable situation by ending the power-sharing arrangement between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Secretary of Defense would be given broad authority to alter Service roles and missions. The Congress would forego its right to review these changes.

Abdication by the Congress of its role in specifying Service functions is a drastic step that does not appear justified by the circumstances. What appears to be needed is an expression of congressional willingness to objectively consider changes to roles and missions assignments which the Secretary of Defense believes are necessary. Implementation of the preceding Options 4A and 4B would in themselves be strong indications of a more favorable congressional attitude.

## G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Military Departments. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The basic four-Service structure of the Department of Defense remains a viable concept.	
2. The positions of Service Secretary can make important contributions to the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, should be retained.	
3. There is substantial confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of Service Secretaries.	<p>3A. Specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>3B. Remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries.</p> <p>3C. Repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress.</p> <p>3D. Strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities.</p>

**Conclusions**

4. There are unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort within the top management headquarters of the Military Departments.
5. The Military Departments suffer from inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions in the Service Secretariats.

**Recommendations**

- 3E. Strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination.
- 3F. Prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries.
- 3G. Remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice.
- 4A. Fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy.
- 5A. Correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments.
- 5B. Require that Military Department political appointees have strong defense management credentials.
- 5C. Seek a longer commitment of service from Military Department political appointees.
- 5D. Alter Federal tax laws with respect to forced sale of assets by appointed Military Department officials to permit the gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.

**Conclusions**

6. The current assignment of Service roles and missions is of limited utility in eliminating unnecessary duplication and in maximizing force effectiveness; in addition, there are no effective mechanisms for changing roles and missions assignments.

**Recommendations**

- 6A. Require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions.
- 6B. Require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions.