

together, so interlocked, that the question might be raised;" - and this is an example, nothing more - "should we go on in a country like Holland, for instance, raising wheat?" We know very well that we can get our wheat much cheaper and better from Canada and the United States. We could also get it from France. We have a preference in Holland for hard wheat which we can better buy in your part of the world. Now, suppose we were to scrap our wheat-farming in Holland and tell our farmers to do something else; to go into the factories, or to raise another product. We would sign away a very vital part of our national interest, namely, how do we feed the people? We don't produce very much, but we have enough in case of an emergency to rely on for awhile.

The Dutch farmers kept the Dutch nation alive during the occupation when we were cut off from everything. The farmer, as well as he could, under the control of the occupying power did his best and he knew how to slip under the control, and did a lot to help us to survive. Now, shall we sign that away by saying, "Let's buy our wheat from America," and have the farmer get out and do something else? We can only do that if we are quite sure that in 20 years or 30 years time you will still be our friend and will still be willing to come over to Europe and help us. That is one of the arguments of General DeGaulle.

He says, "I'm not sure that in 20 years time the United States will still be willing to come to the rescue of Europe. Because I'm not sure I shall raise my own nuclear force; I shall raise my own armed strength; I shall try to write my own alliances in Europe and elsewhere, so that I can be able to face whatever risks will present themselves in 20 years