

the communists really would control in Iraq. But they haven't done it, and since then the tide has rather been running against them.

Now let me turn to American policy. Our policy in the area, as I said, dates from the immediate post-war period. It was the first time we attempted to develop any kind of general strategy and line of military and political thinking for dealing with that area. And it began with our assumption of a position in Greece, Turkey and Iran, which we looked at not merely as areas to be defended for themselves, but also as the crust, so to speak, which was on top of the softer parts of the Middle East in the Arab World.

We set about doing this with the cooperation of the British, trying to preserve, so far as we could, the strong-points and positions which were the historic British strong-points in that area. After all, Britain had come out of World War II with what looked like a very strong position in the Middle East. And it wasn't apparent until a couple of years later that it had as great weaknesses as it did.

What we tried to do, really, was to take over that system with the British as partners, but also to bring into it the new nations that had come into being in the area, particularly, in addition to Turkey and Iran, Egypt and such other Arab nations as we could get to come along. The difficulty was that at that particular period in history it was impossible to line up the Arab nations with the Western powers in any kind of common defense policy. So that, all our proposals of that time - the Middle East Command proposal which we put up in 1951; the so-called Middle East Defense Organization, which never really got off the ground;