

tion which destroyed the pro-Western government in Iraq. And the whole American effort of trying to build a strong group of pro-Western states in the Arab World really fell apart. And Iraq, the center-piece of the Baghdad Pact was, in fact, knocked out of the pact.

So that, when you look back over this period of American policy in the '50s in attempting with the British - or against the British; it seems to me whether we work with them or against them we came to a disastrous end either way - the record of the '50s is one which we tried methods of organizing the Middle East in a pro-Western alignment and did not succeed in doing so.

But, the year 1958 is an interesting one, not just because it was a low point in our position in the area, but also because it turned out to be a turning point. And there have been developments since then which put a much brighter face on the picture. There was a great apparent victory both for Nasser and Arab nationalism, and for the communists, in view of what happened, particularly in Iraq. Nevertheless, the very success of their revolution, or what they thought was their revolution in Iraq, brought them to the end of the period where they were both cooperating against the common enemy, namely the West.

And after 1958 when we were out of the picture in many of these countries, these forces came into contact and conflict with each other. There were increasing checks to Nasser's position and his brand of nationalism, largely because it turned out that the Iraqis didn't want to join with Egypt; they had other ideas of their own. And there were increasing checks to Soviet ambitions, on the other hand, because resistance