

arose in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, to the role which the Soviets were trying to play; they were trying to push into their second stage by seeking out for the pro-communist elements in the Middle East, a larger part in what was going on. And in that they ran up against Nasser who wanted to run a totalitarian state of his own type and not have other kinds of totalitarians given any role in it.

So that, we, then, quietly and without any fanfare, reversed our own policy toward Nasser, and this, I think, has been a major factor in explaining many of the things which have happened in the Middle East since 1959 and 1960. We did so not because we thought he'd become a democrat or for any reasons that we had to respect him or like his policies, but we did so on the basis that after all, here now, proved by the fact, was an important force in the Middle East. There was no question that Arab nationalism was on the march and that Nasser was the symbol and recognized leader of it, and that we had to take account both of him and his country, which was, after all, the strongest country - the most populous one - in the Arab World. We could not build a policy in the Middle East which didn't take account of the fact that Nasser and Egypt were an important factor.

At the same time, we didn't make him the pivot or the fulcrum of our policy; much more important was the fact that we still had Iraq, Turkey and Iran as allies. The Baghdad Pact had disappeared but we put it into new form, as you know, and called it CENTO, and it has gotten along much better with the Arab member of it outside, not inside, and bringing Arab problems to disturb what has been a reasonably good working