

radical and dynamic nationalism, like Egypt and Syria; and also to maintain a position still, in a more traditional and monarchical country such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, etc.

Now, let's look for a moment at our relationship with Nasser. Incidentally, this is of considerable benefit to him. It has been built partly on the extension of a great deal of American aid to him. This chart will give you an idea of how far that has gone. This, incidentally, shows both military and economic aid to the major countries of the Middle East. On the Egyptian side you see the degree to which it has gone up from practically nothing in 1959. Just in four or five years it has gone now to over \$800 million worth of aid. That has mostly been in surplus agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, from the Egyptian point of view it has been very important both to feed the population and to help their balance of payments, and their ability to keep their economy going.

Obviously, the largest quantities of aid have gone to our out-and-out allies in the Middle East. Turkey, for obvious reasons, heads the list. Pakistan and Iran are also very high. The military figure on Pakistan can be deduced from the figures which are given for the whole area, because it's the only one which is classified except for Saudi Arabia which is not very high. Nevertheless, it doesn't appear on this chart on the ground that it is classified. You see the extent of the economic aid which has gone to Pakistan.

Now, we had hoped that our aid would make Nasser more susceptible to our influence and encourage his concentration on domestic developments rather than foreign adventures. We are no longer trying to line up the