

Arab states against him; on the contrary, we've really let him get away with an adventure of his own in Yemen, which we'll talk a little about later. Now, it looks from what I've just said, that Nasser is getting all the benefit of this and we're not getting very much in return. I think what we have got is a regaining of prestige and influence and position in the Arab World, where we do have the possibility and capability of saying more to governments and having our words listened to than was the case in the 1950s when we were so much involved in the internal Arab quarrels which were going on and unable to make our influence felt in a very constructive way.

Now, some have even gone so far as to say that Nasser has become a chosen instrument of the United States in the Middle East. It seems to me there is really no ground for this, if only because Nasser himself does not follow such a policy, and certainly the United States Congress would not go along with any such policy. It might perhaps be called just the other way around in the Yemen affair; that we are, in a sense, his chosen instrument to help him get away with a particularly difficult situation which might not otherwise have been the case.

The position we've established rests on three main pillars which are related to the three main instruments of our policy. And I'd like to say this by way of summary on the American policy side of this; but the first is obviously the military side. And there Turkey remains the strongest point in our military position. Iran is also essential to it. CENTO, I think, is not important as a military barrier, but it does have some importance because it is a political commitment, and particularly