

do it, especially in those countries which are vital to the world position that we have, and to such primary interests as access to Middle Eastern oil. This, again, is a question of flexibility and timing, mainly, and not a question of principles and doctrine. I think we've more or less passed the stage where we feel that somehow we can effect the Middle Eastern situation by proclaiming doctrines and by building formal organizations; that we've had much greater success by what you might call pragmatic diplomacy, maximizing our influence as best we can.

The third pillar of our policy is economic, and this is perhaps the strongest potential means of influence in the area. We use it, obviously, to shore up our allies, provide them both military equipment and economic aid, which increases the chances of stability, and gives us bargaining power with those countries which are not our allies, such as Egypt. Economic aid thus has, really, a political motivation in our dealing with the neutralist countries in the area. Of course, some of the rationale for it is that we help them progress at a certain rate and to gain a certain amount of economic stability by the aid which we give them, but for the most part it has been a political motivation.

And, of course, this has also been the same motivation on the part of the Soviets. I'd like to show you a chart which contrasts Soviet and American economic aid; the military is not in this picture because they can't really get the figures on Soviet military aid. Soviet military aid has gone mostly to four countries - Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen - and those are the same four countries where most of the Soviet economic aid has gone.