

aid which they are providing to Middle Eastern countries. Because, none of these countries has been softened up in a way in which they've been able to get a real foothold there.

On the other hand, like ourselves, they find it hard to break off; once they've established the relationship of foreign aid to these countries it's very hard without taking a political loss just to admit that it isn't worth it and give it up.

Finally, let's take a look at the political forces within the area itself. Because, these are the things which limit what we can do and what the Soviets can do in the Middle East. As I said, in the present conditions which we have there it is not so much the power positions and the potential military situation, but the political struggle and duel which is determining how we are making our influence felt and how we are holding our own in the area. And more and more power of decision has gone into the hands of the local governments themselves. It's ironic perhaps at a time where the gap between the big powers which have the most modern arms and the small powers, the gap in their power has been increasing greatly. At the same time, the ability of the big powers to use that power in a political sense in the area has been decreasing.

So that, what Middle Eastern governments and Middle Eastern people think and say is a very much more important part of the picture than it used to be in the past. Whereas the British before the first war and between the wars, for example, were dealing principally with the sheiks and the kings and could build a Middle Eastern system on that and their ability to handle by force, bribery, influence, military power; whatever