

ways, directed toward a few people at the top of society, they could run a system in the Middle East. And where, later they could do it with a rising bourgeois elements of the new middle class, the so-called "Liberal Nationalists," who generally were pro-Western in their orientation, this still was a manageable situation. But now, where there is no stable factor, where we're dealing mainly with unpredictable movements, demagogues, changing governments, interventions, coups de etats and all the rest, it's hard to have anything grab hold of from outside, and we're very much dependent in our position there, on how these governments change and on who is running them; this political self-assertion taking the form of a nationalism which has been directed mostly against the West. And in the case of the Arabs, of course, the fact of Israel and the history of the way in which Israel came into being, and the support which we have given it since it came into being, has been another burden on our relations with the Arabs and has added to the fact of unpredictability, the fact of almost congenital anti-Westernism on the part of the new and loud nationalist forces which are making themselves felt in the area.

Now, the old situation having broken down and no real basis having been established, no firm basis for a new kind of society; after all, the Middle East was under a more or less static society for centuries, and this broke down only very recently - and as I said, there are no strong institutions which have taken its place - and in this great variety of situations we have to attempt to find some kind of a policy which preserves our position in the area as a whole and not just an individual part of it.