

DR. CAMPBELL: Well, it seems to me what we have here is another phase of the conflict between the forces which Nasser likes to consider himself the head, namely the forward-looking nationalist-socialistic Arab forces - progressive forces of the future - and the reactionary forces represented by Saudi Arabia, the old regime rulers in the Gulf area and the Kingdom of Jordan, etc. And having suffered a defeat in Syria in 1961, Nasser was just ready to find hope for any kind of an opportunity to recreate the image of the nationalist who was going forward to lead in the direction of Arab unity, and that he was the instrument of history in that regard.

And the Yemen thing seemed to be set up for him in that respect. Now, the degree to which he shared in planning and plotting that revolution, I don't know. But it doesn't make much difference at any rate; he was in there right at the beginning, to take advantage of it. The difficulty, it seemed to me, objectively, was that Nasser was attempting to implant a 20th Century revolution in the most backward country in the world. It's said by some, to be rushing headlong into the 12th Century. And he just created an impossible situation where a nice, shiny, brand new, officer-controlled republic was set up with no real basis in the country.

It couldn't govern and it couldn't maintain itself except with the support of a great number of Egyptian Armed Forces. So, those Egyptian troops - some 30,000 or even more as some estimate - are there in Yemen. And when some come home others go out there; it's a good training exercise, maybe, for some of them. But actually it takes about 1/3 of Nasser's