

is that the proposed solution which we helped to devise a couple of months after the revolution broke out, which was that Nasser should get his troops out and he should recognize the new Republic of Yemen regime, and the Saudi Arabians should cease sending support to the other side - the Royalists, you might call them, and to the tribes - and this whole thing hasn't worked, for a number of reasons. Nasser has not gotten out; the civil war has not stopped; the Saudis did stop sending supplies for awhile, but I think one can assume that some things are still going in as the war goes on. And there's no way, apparently, for anybody to find a way out of it.

So that, in a way, we seem to be stuck with a policy of having recognized a government which now is wholly dependent upon foreign support. Apparently it wouldn't last a day if the Egyptians just all went home all of a sudden. So that, it is an unsolved and perhaps insoluble problem except by the processes of time.

I don't want to take too much time on just this one question but I would like to touch on one point of Soviet penetration. Because, this is of much more concern to us than any other part of the picture. The Soviet worried Yemen before the revolution, and they're in there a bit more strongly now. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that at one time they had over a thousand technicians there and that they have built an airfield in the country, I don't know to what degree the United States Government is concerned - I'm not very much concerned - about the possibility that they could somehow take over Yemen.

It seems to me that first there are basic conflicts between their