

position and the Egyptian position; that Nasser is certainly not trying to act as a stalking horse for Khrushchev in helping to take over Yemen for the Russians. And I don't think the Russians, on the other hand, are particularly anxious to contribute to Nasser's position there. I think the same basic disagreement between them exists there as it exists in Egypt regarding Egypt's own destiny itself; in spite of the fact that the Russians helped the Egyptians in arms, transport and various other ways to maintain the campaign there in Yemen, I do think there is a basic incompatibility there. And I do think also that Yemen is far enough away from the Soviet Union that it isn't the kind of thing that they could easily bring under their permanent control.

One more factor; I don't think anybody can control Yemen for any length of time. This is an impossible country, really, to establish any kind of position for anybody. I haven't been there, and this is mostly second-hand, but my guess would be that the way this is going to come out is that anybody from the outside, whether it's another Arab country or whether it's an outside power, is not going to get out of the attempt to establish a position there what it thought it was going to get, and that the Yemenis somehow are going to be the ones who have the last word.

QUESTION: Doctor, you mentioned that one of our major national interests in the Middle East was to maintain the flow of oil from there to Europe. Would you enumerate some of the other U.S. national interests in the Middle Eastern region and then give us your feeling as to how these interests should effect our policy toward Israel on the one hand and Arab nationalism on the other?