

DR. CAMPBELL: Well, one can make a list of our interests in the Middle East. This has been done; I'm sure it's done in some NSC papers; it has been done by people who write on the outside. These are usually the denial of the area to the Russians; the maintenance of communications and transit facilities in the area; the establishment of regimes which are not unfriendly to us; the maintenance of a maximum degree of stability in the area; the avoidance of local conflicts which could grow into unmanageable situations; the settlement, or attempts to settle, some of the outstanding disputes which keep us at odds with our allies and with certain of the countries in the area, such as the Arab-Israel dispute. That's about as far as it would go, I think.

It's not often the best guide to the selection and decision on policies merely to have a catalog or list of national interests. In other words, there is an important interest of ours in keeping in mind a general strategy and general attitude toward the area, which will keep it in the kind of conditions which will damage us the least, so to speak, and to have a minimum of conflict within the area, which can be turned to advantage by the Russians; to avoid the kind of situation where a country in the Middle East, as Egypt did in the 1950s, is able to call in the Soviet Union, more or less, and establish it in a position which it hasn't had before.

This is an interest which has to be pursued, as I mentioned before, in a kind of pragmatic way and as you go along. And you can't often find a ready-made policy in order to do it.

Now, the way in which the Arab-Israel conflict affects this, it