

states in that area.

The basic Soviet motive, I think, is power, but nevertheless ideology is a factor in the picture. There is a great deal of ideology mixed up not only into their public pronouncements on this subject, but also in their own thinking and in their own discussions among themselves. There have been endless debates within the Soviet Communist Party and the International Communist Movement since the 1920s, about how to go about subverting the Middle East and bringing it into the world of socialism; what bourgeois elements they should cooperate with, and how far; and which ones they should refrain from cooperating with. But, in practice, it seems to me, it's pretty clear they'll cooperate with anybody who is against the West.

Khrushchev has certainly been much more flexible than Stalin was in carrying out this kind of tactic. Stalin during his closing years, felt - or at least it was apparent from his policies - that he wasn't sure of anybody he was cooperating with unless there was somebody right there under his thumb; somebody whom he could physically control. So that, areas like the Arab countries which were beyond the border of the Soviet Union and not peripheral to it, he never really attempted to do anything very formidable in taking over those countries because they weren't within reach of the Soviet Army on the ground. Whereas, Khrushchev has been much more flexible and has been much more successful and more adventurous, and has perhaps had a much more intelligent policy in going much further afield than Stalin did.

The currently-proclaimed strategy of the Russians - and this ap-