

Right here.

Q: Luke Baker from Reuters. So you've overseen once of the most volatile regions of the country for a good long while. What sort of mistakes do you think you actually made in the last several months, and how have you learned from them? And what advice would you give to the commander who's taking over, considering he's also criticized some of the techniques you've used to police your area?

Swannack: Okay. First question. I would probably go ahead and start buying the body armor, the radios and the vehicles myself using CERP money. If I go ahead and take you from day one when we got here in September, I kept on expecting at that time for this equipment to equip the ICDC and the police to arrive in November. November came around, and I was told this equipment would arrive in January. Now it's postponed till the end of March. And so I've started as of January 1st procuring, within the resources I have, the radios, the body armor and some of the vehicles to provide this equipment to the security forces. I would have started that earlier. I wouldn't have bet on it coming, because it never came on my watch.

Your second question was about the techniques the Marine Corps will use and vis-a-vis what we do. Okay. First of all, the techniques that we have employed, as I've spoken here today, you've seen have been very, very successful. Different techniques will accomplish this mission. The Marines are very capable. I won't comment on the techniques that they'll use. I just will hope and pray, as I said before, that they're as successful in the next seven months as we have been in the past seven months.

Yes? Follow-up?

Q: Yeah. To be clear, then, what you're saying is the key mistake, perhaps, is more just in giving equipment to local Iraqi forces; your soldiers haven't made any mistakes.

Swannack: I will tell you that in terms of our soldiers, we are a human organization, we're not a perfect organization, and sure, we have made some mistakes. Every mistake we've had, we've gone ahead and investigated and followed through on. And with that, if it's been our fault we've compensated individuals for the mistakes we've made. We've been very ruthless in undertaking that.

Okay, next question. You had a question right here. And then I'll take the next question from Washington.

Q: General Swannack, Rajiv Chandrasekaran from The Washington Post. I want to go back to the insurgency and the terrorists, and maybe you could just define those terms, and the whole world of people who are fighting against coalition forces and Iraqi security forces. You mean the insurgents of the FREs and the terrorists as foreigners; and where do sort of indigenous Islamic extremists fit into this? And if you could just perhaps give us a bit of a picture of the whole sort of world of the people who are fighting against the coalition and the Iraqi security forces. To what degree is that group dominated by FREs and to what degree have indigenous extremists taken the lead role, and to what degree are you seeing foreign fighters, foreign extremists coming in, plugging into those networks and/or leading some of that activity in terms of the fighting?

And if I might, just on a separate subject, ask you in following up from my colleague in Reuters. The delay in getting this equipment for the ICDC and the Iraqi police, is that a U.S. military supply issue or were you expecting that to come from the CPA? Thank you.

Swannack: Okay. First of all, your question about the insurgency and the terrorist fight is a very good one in trying to put that in the right context. When we first got here, I felt very, very strongly about fighting the insurgency, and there was a very sophisticated insurgency here. Since that time, we've systematically taken away the leadership, the funding and the facilitation of that insurgency.

Now, as we -- seven months later from when we got here, I think primarily there are individuals out there who