

- In mid-November 2006, Gen. Abizaid informed Gen. Casey that, "the White House was thinking about a surge of more U.S. brigades to Iraq." Casey began to consider how he would use the additional troops. (pg. 231-32)
- During a November 18, 2006 review group meeting, Defense Department representatives presented a "strategy paper" representing the views of Sec. Rumsfeld, Gen. Abizaid, and Gen. Casey. (pg. 235)
- On November 20, 2006, Gen. Pace informed the Council of Colonels that "General Casey has been asked by the SecDef and White House for his views on a surge." (pg. 240)
- On November 22, 2006, Gen. Casey discussed "a possible surge" with the Joint Chiefs and the Council of Colonels. (pg. 241)
- On November 26, 2006, Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch presented the results of the review team's deliberations to the President. (pg. 244-45)
 - Sec. Rumsfeld and Sec. Gates attended, and Gen. Pace presented the military's opposition to the surge. (pg. 247)
 - The President concluded the meeting by saying "he would take input from everyone over the next three weeks and that he anticipated announcing a new direction by mid-December." (pg. 247)
- On November 27, 2006 Gen. Pace met with the chiefs and the Council of Colonels in the tank to brief them on his meeting at the White House. "'I walked out happy because I got my views on the table,' he said." (pg. 248)
- On December 7, 2006 in a meeting with Hadley discussing a possible surge of forces, "Pace said ... 'It can succeed.'" (pg. 265)
- At a December 8, 2006 NSC meeting including the President, Gen. Pace, Gen. Casey, and Sec. Rice, Gen. Pace rejected the idea of "intervening only in major actions. They couldn't sit and watch from the outside as sectarian violence raged." (pg. 267)
- On December 13, 2006, the President led a meeting with the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon to get their views on the potential surge. (pg. 289)
 - At the end of the meeting, Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker "and the other chiefs left unsatisfied, but at least they had their say." (pg. 289)
 - "'The chiefs and I had reservations,' Pace later reported to Hadley. 'They have been addressed in the new strategy, and I am now comfortable with the new strategy.'" (pg. 289)

Accordingly, the evidence presented in the body of Woodward's new book does not support his own personal view that the military was left on the outside of the Iraq strategy review. To the contrary, and as demonstrated above, Woodward's record supports the opposite conclusion: the military had input at essentially every stage of the strategy review process.

President Bush Remained Engaged With Daily Events Of The Iraq War And Accurately Conveyed The Situation To The American People

Woodward's personal conclusions that the President "maintained an odd detachment from