

Each service with its individuality, traditions, and unique combat experience believes sincerely that its concept of a new aircraft or missile will be best for the Nation and mission and is strongly against compromise. There are also marked differences in service doctrine, operation, logistics, and procedures which tend to diversify system designs. Many of these interservice differences may be hard to fault individually. The trouble is that there is no "military court of appeals" to rule on conflicting doctrinal and requirements claims, or for that matter, to recommend diversity if that is the more prudent military course.

When joint acquisitions are ordered, the number one problem is getting agreement on joint requirements, especially difficult when doctrinal differences are high. Agreement is still more elusive when one of the systems is well into development with a "hardened" design, contracts in place, and a constituency formed. The second service can exert very little leverage for its more immature concept. Eventually, a service is likely to withdraw from such a venture.

We believe that joint programs can work out if (1) essential service doctrines will not be unduly compromised, (2) the programs are not too far down the development road at merger time, (3) military effectiveness will not be unduly lessened,