

Chairman ROTH. At this time I would like to call forward George Kuhn.

Mr. Kuhn, I want to welcome you here.

I have had the opportunity to read the report you prepared for the Heritage Foundation. I understand you do not represent them today but are here on your own behalf.

As I said earlier, one of the things that I would hope that the Pentagon understands is that there is a broad consensus that some basic reforms need to be adopted to become more effective. This includes not only doves but people who perhaps think that there should be more spending rather than less.

In that latter category, I certainly list your work.

I would ask you to proceed with your statement.

**TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. S. KUHN, INDEPENDENT  
CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Mr. KUHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure I am here today primarily because I am a hawk who is critical. The report that I wrote has been likened by one of the major weeklies in the country to something like "the dead rat in the punch bowl." It disturbed a lot of people.

I think that hawks, people who are prodefense, if you want to use such terms, need to be critical and honest about the problems that the Defense Department faces and the Congress and the rest of us face in fielding effective combat forces.

My own view is that we face severe difficulties which, if they remain substantially unaddressed, will undermine our efforts to build up our military power.

If you go through just the three areas that I address in my chapter—which were force structure, readiness, and the balance of fighting capabilities in the field—you find little realistic promise of the kinds of decisive improvements officially forecast for our fighting forces.

There are slight increases in numbers of weapons and fighting units in certain categories. There are actually decreases in other categories of either weapons or fighting units.

If you look at readiness over the long term, while the projections in the Defense Department are going up—the expression is "the ramps are up"—if you look at how much they are spending on readiness versus how much they are spending on modernization programs, the prospect is that readiness will, in fact, go down. DOD is laying in more readiness burdens, through its procurement program than it is planning to support.

This is a very serious problem. Finally, I think there is a difficulty in the kinds of weaponry, the kinds of units and troops, et cetera—the kinds of combat capabilities—that we are actually putting into the field.

In the chapter, I try to outline some of those problems.

I base my analysis on the view that combat is comprised of both complex and simple field tasks. What is it that you can do in the field against the enemy that is relatively simple technologically to do, but very effective? And what other sorts of things can you do to