

an enemy which are effective but also relatively difficult technologically?

Chairman ROTH. In other words, you do believe there is substance to the charge we buy goldplated, too complex weapons for a mission.

Mr. KUHN. There is no question about that; absolutely.

There are two parts to it: First, there is an imbalance of equipment to perform simple and complex tasks; second, this imbalance leads to unnecessarily high readiness problems. We try to build forces which rely from stem to stern on performing the more complex combat tasks in the field. We end up being unable to field enough forces of the right kind to succeed at the technologically simpler tasks.

The complex tasks require technologically very complex systems. I am talking, for example, about shooting down a maneuvering enemy aircraft at exceedingly long range—50 or 100 or more miles is what we are trying to do today. Or killing an enemy tank by friendly tank fire at ranges in excess of 3.5 kilometers.

Well, if you can do these things on those occasions when such opportunities are presented to you, that is fine, and you usually cannot do these tasks with relatively simple systems.

The problem is that you are not presented those opportunities often in combat. The kinds of opportunities that you are normally presented are the close-in kills of enemy aircraft or tanks. These tasks certainly require great skill and courage to perform, but they are relatively simple technologically speaking.

What we need, for example, is a lot more planes up there excellent at dogfighting. That requires increased numbers of fighters with superior aerodynamics, range, loiter time, combat speed between mach 1 and 2, and cannons and short range heat-seeking missiles. Advanced materials and methods permit us to field vastly improved fighters in more adequate numbers, so long as we don't try to make dogfight aircraft into long range interceptors, which require more complex and costly applications of the same advance technology. And we ought to weigh the mix of simple and complex aircraft toward the simple end.

We are not doing that. We sometimes keep a relatively steady balance between the complex equipment and the simpler equipment, but we normally weigh the mix toward the complex end. In my view, the forces need a far greater emphasis on accomplishing the more numerous and frequent simpler tasks. We could thereby build up the forces in terms of both relevant capabilities and numbers, and devote more adequate effort to the readiness of all the forces complex as well as simple.

Well, that is all laid out in the chapter, or I try to lay it out there. I think, just for the sake of brevity, I would like to make a few remarks about points raised here this morning, rather than deliver my prepared statement.

Chairman ROTH. Yes. Your statement will be included as if read.

Mr. KUHN. First of all, in my own look at the December 1982 SAR, which I got a couple of days ago, the statement that they are saving \$18 billion is, in fact, wrong if they attribute all of that \$18 billion to their own management improvement program.