

Right now, we do not have that information. In fact, the Defense Department apparently intends to dismiss that kind of analysis by saying, "Well, that fellow is just looking at history, he is not looking at us." Of course, my response would be, "Well, those fellows are simply being overly optimistic again, and are not learning their lessons."

The second specific point I would make is that the Congress needs to have a sense of overall context when it makes decisions every year on the various weapons programs. That sense of context, it seems to me, can only be gained when the Congress knows what the DOD's past plans were for those programs versus what its current plans are. There is only one source for that information, and that is the group of quantity and cost projections made in prior years for a series of outyears. The 5-year defense program, or FYDP, includes 5-year projections of what DOD intends to buy in each of the 5 years and how much they think it is going to cost in each of those 5 years.

The only way to gain an overall context is to see whether DOD is achieving its plans. One must compare DOD's annual requests for quantity and cost per program to what it projected for each program in prior years.

Well, Congress does not now know that context. Each year, Congress is simply told by the Pentagon, "this year and next year, we intend to buy the following for so-and-so cost." Until the Congress is able to compare that current plan to previous plans covering the same years, it seems Congress will not be able to make adequate judgments as to the quality of defense programing and decision-making.

So my specific recommendation is that the Congress mandate that it be given not the 5-year defense program, which is a classified document, but the quantity and cost projections extracted out of that document, which are, in most programs, unclassified; and that they be given that information on a yearly basis. I bet you will find, even though you had this testimony this morning to a contrary, that 2 and 3 and 4 years from now, the costs will be considerably higher than DOD now projects; and second, that the quantities in DOD's actual annual requests will be considerable lower in many cases than they now project to buy.

I can illustrate my point by showing figures, which I have included in my statement, for the Navy shipbuilding program. It has already happened. Secretary Lehmen is an extremely impressive presenter of information. He claims to have already licked the problem of the 600-ship Navy.

Yet if you look at his 1984 to 1988 projection of ship buying for new construction, it is reduced by 21 major vessels from what he projected just 1 year ago that he would buy in the overlapping period of years from fiscal year 1984 through fiscal year 1987.

The Navy's plans are being eaten up by the double-edged sword of over-optimism: about future costs and about the size of future budgets. This is the nub of what has undermined our defense plans for decades. Little, if anything, has changed with the new administration.

The other end of the program cost control, I think, is to control costs—not just better estimate costs at the front end—but to con-