

Two points are quite clear: quantities actually requested during the year when it was time to pay the bills were almost always considerably below what had been planned previously for that year; and costs were almost always considerably higher than had been foreseen. The more correct description is to reverse that order. Costs typically increased beyond expectations -- and beyond budget allowances, whether high or low -- with the result that fewer items could be afforded than were planned.

I believe that, contrary to claims otherwise, this mismatch persists today. I offer the following table I put together last fall showing the results of just such a mismatch on the early Reagan programs.

Reagan Increase (Decrease) Over Carter

Program	Actual	Quantity Procured Compared	
	Quantity	to Carter's FY80 FYDP	
	Procured	FY81-FY82	FY81-FY83
	FY81-FY82	FY81-FY82	FY81-FY83
	Total	Total	Total
M-1 tank	305	(348)	(526)
Patriot missile	46	(276)	(543)
Fighting vehicles	236	0	0
5-ton truck	2947	3970	7306
Copperhead shell	(854)	(9325)	(11,096)*
Trident submarine	(1)	(1)	(1)
SSN-688 submarine	1	2	3
CG-47 cruiser	1	1	1
F-18 fighter/attack	12	(21)	(45)
F-15 fighter	6	(12)	27
F-16 fighter	24	(60)	(130)
Air-launched cruise missile	0	(40)	(80)

*Amount assumes Reagan FY83 request though the program was canceled by Congress in FY83.

Sources: FYDP and FY81-82 figures from "Defense Budget Increases: How Well Are They Planned and Spent?" (GAO, April 1982); FY83 figures from the conference report on the FY83 defense authorization bill.

The problem of cost lies at the heart of our seeming inability to enlarge and improve our forces. The cost problem exists on two planes. There is what might be called the static fact that the per-unit cost of